monarchical and republican governments prior to World War II. The importance of foreign pressures is emphasized, King Othon's reign is examined not without sympathy, and George I receives guarded praise. The Venizelos-Constantine quarrel is offered as a prelude to tragedies to come.

Chapter Five describes the origins of political parties, their vague ideologies and their highly personal character. Particular attention is paid to the Communist Party and to its indirect role in causing the Metaxas dictatorship. "The Dreadful Decade 1940-1950" will be for some readers the least satisfactory section, dealing as it does with events and forces that defy description and analysis in twenty-four pages. Closer attention to British influence during the war years (over the Government-in-exile, the resistance movement, the question of the King's return, etc.) and immediately following liberation would have helped explain much that otherwise remains confusing. "Years of Stability, 1952-1961" end with the resignation of Karamanlis in 1963. The early post-Karamanlis period is presented clearly and dispassionately in "From Right to Center and the New Left, 1963-1965," with the political events reviewed critically but fairly. Communism in the 1960's receives considerable attention, though there is no attempt to exaggerate its importance. In "After Papandreou the Deluge, 1965-1967" the authors walk carefully and successfully the thin ice of these controversial years, too recent to analyze in greater depth. The book ends with the events of April 21, 1967, which thus remain outside the scope of the study.

The serious student and the partisan observer of contemporary Greek politics may not be happy with certain of the authors interpretations or the sources chosen. Given the scope and purpose of the book, this could not be otherwise. For the generalist it will prove a most valuable and very readable guide for the labyrinth that is The Web of Modern Greek Politics.

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Without doubt, Yugoslav historiography has entered a period of
ideological and historical revisionism. Perhaps the first to inaugurate this trend was Vaso Cubrilović, a professor of History at Belgrade University, in his book *The History of Political Thought in 19th century Serbia* (1958), in which he analysed the Serbian political attitudes towards the Yugoslav idea. He came to the conclusion that the Serbian political leadership with a few exceptions, regarded Yugoslavia as a greater, or enlarged Serbia.

A similar conclusion was reached by another Serb historian—more precisely, a Serb from Croatia—Vaso Bogdanov, who attributed the pre-war Serbo-Croat antagonism to the fact that the Serbian establishment regarded Yugoslavia from an exclusivist Serbian view-point, while the Croats entered the union with Serbia convinced that Yugoslavia should be a new state, in which the Serbs and the Croats would be able to develop their national and economic expansion under conditions of equal partnership.

In his recently published book, *Great Ideas and Small Nations*, the Croat historian Dr. Franjo Tudjman treats the same subject in a new and much broader context. Tudjman is a former Partisan general, who took an active part in the National Liberation War, and a former Director of the Institute for the Study of the Labor Movement in Croatia. He is the author of several outstanding studies on the formation and disintegration of the pre-war Royal Yugoslavia and the formation of Socialist Yugoslavia.

Tudjman’s thesis is that while the small Slavic nations that lived in the Habsburg Empire and faced Austrian and Hungarian hegemonies fought stubbornly and successfully for the destruction of the Dual Monarchy, and eventually severed their ties with Vienna at the end of World War I, they came to face the same threat to their national identities in the successor states. Having freed themselves from the great empires, they met a new impediment to their national development, in the hegemony of one of their small sister nations. In the case of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia were subjected to Serbian domination. The problem of power and domination once again became a hindrance to the process of unification based on equality and partnership.

Pre-war Yugoslavia was based exclusively on the supremacy of Serbia over Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro; the first Yugoslavia was a centralist state ruled by the Serbian dynasty and the Serbian political establishment. This was profoundly resented by the other nations that had hoped that the new state would enable them to develop their
individualisms. The Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Slav-Macedonians refused to merge into a unitary, Serbian-dominated Yugoslav state.

A similar situation developed in the bi-national Czechoslovak state, in which the Slovaks felt threatened by the Czechs. Thus World War II found Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia totally unprepared to resist the German and Italian aggressions, and independent and Slovak states were established. This similarity, Tudjman explains, took place because the great powers of Versailles Europe favored both the Serbian and Czech establishments thus justifying a small minority of middle class bourgeois nationalist minority to side with Italy and Germany and establish their own states against pre-War World I Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

At War's end, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were re-established. The Communist parties of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia created "federal" unions that recognized at least in theory the formation of national republics. However, the Communist-constructed federal unions conformed to Stalin's dictum, "national in form and socialist in essence," which failed to satisfy all the nationalities. "Democratic centralism" of the Communist Party deprived the individual nations of any real power and independence. This may be the reason why the Soviets after their 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, granted the Slovaks state equality with the Czechs, and why they give encouragement to Bulgarian schemes calling for the separation of Slavic Macedonia from Yugoslavia.

