T U R A N I S M

A N  A S P E C T  O F  T U R K I S H  N A T I O N A L I S M

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, as is generally known, the Ottoman Empire drifted away from the British orbit and came increasingly under the influence of Germany. It was the time when the British Foreign Office, after half a century of adhering to the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to Russian expansionism, began to tolerate, or even support, the nationalist movement of the Balkan peoples and their claims against Turkey. At the beginning of Gladstone’s administration, in 1880, Montenegro, thanks to British as well as to Russian favor, acquired an outlet at Dulcigno (Ulcinj); a year later Abd-ul-Hamid II was compelled to cede Thessaly to Greece; on several occasions thereafter London registered an interest in behalf of the Cretans and the Armenians and reminded the sultan of his obligation to introduce reforms according to Articles 23 and 61 of the Berlin Treaty.

No less important in Turkish eyes were Great Britain’s attempts to carve off Ottoman territories or to establish a foothold in the periphery of the declining empire. The retention of Cyprus by the British and the occupation of Egypt, the former in tune with Greek aspirations, the latter in overt opposition to Egyptian nationalism, were equally severe blows to

4. The Greeks of Cyprus took the arrival of the British as a prelude to union with Greece, following the precedent of the Ionian Islands. Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus (Cambridge University Press, 1952), IV, 297-298, 411.
the prestige of the sultan-caliph. In general, the Near Eastern policy of Gladstone, himself an avowed Philhellene and crusader, came in conflict with Moslem susceptibilities, and, by way of a reaction, there was an upsurge of Islamic loyalty all over the Near East, whence, it was presumed, its echoes might reverberate among the Faithful in India and in the British and French colonies of Africa.

After the fall of Gladstone (January, 1886), Anglo-Turkish relations showed but limited improvement. Great Britain supported Bulgaria's claims over Eastern Rumelia and exerted diplomatic pressure on Abd-ul-Hamid to bow down to the results of the Philippopolis coup d'etat. Seen from Constantinople, the loss of Eastern Rumelia could hardly be balanced by Prince Alfred's blockade of Greece that forestalled a Greek attack on Macedonia. Such an attack, coming as it would without adequate preparation on the part of the Greeks and without foreign support, would have given the sultan the satisfaction of an easy victory that would have restored part of his shaken prestige. In 1886 the Greeks resented Britain's strong-arm methods, but the Turks had no reason to be thankful.

Once the union of the "two Bulgarias" was accomplished, British influence at Sofia gradually diminished while Russo-Bulgarian relations, severely tried by the crisis of 1885, became again normal, reaching a climax during the last phase of the principality's struggle for independence (1908). At the turn of the century the Bulgarian question was by no means so important as to disturb the peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, partly because Russia, involved in her Far Eastern ventures, paid less attention to the "Sick Man of Europe". Lord Salisbury's imperialism, on the other hand, clashed with Germany's Berlin-Vienna-Constantinople-Baghdad

7. Though all the Great Powers, except France, participated in the blockade, it was generally known that the Gladstone cabinet had taken the initiative. See William Miller, "The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Peninsula," Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1934), XII, 408. In Greece Gladstone's motives were not understood, there was a general outcry against the British, and the "war cabinet" of Theodore Deliyannis fell. Driault-Lhéritier, op. cit., p. 217. G. K. Aspreas, Πολιτική ιστορία της νεοεποχής Ελλάδος [Political History of Modern Greece] (Athens, 1922), II, 154-170. Th. S. Lascaris, op. cit., pp. 176-180.
axis. British policy was then in favor of partitioning the Ottoman Empire. The Kaiser's visits in 1889 and 1898 lent a dramatic éclat to the Drang nach Osten. It was German military experts, men of the calibre of Von der Goltz, who helped Abd-ul-Hamid win his easy victory over the Greeks in the spring of 1897, when the Cretan self-government was at stake. Drunk with success, a Moslem mob, with Turkish troops participating, burned the British consulate at Candia, killing the vice-consul and his staff; whereupon British marines took possession of the island and hanged a number of Turkish Cretans in retaliation. As a graver consequence, the sultan's army was forced to evacuate Crete, which now became autonomous with Prince George of Greece as high commissioner, under the trusteeship of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Italy. The Cretan question seemed to be on its way to a solution, but throughout the Balkan crisis Germany, and usually Austria-Hungary, refrained from any action that might be construed as unfriendly to the Porte.

