Les principaux personnages de l'époque des brumes de malentendus qui les enveloppaient: on peut voir, pendant la durée des hostilités entre la Russie et la Turquie, le roi Georges et Ch. Trikoupis en particulier chercher, avec angoisse dirait-on, la réponse au dilemme «guerre ou neutralité?» et la ligne la plus conforme aux intérêts de la nation. En outre, la conception dominante en ce qui concerne l'invasion de l'armée grecque en Thessalie en 1878 est renversée, l'auteur soulignant à juste titre que cette action permet la prise en considération des revendications grecques par les grandes puissances.

Ensuite, après avoir exposé les événements relatifs aux insurrections de l'élément grec en Crète, en Épire, en Thessalie et en Macédoine, au traité de San Stefano et au Congrès de Berlin, l'auteur met en relief l'œuvre très difficile de la délégation grecque pendant les travaux de ce dernier, la satisfaction d'une partie des revendications grecques étant - jusqu'à un certain degré au moins - le fruit de sa présence dans la capitale allemande. En fait, les décisions du Congrès - malgré les problèmes qu'allait poser leur application - contenaient des points jugés positifs pour l'Hellénisme. L'annexion notamment de la Thessalie et du district d'Arta en 1881 couronnait de succès les manœuvres diplomatiques angoissantes de trois années et encore la politique menée par un homme réaliste mais souvent malcompris, Al. Koumoundouros.

En conclusion, il faut souligner qu'E. Kofos ne se borne point à donner, dans le cadre de ce travail, un exposé satisfaisant des événements. Connaissant à fond son matériel, il réussit, grâce à une analyse objective et méthodique, quelque chose de beaucoup plus important, c'est-à-dire à donner aux facteurs qui déterminèrent l'histoire de l'époque étudiée leur juste valeur: peuples, personnages et événements forment une mosaïque éblouissante, où nulle pièce n'est détruite en raison d'une incompréhension ou d'un préjudice de la part de l'auteur.

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With its long history of human settlement and strategic location, the Balkan peninsula offers the historian a wealth of material and intriguing issues to ponder and assess. In recent years scholars have examined the history of the region from an ever increasing number of points of view. Some have turned to new methodologies while others have unhesitatingly adopted theories from a wide variety of the social disciplines in their efforts at historical explanation. Although fruitful in some cases, not all such work has enhanced our understanding of the historical vicissitudes of the peninsula. The authors of this study, seasoned and discerning scholars, have chosen a careful and straightforward though less intellectually stimulating path of inquiry in tracing the historical development of the Balkans.

The work is a century by century account, beginning with the Ottoman conquest, of the social and political upheavals that erupted for centuries and gave the Balkans the reputation of being a "powder keg". It ends pretty much with the emergence of the "New Europe" after the Great War, though the authors do try to
tie up the main threads of their story with references to the disastrous events of World War II and their consequences. They devote much of their attention to the affairs of the nineteenth century, which take up more than half the pages of the text.

Dominated as they were for centuries by a ruler who was alien in faith and outlook to most of the peoples in Balkans, friction between masters and subjects was bound to occur. When such friction produced flames of revolt, the conflicts were neither continuous nor the simple struggle of the downtrodden against their imperial oppressor. Rather, as the authors make quite clear, down to the end of the eighteenth century resistance to authority, whether in the form of rebellions born of conspiracy, spontaneous peasant jacqueries, or revolts instigated from outside the area, was the result of a combination of factors. To begin with the Ottomans had only about a century of good fortune in which they faced weak rivals in the heart of Europe. By the seventeenth century the growing power of the Habsburgs and Romanovs heightened the strategic importance of the Balkan peninsula. Due in part to the stress produced by the intervention of both neighboring and more distant European states in the affairs of southeastern Europe, the Ottomans experienced significant internal alterations to their imperial power structure. This in turn affected the socio-economic life of the empire, especially that of the subject Christian peoples in the Balkans. But neither intervention from without on the international level nor altered local conditions from within were sufficient to produce a significant revolutionary movement with an alternative set of goals to the traditional way of life.

It was not until the late eighteenth century that small segments of the Balkan populace recognized the possibility of breaking with the order of life as it had been and found the rationale for such a move in the ideas circulating through western Europe. This was the vehicle which, when coupled with local domestic unrest, produced the rapid and often violent change associated with revolution. In chronicling the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century, the authors stress the dual aspects of these upheavals: the social issue involving the peasant masses' desire for land and the benefits accruing from it, and the national problem focusing on the attainment of political sovereignty over a defined territory. The national issue of course quickly gained the upper hand, becoming the leading factor in the revolutionary upheavals of the last century. The authors present almost a decade by decade account of the innumerable revolts, failed or otherwise, in the Balkans. Indeed the narrative swells with such events to the degree that the reader has the feeling that there must have been haiduks to the left, klephts to the right and conspiracies swirling all around.

Out of all of this activity the authors have discerned a spatial and chronological pattern. They see the revolutionary impulse in the nineteenth century beginning on the geographic periphery of the region. Once a national center of some sort was established it became the core from which the nationalist program radiated. Finally, when several such centers had been created in the peninsula, intraregional competitiveness erupted among rival national revolutionary movements. Because so much ground is covered in a relatively limited amount of space, however, significant aspects within this pattern do not receive the attention in this work that they deserve.