In dealing with these controversial subjects, Tudjman pinpoints the deeper issues that separate the Slavs. He implies, in subtle and new reasoning, backed by an impressive array of historical data, that the Soviets have sought to satisfy the aspirations of the various East European nationalities for independence within the framework of "people's democracies" which all, ultimately subjected to Soviet domination. Like Vienna in the last century, Moscow follows a policy of "divide et impera" in order to maintain its own hegemony.

As a Marxist, Tudjman seeks explanation for Soviet behavior in Communist ideological writings. He attributes Soviet policy to the ill-informed and contemptuous views that Marx and Engels held regarding the "reactionary" role that the small Slavic nations of the Austrian Empire played in the crucial revolutionary year of 1848. Marx and Engels wrote in Horace Greeley's New York Tribune that the Serbs, Croats, Slovaks and Czechs constituted "ethnic garbage" and accused them of being retrogressive and counter-revolutionary elements as opposed to
the progressive Magyar revolution of 1848 and the German and Austrian nations. Marx and Engels went so far as to question whether these small Slavic peoples had their own distinct languages, or merely spoke dialects or patois.

In their attacks on Bakunin and his role at the 1848 Pan-Slav Congress in Prague, Marx and Engels also condemned the Russian Tsarist schemes regarding the creation of a Pan-Slavic Empire that would extend all the way to the Mediterranean and would prevent the Germans and the Hungarians from reaching the Adriatic Sea.

In an essay on the "Brezhnev Doctrine," published in Zagreb magazine Forum (April-May, 1969), Tudjman makes it clear that the implementation of this doctrine would result in the complete negation of the national independence and sovereignty of the small nations of Central and South-East Europe. He sees a parallel between Brezhnev's views and the views of Marx and Engels who in effect negated the right to national identity and independence to the small Slavic nations of South-East, which is now within the recognized Soviet "orbit." This old Marxist view, revived and modified by Brezhnev, threatens to completely destroy the national sovereignty of a number of small nations that have existed as separate entities for centuries. Tudjman identifies these dangerous trends with the "rise of neo-Stalinism" in Russia and favors a broader European policy that would free Europe both of Soviet and U.S.A. domination.

While Tudjman's theses are novel and original, they are based on historical interpretations that reach back to the beginning of the 19th century. The wealth of bibliographical data and a new research makes the volume Great Ideas and Small Nations an eminently scholarly and serious interpretative study.

The book recognizes that Marxism in its applications has failed to solve the national problem of Yugoslavia and of Eastern Europe, and that it requires new approaches and different solutions. Pan-Slavism, Yugoslavism, Czecho-Slovakism seem all to be dead ideologies which the Marxists have been unable to keep alive. The Marxist type of "unitarism" and "federalism" have failed just as had the earlier bourgeois ideologies. Today the Croats, Slovaks or Slovenes feel as much threatened in their national and economic existence as they did in the pre-World War I, Habsburg monarchy. The only way or the impass, Tudjman suggests, seems to lie in the establishment of a large European common-
wealth of nations within which the Slavic and non-Slavic nations of South-East Europe could live in progress and freedom.

A fully annotated bibliography and a detailed list of important personalities with relevant data, mentioned in the book, provide very useful informations for the student in 19th and 20th century of South Slav world.

A translation of this book into English would be of great interest for a foreign audience.

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The main objective of this study is to analyse the emergence and nature of institutional innovations, as well as the trends in political integration of Yugoslavia's communist system.

The distinctive Yugoslav polity is not presented as a model of totalitarianism, nor as a betrayal of Marxism. Following the example of contemporary Sovietologists the author refuses to view Titoism through the monolithic conceptual scheme, with the logical result that such themes typical of a communist-based system as terror, concern with power, the imposition by force of an alien political system, etc. are left out or strongly de-emphasized. According to Professor Zaninovich, the main reason for this methodological neglect is his fear that the monolithic model is insensitive to many "non-communist" variables which allegedly should be taken into account if we are to grasp the genesis and particular features of communism in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the author offers a multi-causal explanation by exploiting the combined strengths of developmental and historico-characterological approaches. Utilizing his complex model, the author isolates several historical phases of institutional growth in Yugoslavia. However, the study's principal focus is upon the period of blind imitation of Soviet institutions and especially on the interval of Yugoslav social experimentations following the well-known Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948.

In the assessment of the causes and nature of institutional and ideological innovations in Yugoslavia, the author repeatedly assigns con-