Meanwhile the Entente Cordiale of France and Russia became the pivotal theme of French foreign policy to a generation of Frenchmen that remembered the war of 1870, and the ground was prepared for the formation of the Triple Entente, which was no longer unnatural after Russia's defeat in the Far East. It was easy to see that fear of the rising power of Germany forced the British lion and the Russian bear into a partnership which was sure to have repercussions in the Near East, whether in peace or at war. At the opening of the twentieth century, anti-Turkish incidents, usually provoked by the French, loomed large at Constantinople and portended a new alignment of political forces. The Ottoman Empire was already looking for help from Wilhelmstrasse.

As the rivalry between the Entente and the Germanic Powers increased and began to be felt on the Near Eastern scene, the political theorists of Turkey fell into three groups, each group seeking to define the position of the empire not only in its dealings with the two opposing camps, but also in more fundamental terms, terms that involved the very existence and future destinies of the Turkish nation. The first group was the Pan-Islamists, the second the Ottomanists, and the third the Turanists. Pan-Islamism (Iltihat-i Islam) aimed at a closer association of all Islam under the aegis of the sultan-caliph and the Turks, while Ottomanism (Osmanlılık) stressed the

harmonious development of all ethnic and religious groups within the empire. Turanism, on the other hand, was fundamentally opposed to both Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism. Each school of political thought had its distinct ideology, each ideology had its "myth". The interplay of the three currents, and their disappearance in the maelstrom of the First World War, forms a colorful epilogue to the long history of Ottoman domination in the Near East. Of the three, Turanism bore the stamp of "genuine" Turkish ideology and came closer to the roots of Turkish nationalism. Hence, its importance outshadowed that of the other two.

Turanism, or Pan-Turanism, can be defined as the trend towards a closer association of the Turks with the original, semi-legendary home of the Turkic peoples—the Central Asiatic plateau, which the Persians, in a somewhat vague way, called Turan. The legendary king of Turan, Afrasiyab, who might have reigned in the lands north of Persia in the sixth century B.C., is sung of in the Shahname of Firdausi, and according to a widely circulated tradition, the verses describing the decay of his palace, inhabited by the spider and the owl, were heard from the mouth of Mehmed the Conqueror when he visited the imperial ruins of Constantinople for the first time in 1453. Mehmed the Conqueror's reference to Afrasiyab, however, must not be taken as an evidence of Turanian tendencies on the morrow of the fall of Constantinople. A man of culture and refinement and of a romantic turn of mind, the young conqueror was reciting Persian poetry to emphasize the motif *sic transit gloria mundi*, in the same way as, sixteen centuries before, Scipio Aemilianus recited verses from the Iliad (VI, 448-449) over the burning ruins of Carthage. At the height of Turkish power the ideological orientation of the empire was not Turanian, but almost exclusively Islamic.

Turanism, which appeared in the latter days of the empire, constituted a virtual denial of the Islamic tradition among the Turks, extolling, as it

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did, Turkic ethnicism in contrast to the theocratic interracialism of the community of the Faithful (ümmet). Joint partners with the Turks in their new era of achievement were to be the Crimean Tatars, the Azerbaijanis, the Turkmens, the Uzbeks, the Kirghizes, the Kazakhs, the Bashkirs, and smaller tribes scattered in enclaves of varying extent over the Eurasian plains from the Black Sea to Vladivostok—Balkar, Nogay, Kumyk, Chuvash, Chechen, Udmurt, Yakut, and a host of others. The outer circle of Turan included the Mongolian races of Asia—Tibetans, Manchu, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese—and the Finno-Ugric group of Europeans—the Finns, the Magyars, and the Bulgarians. For Turanian visionaries no religious barriers, such as Christianity, Judaism, or Buddhism, would be strong enough to obstruct the cultural and political rapprochement of the members of the far-flung Turkic family. Dissenting voices were heard occasionally, but they were by no means feeble. Dynamic young Turks, like Enver Pasha, had no use for religious cosmopolitanism, and proposed to keep out all Turkic peoples, such as the Gagauzes, who had drifted into Christianity, or any non-Moslem faith. Yet, beyond all disagreements, the basic criterion was ethnic descent.

