EVANGELOS KOFOS

ATTEMPTS AT MENDING THE GREEK-BULGARIAN ECCLESIASTICAL SCHISM (1875-1902)

The decision of the Grand Synod of June 1872 to declare the Bulgarian Exarchate schismatic put an end to repeated efforts for reconciliation in Greek-Bulgarian ecclesiastical relations. The field was now wide open for nationalist confrontation.

Undoubtedly, the decision was favourably received by the most nationalised elements on both sides. On the Greek side, they believed that the Schism would provide an adequate barrier to the expansion of Bulgarian nationalism in the mixed regions of Thrace and Macedonia. On the Bulgarian side, they expected that the struggle for ecclesiastical autonomy would harden into a general nationalist movement in the disputed regions. For the Ottomans the Schism offered the reassurance that the Christian subjects would not find it easy to rise jointly against Ottoman rule.

It was precisely this negative aspect of the Schism, that raised much concern among advocates of an all-Balkan cooperation. Strangely enough, the most concerned of all was the architect of the independence of the Bulgarian Church, that staunch supporter of the emerging Bulgarian nationalism,

Count Nikolai Ignatiev, Russian Ambassador at the Porte. Certainly, he had worked hard to see the realization of the dream of so many Bulgarians. But he had equally endeavoured—even to the point of causing ill feelings among the most nationalist Bulgarians—that this achievement should not ruin the chances of his most-cherished objective, namely a pro-Russian alliance of the Balkan peoples against the Ottoman Empire. Having failed to avert the Schism, he set himself the task to mend it.

What were really the chances for such a course in the mid-'70’s? Among the Greeks, there were still those who condemned the extreme measure of the Schism, for ruining the chances for a Balkan rapprochement. Such voices were weak, but they could be heard both in Athens and Constantinople. In the mixed regions, however, of Thrace and Macedonia, the struggle over the control of the local churches and schools hardened nationalist feelings. Indeed, many Greeks thought that the ecclesiastical conflict would block the spreading of Bulgarian nationalist agitation among the peasantry.

The first opportunity for an agreement

The uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer and autumn of 1875, gave rise to speculations for the reopening of the Eastern Question. For Ignatiev, there was no time to loose. Having cultivated very close ties with Grand Vezier Mahmoud Nedim, he convinced him to take the initiative to mediate a solution to the ecclesiastical dispute. Early in 1876, the Porte set up a Mixed Commission of two Greek and two Bulgarian Ottoman administrators to work on a compromise proposal. The Patriarch and the Exarch were not directly involved, but they directed the deliberations behind the scenes. It is interesting to note that the Greek Ambassador at Constantinople, Andreas Koundouriotis, was kept in the dark until the very end of the deliberations.

2. On Ignatiev’s efforts to mend the Schism, see Meininger, op. cit., pp. 90-96. Anti-Russian feelings among a segment of the Constantinople Greeks, echoed in the pages of Thraki, demanded that the Russian Church should endorse the Schism and in case it refused should also be declared schismatic. Koundouriotis Archives (KA), Koundouriotis to Trikoupis, No. 2353, 20.6/2.7.1875.

3. Kofos, O Ellinismos..., op. cit., pp. 25-29. From Monastir, Consul Petros Logothetis expressed the opinion that the Schism would force the Bulgarians to join the Uniate Church. If this happened, the Russians might find it to their interest to support the Ecumenical Patriarch against the dissident Bulgarians. AYE/76/1/1872, Logothetis to For. Ministry, No. 52, 23.2/6.3.1872.

4. Details in Kofos, Greece..., op. cit., pp. 53-57.
Late in February, the agreed text of 15 articles was submitted to Foreign Minister Rashid Pascha who in turn presented it to the Patriarch and the Exarch, indicating his own approval.

Reviewing the text, one is impressed by the meticulous effort to strike an accommodating balance between the ecclesiastical and national claims of both sides. It appears that the emphasis was placed on satisfying the Patriarchate's sensitivities over ecclesiastical rules, precedence and jurisdiction, without placing a break on Bulgarian immediate and long-term national objectives. Briefly speaking the agreement provided for the recognition of a self-governing Bulgarian Exarchate, under the nominal spiritual authority of the Patriarchate, operating within a clearly defined territory. Outside this territory, in regions inhabited by Bulgarians, the people could elect Bulgarian priests and choreopiskopoi, to be ordained, however, by the local Metropolitan of the Patriarchate, to whom they would be responsible. Similar rights were to be conferred on Greeks living within regions passing to the Exarchate. Churches, schools and other communal property were to remain in the hands of the members of the parish in whose language the Church service had always been conducted. The minority sect, however, could build and administer its own churches and schools. The thorny boundary issue, was regulated by Art. 15. All the Macedonian bishoprics remained under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. The Exarchate received the bishoprics, more or less of present-day Bulgaria, with the following reservations: the districts of Philippopolis, Varna, Mesimvria, and Anchialos, with large Greek populations, would revert to the Exarchate. The Bulgarian communities within these provinces would be detached and joined to neighbouring Bulgarian bishoprics. Varna, Mesimvria and Anchialos would then form one Greek entity under the name of Province of Varna, while Philippopolis would form a second Greek province. Both of these would have the right to elect their own Greek Metropolitan and clergy, but the Metropolitan would have to be ordained by the Exarch.

The Bulgarians were offered official recognition of their Church and jurisdiction over the Northern Thracian bishoprics. Although Southern Thrace and Macedonia were excluded, provisions were made for the establishment of Bulgarian religious and educational institutions in these regions. On its part, the Patriarchate could be satisfied with the provision that the Exarchate would be established according to the canons of the Church and would acknowledge the precedence of Constantinople. Moreover, the Exarchate could not expand its jurisdiction to regions outside its confines, even in districts where there were Bulgarian majorities.  

5. See Appendix "A" for full text of the Mixed Commission's Report.
Thus, the Patriarchate won most of its claims of an ecclesiastical order, while the Bulgarians appeared to gain most of their national objectives. This is why much opposition was voiced against this agreement when its terms became known in Athens. When, however, Patriarch Joachim II confided to Koundouriotis that he intended to ask that the districts of Philippopolis and Hankioy be ceded to the Patriarchate in exchange for certain northern Macedonian districts, the Greek Government appeared satisfied to go along with the scheme, provided certain amendments were accepted. These referred neither to ecclesiastical precedence nor even to the geographical limits of the Exarchate (provided the proposals on Philippopolis and Hankioy were accepted). Rather, they aimed at the curtailment of any Bulgarian ecclesiastical or educational activity in regions to remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. In addition the Greek Government asked the Patriarch to obtain the consent of the Bulgarians or the Russians to the recognition of the ecclesiastical boundaries as the national boundaries between Bulgarians and Greeks within the Ottoman Empire; an unrealistic request which Joachim II had no difficulty in explaining why he could not endorse.

Undoubtedly the Greeks in Athens did not react in unison. Those who believed that the Schism was, indeed, beneficial to long-range Greek aspirations—and such were among others the members of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters, as well as Foreign Minister A. Kontostavlos—tried to put forward such terms that the Bulgarians would have no choice but to turn them down. Others, including Prime Minister A. Koumoundouros, who believed in Balkan collaboration at some not too distant date, were more moderate. To judge from a private letter sent to Ambassador Koundouriotis by King George in March 1876, the Greek monarch appeared, at this time, to view favourably the proposed compromise, on the basis of the Patriarch’s recommendations. Meanwhile, at Constantinople, the extremist supporters of the Schism, mainly influential Greeks originating from Northern Thrace and Macedonia, were exerting much pressure on the Patriarch against the ratification of the agreement.

Given Ignatiev’s determination and the Porte’s support, such opposition could have been overridden were it not for rapid political developments which altered drastically the prerequisites for an agreement. In April, the Bulgarians

6. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1874-76. The Greek Government’s instructions appear in the dispatches to Constantinople Nos. 3273, 25.2/8.3.1876; 556, 2/14.3.76; 17 (secret), 29.3/10.4.76. Koundouriotis’ relevant replies are in Nos. 597, 17/29.2.76; 715, 26.2/9.3.76; 785, 2/14.3.76; 833, 12/24.3.76; 1224, 9/21.4.76; 1874, 12/24.5.76.
7. KA, King George to A. Koundouriotis, 9/21.3.76 (handwritten, private).
revolted, soon to be followed by a declaration of war on the Ottomans by Serbs and Montenegrins. On 11 May, Ignatiev's friend Mahmoud Nedim was replaced as Grand Vezier by the anti-Russian Midhat Pasha, who realized that a general crisis was rapidly approaching. In his view, the Porte had no interest to work for the conciliation of its Christian subjects, but rather for the widening of their differences. Under the circumstances, discussions on the proposed plan were left incomplete.

San Stefano and the Schism

During the Russo-Turkish war, it was not possible to undertake serious initiatives to bring about a Greek-Bulgarian reconciliation on the ecclesiastical issue. Yet, the Bulgarian Exarch Iosif showed interest in renewing negotiations. Koundouriotis expressed himself in favour of the idea, believing that it was to Hellenism's long-range interests to draw the geographical lines between Greeks and Bulgarians, even if these were merely boundaries of an ecclesiastical nature. But he was categorical against any idea of imposing by force such an agreement, as Sultan Abdul Hamid appeared to favour. Writing on 8/20 June 1877 he warned:

"The Sultan might enforce a solution on the Bulgarians, taking advantage of prevailing circumstances. This, however, would have no practical value for Hellenism, because when the time comes and peace is imposed on Turkey, as it is likely to happen, Russia would compel the Sublime Porte to recall its decision, to the detriment of Hellenism and the Great Church. For this reason, we ought to work so that conciliation might not be imposed but rather come about willingly and sincerely by both sides."

