mands, are successfully treated. The question of the exchangeable property is looked upon in a more extended way though the author does not closely follow the function of the Independent Fund for the Administration of exchangeable property.

The author's final conclusions (16 pages) concern mainly the exchange of populations as a general method of solving minorities' questions. In fact the author examines the divergent opinions on this problem, though he does not seem to adopt any one of the suggestions already made by scholars. Is an exchange of population desirable or not so far as the solution of conflicts deriving from that matter are concerned? It is not at all easy to give a "yes or no" answer and the author most wisely avoids such absolute suggestions. However, he proceeds in setting four prerequisites to be followed as a minimum of guarantees, in case a transfer is unavoidable. Namely a) the acceptance of the transfer by the countries affected by it, b) the placing of the implementation of such a scheme under international supervision, c) the institution of adequate guarantees for the compensation of the transplanted individuals and d) the establishment of an international machinery for the settlement of the evicted persons. In the author's own words (p. 253) "The exchange of populations constitutes a landmark in the history of modern Greece. It is doubtful whether any other event has affected the country as profoundly and extensively as the influx of the million and half irredentist Greeks arriving from every corner of the Eastern Mediterranean. This gigantic transmigration represents the end of an era and has left its permanent imprint on every aspect of Greek life."

This study is undoubtedly a considerable contribution to the international literature on the subject of refugees. Mr. Pentzopoulos is more successful when he deals with the exchange itself than when he proceeds to appraisals of political events of modern Greek history. His psychological approach is rather unsufficient a method for such considerations. The facts of the exchange themselves are offered to the reader with a scholarly care and an excellent elaboration of sources. The overall exchange scheme is dealt with an ample and accurate way. All those who have some knowledge on the exchange of populations but particularly those who have not, must read this book.

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... on 30 August (1949), at five o'clock in the morning, the
VIII Division reached the summit of Kamenik. The remnants of the guerrilla army beat a hasty retreat into Albania. By ten o’clock that morning all organized resistance in Grammos had ceased. For all practical purposes the Third Round was over”.

And so it was. The “Third Round” was nothing else than the third armed attempt by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) to take over the country. Three times in less than a decade the KKE had tried to seize power by arms and three times it failed. It failed, initially, in the summer of 1944, when being in overwhelming control of the resistance movement, it found itself politically outmaneuvered by the non-communist politicians, the British and, strangely, by Stalin himself. It failed for the second time, when, in the December 1944 Athens’ uprising, it underestimated British stubbornness to hold on the last piece of real estate left to them in the Balkans following the Churchill-Stalin agreement on spheres of influence. It failed for a third time when it miscalculated the stamina of the Greek people and their determination to remain free.

The crushing of the rebellion (1946-1949) marked the end of a whole period in the history of the Greek communist movement; it had started a quarter of a century before it came to its cataclysmic doom.

It is precisely this story that Professor Kousoulas tells in his recently published book, Revolution and Defeat. Following the publication in English of a score of monographs on the communist parties of the Eastern European countries, the book comes to fill a long existing gap in the bibliography of the international communist movement. Being a Greek by birth and having a personal knowledge of the events, Professor Kousoulas tells the story with the insight of a close observer; being an American by training, he views these most recent events with considerable detachment, offering to his readers a scholarly analysis of a perplexed case of communist intrigue.

The three “rounds,” as described above, constitute in fact the totality of what is generally known of the story of the Greek Communist Party. Yet, the author devotes only half of his book on them. Significantly, he allows the first half of his narrative to deal in extenso with the inter-war story; a story which today’s communists in Greece would have wished not to have existed; a story which at the time of its making was ignored by all but a minority of “insiders” but which helps us today understand better the nature of a movement which wrecked the country for almost a decade. It is, probably, in this first half of his book that Professor Kousoulas excels.
The story which unfolds from April 1920, when the Greek Socialist Labor Party joined the Comintern, to the invasion of the Germans in 1941, introduces in all its bareness the nature and the true meaning of the communist movement for Greece.

Page after page the author reveals how the leadership of the KKE — or rather the various successive leaders — blindly pursued the directives of the Kremlin even when they came in direct opposition to the national interests and to Greek realities. “Three tenets of communist propaganda and agitation — the anti-religious propaganda, the “Macedonian” slogans, and the theories of collectivization and control under the dictatorship of the proletariat — were repellent to people as religious, nationalistic and individualist as the Greeks” says Prof. Kousoulas. Nevertheless, the KKE stubbornly stood by its “theses,” even though it was aware that by doing so, far from attracting the masses, it was provoking the wrath of all strata of Greek society — as was, for example, the case with the slogan for a “united and independent Macedonia.”

It was on account of this attitude that the KKE remained foreign to Greek political life during the inter-war period. Whatever little following it attended at times, was the result of popular dissatisfaction with existing situations — political or economic — rather, than popular magnetism of the principles advocated by the KKE. In fact, the Greek communist party was operating in the “periphery” of Greek political life, as Prof. Kousoulas characteristically puts it. The same atony was to be repeated many times thence; the KKE was never able to stir the masses on its own program, basically because it was never a national party. It simply thrived on political instability and confusion.