Thus, by definition, Turanism was a reaction to the time-honored set-up in the Ottoman Empire, where Islam had provided a social system, an ideology, and a way of life. The declining fortunes of the empire at the turn of the century led many alert minds to question the efficacy of Islamic ideals and practices in the midst of a rapidly changing, aggressive, and revolutionary world. Yet the inevitable question was: "If Islam has failed, where can the Osmanlis find a new orientation, a new force to strengthen their society?" Hemmed in on one hand by the imperialism of the Great Powers and on the other hand by the nationalism of their subjects or neighbors—non-Moslems in Europe, non-Turkish in Asia and Africa—the Turks realized that Ottomanism had become no more than a vague memory and an empty phrase. As a memory it was associated with Midhat Pasha (1822-84) and his fellow-reformers, the Young Turks of the first generation, who became prominent during the crisis of 1876-78 and disap—

peared beneath the tyrannical regime of Abd-ul-Hamid or passed their days as political refugees in Western Europe. As a slogan Osmanlılık was resorted to by the great opportunist Abd-ul-Hamid, who theoretically accepted the principle of a multi-national state, levelling down all barriers, in so far as such a program was necessary for the maintenance of his regime and for the integrity of his empire.

Abd-ul-Hamid was also a Pan-Islamist, without being too much concerned about the antithesis that existed between Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism. It is doubtful whether he was sincere about either, but, according to the urgency of the problems before him, he turned now to the one, now to the other, accepting Ottomanism as a recipe for local consumption and Pan-Islamism as something specially suited to the tastes of Kaiser William II, the "friend" of the "three hundred million Moslems." 

The Young Turks of the second generation, who founded the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), in 1889, inherited vestiges of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism from the Hamidian regime. But both of these ideologies were worn out. Attached to the new Ottomanism was the concept of a federation, still in its nebulous stage and carrying no weight in the opinion of the non-Turkish minorities, who guarded zealously the prerogatives of the millet system; and Pan-Islamism likewise proved to be of no consequence. It was finally discredited as a political ideal when the jihad (holy war), proclaimed by the sultan-caliph in 1914, failed to arouse an appreciable response among the Moslems of the British Empire, and it received its death blow two years later, when the Arabs turned against their fellow-Moslems, the Turks. It was then that the most vigorous—and also the most visionary—minds among the Committee of Union and Progress turned to Turanism, as to a new centripetal power. For a time Turanism seemed to provide a weapon against such anti-Turkish


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trends as Pan-Slavism, the Great Idea of the Greeks, and the Pan-Arabism of Hüseyin the shérif of Mecca. Simultaneously, it was the Asian counterpart of Pan-Germanism, when the Turks were allies of the German Empire; and it was directed against the Russians, who were then at war with both the Turks and the Germans.

The war against Russia in the eastern provinces, the alliance with the Germans, Magyars, and Bulgarians, disillusionment with both Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, the crisis of the Tanzimat (Reformation), and, last but not least, the loss of the European provinces during the Balkan Wars—all these actualities created the psychological milieu of Turanism. In the face of adversity, Turanism assumed a narrow, chauvinistic form. To most of its advocates the Turanic ideal aimed at establishing Turkish hegemony over the peoples of Central Asia, or organizing a Turkish-controlled "Middle Asia", analogous to the German-controlled Mittel-Europa. The basis and rationale of the new structure continued to be the same Turkic ethnicism.24

Such a trend would have been out of the question in the nineteenth century. The old practice of associating the name "Turk" with the uncultured and uncouth peasant or nomad of the plains still persisted in the 1880's and a sharp distinction was drawn between the city Turk, who called himself an Osmanli, and the man from the countryside. The peasant's speech was not the refined Osmanli Turkish, replete with Arabic and Persian phrases, but it was the kaba Türkçe (coarse Turkish) that was shunned by good society. There was not even a thought of beginning relations with the Eastern Turks. When Hermann (Arminius) Vambéry (1832-1913), the great Hungarian Turkologist and Turanist, visited Istanbul in the early 1880's, he was distressed to see how educated Ottoman Turks refused to have anything to do with the Central Asian "nomads". Vambéry explains the desire of the Osmanlis to renounce their ethnic origins in the light of the influence of Islam. He remarks that the tendency of denationalization (Entnationalisierung), so characteristic of Islam, was nowhere else carried so far as in the Ottoman Empire.25 "In any case", he concludes, "the


Osmanli of today is a man in whose veins flows only a negligible quantity of Turkish blood, a man whose physical features do not show the least trace of the typical Turk”.