The Greek Government, however, took a negative attitude. Other issues

8. Writing a year later, Koundouriotis confirmed that agreement on the Patriarch's amended draft, which had been endorsed by the Greek Government, would have been reached were it not for Mahmud Nedim's replacement by Midhat Pasha. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1877, No. 1846, 25.5/6.6.77.

9. Midhat was reported to have approached certain influential anti-Russian Constantinople Greeks offering them the Porte's support in overthrowing Joachim II, who appeared ready to accept the lifting of the Schism. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1876-78, Koundouriotis to Kontostavlos, No. 1874, 12/24.5.76.

10. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1877, Koundouriotis to Koumoundouros, No. 1846, 25.5/6.6.77 and to Trikoupis, No. 2065, 8/20.6.77.
had priority and discussions on the Schism could wait. Its fate, as, indeed, that of all outstanding questions in the Balkans, would be resolved in the battlefields rather than around a conference table.

The war ended triumphantly for the Russians. No doubt the terms of the Adrianople Armistice (and subsequently the preliminaries of peace signed at San Stefano on 3 March 1878) were enthusiastically acclaimed by the Bulgarians and Ignatiev. The latter, however, could hardly conceal his concern about the durability of this edifice. He was aware of the strong opposition of the other European Powers and their intention to use the Greeks as an excuse for demanding major revisions of the San Stefano terms. If the Greeks could be lured—even at such a late stage—to come to terms with the Bulgarians over their ecclesiastical dispute, then the British and Austrians would loose their "Greek card".  

Russian approaches to Greek ecclesiastical and lay leaders in Constantinople for mending the Schism, took place in February and March 1878. The argument now was based on the assumption that since the Bulgarians had acquired their own state, the Exarch needed no more have his seat in Constantinople. This would relieve the Patriarch of what constituted in his eyes the most obnoxious clause of the 1870 firman. No doubt the Patriarchate circles at that moment were uncertain and perplexed. Thus, the Russian initiative appeared promising. If they could induce the Bulgarians to accept the Patriarchate’s jurisdiction over the Northern Thracian dioceses, where a sizeable Greek element lived, then the mending of the Schism might not be so harmful. The arrival in Constantinople, at that critical moment, of the Metropolitan of Beotia, David, who—as it was rumored—was conveying similar views of leading circles in the Greek capital, increased the excitement among the Greeks, both in the Kingdom and in Constantinople. 

This time, however, the Greek Government lost no time to instruct his Ambassador to exert all possible pressure on the Patriarch, including, if necessary, the instigation of popular demonstrations, in order to restrain him from entering into negotiations with the Russians on the ecclesiastical issue. On his part, King George even addressed an appeal to Layard, the British

12. British Museum/Layard Papers/Add. Mss. 39019, Wyndham (Athens) to Layard (Constantinople), 20.3.78 (private). PRO/FO 32, 496, Wyndham to Derby, No. 167, 22.3.78. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1878, Koundouriotis to Delyannis, Nos. 648, 10/22.3.78; 666, 12/24.3.78; 679, 13/25.3.78; and Delyannis to Koundouriotis, Nos. 752, 17/29.3.78 and 767, 18/30.3.78.
Ambassador at Constantinople, to use his own influence with the Patriarch\(^1\). Such maneuverings, however, proved unnecessary. Toward the end of March, the terms of San Stefano became known. Greek violent reaction to them was such that the Patriarch lost no time to disclaim any intention to act contrary to public opinion. In tears, he confided to Koundouriotis that he had no other thought but to serve, as best as possible, the interests of Hellenism. If some Greek newspapers in Constantinople had supported the idea of conciliation with the Bulgarians, they would be instructed to withdraw their support\(^14\).

*The initiatives of Patriarch Joachim III*

The Berlin Congress averted the catastrophe the Greeks had feared. Late in 1878, a new Patriarch, Joachim III, former Metropolitan of Varna and Thessaloniki, was elected. Immediately he tried to take advantage of the Exarch’s absence from Constantinople. Arguing that an autonomous Bulgarian state had been established, he asked the Porte not to allow the return of the Bulgarian prelate to Constantinople who should remain in Sofia, with jurisdiction in the Bulgarian Principality and possibly Eastern Rumelia. He further demanded that Bulgarian bishops, who had been assigned to certain northern dioceses in Macedonia, should not be allowed to take their posts, while the Porte should officially acknowledge the existence of the Schism and accept the Patriarchate’s request that Bulgarian priests in Ottoman regions be compelled to wear different attire so as to be distinguished from Greek orthodox clergy. The Porte, however, turned a deaf ear to these demands. In the midst of the chaotic post-Berlin period, the Ottoman Government was not eager to open up new problems with its Christian subjects and especially with Russia which was certain to uphold the case of the Bulgarians\(^15\).

Early in 1880, Joachim tried to internationalize the ecclesiastical dispute with the Bulgarians. In a detailed memorandum to the ambassadors of the European Powers at the Porte he presented a well documented exposition of his case. But the ambassadors and their governments had other more pressing

\(^{13}\) Br. Mus./LP/Add.Mss. 39019, Wyndham to Layard, 26.3.78 and 3.4.78 (both private).

\(^{14}\) Br. Mus./LP/Add.Mss. 39131, Layard to Wyndham, 27.3.78 (private), and PRO/FO 424/69, Layard to Derby, No. 397, 23.3.78. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1878, Koundouriotis to Delyannis, No. 772, 22.3/3.4.78; KA, Koundouriotis to Delyannis, Nos. 609, 8/20.3.78 and 959, 5/17.4.78.

\(^{15}\) AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1879, Koundouriotis to Delyannis, No. 1638, 22.5/3.6.79 and to Koumoundouros, No. 323, 1/13.2.1880.
issues to solve and ignored the Patriarch's pleadings\textsuperscript{16}.

Certainly the position of the Patriarchate in the years after the Eastern Crisis had weakened, and its jurisdiction curtailed. Joachim was aware of these developments. The last approaches to the foreign ambassadors convinced him that he could expect no help from Russia's adversaries. Not even the Greek Government could offer him meaningful assistance in facing the Porte's demands for the curtailment of certain age-old prerogatives of the Great Church. Indeed, the state of hostility that prevailed in Greek-Turkish relations in the years following the Congress of Berlin, rendered Greek demarches to the Porte in favour of the Patriarchate futile\textsuperscript{17}. Under the circumstances, there was no other way for Joachim but to seek an understanding with Russia.

On their part, the Russians appeared eager to do what they could to regain their influence with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. From the summer of 1878 to 1880, the Russian Government tried to maintain a balance between Greeks and Bulgarians on the ecclesiastical issue. As a matter of fact, the new Russian Ambassador at Constantinople Evgeni Novikov appeared to favour the Patriarch over the Exarch on a number of points, particularly those of an ecclesiastical nature, which could affect the prestige of the Patriarch. Moreover, the Russian Church, which had not joined the Grand Synod of 1872 in voting for the Schism, had avoided offending the Ecumenical Patriarchate by entering into spiritual communion with the Bulgarian Exarchate. And this line continued to uphold after the Congress of Berlin. Thus, both the Russian Government and Church appeared as suitable mediators in the Greek-Bulgarian dispute\textsuperscript{18}. It is true that throughout 1880-1, and to a lesser extent in 1882-3, Joachim conducted unofficial negotiations with the Russians, without prior consultation with the Greek Government. Various approaches toward finding a solution were tried, but they hinged frequently on canonical as well as political considerations. A thorny problem remained the removal of the Bulgarian Exarchate from Constantinople and its confinement to the Bulgarian Principality and possibly Eastern Rumelia. Joachim, however, had no much space to manoeuvre as there was much opposition to his initiatives not only from the

\textsuperscript{16} AYE, 99/2, 1880, Koundouriotis to Delyannis, No. 323, 1/13.2.1880.


\textsuperscript{18} Kiril, \textit{Balgarskata Exarkhia...}, op. cit., I, a, pp. 660-1, 663, 666-8.
Greek Government but also from influential ecclesiastical and lay leaders in Constantinople. On a parallel line, the Bulgarians faced with serious internal issues and the question of Eastern Rumelia, realized that the continuation of the Schism would be to the detriment of their national interests, particularly in Macedonia. Thus, after the crushing of the Kresna-Razlog uprising in autumn 1878, certain feelers began to reach the Greeks from the Bulgarian side. No sooner had a Greek diplomatic agent been appointed to Sofia, when Prince Alexander took the initiative to convey to him his views on reaching a Greek-Bulgarian understanding on conflicting claims in Macedonia, as well as on mending the Schism. In the event, he considered a solution to the latter as the starting point for an agreement on other outstanding issues. To flatter the sensitivities of the Greek clergy, he proposed that the Bulgarian Exarch ask for the Patriarch’s pardon as a prerequisite to any agreement. If the Greeks responded favourably, he wished to conduct personally and secretly all relevant negotiations with the Greek Government, apparently in order to avoid pressure by the most extremist elements within the Bulgarian Church and among the Bulgarian public. The Prince, and probably members of the Government, appeared to be encouraged in their hope for a Greek-Bulgarian understanding, by a report from Balavanov, the newly-appointed Bulgarian agent in Constantinople, who reported, in July 1880, that the Greek ambassador to the Porte, Andreas Koundouriotis shared his views for an understanding on Macedonia and Thrace.

19. Numerous detailed dispatches from Koundouriotis in 1880-1883 contain valuable details on this issue. In some of them, the Greek ambassador attached the original, unsigned letters written to him by Patriarch Joachim III. Koundouriotis, however, had insight information on Joachim’s initiatives from certain lay and religious leaders who opposed Joachim. (Files of the Constantinople Embassy, in AYE, for the period 1880-1884).

