
This book is a subtle and lucid account of how the dominant structures in Cyprus under late Ottoman rule were transformed. A corporate estate system in which religion, patronage and feudal tenancy gave the lower orders minimal comfort and security was to be partially reformed by British colonial administration. Cypriot Christians were to develop a new identity: Greek nationalism as a protest against the authoritarianism of alien administration was to become the obsession of many Greeks. The change largely took place in twenty crucial years, from 1880-1900.

Late Ottoman rule in Cyprus allowed the Orthodox Church to collect church taxes with the help of the state’s constables. In some popular songs, the bishops were likened to wolves. The Iltizam tax-collection system allowed the Ottoman authorities to down-load the trouble of raising revenue by farming the job out to wealthy Greeks, who used coercion and imprisonment freely. Dr. Katsiaounis, an admirer of historians E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, is concerned to understand where the Cypriot poor were coming from when the British arrived. They were coming from a late-feudal world of deep subordination, deference, hierarchy and patronage. They were told by the
powerful to see the order of things as divinely ordained. If they sometimes saw wolves instead of God’s agents, that was because subordination had not completely robbed them of their critical reason, which taught them that such forms of resistance as songs and carnival burlesques, and cutting down the trees of local bullies were safer than open defiance and insubordination. When the poorer Christians and Muslims openly rebelled against the Ottoman political order they were brutally repressed.

But Katsiaounis, as a Cypriot, wants to understand what sort of identities animated particular categories and classes of Greek Cypriots at specific times. In the nineteenth century the evidence suggests that most of them saw themselves as Orthodox Christians, but not yet Hellenes in the nationalist sense of the term. Here, the work of Richard Clogg has made these issues much clearer. By the end of the eighteenth century, in the towns of Larnaca and Limassol, there were bourgeois Christians oriented to Europe, to freemasonry, and the Philiki Etaireia. The Church leaders did not share these enthusiasms. But in 1821, in spite of Archbishop Kypranos’ denunciation of the revolt in mainland Greece, he and 400 other Christian notables were executed. Their successors were to show no overt support for Hellenism for the remainder of Ottoman rule. The Church wanted to continue to live at peace with the State. It offered spiritual comfort to the Greek masses but no political creed beyond accommodation. The modern image of Orthodox clergy as the firebrands of Greek nationalism is no guide to the nineteenth century. The first leaders of Greek nationalism in Cyprus were not churchmen, but modernists, who had been educated to high standards of literacy, and for whom the status quo was not good enough.

Who made the clerics and the masses into militant Greeks? In some ways, the British. They did a number of things which transformed late Ottoman society: First, they put the two religious communities on an equal footing before the law. This meant that poor Turks were demoted and the Greek masses, promoted. Then, they refused to allow the Church to rely on the state in supporting its privileges: No longer could the bishop expect constables to help him get his taxes paid, and Church land was no longer tax-exempt. They also destroyed tax-farming, cut out the middle men, and required that everyone pay up promptly. This may well have increased the burden of direct taxation on the poor. Not least, they turned tenants into land-owners, but also allowed land to be alienable for debt. The peasantry exchanged the security of Ottoman tenancy for the insecurity of liberal free-market land ownership, and many, encumbered with debts, whether for taxes or their own survival, were soon rendered landless. A labouring poor was thus available for light industry,
for begging, for petty criminality, and for political mobilization.

These political and economic changes were accompanied by a programme of tax-rationalization, road building and public health. The population of Cyprus increased by 25% in 20 years and trade flourished. Some became paupers, but more prospered. Literacy increased, and the teaching of Greek history, with textbooks imported from Greece, created the attachment to Greek heroes, the imagined history and the far-reaching Hellenic identity was intensified (Loizos, 1974).

Dr. Katsiaounis is a learned and persuasive historian, and his account will help us correct several misapprehensions, of which the nationalist leadership of the clergy is the most serious. I am personally grateful to him for pointing out that the received view of the British arrival in 1878 conceals some ambiguities. Several authorities have suggested that the British were greeted by firm statements of a pro-Enosis nature. This is, at best, a possibility. It is not a fact.

I have some differences with the book, however. Katsiaounis’ treatment of banditry as “social” sticks to Hobsbawm’s “primitive rebels” thesis too faithfully, perhaps. There were bandits out and about in the first twenty years of British rule, and they had popular followings. Thus, he decides that banditry “may be seen as a surrogate for a social movement”. Perhaps “surrogate” is less unilinear than “precursor” or “forerunner” but it fails to explain whether, given that there were also bandits in the preceding 100 years when Ottoman society is becalmed in feudal domination, were these earlier bandits also surrogates? Were they political, too? If we allow that any tax-rebellion is political, then the social bandits who flourished in the early days of British rule are simply a carry-over and not a new development of significance. We can see forms of banditry and mafia-like practices in the former soviet union today, just when political parties are open to all. Banditry and ideological politics can co-exist perfectly comfortably.

His account of the Legislative Assembly is disappointingly conventional. It comes close to suggesting that the British designed the Assembly to divide Greeks and Turks, and that they somehow foresaw that the Turkish Cypriots would normally vote against the Greek Cypriots. Is there evidence for such Machiavellian planning? The thing that the British failed to foresee was that the Greeks would use the “toy parliament” to protest against the Tribute, and to argue for Enosis, opposing Government legislation to show their frustrations. The British had intended the Assembly to work at administrative development. Had they foreseen how it would be used, they would surely have never invented it.
Dr. Katsiaounis has mined his historical sources assiduously and to great effect. He has largely cold-shouldered sociological and anthropological studies, which are not without insights into the matters which concern him. He might have made use of Diamond Jenness’ brilliant overview of Cypriot economic history and of Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*. But my criticisms are unimportant in view of the fine achievements of this excellent book. No-one who wishes to understand Cyprus today can afford to overlook it.

London School of Economics  

Peter Loizos


As the author’s annotated bibliography at the end of the book indicates, the Greek military has so far inspired a considerable volume of work: memoirs and biographies, official historiography, journalistic accounts, scholarly monographs, as well as a growing body of unpublished dissertations. On the scholarly level, the subject has been tackled from various perspectives: socio-logical, institutional-legal, and *stricto sensu* political-historical. Equally varied is the chronological approach, with the years between 1909-1935 and 1950-1967 attracting most attention.

The book of Thanos Veremis emerges as one of few attempts at an all-encompassing study of the military from the founding of the modern Greek state up to the mid-1990s. It is based on extensive and exhaustive historical research, of which earlier products were the author’s PhD dissertation (*The Greek Army in Politics 1922-1935*, Oxford 1974) and his subsequent monograph *I epemvaseis tou stratou stin elliniki politiki 1916-1935* (Military Interventions in Greek Politics), Athens 1977. Since then Professor Veremis, who currently directs the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), has been acknowledged as a leading authority on the role of the military and Greek security matters in general.

The main Chapters are preceded by a concise introduction in 19th century Greek politics, focusing on state formation and nation-building. This provides the necessary context for the subsequent analysis of the military and its political role up to the present time. In this part, the author outlines the evolving social and political background against which the Greek army was transformed from a policing force into a more substantial instrument of