The process of de-Turkification, involving the loss of Mongoloid characteristics and the disappearance of the so-called “ethnic” institutions beneath the Islamic and Ottoman fabric, goes back to the early centuries of the establishment of the Turks in Asia Minor and in the Balkans. In the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) this process of de-Turkification was already in full progress. Its end may be said to coincide with the last years of Abd-ul-Hamid II, who was finally dethroned in 1909. Perhaps the most succinct statement of the case comes from the pen of E. J. W. Gibb:

It is much to be regretted that Süleyman and his successors, in place of wasting the energies of their people and the resources of their state in vain schemes for the conquest of foreign lands, which it was as impossible as it was undesirable that they should permanently retain, did not turn their serious attention to completing the best work of their predecessors by gathering under their wing those large bodies of their fellow-Turks who still remained subject to the shahs of Persia in districts conterminous with their own dominions.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the British Turkologist voiced the feelings of contemporary Turanists, but at the height of Ottoman power thoughts such as these could not have entered the head of Süleyman the Magnificent and his successors, whose loyalties were centered in the empire and in the Moslem Institution which culminated in the caliphate.

The roots of Turanism, on the other hand, can be traced to the growth of secularism. The Turkish national movement, in its beginnings, was, like every other nationalism, primarily a cultural and intellectual movement. Its pioneers were men of letters, leaders in the New Literature (Edebiyatı Cedidi), notably Ibrahim Sinasi (1824-71), Ziya Pasha (1825-80), and Namik Kemal (1840-88), all poets and story-tellers who gave expression to their people’s desire for national freedom. Namik Kemal’s play Vatan (The Fatherland), presented for the first time in 1873, has become a classic that arouses popular enthusiasm even in our days. Equally significant were the new historians, who sought to reinterpret the past by shifting the emphasis upon the pre-Islamic period—Ahmed Vefik Pasha

26. Ibid., p. 594.
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(1823-91), Ahmed Djevdet Pasha (1822-95), and Süleyman Pasha (1836-92), to mention only the most important. 28

It would be an error, however, to imagine that these poets and historians turned their backs to Islam and what it stood for. They were not exclusively, nor even primarily, Turanists. It was rather in asserting the position of Turkey as a bridge between East and West, and extolling the value of the common people, that they acquired the status of leaders. Namik Kemal, particularly, speaking the people's language more effectively than any of his contemporaries, was wholeheartedly in favor of a return to a purer form of Islam and to earlier Ottoman institutions associated with the period of the ascendancy. At the same time, he proposed to follow the West only in its material civilization. The Sacred Law (Sheriat), it is true, should be given up for modern legislation but neither the caliphate nor the sultanate was to be abolished. Moslem non-Turkish institutions and attitudes, such as polygamy, seclusion of women, identification of religion with nationality in the millet system, asceticism, mysticism and fatalism, were to be discouraged and finally discarded. Corresponding Turkish behavior patterns, which—it was pointed out—were also contemporary Western European, were to be sought after and brought back into Turkish life.

The platforms of all political parties, after the Young Turkish Revolution (Union and Progress, Liberal Entente, Moderate Liberals, Populists, Innovators, Radicals, etc.), reflect, some to a greater, others to a lesser degree, Turkey's dual position between East and West. 29 In this respect the words of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), 30 the greatest political theorist of the second generation Young Turks, may be regarded as typical: "We belong to the Turkish nation, to the Moslem community, and to European civilization." 31 Ziya Gökalp insisted on using the old word millet to designate


the new concept of "nation," and the term was adopted by the Young Turks and the Kemalists. It is well known that through the crisis that was precipitated by the First World War, Ziya Gökalp's slogan was: Türkleşmek, İslamaşmak, Muasırlasmak (Turkification, Islamization, Modernization). To the credit of the Young Turks, it must be pointed out that they gave a realistic content to their nationalist aspirations and did not dissipate their resources on dreams of Asian conquests.

After its acceptance in Turkey, Turanism—still academic and romantic in character and amorphous in its directives—became the vanguard of Turkish patriotism. Inspired by the works of Léon Cahun, who was more of a poet than a historian, a large number of papers and periodicals, such as Turan and Rumeli, both of Salonica, and Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) and Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) of Istanbul, and clubs, like the Türk Ocağı (Turkish Hearth), became powerful vehicles of Pan-Turanism. Two educational institutions, one inside Turkey and the other outside, exerted a conspicuous influence in the development of Turanism—the universities of Istanbul and Kazan. Prior to 1914 from these two centers there was a constant flow of books and newspapers, and many young men came to study at Istanbul from the lands of Turan. The cultural contacts between the Turks of the Ottoman and Russian Empires continued uninterrupted during the period between the Russian uprisings of 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War. During that crucial decade, Baku, Kazan, Tomsk, Astrakhan, and a dozen other towns had one or more Turkic newspapers which published contributions by writers from Turkey, who were interested in Turan.

