supported by 231 footnotes. The bibliography contains 33 items, including Cecil Woodham Smith’s *The Reason Why* and Winston Churchill’s *A History of the English Speaking Peoples*.

Besides relying heavily on Lane-Poole, Mr. Byrne also finds fairly extensive support for his narrative in H.W.V. Temperley’s *England and the Near East: The Crimea* and A.W. Kinglake’s *The Invasion of the Crimea*. The bibliography tempts one to wonder what sort of places the author was referring to as “warehouses not readily accessible to the layman.” Many libraries would contain virtually all of his bibliography and other pertinent materials besides. Mr. Byrne has not really been interested in pursuing his subject very deeply or he would have encountered a considerable body of material, especially in article form. Though some of this might touch on “obscurantism and picayune concerns,” it should not be summarily dismissed. Indeed, perhaps it cries out for an intelligent interpreter, such as Mr. Byrne, for instance. By casting his net so casually, and possibly also by viewing Canning with a completely uncritical eye, Byrne overlooks a number of vital questions. There is no regard for Canning’s tempestuous relationship with other ambassadors at Constantinople, as Professor Lynn Case of the University of Pennsylvania has recently pointed out. (*Journal of Modern History*, XXXVII, no. 3, Sept., 1965. Pp. 386-388). A striking example of a judgment based on inadequate and insufficient materials, is the author’s ready acceptance (p. 244) of Kinglake’s view of Napoleon III’s motives in the period prior to the Crimean War.

The most charitable judgment of this book, from a professional point of view, is to say that Byrne has presented a picture of Canning for the most part drawn uncritically from a relatively few secondary materials. He has produced an interesting and pleasing story that might indeed satisfy a general reader. The serious historian, however, could not accept this work as a meaningful contribution to historical literature. In fact, it is difficult to understand why a university press should publish such a work.

University of Oklahoma

BRISON D. GOOCH


The purpose of Professor DeNovo’s study of American relations with the Middle East is to provide “a description and assessment of
American cultural, economic, and diplomatic activities in Turkey, Persia, and the Arab East during the first four decades of the twentieth century.” This is an ambitious task, and the result is evidence of the author’s comprehensive research into the activities of American missionaries and oil companies in the Middle East. The detailed accounts which he presents however, throw into stronger relief the weakness of the book regarding the political relations of the United States with the Middle East.

The book opens with an introductory chapter on American interests in the Middle East in the nineteenth century, and continues with a chapter on the United States and the Middle East in the years before World War I. A chapter is devoted to the abortive Chester concession before the War and two chapters to the War and its settlement. In the post-War period, there is a thorough study of American oil interests and a further chapter on the misfortunes of the Chester interests. The rest of the book covers American missionary, economic, and diplomatic activities in Turkey, Iran and the Arab states in the inter-war period.

The chief contributions of Professor DeNovo’s book are its very complete accounts of American missionary endeavors and American oil interests, together with what must be the definitive study of the Chester concession. These accounts are based on thorough research in the files of the Department of State for the Chester concession and oil interests, and on the voluminous documentary collections of the various missionary societies. In addition, if the exhaustive (and definitive) bibliography is any indication, almost every published source of relevance to the study has been consulted.

After saying this one regrets even more the necessity of saying also that this standard was not maintained in the treatment of American political interests and diplomatic relations. The bibliography contains a long list of Department of State files covering American relations with the Middle East, but the most important files dealing with United States policy in that area are missing: these are 763.72 on World War I, 763.72119 (and all the Peace Commission files) on the Versailles settlement, and 767.68 and 767.68119 on Greek-Turkish relations and the settlement of the Greco-Turkish war. For the inter-war period, Professor DeNovo relied almost exclusively on the Foreign Relations series for his source material on diplomatic relations (though not, it should be pointed out, for his treatment of American oil interests) and apparently did not investigate the unpublished material in the State Department files.
These gaps are more serious than they might at first appear. The outstanding characteristic of American Middle East policy, from the beginning until the recent past, was that it did not derive from direct American interests in the region but indirectly through the significance of the Middle East in European politics — if the United States determined that its interests were involved in European politics, it automatically became involved with the Middle East. Thus in World War I, the United States was concerned to contain *Mitteleuropa* and keep the Middle East out of German hands. During the Peace Conference, it was essential to American policy that the Middle East settlement be based on the same principles as the German settlement. During World War II, American policy was again based on containing the German threat, and since then it has been the Russian threat to the Middle East that has determined American policy. This means that the historian of American Middle East policy must look for his key material not in the records of American relations with the Middle Eastern countries but in the records of American relations with Britain, France, Italy, and latterly Soviet Russia.

From the Lausanne settlement and the other negotiations that regularized American relations with the new Middle East to the rise of Nazi Germany some ten years later, the United States had no Middle East policy and Professor DeNovo's approach is therefore valid. But in the middle 1930's as the United States interest in and concern with European events developed, so did American concern with the Middle East. None of these developments are covered by Professor DeNovo. As a result, the interests and policies of the United States, contrasted with the interests of individual Americans, are not only inadequately covered but are inaccurately portrayed and analysed.

This disproportion in research has led to a second weakness in the book: the amount of space and detail given to a particular aspect of American interests and policies in the Middle East does not reflect its relative importance. One chapter deals with the crucial years of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, the only period when the United States as a nation was actively involved in political events in the Middle East. Yet the Chester concession, of no great importance in American foreign policy, the history of American commercial interest, or the history of the Middle East itself, is given two chapters. There is a wealth of information on missionary activities, and the history of the American University of Beirut and other educational institutions is given in detail. But there is little room apparently for the reports
Reviews of books

in leading Yugoslav periodicals: in the *Zora Dalmatinska* in Zadar and the *Podunavka* in Belgrade. A comprehensive translation of the *Comedy* was accomplished in 1910 by the Bishop of Kotor, Franjo Tice-Uccelini, in decasyllabic verse and with commentaries: *Divna Gluma*. The most recent attempt of this type is the Kombol-Delorko translation. Professor Cronia particularly stresses the accomplished metrical and musical faithfulness of the Serbo-Croat translation to the Italian original.

The final chapter of the book is dedicated to Dante studies in Serbia and Croatia. Cronia's argument that there were no Dantologists in these areas equivalent to Dante scholars in France, Germany, England and other countries, where the study and scientific elaboration of individual problems and themes in Dante's works was taking place, seems somewhat exaggerated in light of the scholarly contributions of Mirko Deanović, Bishop Tice-Uccelini, Mihovil Kombol, et. al. The author does however, emphasize the lively interest in Dante extending from the middle of the nineteenth century down to the present day.

Finally, it is clear that Cronia's book has fully accomplished its objective by providing us with an exhaustive study of Serbo-Croatian interest in the great Italian poet. It will serve as a springboard and an incentive for further detailed research, and it should therefore be hailed as a major event in comparative Slavic literary studies.

Florida State University  
Tallahassee

NIKOLA R. PRIBIĆ


Jacob Hoptner's volume traces the complicated course charted by Yugoslav diplomacy in its efforts to ward off attack by Italy and Germany in the years when the Axis powers were gaining control of Central Europe and the Balkans. The failure of this policy, Mr. Hoptner feels, has been unjustly exploited by those who cannot forgive the Yugoslav government for seeking to assure its own survival through a rapprochement with Italy and Germany at the expense of Yugoslavia's traditional allies in the West. The author wishes to set the record straight; if he does not exactly exonerate the Yugoslav diplomats, he certainly goes to their defense, attempting to demonstrate that in the circumstances they were compelled to act as they did to protect their country's vital interests.

Mr. Hoptner has impressive evidence at his disposal to support his