cludes with an utterly anti-climactic four-page chapter containing a few prognostications of doubtful validity.

Except for this last chapter, Mr. Warth's presentation is solidly founded and well-balanced, although his treatment of the post-Stalin period is rather thin. In view of the many striking developments that have characterized Soviet behavior in world affairs since the death of Stalin, a fuller discussion of the post-Stalin era would have been warranted. This could have been done easily without enlarging unduly the size of the study by shortening somewhat the accounts of earlier developments, especially the chapter on civil war which is unnecessarily long.

But the one major weakness of the book lies in its imbalance between description and analysis. Mr. Warth narrates quite well what happened, but concerns himself far too little with the important questions why things happened the way they did. He thus rarely delves into such complex but crucial matters as the interplay of ideology, strategy, power political and other factors, and their role in determining the course of Soviet actions.

As for his expressed striving after objectivity, the author seems to have done quite well. Nonetheless, his personal likes and dislikes do occasionally pop up. They may also account for a few questionable assertions advanced without adequate substantiation, such as, to cite only a few instances, his statement that "Polish nationalism had dug its own grave by spurning the Curzon line while time remained" (p. 287); his contention that "Washington's anxiety about a Soviet military takeover in Western Europe... was never really tenable" (p. 472); and his belief that "a few more Yugoslavias [among the ex-colonial countries] might actually enhance Western security" (p. 472).

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, Mr Warth's study should serve as a handy reference volume on Soviet Russia's external relations from 1917 to 1962.

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America's failure to take part in the League of Nations after World War I and the feeling that this failure had contributed—together with other factors—to the outbreak of World War II tended, as well known, to permeate the mind of Cordell Hull during the latter great global
conflagration and spurred his efforts to secure America's participation in the new world organization, the United Nations, which he was planning. Another, not unconnected, though less well known episode in U.S. foreign policy after World War I, however, may have been of equal importance in contributing to the special features of another sort of international conflict, the "cold war." This "failure" was America's refusal to play any significant role in the settlements of World War I concerning the Ottoman Empire.

In 1918 Russia was still in the throes of revolution and civil war. Since 1917 it had repudiated those secret treaties of 1915 and 1916 by virtue of which it might have obtained Constantinople and large sections of territory in northeastern Turkey. Britain, moreover, which had military forces in the Middle East as far north as the Caucasus, was inviting the United States into the picture, by proposing on various occasions at the Peace Conference in 1919 American mandates for Constantinople (of a permanent character) and Armenia, or in the region of the Turkish Straits as well, and in Cilicia, too—even a mandate for the Caucasus (until Russia's reorganization)—and by suggesting the dispatch of U.S. troops to Constantinople and Armenia. While rejecting the latter proposal, on the ground that the United States had not been at war with the Ottoman Empire, Wilson had agreed with regard to mandates in Constantinople and Armenia, subject to the approval of the U.S. Senate. Nevertheless, in the end, the United States turned out to be unwilling to assume such responsibilities in the Near and Middle East. And it was only in 1947, when Russia's successor state, the USSR, a full-fledged victorious power, even a superpower, was threatening that same region, upon which the pressure of imperial Russia had been exerted almost incessantly since the seventeenth century, from the time of Peter the Great, that the United States, once again prodded by Britain, decided to step into the Middle Eastern picture (at least as far as Iran) with the "Truman Doctrine," assuming in that part of the world responsibilities it had shirked twenty-eight years earlier—to play there, as well as in the eastern Mediterranean, a protective role that differed, of course, quite considerably from that of a mandatory power, yet still, in substance, meant a very strong political presence in this strategic area.

But the temptation to try to analyse the possible effects of a policy that was never followed should be resisted. Harry N. Howard's excellent book on the King-Crane Commission is the story of a hesitation in U.S. foreign policy, prior to the decision not to assume any com-
mitments with regard to the settlement concerning the Ottoman Empire. This thorough and penetrating study—which makes use of all available documentation—of the origin, work, and accomplishments of this Commission reveals the extent of this historical hesitation and the earnestness with which American foreign policy makers actually approached this important question, before deciding against involvement.

Getting the facts first, in a scientific manner, was the object of this Commission which originally was intended to be but part of a broader international investigation that would also include British, French, and Italian representatives. President Wilson felt that Dr. Henry C. King, and Mr. Charles R. Crane "were particularly qualified to go to Syria because they knew nothing about it" (p. 37). And studying the situation on the spot and consulting in some way the wishes of the local populations, before deciding on the mandates and the mandatories, instead of the other way round, as the British proposed (p. 44), was the procedure preferred by the Americans.

The result of this fact-finding efforts was a document of enduring historical value, because of the information it contained about the peoples in the Ottoman Empire immediately after World War I. This report, which Wilson probably never saw, because of the stroke that paralyzed him in autumn 1919, revealed that, at the time, the various peoples of the multinational Empire—the Turks not excluded—preferred the United States to any other state as a mandatory power.

This report could not be particularly liked, however, either by the Greeks or the Zionists. For the Turkish homeland—minus Constantinople and the Straits, for which a permanent mandate was urged—the Commissioners proposed an American mandate which would not cede territory to Greece but would only guarantee Greek rights. Only local autonomy for "that portion of the sanjak of Smyrna which had a decided majority of Greeks" was advocated. In retrospect could such a solution have meant no Greek disaster in Asia Minor and the preservation of Hellenism there? This is another tempting but "iffy" question, discussion of which would be both fruitless and useless, however. With regard to Palestine, the commissioners advised a "serious modification of the extreme Zionist program" of unlimited immigration of Jews there. They had found that about nine tenths of the people in Palestine were emphatically opposed to the Zionist program and they wished to abide by the Wilsonian principle that "the settlement of every question, whether of territory, or sovereignty, of economic ar-
rangement, or of political relationships "should be based on 'the free acceptance of the settlement by the people immediately concerned.' Hence, the commissioners saw "no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian state."

Of course, the commissioners' recommendations and attitudes are interesting mirrors of the way in which they regarded their own country's foreign policy. On the one hand, they were not only desirous of applying, as aforementioned, the Wilsonian concept of "self-determination", but also were well aware of the geographical or geopolitical importance of the region as a land bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa, and expressed the hope that this "debable" land would become a "mediating" land. On the other hand, they stressed that the United States was "the most natural power to take the mandate for the international Constantinopolitan state, as well as for Armenia, for the simple reason that she is the only Great Power territorially and strategically disinterested." But — and here is a vital problem in international politics — it was perhaps because the United States in 1919 felt so disinterested territorially and strategically in the area (with oil interests forming an exception), that it was not interested in assuming the responsibilities of a mandate in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire.

In the last three chapters of this valuable book, Mr. Howard also tells the story of the aftermath of the King-Crane report and of U.S. foreign policy concerning the peace settlement with Turkey up to, and including the Treaty of Lausanne. And, in the last section of the last chapter he evaluates the report's findings and recommendation in the light of later developments in the Middle East. All in all, he should be congratulated for his important new contribution to the knowledge of international politics at the time of the emergence of the Modern Middle East.

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This formidable volume contains the scholarly series of papers published by Harvard University's Center for Byzantine Studies and is surely illustrative of the considerable scholarly activity that characterizes this famous international research center. A good number of