balkaniques pour leur liberté y sont présentés avec l'objectivité et la précision d'un historien impartial.


C. Papacostea-Danielopolu


Since its founding in 1919, Yugoslavia has been a favorite topic for study by Western scholars either because it does not fit the Western conception of modern Southeastern Europe or in spite of this factor. English-language scholarly monographs on Yugoslavia outnumber those of any other country of the region. After World War I the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was seen as a justification of the principles of national self-determination—one of the prime reasons for the suffering of the war—and the triumph of the first ally of the Entente—Serbia. In fact the kingdom was a mask for Serbian domination over the other South Slav nations, which showed dubious feelings toward the union in 1919 and rampant hostility against it in 1939. During the height of the Cold War after World War II the country represented a greater anomaly. Here was a Communist-ruled land defying the motherland of "monolithic" Communism—the Soviet Union. The meaning of these paradoxes have proved difficult to fathom for many Western observers, requiring the abandonment of old prejudices and the adoption of fresh insights from impartial analysis.

The two monographs under review here are, therefore, a welcome addition to the literature dealing with this enigmatic country. The lack of prejudice and strength of analysis required here are present in both. These books examine from different angles two essential questions of deep concern in Socialist Yugoslavia. First, to what extent has Yugoslavia solved the "nationality" crisis that has plagued the country since 1919? Second, how has the system of workers' control fared in Yugoslavia and what is its significance for the society? For both authors the Yugoslav workers' councils are the key to the country's present society. They are in fact Rusinow's "experiment" and the institutions of Denitch's "legitimation". What appears to most casual observers to be the major factor of Yugoslavia's existence—the dictatorship (either benevolent or malevolent, by force of personality or by force of arms) of Tito—plays only a supporting role in both books (a major one to be sure, especially in Rusinow, but supporting nevertheless). This is a significant fact since both authors tend to support the view that Yugoslav institutions are of an enduring rather than a transitory nature.
Rusinow, an associate of the American Universities Field Staff, is a trained historian with an inclination for political science enhanced by his career as a reporter-scholar for the AUFS in Yugoslavia and Austria. His observations of the Yugoslav scene are justifiably regarded very highly by his colleagues, although occasionally Croatian Nationalists or cold warriors have attacked him for being too kind to the present regime. He is also a well-received and popular lecturer on the University circuit. (Indeed, his engaging speaking style surpasses his written work, which sometimes suffers from tortuous circumlocutions better suited to the podium than the printed page). In the current monograph Rusinow traces the development of the Yugoslav “experiment” from the time the Yugoslav Communists gained power during the second world war.

In his introductory chapters Rusinow recounts the story of the Yugoslav Communists rise to the forefront during the war and Tito’s break with Stalin in order that the Yugoslavs might be masters of their own fate. The bulk of the book then relates the historical development of Yugoslav socialism. It is chiefly a non-technical economic history, but since he writes on all issues, the book is useful as a general survey of post-war Yugoslavia. The major debates on the country’s politics and society in Rusinow’s interpretation revolve around the concept of the workers’ councils—the unique Yugoslav contribution to functioning socialism.

The workers’ councils were created in June 1950 by “the most famous legislative act of the postwar era in Yugoslavia”. Rusinow portrays the decision to institute the councils as an attempt “born of necessity not of conviction” (p. 32) to demonstrate that Yugoslavia was a truer socialist society than the Soviet Union. The idea was worked out by Milovan Djilas and Eduard Kardelj from Marx’s conception of the free association of producers (p. 51). Once in effect they became the means by which flux and conflict within Yugoslavia could be resolved. The League of Communists (the rechristened Yugoslav Communist Party), granting some flexibility including even unsuccessful attempts at multi-candidate elections, retained effective political control. Extreme critics or errants of both the left and right such as Milovan Djilas or Aleksandur Ranković found themselves in trouble, but vital and vocal economic debate has been part of the Yugoslav scene since 1950. “Liberal” decentralizers and “Laissez-faire Socialists” have vied with “conservative” centralizers on the merits of workers’ self-management, market socialism, and other economic problems, especially those involving the relationship between the federal and republican economies. Rusinow also shows that the economic issue involved national problems which could not be hidden. The debate whether the richer republics should aid the poorer led to the old conflicts among the Serbs, Croatians, Macedonians, etc. and both political and economic solutions were sought—for example, an enlarged and representative executive committee instead of a president, and a balance between federal and republican financial institution. In the final analysis Rusinow, although he expresses admiration for many of Yugoslavia’s accomplishments, is not ready to call the “experiment” a success. For him the end is still unclear, and he wisely does not guess at what the future might bring.