20. AYE/Sofia Legation/1880, Vyzantios (Sofia) to Trikoupis, No. 9, 15/27.9.80.

21. As reported by Balavanov, Koundouriotis, speaking personally, indicated that Eastern Rumelia was Bulgarian, that Macedonia should be divided between Greeks and Bulgarians, with its northern part ceded to the Bulgarian Principality. If these issues were thus settled, the Greek diplomat believed that the two countries will be able to establish stable relations and no third power could intervene. He even suggested that the two sovereigns discuss the problem personally. Text of Balavanov’s memorandum in: Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vanshnata Politika na Balgaria, I, 1879-1886, Sofia, 1978, p. 122. Also, Elena Statelova, Diplomatsiata na Kniazestvo Balgaria, 1879-1886, Sofia, 1979, p. 127 and 148-9. Reporting on his conversation with Balavanov, Koundouriotis informed his superiors in Athens, that it was Balavanov who took the initiative to propose that the two countries should collaborate in Macedonia and reach an agreement, because otherwise the Austrians
The Greek response was not encouraging. In no uncertain terms Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis instructed Vyzantios, the Greek agent at Sofia, to avoid entering into such talks, because, in his view, the Bulgarians were not yet in a position to appraise, in a conciliatory manner, the issues that divided the two peoples. Nevertheless, he was to continue working for friendly relations between the two countries. Trikoupis' views were endorsed by the new Koumoundouros government22.

Undoubtedly, the Greek Government’s response was influenced by consular and private reports reaching Athens from Macedonia and Thrace which offered a dark picture to any prospect for reconciliation. Throughout 1879 and 1880, armed Bulgarian incursions into Northern Macedonia had created the impression that the Bulgarians, with Russian aid, were preparing a major coup in Macedonia. On the communal level, daily conflicts between Patriarchists and Exarchists were increasing. Such conflicts, however, tended to strengthen the determination of the Hellenic element of the Macedonian population to withstand Bulgarian proselytizing efforts in the mixed regions23. As a result, the view that the Schism could act as a barrier to Bulgarian nationalist expansion in the contested zone, was gaining considerable support among leading Greek circles in Athens.

Under the circumstances, Patriarch Joachim’s on and off pourparles with Russians and Bulgarians throughout 1879-1883, strained his relations with the Greek Government and an influential segment of the Greek public opinion. Foreign Minister Kontostavlos, on the counsel of the leaders of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters, went as far as to ask Joachim to convene would profit from their quarrel. On his part, the Greek diplomat indicated that he had no authority to negotiate, but he suggested that if the Bulgarians were sincere, they could approach the Greek Government in Athens. His personal views, however, coincided with Balavanov's. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1880, to Trikoupis No. 2523, 28.7/9.8.80 and to Koumoundouros, No. 3487, 27.10/8.11.80.

22. AYE/Sofia Legation/1880, Trikoupis to Vyzantios, Nos. 1257, 29.7/10.8.80 and 1804, 20.9/2.10.80. Nevertheless, Prince Alexander continued to explore ways of reaching some understanding with the Greeks, including the ecclesiastical issue. He tried to pursue the same line during his Athens visit in 1883, but the Greek Government was not responsive, believing that the time was not yet ripe for such talks as the Bulgarian claims in Thrace and Macedonia were considered far from conciliatory. Kofos, "Dilemmas...", op. cit., pp. 50-51, citing Greek diplomatic archives.

23. AYE. The files of 1879-1881 contain numerous dispatches from the Greek consulates in Thessaloniki, Monastir, Serres and Kavala on this issue. See also, Konstantinos Vakalopoulos, O Voreios Ellinisimos kata tin Proimi Fasi tou Makedonikou Agonai (1878-1894), Thessaloniki, 1983, pp. 79-92.
Mending the Greek-Bulgarian Ecclesiastical Schism

a new Grand Synod to examine and possibly condemn the Russian Orthodox Church for its neutral if not friendly attitude toward the Bulgarian Exarchate—an attitude that was contrary to the Orthodox Church's canons. Understandably, Joachim's response could not satisfy the Greek Government. In no uncertain words, he spelled out the political as well as the ecclesiastical impossibility of carrying out such a request. On his part, he emphasized, he continued to believe that the continuation of the Schism harmed not only the Church but also the long range interests of Hellenism. He even went on to express his strong opposition to the Greek Government's involvement in the educational affairs of the Ottoman Greeks in Macedonia and Thrace, a policy which, in his view, was bound to have adverse effects and strain the relations with the Ottoman Administration.\(^{24}\)

24. The influential leaders of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters adopted a very critical attitude toward Patriarch Joachim not only for his efforts to reach an understanding with the Russians and Bulgarians on the Schism, but also on the question of the administration of Greek education in the Ottoman provinces, particularly in Macedonia (AYE/Macedonian Question/1882, AAGL to Prime Minister Koumoundouros, No. 32, 12/24.1.1882, accusing the Patriarch for leaning too much toward the Slavs, and to Prime Minister Trikoupis, No. 321, 20.3/1.4.1882). Foreign Minister Kontostavlos (in Prime Minister Trikoupis' cabinet) believed that Joachim was ready to make vital concessions on the ecclesiastical issue in order to obtain Russian support in his feud with the Porte over the question of the Patriarchate's privileges on educational and social matters (AYE, "Circulars", 1884, Kontostavlos to Logothetis, No. 513, 5/17.4.1884). The quotation for Kontostavlos' instructions to Koundouriotis (AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1883, No. 626, 3/15.6.1883) is revealing:

"It is known that the Russian Church, in violation of indisputable [canonical] principles not only refrained from anathematizing and ostracising those so condemned by the Grand Synod of Constantinople [1872], but it did not cease to offer them its moral support. This, in my view, is the canonical and ecclesiastical question raised by the Russian Church's behaviour on the Bulgarian Schism...
If the Great Church had insisted, on a purely canonical basis, that the Russian Church declare the Bulgarians officially as schismatics, then it could have forced the Russian Church and the Russian Government into a very difficult position. The Great Church, however, considered more politic—probably rightly so—not to make such a démarche for the time being. [But this decision] offered the Russian Church a way out from its predicament on a canonical issue".

Kontostavlos went on to reiterate the view that a new Synod should be convened to isolate the Russian Church, even though there was the risk that Romanians, Serbs and Montenegrins might side with the Russians. The Patriarch's views on all these points had been outlined in a long conversation and letter to Koundouriotis (his dispatch No. 1271, 24.5/6.6.1883). Joachim explained that the Russian Church had not yet entered into canonical relations with
In the end, Joachim’s real problems developed with the Porte. On assuming his office, he had tried to obtain the Administration’s support to certain requests involving Bulgarian ecclesiastical claims in Macedonia. More specifically, he had asked for the withdrawal of berats to Bulgarian bishops to certain Macedonian dioceses and the compulsion of Bulgarian Exarchist clergy to wear different religious attire in order to be distinguished from the Patriarchist priests. The Porte had turned down both requests. Worse yet, it had began to curtail certain of the Patriarchate’s age-old privileges, particularly in matters of ecclesiastical justice and education. Both issues, being of cardinal importance, led to an open crisis between the Patriarchate and the Porte, and finally compelled Joachim to resign in protest.

What the Greeks at the time failed to appreciate was that Bulgarian-Russian political relations were similarly worsening. Despite much support given to the Bulgarians on a number of issues, the Tsar and his Government, as well as the leadership of the Russian Church, had tried to restrain excessive Bulgarian claims on the ecclesiastical issue and convince them to accept some of the Patriarchate’s requests, more specifically the removal of the Exarch’s seat from Constantinople. As, however, the prospects for improvement of Russo-Bulgarian relations deteriorated, the ability of Russian diplomacy to mediate the Patriarchate-Exarchate feud became meagre.

_A decade of abortive efforts (1885-1896)_

Meanwhile, in Athens the debate was going on. Responding to a pamphlet the Bulgarian Exarchate and its ability to act as mediator was still valid. The convocation of a new Synod, from a canonical aspect, had no basis. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Sultan would give the necessary permission, while it was almost certain that all the other Balkan Orthodox Churches would side with the Russians, at a great loss of prestige for the Great Church. Joachim still believed that the great danger to Hellenism in Macedonia was not the existence of a Bulgarian Church, but the prospect of the dissemination of Bulgarian education through the rapid growth of the number of Bulgarian schools established with the assistance of the Bulgarian Government.

25. When Joachim was asked by the Greek Government to return to the Ecumenical throne (1901), he wrote a long memorandum in which he strongly criticized Greek official policy in Macedonia after the Congress of Berlin, for attempting to subject the Church’s officials under the tutelage of the Greek diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire. Quoted by E. Kofos, “Agones gia tin Apeleftherosi, 1830-1912” _Makedonia: 4000 Chronia Ellinikis Istorias kai Politismou_, (Athens, Ekdotiki Athinon, 1982), pp. 460, 555-6. On Joachim's resignation in 1884: AYE/“Circulars”/1884, Koundouriotis to Kontostavlos, No. 868, 3/15.4.1884.
written by the Imperial Commissioner to the Russian Church Povodonotchev, Professor of Theology N. Damalas issued in 1884 his own pamphlet “Réponse au mémoire de l’Honorabe M. Povodonotchef” which summarized the views held by a segment of the Greeks on the ecclesiastical issue. According to Damalas, the Exarch’s jurisdiction should be limited to the Bulgarian Principality and Eastern Rumelia, while the Patriarch’s authority in the Ottoman provinces should be supreme. In Macedonia, however, a line could be drawn, leaving to the Patriarch the regions up and including the dioceses of Nevrokop, Meleniko, Strumnitsa, Monastir and Korytsa. North of that line, the dioceses should be assigned to Bulgarian bishops. Despite the fact that this brochure was translated into French and sent by the Greek Foreign Ministry to all Greek missions abroad, its contents were criticized as damaging to Greek national interests by other influential Greeks, among them Professor of history C. Papparigopoulos and the leaders of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters.

