still unanswered questions about Minoan and Mycenaean palace architecture, he begins with a survey of the principal characteristic features and elements of the Palace. Emphasis is given to their appearance at Gournia, which Mrs. Hawes excavated and published.

T. Leslie Shear, Jr. lectured on "Minoan influence in the Mainland: Variations of Opinion since 1900." He begins indeed with a short account of the opinions of excavators, but he is mostly concerned to describe the differing characters of Minoan and Mycenaean art. He illustrates these in metal work, pottery, and architectural plans and decoration, with most emphasis on the works in each of these media in which a blending can be seen of a Mycenaean structural and a Minoan decorative form.

Emily Townsend Vermeule lectured on The Decline and End of Minoan and Mycenaean Culture." With illustrations from decorated pottery, small terracotta figures, and late Minoan and Mycenaean pictorial painting, she calls to attention the importance and satisfaction of studying not only the great monuments of the Bronze Age's prosperity, but the simpler arts through which successors of the Mycenaeans transformed the Bronze Age traditions continuously until they became part of the Greek heritage.

Sterling Dow lectured on "Literacy: the Palace Bureaucracies, the Dark Age, Homer." In the first section he considers both the historical implications of the writing of Greek in Linear B at Knossos, and the long difficulty scholars had in recognizing that it indeed was. In the second, he considers why we have no writing from Greece between the latest Linear B texts and the earliest Greek alphabetic inscriptions. In the final section, he shows how fortunate it is for us that Homer lived in an age which joined just the right amount of illiteracy with just the right amount and kind of literacy — so that his poems could be both composed and preserved.

These lectures are as good to read, and as handsomely published, as they were to hear.

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Bismarck once remarked of the Balkans that it is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. If one were to take this expres-
sion seriously, he would conclude that all the wars, crises and intrigues that have characterized the Balkan peninsula as the powder keg of Europe would have been in vain.

Great Powers, however, such as Russia (later USSR), Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, and more recently the United States, have considered the Balkans not only worth their trouble but also the risk of a major war in order to maintain their balance of influence in the area.

It is with this controversial peninsula that the carefully researched, scholarly work of Professor Iatrides is concerned. The volume covers a period from 1941 to the present time, although its main emphasis stops around 1956. The focus of the book is on a triangular politico-strategic system formed by Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece.

The *Balkan Triangle* begins in the setting of World War II. It carefully traces the rise and organization of communism in Yugoslavia and Greece around the cause of anti-fascist resistance movements.

Tito is described as self-made man (not a Soviet-imposed puppet) who has clearcut, personal objectives such as the creation of a large, Yugoslav-controlled Balkan federation which would include Bulgaria, Albania and large portions of Greece. The Tito-Stalin dispute, and the subsequent break of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, serves as one of the primary motives for Yugoslav disorientation, momentary isolation, and then its “pragmatic” turn toward the West which equally “pragmatically” extends a helping hand to a drowning “friendly communist.”

Greece is depicted as a country torn by civil war, contested by determined communist and nationalist groups that prefer war to compromise. The defeat of the Greek communists is almost as certain as death is in tragedy. The Greek communists are fighting an imprudent war against the strategic accommodations of the global system. The Soviets had never placed any hope on them to transform Greece into a Peoples Democracy for they had simply written the country off into the British sphere of influence (percentages agreement). The Yugoslavs, for their part, supported the Greek communists with impunity only so long as they were in friendly terms with Moscow and they had something to gain in Greece. After the Tito-Stalin rift, the Greek communists opted for Stalin and Tito shut the gates of his privileged sanctuary to the Greek communists.

Turkey is studied less in terms of its internal political situation
and more as a country that happens to sit astride the strategic straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and rubs underbellies with the USSR.

The author masterfully weaves his argument, shifting this setting from country to country and thus building the stage for the signing of the Ankara treaty and the Bled alliance (the Balkan pact).

What is it that draws three dissimilar countries as Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey together? Iatrides clearly suggests that the Pact can be explained as the simple result of short-range, tactical security needs of the participants.

Yugoslavia was threatened in the late 1940s with economic paralysis, Soviet military intervention and cultural isolation. Simultaneously it had a burning dispute with Italy over Trieste, a dispute with Bulgaria "irridenta" over Macedonia, and would add I (Iatrides does not treat this subject) a bitter dispute with Hoxza and Shehu in Albania. An association with Greece and Turkey (indirectly linking her with NATO) would have improved Yugoslavia's position on all these fronts by strengthening her bargaining weight.

Greece, also, had much to gain by entering into the Pact for its vulnerable (20 mile wide) strip of land uniting Macedonia and Western Thrace was an "attractive nuissance" to a Bulgaria which has traditionally longed for a "window" facing the Aegean sea.