When the Committee of Union and Progress established its headquarters in Salonica (1906), it relied heavily upon Turanist intellectuals. Their number increased rapidly after the brief experiment with Ottomanism during the Young Turkish Revolution. Ziya Gökalp, who saw the futility, or

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32. See Heyd, pp. 149-151.
33. Hartmann noted that, like Pan-Slavism, Turanism received much from the work of scholars, men like Vambéry, Barthold, Thomsen, Von Lecoq, who paved the way for the Turanian Society founded in Budapest in 1911. See M. Hartmann, "Le panislamisme et le pantouranisme," Revue du Monde Musulman, XXII (1913), 194. The Turanian Society published an international journal, Turan, which lasted until the end of the First World War.
34. His Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des origines à 1405 (Paris, 1896), which appeared in Turkish translation in 1899, had an enormous impact on Turkish historical thought. Cf. B. Lewis, Middle Eastern Affairs, IV, 221-222.
35. Notable in this connection are the words of Djemal Pasha (Memories of a
the insincerity, of Ottomanism, acquired even greater prestige, as he assumed the role of ideological mentor of the Young Turkish triumvirate and later of Mustafa Kemal, the future Atatürk. Ziya Gökalp's poem "Turan" contains the essence of Turanism. Its most quoted lines are:

The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan;
Their country is a broad and everlasting land—Turan.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, he published the "Red Ballad" (Kızıl Destan), characterized by strong anti-Russian bias:

The land of the enemy shall be devastated;
Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan. * * * 36 37 38 39 40

And further on:

Now there are no tribes, no separate khans or beys,
But only a great Turan with a single Ilkhan.

It may well be that the unity envisaged in these last verses is spiritual rather than political, since a Pan-Turkic empire was difficult to achieve even in case of German victory.

Ziya Gökalp's ideal of spiritual unity found an encouraging echo within the Russian Empire. Pioneers in the Pan-Turanian movement were Shihab ed-Din el-Mardjani (1815-89) and Abd-ul-Kayyam en-Nasseri of Kazan (1824-1902). The Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinski, alias Gaspirali (1851-1914), born near Bahçesaray, and profoundly conscious of his Turkism, preached "the union of all Turks in language, in thought, and in action." He was the founder of the newspaper Tercumân (Interpreter) at Bahçesaray. His wife, Sahra Hanum, was a sister of Yusuf Akçuraoğlu (1876-1933), a Volga Turk who spent his childhood in Istanbul and returned to Russia via Paris shortly after the 1905 revolution, when the restrictions on the racial minorities were abolished. Between the Russian and the Young Turkish revolutions, Akçuraoğlu was active as a member of the (Russian) Constitutional Democratic Party and as a propagandist and publisher (jointly with Ayaz Ishaki) of the daily Kazan Muhbiri (Kazan Corres-

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38. From the same source; Heyd, op. cit., p. 128.
In 1908 he came to Istanbul and three years later he founded the journal *Türk Yurdu*.

Yusuf Aşçuroğlu's lectures on Djenghiz Khan and Tamerlane were sensational events in the intellectual life of Turkey of that time. They were published and widely circulated. The central theme in both was that the Turks founded the greatest empire in history, either as political leaders or as warriors, and that Turkic blood had the power to regenerate a corrupt, senescent, and confused society. Like other Pan-Turanists, Aşçuroğlu (later simply Aşçura) was opposed to Islamic traditionalism and Arabic and Persian culture. Islam, it was alleged, had been used against Turkism by the enemies of the Turks, and with its fatalistic creed it had sapped the vitality of the Turkish people. Islamic history, according to Aşçura, falls into three periods—Arab, Persian, and Turkish. The third will outshine the other two. The Turkic element will dominate henceforth in the history of Turkey, of Islam, and of civilization, because of its inherent values that stem back to the origins of the "gifted" Uralo-Altaic race.