To begin with, the narrative speaks of movements of "national rebirth" occur-
ring in the nineteenth century, nurtured and guided by a nascent, indigenous "bourgeoisie". This urban, commercial, and educated stratum of Balkan society promoted what capital formation there was in private hands, cared little about the plight of the rural folk, steered a political course of national territorial expansion and arrogated to itself the historical consciousness that was the crucible of its people's past and presumably its future. Yet one cannot generalize too much about this element and its role in the political and social transformation of southeastern Europe. It of course differed both in nature and size from its western European counterpart. And it remained divided within itself with regard to courses of action to be followed. Indeed it would probably serve the historian's purpose better to speak of the "mercantile" sector in Balkan society rather than the umbrella term "bourgeoisie".

Much of the discussion surrounding the nationalist movements that arose after the French Revolution and Napoleonic eras focuses of necessity on the ideology that underpinned them. From the peninsular vision of Rhigas, the Nacertanje of Garasänin and the plans for a South Slav federation, to the revolutionary thought of Hristo Botev the development of nationalist ideology in the Balkans was a multi-faceted process resulting in a plethora of political schemes for the welfare of the nation. The many threads that made up this world of secular belief are fairly and adequately described. But what was the significance of all of this? This question is especially important when one realizes that the fate of the peninsula and its peoples was essentially in the hands of determined politicians representing the practical interests of the great European states, a crumbling Ottoman empire, and fledgling national governments and not messianic revolutionaries. Yet ideas were obviously important, but to whom, in what manner and most important, with what result?

In a part of the world that became engulfed in revolutionary violence for much of the past century and a half, there had to have been a significant impact on the formal political structures that emerged as tangible evidence of all that activity, the states. It is as important to evaluate the impression, lasting or otherwise, of that activity on the state as it is to describe it. Some Balkan revolutionaries, for example, quickly placed their faith in the ethnic vessel, the nation, rather than the political community represented by the state. In what manner did the revolutionary syndrome affect the perceptions of those who separated the world of the nation and the state, endowing in their minds only the one with the quality of permance? Here surely lies much of the relevance of the affairs in the Balkan peninsula to the phenomenal acceptance of the nation-state system in the twentieth century around the globe.

One considerable merit of this three-century survey of political upheavals in the Balkans is to point up how a region of geo-strategic importance could draw upon it larger competing interests from pre-modern to modern times. In the nineteenth century rival powers in the name of different faiths battled for ascendancy in the heart of Europe. The rise of a secular world by the end of the nineteenth century continued to draw competing states to the area, now in the name of a new god, economic interest. Into this continuing swirl of competition a new factor had emerged, however. The peoples of the region had taken their fate into their own hands and managed to create political units, fulfilling "historic goals" to some de-
gree, while creating historicist myths at the same time. In this centuries long process the Balkan peoples had gone from religious to historical nationalism. From a limited identity and spatial sense vis-a-vis, those who ruled them, they emerged with a broader consciousness based on time. And that fuller sense through historical awareness provided the validating principle for both national and social revolt.

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Professor Weiker's latest book touches on most of the social, political, and economic issues which complicate yet propel Republican Turkey's modernization into the twenty-first century. In nine chapters, he presents the various forces, the major leaders, and the political parties involved in developing the necessary infrastructure for such modernization. Despite its title, the book only superficially covers the period from Atatürk to World War II but treats in depth the important years 1945 through 1979. The momentary Turkish retreat from parliamentary democracy (in 1980) does not fundamentally affect the author's general conclusions. Based on his formulation of more than 50 tables, from original Turkish and other research, he explains statistically many of the issues arising out of Turkey's special geo-political position between the Soviet Union and the West, and its special Islamic relationship between the Ottoman caliphate and Kemalist secularism. Despite many stumbling steps, the Turks, in Weiker's view, will continue to modernize toward a state-supported capitalist system, toward parliamentary democracy, and probably acceptance as an integral part of the European community and the West.

Although the author looks positively on this Turkish struggle to modernize along western lines, he carefully notes Turkish setbacks, to be sure, and does not hide the oftentimes extreme political and social problems which they themselves have raised. A temptation has always existed among some Turks to accept an authoritarian solution. In the past forty-five years, internal disagreement often pushed them away from parliamentarianism: an undisciplined press and a divided and often polarized electorate led to the excesses of the Sixties; more recently in the Seventies uncompromising politicization resulted in virtual civil war. The Parliament itself often could not compromise sufficiently with its own leadership to solve fundamental issues within Turkey, issues which led to the impasses and military coups of 1960 and of 1980. Weiker believes that it is still too early to judge the final outcome, and that adherence to the parliamentary institutions established by Atatürk and the early Kemalist reformers of the Twenties seems to be deeply ingrained among the Turks. Despite the excesses Weiker believes the forces of moderation in Turkey can prevail, given good leadership and a willingness to compromise.

Unlike some of his other books, the author here tends to expose rather than to analyse. The major points are covered, but sometimes not enough space is de-