sayers and astrologers (273) have been initiated into the wisdom (μυηταί) of Balaam. In view of the failure of iconography to exhibit an utterly naked Christ, the epithet applied to Him as he stands in the Jordan should be "stripped" (332), although the point is emphasised by repetition (364).

The Hypapanti (discussed on p. 60) is more than "a Meeting." The Presentation of the Holy Child in the Temple on Candlemas Day means His having been received into the arms of Simeon, His Reception. Simeon moves forward in welcome. If therefore we are to alter the traditional English name let us think of "welcoming."

The problem successfully solved by the translators may be illustrated by one final quotation (270). Here the Greek text has the succinct utterance of five words: τρίβον βατήν πόλου τίθησιν ήμΐν. The translation expands it to fourteen, very effectively: "And so He establishes a path for us whereby we may mount to heaven."

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This volume of official American documents is especially important because of the light which is thrown on the problem of possible Turkish entry into World War II, as reflected in the minutes, discussions, documentation, and records of the Casablanca Conference, January 14-24, 1943 (pp. 485-849). Among other things, the documents make clear the decision that Prime Minister Churchill was to go to Adana, as, indeed, he did on January 30, 1943, to confer with President İnönü relative to Turkey's entry into the war, that he was also to represent President Roosevelt in the enterprise, and that, generally, the United Kingdom was to "play the hand." It is also evident that, while there was a desire on the part of the American, the British and the Combined Chiefs of Staff that Turkey enter the war, there were no real plans for a campaign in the Balkan area, in which Turkish forces might play a useful role; essentially, it was felt that Turkey might be used as a base for air
attacks on the Rumanian oilfields and Black Sea communications, that the Straits might be closed to the Axis and opened to United Nations forces, that an increased dispersal of German forces might result, and that Turkish chrome might be denied to Germany. On the one hand, it was agreed that Turkey would need much military equipment if it entered the war, but on the other that no equipment was to be diverted from the main front against Germany in Western Europe. The presentation and the discussion of these problems are intensely interesting and central, of course, to the basic issues involved.

The current volume of American documents can now be placed in relation, not only to the British documents which are now available on the point, to say nothing of the German, but to previous publication of American documents. In particular, these include the General Volume 1 of *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1943, which include documentation on both the Quebec and Moscow Conferences; *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943* (1961); *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945* (1955); and *The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945* (1960), 2 volumes. The regular annual volumes, of course, fill out the interstices of documentation and information.

No student of military operations or of diplomacy during the period of World War II involving North Africa, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, or Turkey and the Balkan area can afford to neglect this very important collection.

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In his introduction the author presents Byzantine sources which indicate that *Philanthropia* has correctly maintained the Greek term and has inspired the social and political philosophy of Byzantium. Our main objective, he adds (p. XI) is to investigate philanthropia as a philosophy and as a way of life among the Byzantines, and to investigate if everything that is said by the Byzantine sources about philanthropia are substantiated by concrete examples from Byzantine daily life (p. XI). Thus, the present book has a double purpose to fulfil and a great and