Following Joachim’s resignation in March 1884, his successor, Patriarch Dionysios V pursued an unbending attitude towards the Bulgarians which hardened even more after the proclamation of the union of Eastern Rumelia with the Bulgarian Principality in 1885.

For the next decade other issues took precedence, such as the question of granting or denying by the Porte of new berats for Bulgarian bishops in Macedonian dioceses, as well as internal problems within the two quarreling camps. The latter sprang from the steady assertion of the initiative of the respective national states over the traditional ecclesiastical establishments which hitherto commanded a leading role on all issues involving the fellow nationals in the Ottoman provinces. Nowhere was this contest more pronounced than in the administration and control of education which traditionally had been dominated by the Church. As schools became the harbinger of national ideas, the lay leaders of the communities and the teachers, supported by the representatives of the national states—consuls, agents, national...


27. AYE/Telegrams/1885, Koundouriotes to Kontostavlos, No. 252, 25.1/6.2.1885, attaching long memorandum addressed by Patriarch Dionysios to the Porte complaining of the Porte’s concessions to the Bulgarians since 1870, and requesting the withdrawal of the Exarch from Constantinople and of the Bulgarian bishops from Macedonian dioceses.
societies—sought to curtail the former dominant role of the local bishops²⁸.

In such a climate, as nationalism swept more and more the leaders and the masses, confrontation rather than conciliation was bound to be the logical consequence. Under the circumstances, the maintainance of the Schism appeared in certain quarters to be useful. On the Bulgarian side, it provided a rallying point for whipping up nationalist belligerency among the elites as well as the peasantry, which gradually began to realize that, after all, it was not that damning to be called "schismatic". On the Greek side, it helped to retain the loyalties to Hellenism of a significant segment of the Slav-speaking inhabitants who did not wish to compromise their allegiance to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and to traditional loyalties and values²⁹.

Certainly an equally strong setback for the advocates of reconciliation and the mending of the Schism was dealt by the deterioration of Russo-Bulgarian relations, following the annexation of Eastern Rumelia. Undoubtedly, Russian leaders had not ceased to endeavour for a rapprochement between the two Orthodox peoples and particularly their Churches. The belief that Russian interests in the Balkans would better be served in alliance with the Orthodox ethnic groups and national states of the region, had not been abandoned. The Schism remained a focal point of antagonism that had to be removed, at best with Russian mediation. Nevertheless, Russia's mediating role

²⁸. On Bulgarian educational policies in Macedonia and Thrace during 1878-1885 and the Exarchate's leading role at the time, see: Voin Bozinov, "Balgarskata Prosvetna Deinost v Makedonia i Odrinska Trakia (1878-1885)" in Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Osvoboditelni Borbi na Balgarskoto Naselenie v Makedonia i Odrinska Trakia sled Berlinska Kongres (Sofia, 1981), pp. 5-36. Details on Greek intercommunal friction on educational matters, and particularly the impact of the arrest of prominent Greek Macedonian leaders, with Anastasios Picheon at the head, in 1886; K. Vakalopoulos, O Voreios Ellinismos..., op. cit. and Nikolaos Vlachos, To Makedonikon os Fasis tou Anatolikou Zitimatos, 1878-1908 (Athens, 1935), pp. 104-8.

²⁹. The Greek Consul General at Thessaloniki Dokos believed that the Schism benefited Hellenism: "Our national interests in Macedonia", he wrote, "would suffer certain destruction if the barrier of the Schism were to be removed" (AYE/Thessaloniki Consulate/1887, Dokos to Stefanos Dragounis, No. 652, 23.5/4.6.1887). From the Bulgarian capital, however, another diplomat, Kleon Rangavis, believed that the excommunication of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Schism opened a chasm between the two peoples without benefiting Greek objectives in Eastern Rumelia, Thrace and Macedonia. The ecclesiastical rift stirred fanatical sentiments among the Bulgarians, and encouraged the adoption of oppressive measures against the Hellenic element in both the Principality and Eastern Rumelia. Without the Schism, Rangavis believed that the two peoples would coexist peacefully and work for their respective national interests in Macedonia, without resorting to force. AYE/Sofia Legation/1883, Rangavis to Trikoupis, No. 96, 11/23.2.1883.
had been substantially curtailed, for almost a decade, as a result of the poor state of Russo-Bulgarian relations.\textsuperscript{30}

In the mid-1890's, however, the situation changed. Stambulov, by far not a Russophile, was murdered, and close Russo-Bulgarian relations reverted to their traditional cordial patterns. Once again, Russian political and religious circles began to search for new ways to find a solution to the Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical dispute. They realized that time was running short, as the old ecclesiastical and political dispute was on the verge of turning into an armed confrontation in Macedonia.

Russian feelers in 1895-96 for initiating new discussions on the Schism were first made to Bulgarian religious and political leaders who, in general, responded favourably. The Russians now aimed at bringing about not only a reconciliation between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, but also a rapprochement between the governments of Greece and Bulgaria. At Constantinople the intermediary was Karacanovsky, the Bulgarian physician of the Russian Embassy. Karacanovsky visited the Greek Ambassador N. Mavrocordatos and told him that the Russians were proposing, in return for the recognition of the Bulgarian Church, the acceptance by the Bulgarians of the Ecumenical Patriarch's spiritual authority; the transfer of the Exarch's seat to Sofia, with only a token Bulgarian representation in Constantinople along the lines of similar arrangements of the other Orthodox Churches; the maintenance of the Patriarch's jurisdiction in the Ottoman dioceses in exchange for the appointment of Bulgarian bishops, in the predominantly Bulgarian districts, or even Greek bishops who spoke Bulgarian. Serbian bishops, however, ought to be definitely excluded from Macedonia. Karacanovsky intimated that similar Russian suggestions were made to a Bulgarian delegation visiting St. Petersburg late in 1895 to discuss the baptism of Crown Prince Boris. Both Prince Lovalov and D. Povodonochev, the powerful imperial commissioner to the Russian Church, had been active in canvassing the idea not only of an ecclesiastical, but also of a political understanding between Greeks and Bulgarians. If Karacanovsky is to be believed, these ideas had found the Bulgarian Government and Prince Ferdinand receptive to the point that they concurred to a political solution of their claims in Macedonia. In a final settlement of the Eastern Question, they were willing to consent to Greece annexing the Aegean islands, Epirus and a large part of Macedonia, including Thessaloniki, on condition that Bulgaria acquired access to the Aegean littoral. The future,

however, of Constantinople would not be discussed, at the request of the Russians31.

Whether these ideas had the endorsement of the Bulgarian Government and the Prince cannot be ascertained. What, however, is known is that Ferdinand, as well as certain Bulgarian political leaders, had repeatedly expressed to Greek diplomats their desire to reach an understanding with the Patriarchate and the Greek Government32. Apart from such confidential soundings, some more tangible initiatives developed in 1896, for opening a Greek-Bulgarian dialogue. Early, in 1896, Constantine Caratheodory, a leading Phanariot, visited Sofia as Sultan Abdul Hamid’s representative to attend Crown Prince Boris’ baptism. While in the Bulgarian capital, he was asked by Bulgarian leaders to convey to the Patriarch a proposal for regulating the ecclesiastical dispute. As a basis for an agreement, the Bulgarians were proposing the removal from Constantinople of the Exarch and his substitution with a simple mission of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Church headed by a bishop. A similar proposal was made to N. Mavrocordatos by the Bulgarian agent at Constantinople, in order to enlist the Greek Government’s support. Needless to add, the support of the Russian Government had been assured33.

While these initiatives and soundings gave rise to much speculation and vivid discussions among Greek circles in Constantinople and Athens, a second bolder initiative was undertaken by Prince Ferdinand himself. During his state visit to the Ottoman capital, in March 1896, he took the unprecedented step to pay a personal visit to Patriarch Anthimos at the Phanar. Undoubtedly this was a courageous and well calculated initiative, which would win for himself much credit among leading Russian circles, and, in case of failure, place the onus on the Greeks. Certainly, on both sides, the most nationalist elements looked at these developments with much concern, fearing that their leaders would make concessions which would jeopardize “vital” national interests. The meeting, however, was a complete failure. Neither the Prince

31. AYE/Sofia Legation/1895, Mavrokordatos (Constantinople) to Skouzes, No. 917, 14/26.11.1895. Also, Tombazis (St. Petersburg) to Skouzes, No. 454, 13/25.12.1885. On Russian Ambassador Nelidov’s activities, see: AYE/“Macedonian Consulates-Schism”/1896, Mavrokordatos to Skouzes, No. 123, 28.2/11.3.1896. For Bulgarian-Serbian relations in the 1890’s see papers by R. Bozilova and R. Popov in Osvoboditelni Borbi..., op. cit., pp. 40-73 and 74-111.
32. AYE/Sofia Legation/1895, Argyropoulos to Skouzes, No. 383, 6/18.6.1895 and 823, 31.10/12.11.1895.
33. AYE/“Macedonian Consulates-Schism”/1896, Mavrokordatos to Skouzes, No. 135, 3/15.3.1896.
nor the Patriarch ventured to depart substantially from their respective well-known positions. To judge from Mavrocordatos’ dispatches, Patriarch Anthimos appeared to adopt a hard line on all issues of ecclesiastical nature, emphasizing the need to eradicate all “anti-canonical” irregularities that had led to the establishment of the Exarchate. In his view, only a Local Synod, similar in composition to the one that had declared the Exarchate schismatic in 1872, could repel the Schism. This, the Patriarch insisted, presupposed the annulment of the 1870 firman, the departure of the Exarch from Constantinople and the Bulgarian bishops from Macedonian dioceses. Once these terms were met, the Patriarch would proceed to discuss all outstanding issues concerning the Exarchate which would include the appointment by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Bulgarian bishops to certain districts of the Ottoman Empire, on lines similar to those adopted in the case of Serbian bishops. Faced with such unbending terms, Prince Ferdinand could proceed no further, even if he intended to. Disappointed, he confided to Mavrocordatos that he had found the Patriarch “obstinate” and unmovable.