Bogdan Denitch examines the same question from a different viewpoint that of a sociologist. With less emphasis on the historical background he asks whether the Yugoslav communists have legitimized their revolution by the workers’ councils and by the attempts to balance national control over state affairs. He is also interested in examining Yugoslavia as a case study of a twentieth-century revolution based on the successful outcome of a civil war—comparing it to China and Viet Nam and contrasting it with other socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

Like Rusinow, Denitch believes that the workers’ councils are a unique contribution
to socialism by the Yugoslav leaders. However, his claim that the concept did not have even ideological forerunners in Marxist theory (pp. 152-53) is an exaggeration. Workers' control of factories is a well-established idea with origins in the earlisest years of scientific socialism. Rusinow, as we have said, cites Djilas's assertion that the Yugoslav institutions were based on Marxist theory.

More central to Denitch's monograph is his examination of the workers' councils as institutions of democracy. Here he successfully shows that a multiparty system is not the only measure of a democratic society and that the workers' councils in Yugoslavia can be a legitimate alternative. Both in the view of the Yugoslavs themselves and by standards of non-Socialist political scientists the workers' councils served to democratize Yugoslav society and remain viable institutions for the "legitimation of the Yugoslav revolution". In this conclusion Denitch seconds Rusinow.

Denitch treats the national question somewhat separately from the economic. He believes that the present regime has made great strides in eliminating the prewar national hostilities by a conscious effort to achieve national balance in all aspects of Yugoslav leadership—political, economic, military, intellectual, etc. Because the various republics do not have homogeneous populations, there is a greater correlation in a geographical analysis than in a strictly national one. Furthermore, some differences exist because of historical circumstances. For example, because of the partisan experience, there is a higher percentage of Serbian officers in the armed forces than the Serbian population warrants. (Former partisans, by the way, have continuously occupied the most influential positions in Yugoslav society giving rise to a generation problem which both authors point out).

Denitch is more sanguine than Rusinow about the success of the Yugoslav "experiment-revolution" and sees it as a model for the future in the third world. In industrial countries the technical managerial class has increased in relative size, while the working class has not. In this context workers' control is just a radical concept of class warfare. "The Yugoslav model", he says, "with all its imperfections and contradictions, is on a different plane. It represents a major historical attempt to create a society based on self-management. The success or failure of this effort may reshape the future strategy of working-class parties throughout the world (p. 182)". Denitch also concludes that the Yugoslav revolution was made by the Communists' own efforts after they achieved power "not...because it was based on an idea 'whose time had come' (p. 206)". In this view he differs in some degree from Rusinow, who emphasizes the necessity caused by the break with Moscow. Denitch insists that the process is now irreversible although foes of Yugoslav socialism with its integral workers' control can still be found among the old enemies (the nationals and anti-Communists) and two new groups—the Yugoslav managerial class and the still-present closet Slatinists (pp. 183-84). Both Denitch and Rusinow believe that most of the younger generation, however, think of Yugoslav socialism as true Marxism. Its retention was an object of the student demonstrations of the late sixties. Whether one agrees or disagrees with either Denitch's or Rusinow's conclusions, both books are welcome additions to the scholarly literature of modern Yugoslavia.

Indiana University Northwest  
Frederick B. Chary