Such was, in fact, the situation in Greece in 1936 when political instability offered the opportunity to the KKE to create a revolutionary atmosphere. The establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in August 1936, however, succeeded in not only neutralizing communist objectives but also in bringing about the ignominious dissolution of the KKE.

In tracing these events mostly through the personal archives of the then Minister of Public Security Maniadakis, Prof. Kousoulas has adroitly presented a case study of successful agit-prop, anti-communist activity and methods. The author describes the events of the 1936 summer when mounting communist disorders resulted in the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, in a lively way which is interrupted by quotations of unpublished documentary material. For the first time it becomes known in considerable detail how the KKE was broken up. There was the case of exiles and imprisonments of leading figures of the KKE;
then, was the case of thousands of rank and file Party members, who were set free after signing "declarations of repentance" which exposed them as traitors to their comrades; then, was the circulation of a second "Rizospastis" — official party paper — which, though printed by the security authorities, circulated underground as the authentic Party organ; and last, but not least, was the establishment — by the Police — of a Central Committee of the KKE, composed of repentant Party officials, which created such a confusion, that no one — not even top Party leaders — was certain any more of who was a bona fide communist and who was a police agent. On the eve of the war, for all practical purposes, the KKE was inoperative. Yet, as Prof. Kousoulas justly comments, all these spectacular achievements were temporary. Under new and favorable circumstances, communism grew up again in Greece. The chaos which followed the German invasion of the country in April 1941, created, indeed, the "favorable circumstances."

The story of the Occupation is told mostly on the basis of published accounts by British officers who played an active role in the Greek Resistance. The author attempted to support, or fill the gaps of their evidence through communist documents published after the war and personal interviews with a number of resistance personalities in Greece. Yet, the British interpretation of the events of the crucial years 1943-1944 is present in most of Part III. As a result, the share of responsibility of British actions in the growth of communist power in occupied Greece is only slightly hinted. It would have been useful if the author had more time to consult a greater variety of protagonists of the Resistance. Nevertheless, what is probably missing in this respect, is more than compensated by Prof. Kousoulas' admirable critical appraisal of the facts at his disposal.

The events of the December 1944 uprising are similarly well presented. The author makes good use of communist documents published immediately after the uprising (1945) as well as during the period of mutual accusations which followed the crushing of the rebellion (1946-1949).

The climax of the story of the Greek communist movement is reached at the time of the decision of the Central Committee (1946) to launch an all-out guerrilla war in order to seize power. Those tragic events would take a voluminous work to tell. In two rather short chapters (15 and 16), Prof. Kousoulas exhibits, among other things, a commentable knowledge of the theory of guerrilla warfare. In this connection, he makes an excellent presentation of antiguerrilla operations, which, with the help of charts vividly explain the difficulties encountered by the national
Greek forces in bringing about the final defeat of the communist guerrillas.

The internal political aspects of the events of those years are not adequately presented. There is a tendency, it seems, to minimize the enormous difficulties and dangers faced by the Greek people during the first two years of the rebellion, before, through the concerted efforts of the leading political and military personalities of the country and American assistance, the communists could be defeated in the mountainous terrains of Northwestern Greece.

A more extensive reference to the international aspects of the rebellion — which were, indeed, of utmost importance to its fate — would have been welcomed for a better appraisal of the nature and the true dimensions of what has passed into Greek history as the Guerilla War. In fact, little attention is given to the political peculiarities of this war in what concerned the northern provinces of Greece. As attested by the United Special Commission on the Balkans, the interest of certain communist neighbouring countries over those provinces played an important role in the aid and comfort extended by these countries to the Greek guerrillas, which in many instances affected the course of the entire war. Naturally the space available for concise, yet all-inclusive book, such as the Revolution and Defeat could not allow for a detailed presentation of the political and diplomatic aspects. However, some reference to the wealth of pertinent material in Prof. Stephen Xydis’ book Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963, 750 pp.) would have been useful.

The book in review closes with a chapter entitled “After the Defeat.” It is long for an epilogue, but short if one attempts to tell the story of the KKE in the period which followed the mass self-exile to the people’s democracies of the thousands of rebels (and Prof. Kousoulas clearly states that he does not intend this). An entirely new book could be written on the period since 1950, and in this connection the theoretical journal of the KKE, Neos Kosmos, could prove of immense value, though it is hard to find it in the West.

The author is undoubtedly right when he states that “the period since the end of the Third Round is much too near for any fully-fledged historical appraisal.” However, it is rather strange that he lets himself express views on certain current political issues.

Secondary issues apart, the basic impression left is that Prof. Kousoulas has succeeded in making an admirable contribution to the bibliography of the international communist movement in general, and to the study of contemporary Greek politics in particular.