Certainly Anthimos could not claim the diplomatic dexterity or political foresight of Joachim III. But he could hardly manoeuvre. The situation in Macedonia had worsened, following the previous year’s incursions of armed Bulgarian bands in certain northern Macedonian districts. Already in Athens, the Ethniki Etairia was preparing its own armed bands to enter Macedonia from the south, while in Crete, revolutionary activities were pointing to an imminent outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities. Thus, the failure of the “summit” talks at Constantinople was to a great extend received on both sides with relief. The Greek and the Bulgarian press immediately came out with violent articles against reconciliation, trying to show that it was the other side which had the initiative for the unpopular attempt at a rapprochement.

**The return of Patriarch Joachim (1901) and the Schism**

Despite repeated setbacks, the idea of finding a solution to the ecclesiastical
issue emerged once again during the re-election of Patriarch Joachim III, early in 1901. The deteriorating position of Hellenism within the Ottoman Empire since the debacle of the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, required a strong personality at the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Greek Government of G. Theotokis took the initiative to encourage Joachim—who had secluded himself in Mount Athos since his abdication of 1884—to return to the Ecumenical throne.

The message was brought to him by Ambassador N. Mavrokordatos who visited him in Mylopotamos on the Holy Mountain. Joachim replied frankly on all critical issues which included relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Government, relations between Hellenism and the Balkan peoples, the Russians and the Ottoman state. For the eminent prelate, the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate had a high priority and ought to be safeguarded. While he consented that the Government of the Greek state should take the lead in national questions, its representatives should not interfere in ecclesiastical matters, nor should act in a way that would harm the prestige of the clergy. For the Patriarchate, the support of Russia was of primary importance in order to be able to face the hostility of the Ottomans Administration and the Sultan personally. On the other hand, the continuous conflict between the Balkan states and peoples as well as Greek hostility toward the Russians served only the interests of the Turks. In his view, the Greeks should work for an understanding with the Balkan peoples who, after all, were “co-heirs” with the Greeks in the East. If they sincerely adopted this line, then they could aspire at assuming a leading role among the Balkan peoples. To achieve this, however, peaceful coexistence was a prerequisite. A step in that direction, he concluded, was the abolition of the Schism.

When Joachim’s views—particularly on the Schism—became known in Athens, they raised a storm. Former Minister of Cults Ath. Eftaxias expressed the prevailing opinion at the time in a lengthy study entitled “The Bulgarian Schism." His main thesis was that the Schism had benefited Hellenism as well as the Church because it had sustained and encouraged the Patriarchists in their struggle to withstand Bulgarian incursions into Macedonia. Because of the Schism, a moral barrier had been constructed around the Bulgarian Exarchate and affected negatively its relations with the other Orthodox Churches—including the Russian one—while on the other hand, the Patriarchate’s fundamental interests had been upheld.

36. AYE/Constantinople Embassy/1900, 1901, Mavrokordatos to Romanos, No. 1037, 25.11/7.12.1900, and Romanos to Joachim (Mylopotamos), No. 446, 2/14.3.1901.
37. Text of study attached to Romanos’ letter to Joachim, No. 446, op. cit.
In conclusion, Eftaxias outlined the following prerequisites for lifting the Schism: a) The Bulgarians should abandon racism in ecclesiastical matters and acknowledge that the Exarch cannot be the religious leader of Bulgarians everywhere, but of a concrete geographical region; in this case the Bulgarian Principality (including Eastern Rumelia). Within this region, a self-rulled Bulgarian Church would operate under an Exarch who would appear as the representative of the Ecumenical Patriarch. b) The Bulgarians should relinquish any ecclesiastical claims to the Ottoman-held regions of Thrace and Macedonia. c) In the mixed Greco-Bulgarian regions of former Eastern Rumelia, the Bulgarian Exarch and his Synod should elect bilingual bishops, while the liturgy and education should be conducted in the traditional language (apparently Greek). d) A similar arrangement should be introduced in mixed regions in Thrace and Macedonia where the Ecumenical Patriarch and his Synod should appoint bilingual bishops. e) The linguistic demarcation for the liturgy and education in Macedonia should be drawn along “the prevailing of old linguistic lines”, i.e. Nevrocop-Meleniko-Strumitsa-Stobi (near Cerna Voda)-Axios (Vardar) river-Monastir-Ohrid.

The Greek Government, however, was reluctant to discuss even these terms—or any terms—for lifting the Schism. Foreign Minister Romanos informed Joachim that if negotiations were initiated on the Schism the Patriarchate will find itself under constant pressure for more concessions. Suspecting that Joachim might prove too hard to compromise on his views about the Russians and the Schism, the Greek Government began to have second thoughts about his candidacy to the Ecumenical throne. For a moment it tried to avert it, but in the end it chose to follow a neutral attitude during his election.

Nevertheless, Joachim, on assuming office, gave proof that he was not only a visionary, but also a pragmatist. While cultivating close relations with the Russians—in order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the Sultan—he gave assurances to the Greek Government that on the question of the Schism he would work in close consultation with Athens.

On their part, the Russians did not fail to communicate to the Bulgarians the conciliatory disposition of the newly-elected Patriarch. Despite the pro-Russian climate that prevailed in the Bulgarian capital at the time, Bulgarian ecclesiastical and political leaders appeared negative to any substantial

38. Ibid.
concessions which might sacrifice vital Bulgarian interests in Macedonia and Thrace in exchange for questionable benefits from the lifting of the Schism. Nevertheless, the Danev Government, wishing apparently to accommodate the Russians, ventured to open discussions with the Greeks. Certain indirect feelers were made to the Greek diplomatic representative in Sofia, but were left unanswered. It was evident that the Bulgarians, while they could probably discuss the withdrawal of the Exarch's seat from Constantinople, they would in no way concede to abandoning their gains in Macedonia and Thrace—where they already had secured the appointment of seven prelates—or to forfeiting future advances in the two regions.

Certainly events had overtaken both Greeks and Bulgarians. Even Joachim, the advocate of reconciliation and collaboration, found himself involved in developments that were soon to lead to an armed struggle between Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia (1904-1908).

* * *

In assessing the unsuccessful attempts at mending the Schism over a quarter of a century, one is struck by the fact that they actually took place. During the last quarter of the 19th century, nationalism had seized the minds and guided the actions of elites and masses. The drive for national emancipation of fellow brethren, living in mixed regions, contested by more than one aspiring heir, left little room for conciliatory maneuvering. The fact that mixed populations had lived for centuries peacefully, one next to the other, and had enjoyed a community of interests and sufferings under the same oppressor, was not a sufficient, valid basis for achieving peaceful co-existence. Old values and even venerable institutions—like their common "Great Church of Christ"—were swept away.

The ecclesiastical controversy that thrust itself into Greek-Bulgarian relations, was equally a result as well as a cause for nationalistic antagonisms. It emerged out of the Bulgarians' struggle to shake off what they considered the spiritual tutelage of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Once this was achieved, its product, namely the Bulgarian Exarchate, became by itself an element that enhanced further nationalistic hostilities. This probably explains why the Russians, throughout the last quarter of the 19th century, moved energetically

41. AYE/Embassies 700-1500/1902, Zalokostas to Zaimis, No. 463, 15/27.4.1902.
and spent so much time and effort to find a solution, which would remove this divisive issue that kept apart two potential supporters of Russia's Ottoman policy.

For Greek nationalists the ecclesiastical question was a manifestation of Bulgarian nationalism threatening the traditional Greek positions in the contested mixed regions of Thrace and Macedonia. For Greeks, however, who viewed the role of Hellenism as an “ecumenical” movement in the regions of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, it was mainly a challenge to long-established positions of supremacy, safeguarded by a panoply of “canons”, “privileges” and rules of protocol. On the Bulgarian side, the establishment of an independent Church was considered of cardinal importance in the road for national emancipation. Once this was achieved, particularly after 1878 and 1885, the ecclesiastical issue became merely an instrument for expanding the Bulgarian national movement over the Thracian and Macedonian regions that had remained under Ottoman rule. As, however, other means—education, armed struggle—began to be introduced and to assume a more important role in carrying out this policy, the significance of the ecclesiastical question began gradually to move to second place.

Within such a context, various initiatives at finding a solution to mending the Schism were destined to fail, even though at times the prospects of success appeared promising. Nevertheless, those repeated efforts at reaching a negotiated solution, reveal that both sides were aware that, in the long run, they could expect mutual advantages for solving their differences. But in the last decades of the 19th century, long-range benefits played second fiddle to immediate and tangible results. It took the painful experience of three wars and almost half a century, before the two Churches finally mended their Schism in 1945, and thus removed one of the obstacles in the rapprochement of the two neighbouring peoples.

Yet, the inevitable question arises: What were the gains and the losses for both sides of their failure to mend the Schism before they chose to enter the warpath for solving their overall differences?

On the Greek side, the Patriarchate failed to obtain the “repentance” of the Bulgarian “rebels” which would have reinstated its prestige and regained for it its former uncontested leadership within the Orthodox world. To achieve however, this repentance, the Greek side would have to make considerable, concessions on what constituted at the time the vital interests of Hellenism in Macedonia and Thrace. The Greeks chose the latter. Whether these interests were served, depends on how they are defined. At the time, however, most authoritative observers, particularly Greek diplomats serving in Macedonia,
Evangelos Kofos

expressed their belief that the existence of the Schism helped the Greek cause in the contested regions. On the one hand, it assisted large numbers of inhabitants to remain firm on their traditional loyalties to the Patriarchate and to reject Bulgarian nationalism, while on the other, it transferred national antagonism—at least in the minds of many—to the level of ecclesiastical contest, which, in the mixed regions proved a more favourable ground for the Greeks.