In the same sense that Ziya Gökalp was Mustafa Kemal's national theorist, Yusuf Aşçura was the great leader's historical philosopher. He, more than anyone else, was the father of the ultra-nationalist theory that received official endorsement in Turkey in the 1930's. With its militant and romantic character, it is not surprising that Turanism had not only followers but also critics and opponents. One of them, the author Ahmed Ferid, pointed out that the Turkish people must be strictly conservative in their foreign relations and must not be swayed by desires for adventure. "Turanism, though only a dream today, antagonizes Russia. Occupying ourselves with the Turks beyond our frontier is like playing with bombs... It is our duty to devote ourselves to the physical, spiritual, economic, and social development of the Ottoman Turks." And Ali Kemal, director of the Cairo daily *Türk*, added sarcasm to invective. "We could not defend the Crimea, which is inhabited by Tatars, a sort of Turks; must we now strive for the unification of the Turks of all Asia?" But these dissenting voices were drowned in the protests of...
Turanian enthusiasts who were determined to uphold the memory of Djenghiz Khan and Tamerlane not merely as great conquerors but also as champions of Turkic civilization.

The influence of both Gökalp and Akçura during the Atatürk era (1923 - 38) explains the persistence of Turanian relics. The Turkish language theory, the theory of the origin of Western civilization, the attempt to purge Turkish of Persian and Arabic words, the appearance of names like Attila, Timur, Alp, Ertoğrul, Babur, the symbol of the gray she-wolf (which was on the standards of the Tu-Kiu in the sixth century A.D. and of the Turkish army during the First World War and also on the Republic's currency and stamps after the war), the keen interest in pre-Islamic Turkish history—all these show that Turanism remained as a cultural force after it had been sacrificed politically at the altar of Turkish-Soviet friendship in the early years of New Turkey.

The memory of the Young Turk Enver Pasha, dying (on August 4, 1922) in a foredoomed attempt to arouse Turkestan against the Soviet Union, was not obliterated, though his policy was officially disavowed by Mustafa Kemal. During the National Liberation War, Kemal needed all the help that the Soviet Union could give him. The slogan then was: "Turkey for the Turks." After liberation, Turkey wanted peace and the Soviets' good will in order to build a modern Republic. The problems of the Soviet Union were analogous to those of Turkey after the First World War and even during the first half of the interwar period. To face realistically the dangers that threatened them both, Turkey and Russia settled their territorial problems peacefully, Turkey giving up Batum, to which she was entitled after Brest-Litowsk, and which was occupied by Kemal's forces at the end of the war, and Russia relinquishing Kars and Ardahan, which she had conquered in the conflict of 1877-78. In an atmosphere of Turk-Russian entente, 131 Turkologists and national delegates met at Baku from February 26 to March 6, 1926, and departed with an expressed desire to cooperate culturally in the years ahead.

Today Turanism cannot be placed in the same category as Turkish Pan-Islamism or Ottomanism. For one thing, Turanism is of more recent background. An abortive attempt to bring it to life was made, doubtless with German encouragement, during the Second World War. Turanist periodicals,

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bearing the evocative names of Bozkurt (Gray Wolf) and Tanrıataş (Mountain of God—a legendary place in Central Asia), appeared on the newsstands, and at least two secret societies, Gürem and Gökburu, were founded. A "Turkish Cultural Union," organized in 1942, announced as its aim the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Eastern Turks and it held public celebrations with an elaborate program drawn from all the lands of Turan. To allay Soviet complaints, the Turkish government took repressive measures against these societies, and, finally, when the outcome of the war was more than predictable, it brought to trial (September 8, 1944) twenty-three Pan-Turanists, led by the historian Zeki Velidi Togan, a professor at the University of Istanbul. Accused of "subversive" activities, "fascism," and "racism," a good part of the defendants were sentenced to imprisonment. Official spokesmen, from President İnönü down, alluded to the fact that the Soviet Union was Turkey's only friend during the War of Independence.49

With the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations since 1945, Turanism is not devoid of interest. One may debate whether it can be aroused from its lethargic state by militant groups in Turkey or among the twenty-five or so million Eastern Turks, now citizens of the Soviet Union.50 These groups may be motivated by sympathy for, or opposition to Turkey's political orientation, but whatever course they choose to take, a Turanist revival is likely to influence the future of Turkic peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

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East in World Affairs (Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 142 - 143, 145 - 146. For the propaganda resorted to by Germany during the First World War, see Czaplicka, op. cit., pp. 9, 118 - 120; Jäschke, op. cit., pp. 10 - 51.

49. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 146.