Turkey's main gain would be that of sharing the burden with Yugoslavia of maintaining Greece as a viable and secure member of NATO. This, in turn, would prevent the Soviet bloc from gaining an overland, direct access to the Mediterranean which would diminish the strategic significance of the Straits.

Iatrides, incidentally, describes intelligently the lag between the political need for a security pact (reaching its peak in 1952) and the institutionalization of this need in 1953-4 coming at a time when the very reasons for the existence of this pact begin to dissipate.

The three countries are obliged to put aside, or freeze, basic differences in order to sign the Pact. Yugoslavia plays down the perennial "Macedonian Question" dealing with allegedly Slavic minorities in Greek Macedonia. Greece, in turn, exempts Tito from its theoretical vilification against communists and opens the port of Thessaloniki as a resupply root to him. Greece and Turkey soft-pedal basic issues such as fishing rights and Cyprus (the latter was later to serve as pall-bearer of the practically still-born pact).

Turkey and Yugoslavia have to ignore a tradition of hostility and
a situation of ideological incompatibility coupled with mutual cultural and economic indifference.

Iatrides carefully documents and describes the short-lived organizational structure and functions of the Balkan pact. It has the usual trappings of typical international organizations, but with some important differences. For instance the Pact has a “roving Secretariat” whose employees are identified as national delegates rather than international civil servants. The Balkan pact, like NATO, sought to cement its security function with various functional trappings that might secure its viability in times of detente. Proposals were made to establish a Consultative Assembly of parliamentarians and establish scores of cultural, economic, political and scientific entanglements. None of these, however, left the phase of the drafting table.

Iatrides, in short, describes the frustration of an area which is not a natural “security community” and which seeks to juxtapose a defense structure on top of an otherwise cool and hostile set of interrelationships.

The seeds of the Pact’s dissolution were already in growth at the time of its signing. The author attributes the atrophy of the Balkan pact to a number of strategic and tactical reasons:

The death of Stalin gave birth to the Soviet “peace offensive” of the mid-1950s. The nature of the Soviet threat became correspondingly less acute, reaching a high point of thaw throughout 1955. The Khrushchev visit to Yugoslavia (May 14, 1955) creates a state of indecision for Tito. No longer isolated by the communist camp he feels more at home with a policy of non-alignment (that can give him global prominence) rather than a policy of Western security orientation (that diminishes both his prestige, flexibility and independence). Implied in Iatrides treatment is his admiration for the relative versatility, agility, independence and cool professionalism with which Tito’s Yugoslavia has pursued her post-war foreign policies.

The second major cause of the Pact’s chronic, if not fatal, disease is the Cyprus issue which poisoned the relation of a triangle made up by Turkey, Britain and Greece. The author describes the vicissitudes of this dispute which brought the “allies” of Greece and Turkey to the brink of war at least three times in the past fifteen years. Perhaps, with the Moscow Peace Offensive and the resultant blurring of the Soviet threat, Greece and Turkey could afford the luxury of pursuing their own narrow national interests rather than playing a concerted role of
“allied strength” within the global game of an East-West confrontation.

Iatrides ends his treatment with, perhaps, his only note of normativism in an otherwise dispassionate, objective and highly detached treatment. He wishes that the Balkan peoples could cooperate more, if necessary unite in many small functional ways, so as to increase their wealth and worth in unity, so as to avoid the impotence that is bred by constant suspicion and bickering, so as to avoid what has been ironically called “Balkanization.”

Generally I found the book written in fine, clear and readable style. It is generously footnoted and the author appears to have nearly exhausted all primary and secondary sources available in the Greek and English languages. Naturally, as the author points out in his preface, this is not the definitive work on this subject, since the three governments in question are still guarding the confidentiality of their archives.

There are a number of universal points that emerge from the discussion in the *Balkan Triangle* that merit brief mention here. First and foremost is the lesson that, given proper circumstances, it is possible for communist and capitalist governments to find enough of an identity of interests to allow for the signing of political and military pacts. Second, that it is possible for two communist countries to come to the brink of war. The conclusion has, therefore, been drawn that nationalism has proven so far a much more potent force than communism, and that international, communist relations poured much of the old “war-diplomacy” wine into a new bottle labelled “fraternal socialist international relations.” In good proportion the book also illustrates that communist (as well as capitalist) nations are ready to soft-pedal or adjust their ideological doctrines in the interest of survival or even expediency.

The last, and perhaps major, contribution of this book is in the area of “alliance theory,” Marshall Tito in his cryptic passage, quoted in the front of the preface, accepts the David Mitrany functionalist thesis of international organization. i.e. Without economic, social and cultural cooperation to begin with, it is difficult if not impossible to have lasting political cooperation. Iatrides seems to have adopted this thesis. Perhaps this is true. Perhaps in the vicious cycle of political vs. economic prerequisites for coexistence the question still remains one of what came first the chicken or the egg.

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