For the Bulgarians, if mending of the Schism meant loss of ecclesiastical independence, the failure of the negotiations was a gain. During the first two decades since its establishment, the Exarchate was a living manifestation of Bulgarian national emancipation. Similarly, if mending of the Schism meant that the Bulgarians consented to the exclusion of the Bulgarian ecclesiastical presence in Macedonia and Thrace, the status quo, established in 1870, was preferable. Of course, such maximalist claims on the Greek side, were not usually the case. But even when there was some prospect for more accommodating solutions, the Bulgarians were, at least, divided over what was more suitable to their interests. There is no doubt that during the first two decades, the existence of an independent Church became a pivotal institution for Bulgarian ethnicity to thrive in Bulgaria, as well as in mixed regions. Fanaticism was probably a useful weapon in cementing ethnic consciousness, and the existence of the Schism certainly harboured it.

In retrospect, however, it may be argued that despite tactical gains for both sides, the continuation of the Schism acted negatively on the prospects for reconciliation and rapprochement between the two peoples. And this should weight heavily in assessing the impact of the Schism on the course of Greek-Bulgarian relations and Balkan history in general.

42. In 1896, Foreign Minister Skouzes in the Th. Delyannis’ Government, sent a circular to the Greek consulates in Macedonia to assess their views on the impact of the lifting of the Schism. Their reaction was negative. The Consul General in Thessaloniki, Andreas Papadiamantopoulos was categorical that such a course would be “harmful to our interests”. AYE/Thessaloniki Consulate/1896, Papadiamantopoulos to Skouzes, No. 547, 1/13.6.1896.
ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ

(Φεβρουάριος 1876)

(Έκθεσις Μικτής Ελληνο-βουλγαρικής Επιτροπής)

'Η Επιτροπή συνεπεία τῆς 'Υψηλῆς διαταγῆς ἦν ἑλαβε, συνελθοῦσα εἰς διαφόρους συνεδριάσεις προάγεται εὐσεβῶς ἵνα ὑποβάλη ὡς ἐφεξῆς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῶν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ διατυπωθεισῶν σκέψεων αὐτῆς ἀναφορικῶς πρὸς τις μεταξὺ τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριαρχείου καὶ τῆς Ἑξαρχίας ὑπαρχούσας διαφόρους γνωστὰς διαφωνίας.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς συστάσεως τῆς Ἑξαρχίας, τῶν σχέσεων αὐτῆς μετὰ τῶν Οἰκουμενικῶν Πατριαρχείων, τῶν θεμελιωδῶν βάσεων τῆς ἐσωτερικῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς αὐτοδιοικήσεως αὐτῆς, τῆς ἐκλογῆς τῶν ἀρχιερέων αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριάρχου κυρώσεως τῆς ἐκλογῆς τοῦ Ἑξάρχου, τῶν ἐντὸς τῆς Ἑξαρχίας μὴ Βουλγαροφώνων Ὀρθόδοξων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριαρχείου βουλγαροφώνων Ὀρθόδοξων, τῆς γλώσσης εἰς ἣν αἱ ἀκολουθοῦσα τάξεις γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καὶ λοιπῶν τοιοῦτων ἀντικειμένων συνεκεφαλαίωσε τά ἀκόλουθα: ἦτοι

1

Ἐκ τῶν κατωτέρω ὀριζομένων καὶ ἀριθμουμένων ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἐπαρχιῶν καὶ χωρῶν συνιστάται ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν Βουλγαρικῆ 'Εξαρχία ἐν ἱδιαίτερον ἐκκλησιαστικῶν θεμάτω ἀπολαβοῦν πλήρους ἐσωτερικῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς αὐτοδιοικήσεως.

2

Εἰς τῶν ἐν τῷ θέματι τούτῳ Ἀρχιερέων ἐκλέγεται Ἑξαρχὸς τοῦ ὅλου θέματος, ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταύτῳ καὶ κανονικός Πρόεδρος τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν ἐσομένης Ἱερᾶς Συνόδου. Κατὰ συνέπειαν κανονικὴ ἔδρα τοῦ Ἑξάρχου καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν Ἱερᾶς Συνόδου ἔσται ὀριστικῶς ἡ πρωτεύουσα πόλις τῆς ἐπαρχίας αὐτοῦ.
Τὰ ἀφορώντα εἰς τὴν ἐσωτερικὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν διοίκησιν τοῦ ῥηθέν-τος θέματος, οἷα φέρ' εἶπεν τοῦ περὶ ἐκκλησίας τοῦ 'Εξάρχου καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἐκκλησίας καὶ χειροτονίας τῶν 'Αρχιερέων, περὶ ἀριθμοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ ὀνομασίας τῶν θρόνων αὐτῶν (Ἰσχυροῦν πάντοτε τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐπομένῳ 15ῳ ἀρθρῷ ἀναφερομένου ἐξαιρέσεων), περὶ χειροτονίας ἱερέων καὶ ἱεροδιακόνων, περὶ γάμου καὶ διαζύγιου, περὶ εὐταξίας καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσεως τοῦ ἱεροῦ κλήρου, περὶ τοῦ κηρύγματος τοῦ θείου λόγου, περὶ ἀποδοκιμασίας θρησκευτικῶν βιβλίων, ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα κανονισθῆσονται δι' ἰδιαίτερου κανονισμοῦ συνωρίον τοῖς ἱεροῖς κανόσι τῶν Ἀγίων καὶ Ἱερών Συνόδων καὶ τοῖς πατρο-παραδότοις ἐθίμοις καὶ ταῖς διατυπώσεσι τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἀνατολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας.

'Ὡς πρὸς τότε δὲ ὁ Οἰκουμενικὸς Πατριάρχης δικαιοῦται, ἐάν ἴδῃ τὸ ἐν τῷ κανονισμῷ ἀντιβαίνον πρὸς τοὺς ἄνωθεν όρους, ἵνα προεπιφέρῃ τὰς παρατηρήσεις τοῦ ἐν τριῶν τῶν πολύ μηνῶν ἀπ' ἡμέρας έπιδοθῆ οὕτως εἰς τὴν Δ' Παναγιότητα.

Ἐν τῷ Κανονισμῷ τούτῳ θέλει ἐξασφαλισθεῖ 'ἡ πλήρης ἐκκλησιαστικὴ αὐτοδιοίκησις τῆς ρηθείσης ἐξαρχίας ἐν γένει καὶ ἴδια ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ τε ἐξάρχου καὶ τῶν ἁρχιερεῶν αὐτῆς, ἀποκλειομένης πάσης παρ' οἷον δήποτε ἀναμίξεως.

4

Πάντες οἱ 'Αρχιερεῖς τῶν 'Επαρχιῶν τῆς Ἐξαρχίας θεωροῦνται κανονικῶς ἐπίσκοποι τῆς Ἐξαρχίας· ἐπομένως αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐφορουργοῦντες μνημονεύουσι κανονικῶς τὸν οὖν ἅγιον τοῦ Ἰεροῦ κλήρου τοῦ Ἑξάρχου, ὁ δὲ Ἐξάρχος τοῦ οὖν ἅγιον τοῦ Οἰκ. Πατριάρχου.

5

Ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Ἑξάρχου ἐπιφυλάττεται τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ κανονικοῦ κύρους τῷ Οἰκουμ. Πατριάρχῃ διότι ἁμα εἰδοποιηθεὶς ἐπισήμως περὶ τούτου παρὰ τῆς Συνόδου τῆς Ἐξαρχίας θέλει ὅσον τὰχιον χορηγεῖ τὴν ἐπικύρωσιν τῆς ἐκκλησίας αὐτοῦ καὶ γνωστοποιεῖ εἰς τῆς Ὀρθοδοξῆς Πύλης τῆς τῆς Ἐξαρχίας ἐπικύρωσιν, ὡς ἐκδοθῇ τῶν ἁγιακαίου ὕψηλον βεράτιον τοῦ διορισμοῦ αὐτοῦ.

6

Ὁ ῥήθεις Ἐξάρχος θέλει ἔχει τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ἀναφέρεσθαι διὰ πάσαν
Υπόθεσιν ἀφορῶσαν τὴν Ἐξαρχίαν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς διοικητικὰς ἀρχὰς εἴτε τῆς Ἐξαρχίας αὐτοῦ εἴτε τῆς πρωτευούσης ἀπ’ εὐθείας καὶ δι’ ἰδίων ἐκθέσεων. Ἰδίως δὲ τὰ παρὰ τῆς Ὃψηλὴς Κυβερνήσεως χορηγηθησόμενα βεράτια καὶ φιρμάνια τῶν ἐντὸς τῆς Ἐξαρχίας Ἀρχιερέων, ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ λοιπῶν ἐκδοθήσονται ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ ῶθηντος Ἐξάρχου πρὸς τὴν Ὃψ. Πολύν ὑποβληθησομέναις ἐκθέσεσιν.

7

Ἐὰν συμπέσωσιν ἐκκλησιαστικαὶ καὶ θρησκευτικαὶ ὑπόθεσεις χρῆζουσιν, πρὸς συντήρησιν καὶ ἐμπέδωσιν τοῦ ὀρθοδόξου πολιτεύματος, κοινῆς σκέψεως καὶ συμπράξεως, ἡ Σύνοδος τῆς ῶθηείσης Ἐξαρχίας θέλει ἀναφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν Οἰκουμενικὸν Πατριάρχην καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν Ἀγίαν καὶ Ἱερὰν Σύνοδον παρ’ ὁνὸν θέλουσι χορηγηθῆναι αὐτῷ προθύμως ἡ ἀπαίτουμενη σύμπραξις καὶ αἱ ἀναγκαίαι ἀπαιτήσεις. Ἐννοεῖται δὲ ὅτι ἐν τοιαύταις περιστάσεσιν, καὶ ὡς σάκις ὁ Οἰκ. Πατριάρχης ἐγκρίνη, ὁ Ἐξάρχος προσκαλούμενος θέλει παρευρίσκεσθαι ἐν τῇ Συνόδῳ τὸν Οἰκουμενικὸν Θρόνον.

8

Ἡ τῆς ῶθηείσης Ἐξαρχίας Σύνοδος θέλει λαμβάνει παρὰ τοῦ Οἶκου. Πατριαρχεῖον τὸ ἀγιὸν Μῦρον, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἄγιος ὁ Ὃ. Πατριάρχης ἐγκρίνη, ὁ Ἐξάρχος προσκαλούμενος θέλει παρευρίσκεσθαι ἐν τῇ Συνόδῳ τῷ ὀρθοδόξῳ Θρόνῳ.

9

Οἱ Ἀρχιερεῖς τοῦ τοῦ ὀρθοδόξου Πατριαρχεῖου καὶ τῆς Βουλγαρικῆς Ἐξαρχίας θὰ δύνανται ἐλευθέρως νὰ πηγαινεῖν καὶ νὰ διέρχωνται ἀμοιβαίας διὰ τῶν Ἐκκλησιαστικῶν Ἐπαρχίων τοῦ τοῦ Οἰκου. Θρόνου καὶ τῆς ῶθηείσης Ἐξαρχίας καὶ διὰ τὰς τὐχόν παρεμπιπτούσας ἀνάγκας νὰ διαμένωσι τῇ κανονικῇ ἀδείᾳ τοῦ ἐπιτοπίου ἀρχιερέως ἐν ταῖς ἑδραῖς τῶν Βιλαετίων καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις διοικητικοῖς κέντροις, χωρὶς ὁμοίως νὰ δύνανται ἐπ’ οὐδεμίᾳ προφάσει καὶ ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ λόγῳ νὰ συγκαλῶσι περὶ ἑαυτοῦ Συνόδους καὶ νὰ ἐξασκῶσιν οἰανδῆποτε ἐκκλησιαστικῆς δικαιοδοσίαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἑκτὸς τῆς Ἐξαρχίας αὐτοῦ εὐρισκομένων εἰτε Γραικῶν εἰτε Βουλγάρων, οὔτε νὰ ἱερουργῶσιν ἀνευ τῆς κανονικῆς ἀδείας τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστημονίας Ἐπισκόπου.

10

Τὸ ἐν Κων/πόλει Βουλγαρικῶν Μετόχιον καὶ ὁ παρ’ αὐτῷ εὐρισκόμε-
νος Βουλγαρικὸς Ναός, ἔχαρτονται καὶ ἐποπτεύονται ἀμέσως ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐξάρχου τοῦ Βουλγαρικοῦ θέματος, ὡς τὸ Ἀγιοταφικὸν Μετόχιον ἔχαρτοται καὶ ἐποπτεύεται ἀπὸ τὸν Μακαριώτατον Πατριάρχην Ἰεροσολύμων.

Δύναται δὲ ὁ ῥήτεις Ἐξαρχὸς όσικάς ὁ χρεία τὸ καλέσει, νὰ ἐρχεῖται ἀπολύτως μετὰ προηγούμενην κανονικὴν ἀδειαν τοῦ Οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριάρχου ως ποιοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Πατριάρχαι, καὶ νὰ ἐνδημῆ ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὰς παρεμπιπτούσας ἐνθεικὰς τοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικὰς αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεις, χωρὶς ὅμως ἕκαστὸς όναμιγνύεται οὐδαμῶς ἐν τοῖς ἀναγομένοις εἰς τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ὅριων τῆς Βουλγαρικῆς Ἐξαρχίας εἰτέ ἐν Κων/πόλει εἰτὲ ἄλλαξεὶ οὐρισκομένους Βουλγάρους. Ὅσικάς δὲ συμπέσει νὰ τελέσει ἱεροπραξίαν εἰτὲ ἐντός εἰτὲ ἐκτὸς τοῦ Μετοχίου ὁφείλει λαμβάνειν ἐκδοσιν τοῦ Πατριάρχου κατὰ τοὺς κανόνας, ὅπερ πράττει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἱεροσολύμων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Πατριάρχαι Ὅσικάς ἐνδημοῦσιν ἐν Κων/πόλει.

11

Ἡ τάξις τῶν κατὰ κανόνας Σταυροπηγίων Μοναστηρίων ἐν (;) τῇ ἡ-θείῃ Ἐξαρχίᾳ κειμένων θέλει μείνει ἀναλλοίωτος.

12

Οἱ ἐντός τοῦ Βουλγαρικοῦ θέματος μὴ Βουλγαρόγλωσσοι ὀρθόδοξοι καθὼς καὶ οἱ ἐκτὸς τῆς περιφερείας αὐτῶν Βουλγαρόγλωσσοι ὀρθόδοξοι, οἵτινες ἀποτελοῦσιν τὸν ὅλικον πληθυσμὸν μιᾶς πόλεως, ἐνὸς χωρίου ἢ μιᾶς ἐνορίας δικαιοῦνται ἀμοιβαίως, ἕως ἔλεος, ἔχειν ὀμολογίαν κλήρον καὶ δὴ καὶ χωροεπίσκοπον ἀπ’ εὐθείας ὑποδεικνύομενος μὲν παρ’ αὐτῶν, ἐγκρινομένους δὲ καὶ χειροτονουμένους πάντας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτοπίου Ἀρχιερέως, κανονικῶς ὑποκειμένους εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ μνημονεύοντας τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ.

13

"Οσον ἀφορᾷ τὴν γλώσσαν εἰς ἣν αἱ ἱεραὶ ἀκολουθίαι θέλουν ψάλλεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις μικτῆς τινος πόλεως, χωρίου ἢ ἐνορίας, τόσον ἐντὸς τῆς Ἐξαρχίας καθὼς καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς περιφερείας αὐτῆς, θέλει εἰσχύει ως βάσις τὸ ἀνέκαθεν καθεστάσας, ἦτοι ἐν γένει θέλει διατηρηθεῖ ἡ γλώσσα εἰς ἣν ἐν ἐκάστη τοῦτων τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν ἀνέκαθεν αἱ ἀκολουθίαι ψάλλονται. Εἰς ἑκείνα δὲ τῶν μικτῶν μερῶν, ὅπου αἱ ἀκολουθίαι ψάλλονται ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὑπαρχόντοις ἐκκλησίαις εἰς μίαν μόνην γλώσσαν ἦτοι τὴν Ἕλληνικὴν ἢ τὴν Σλαβωνικὴν δύναται μὲν δὰν θέλει ἡ ἔτερα τῶν δύο τούτων μικτῶν μερίδων νὰ κάμῃ χρῆσιν τοῦ δικαιώματος ὅπερ ἀμοιβαίως παρέχεται διὰ τοῦ
προηγουμένου άρθρου, ήτοι το έχειν ίδιον όμόγλωσσον κλήρον, άλλα πρός τούτο ἀπαιτεῖται ἵνα ἀπαντᾷ τὰ μέλη τὰ ἀπαρτίζοντα τὴν τοιαύτην μερίδαν νὰ σχηματίσωσιν ἵδιαν κοινότητα μετὰ ἱδίας ἐκκλησίας. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ δὲ περιπτώσει εἰς μὲν τὰ μέρη ὅπου ἦδη ὑπάρχουσαν πλείονες τῆς μιᾶς ἐκκλησίας, μία ἐκκλησία ἐκ τῶν ὑπάρχουσών (ἐκτός τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς Μητροπόλεως) καὶ ἱδία ἐκείνη τῆς ὁποίας ἦ ἐνορία περιλαμβάνει τοὺς περισσοτέρους ἐτερογλώσσους ἐνόριτας θέλει καθιερωθῆναι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινότητα, ἡ δὲ ἐκκλησία αὐτὴ, ἡ ἄλλα ἀπάντα τὰ μέλη τῆς ἐκκλησίας θέλει καθιερωθῆναι ως κέντρον τῆς κοινότητος ἐκείνης. Εἰς δὲ τὰ μικτὰ μέρη ὅπου μία μόνη ἐκκλησία ὑπάρχει ἢ ἱδίον όμογλώσσον κλήρον, ὡς ἀνωτέρω εἰρηται, θέλουσα νὰ ἔχῃ μερίς, ὁφείλει πρὸς τούτο προηγουμένως νὰ κτίσῃ ἱδίας ἐκκλησίαν, τοῦ ἀνέκαθεν καθεστῶτος ἱσχύοντος ὅσον ἀφορᾷ τὴν ἢ ἄρθρως ὑπάρχουσαν κοινῆς Ἐκκλησίας.

Τὸσον ἐντὸς τῆς Ἐξαρχίας ὅσον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὑπὸ τὸν Ὀικουμ. Θρόνον ἐπαρχίαις, αἱ ἐτερογλώσσαι κοινότηται αἰτίνες κατὰ τὸ προηγοῦμενον ἄρθρον θέλουσαν ἐνασκήσει τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ἐχεῖν ἱδίον όμογλώσσον κλήρον μετὰ ἱδίας Ἐκκλησίας, ἠθέλουσιν, ὑπὸ τὴν ἀνωτέραν ἐποπτείαν τοῦ ἐπιτοπίου Ἀρχιερέως, ἀποκλειστικῶς διευθύνει καὶ διατηρεῖ αἱ ἱδίαι τᾶς Ἐκκλησίας, τὰ Σχολεῖα καὶ λοιπὰ αὐτῶν ἐθνικὰ καὶ κοινοτικὰ καταστήματα. Ὅσον ἀφορᾷ δὲ τὰ μικτὰ μέρη ὅπου μία μόνη Ἐκκλησία ὑπάρχη, ἢ ἐτερογλώσσος μερίς ὅτι, μὴ θέλουσα νὰ κάμη χρήσιν τοῦ ἐν τῷ 13ον ἄρθρῳ ἀναφερομένου δικαίωματος, θέλει ἐξακολουθεῖς ἐνεκκλησίαζει ἡ ἱδίας ἐκκλησίας μετὰ τῶν λοιπῶν συγχωρῶν τῆς, θέλει μὲν ὡς ἀνωτέρω διευθύνει καὶ διατηρεῖ τὸ σχολεῖον καὶ τὰ ἱδία αὐτῆς καταστήματα, τὰ περὶ διευθύνσεως ὅμως τῆς κοινῆς Ἐκκλησίας καὶ τῶν εἰσοδημάτων αὐτῆς θέλουσα κανονισθῆναι ἐπὶ τῆς βάσει τοῦ ἀνέκαθεν καθεστῶτος ἢ ὅπως ἄλλως ἤθελον συμφωνῆσαι ἀμφότερα τὰ μέρη.

Ὡς πρὸς τὸν προσδιορισμὸν δὲ τῶν Ἐπαρχιῶν καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἄτινα περιληφθῆσονται ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ τῆς Ἐξαρχίας ἢ Ἐπιτροπῆ ἔλαβεν μὲν ὑπ’ ὄψιν καὶ ὡς βασίν τὸ γνωστὸν σχεδίον τοῦ πρώην Πατριάρχου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Κύρ. Γρηγορίου, πρὸς περισσοτέραν δὲ διευκόλυνσιν τῆς ἀμοιβαίας πνευματικῆς διοικήσεως θεώρησεν εὐλόγον νὰ ἐπενεχθῶσιν ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ ἀκόλουθοι τροποποιήσεις: ήτοι ἐκ μὲν τῶν Ἐπαρχιῶν καὶ μερῶν ἄτινα ἐν τῷ εἰρήμενῳ σχεδίῳ ἀφίνεται τῇ Ἐξαρχίᾳ νὰ ἀφαιρεθῶσιν, ἀπασά ἡ ἐπαρχία Βελεσσών, ὁ Καζάς Περλεπὲ τῆς Ἐπαρχίας Πελαγωνίας, καὶ ὁ Καζάς Ἀχή-Τσελεπὴ τῆς Ἐπαρχίας Ξάνθης, προστιθεμένου τῇ Ἐξαρχίᾳ.
έκ τής ἐπαρχίας Σκοπείων μόνον τοῦ Καζά Βράνιας, ὡς πλησιεστέρου πρὸς τὴν ἐπαρχίαν Νύσσης παρὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σκοπείων.

Τὰ δὲ μέρη τῆς Ἕπαρχίας Φιλιππουπόλεως ἀπερ κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον σχέδιόν ἔμενον ὑπὸ τὸν Οἰκουμενικὸν θρόνον, νὰ υπαχθοῦν μὲν ὑπὸ τὴν Ἕξαρχίαν ἐπὶ τῷ ὅρῳ ὅμως τοῦ ν’ ἀποτελοῦν εἰς τὸ ἔξης αὐτὰ μόνον τὴν ἐπαρχίαν Φιλιππουπόλεως οἱ δὲ κάτοικοι αὐτῶν νὰ ἔχουσιν τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ὑποδεικνύειν τῇ Ἕξαρχίᾳ τὸν Ἀρχιερέα αὐτῶν. Ἕπισης καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τῶν Ὑπαρχίων Βάρνης, Μεσημβρίας καὶ Ἀγχιάλου, τὰ ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ἰθέν σχέδιον ἔμενον ὑπὸ τὴν δικαιοδοσίαν τοῦ Οἰκουμν. Πατριαρχεῖον νὰ σχηματισθῇ ἀποκλειστικῶς μία ἐπαρχία, ὑπαγομένη μὲν ἔπισης εἰς τὴν δικαιοδοσίαν τῆς Ἕξαρχίας ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ νὰ ἔχουσιν καὶ οἱ κάτοικοι αὐτῆς, ὡς οἱ τῆς ἐπαρχίας Φιλιππουπόλεως τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ὑποδεικνύειν τῇ Ἕξαρχίᾳ τὸν Ἀρχιερέα αὐτῶν.

Επὶ ταῦτας ὀθέν ταῖς βάσεσιν ἦ ἐπιτροπὴ προεβή εἰς τὸ νὰ διατυπώσῃ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἄρθρον:

15

Ἡ Βουλγαρικὴ Ἕξαρχία ἀπαρτίζεται ἐκ τῶν Ἕπαρχίων: Τσερβενοῦ, Δρύστρας, Πρεσλάβας, Τουρνόβου, Σόφιας, Βράτζας, Λοφτσοῦ Βιδύνης, Νύσσης, Νυσσάβας, Κεστεντηλίου, Σαμακοβίου καὶ τῶν Καζάδων, Συλήμνου, Γιαμπόλεως καὶ Νοβάϊ τῆς ἐπαρχίας Άδριανούπολεως, καὶ τοῦ Καζά Βράνιας τῆς Ἕπαρχίας Σκοπείων.

Αἱ δὲ ἐπαρχίαι Φιλιππουπόλεως, Βάρνης, Μεσημβρίας καὶ Ἀγχιάλου, θέλουσι μὲν ἔπισης ἀποτελεῖ μέρος τῆς Ἕξαρχίας καὶ ἐξαρτάνται ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξης ὄρων: ἢτοι ἡ μὲν ἐπαρχία Φιλιππουπόλεως θέλει εἰς τὸ ἔξης, ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντοτε ὄνομα, ἀποτελεῖσθαι ἐκ μόνης τῆς πρωτεύουσας τῆς ἐπαρχίας (ἐκτὸς τοῦ προαστείου Καρσή-Γιακὰ), καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Νιαχιέ-Κόνους. Ὁ δὲ Καρσή-Γιακὰς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ αὐτῆς μέρη ἢ ἐν σήμερον σύγκειται, θέλουν προσαρτηθῆναι εἰς μίαν τῶν παρακειμένων Βουλγαρικῶν ἐπαρχίων ή θέλουν ἀποτελέσθη, ὑπὸ ἄλλο ὄνομα, ἰδίαν τινα ἐπαρχίαν, κατὰ τὴν ἔγκρισιν τῆς Συνόδου τῆς Ἕξαρχίας. Τὰ εἰρημένα δρια τῆς Ἕρμος Ἐπαρχίας Φιλιππουπόλεως ἐσονται ἐσαι ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀμετάτρεπτα, οἱ δὲ κάτοικοι τῆς ἐπαρχίας ταῦτας ἔλουσιν ἔχει διαρκῶς τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ὑποδεικνύειν τῇ Ἕξαρχίᾳ τὸν Ἀρχιερέα αὐτῶν, δεσίες θέλει, ἢ γιανιοὶ ἀρχιερεῖς τῆς Ἕξαρχίας, χειροτονεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῦ Ἐξάρχου καὶ μνημονεύει κανονικῶς τοῦ ὄνοματος αὐτῶν.

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς πόλεως Βάρνης, τῆς Κωνστάντζας καὶ τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν δύο τοιτων πόλεων ὑπαρχόντων εἶκοσι περίπου παραλίων χωρίων, καθὼς καὶ
εκ τής Ἐπαρχίας Μεσημβρίας (ἐκτός τοῦ Καζά-Προβατί) καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἐπαρ-
χίας Ἀγγιάλου (ἐκτός τῶν Καζάδων 'Αετός καὶ Καριαβάτι), θέλει σχηματι-
σθεί μία Ἐπαρχία, ἧτες θέλει φέρει πάντως τὸ ὄνομα Βάρνης ἐχουσα πρω-
τεύουσαν τὴν ὁμώνυμον αὐτῆς πόλιν. Τά δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη ἐξ ὧν σήμερον ἀπαρ-
tίζονται αἰ ὄντω εἰς μίαν συγχωνευθησόμεναι αὐταὶ Ἐπαρχία, θέλουν ὀσαύ-
tως κατὰ τὴν ἐγκρισιν τῆς Συνόδου τῆς Ἐξαρχίας προσαρτηθεῖε εἰς μίαν τῶν
παρακειμένων Βουλγαρικῶν Ἐπαρχιῶν, ἦ θέλουν ἀποτελέσει μίαν ἤ πλειο-
tέρας Ἐπαρχίας, ὑπὸ ἄλλα ὅμως ὅνομα παρὰ τὰ τῶν ὡς ἀνωτέρω συγχωνευ-
thησομένων τριῶν Ἐπαρχίων.

Τὰ ὀρια τῆς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων μερῶν ἀποτελεσθησομένης καὶ σχημα-
tισθησομένης Ἐπαρχίας Βάρνης, ἐσονται ἐσαεί ἑπίσης ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ
ἀμετάτρεπτα, οὶ δὲ κάτοικοι αὐτῶν θέλουσι ἔχει διαρκῶς, ὡς ὃ ὁ τῆς Ἐπαρχίας
Φιλιππουπόλεως τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ ύποδεικνύει τὴ Ἐξαρχία τὸν Ἀρχιερέα
αὐτῶν, ὅστις θέλει ὀσαύτως χειροτονεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῦ Ἐξάρχου καὶ μνημο-
νεύει κανονικῶς τὸ ὅνοματος αὐτοῦ*.

* Διαβιβάσθηκε στὸ Ὑπουργεῖο Ἐξωτερικῶν μὲ τὸ ἔγγραφο τῆς Πρεσβείας Κων/πό-