stored under the Köprülüs. Of the thirty-seven men who held the office of defterdar in the eighteenth century before 1774, at least twenty-eight were professional bureaucrats from the financial administration.

With reference to the education of future bureaucrats, Lewis maintains (p. 92) that the boys studied in mosque primary schools and Muslim religious seminaries until the age of sixteen or seventeen when they were placed in government offices as apprentices to learn the work and enter upon the ladder of promotion. Here again one would like to know the period being described. For in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries boys destined for the civil bureaucracy usually attended local schools (sibyan meketebi) for an introduction to reading and writing, and then at about the age of ten were enrolled in bureaus (usually those in which their fathers worked) where part of the day was devoted to learning the business of being a secretary, while the boys would attend classes during the remaining part in the traditional Islamic sciences offered at the various mosques. Education for both the ilmiyye and the kalemiyye careers needs further study.

Professor Lewis has written an informative, thoughtful and stimulating book. It deserves a prominent place on all reading lists for undergraduate courses. He has also demonstrated that the specialist can write for the general reader without any lowering of scholarly standards. In this age of the communications specialist it is refreshing to read a specialist who really can communicate.

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NORMAN ITZKOWITZ


On October 5, 1915, a small number of British and French units were disembarked at Thessaaloniki in a rather half-hearted attempt to coerce neutral Greece into joining the Allies and to provide relief for the Serbian army then retreating before a massive Austro-German offensive. Initially, the venture failed on both counts. The Greek government refused to take action, and weak Allied forces were forced to retreat and to entrench themselves in a vast fortified camp around the port. From this base, however, the Allies eventually forced the neutralist King Constantine into exile and brought the Greeks into the war. Meanwhile, a number of offensives were undertaken in 1916-1917, especially after the entrance of Rumania into the conflict, failed to achieve any major suc-
The presence of a slowly growing force, deadlocked on a distant front, soon aroused bitter criticism in France and England. The Allied forces, restyled the Army of the Orient, were derisively called "the Gardeners of Salonika" by the fiery Clemenceau. At the same time, the Germans tried to ridicule the venture by calling Thessaloniki the "largest Allied internment camp."

But fortunes changed. Almost three years to the day after the initial landing, on September 15, 1918, a cosmopolitan army of 28 divisions: nine Greek, eight French, six Serbian, four British, and one Italian, began its great offensive. French and Serbian troops broke through the Bulgarian front and within a fortnight forced that country to sign an armistice. Pushing north, the Allies liberated Serbia and reached the edge of the great Hungarian plain. On October 2, 1918, the Allied commander, French General Franchet d'Esperey, could write: "I can with 200,000 men cross Hungary and Austria, mass in Bohemia... and march immediately on Dresden." This indeed was victory. But despite this lightening advance, the final decision in the war was reached on the Western Front, and on November 11 a telegram from Paris informed the general that an armistice had come into effect on all fronts.

This is a very well written book. Mr. Palmer is interested in more than just battle history, though he tells it very well. He describes not only the strategic picture, but also the life of the common soldier in the long stalemate which followed the initial thrust. He evokes the summer heat and the bitter cold of winter, the grim warfare in the mountains, and the discomforts of mud and ice. He tells of disease and exhaustion, as well as gallantry and devotion. If the author emphasizes somewhat the experience of the British contingent, he is by no means narrowly chauvinistic but gives due credit to other national forces. He praises the valor of the reconstituted Serbian army, the elan of the French colonial troops, and he finds compassion for a brigade of hapless Russians which found itself stranded far from home by the events of 1917. On the command level the author gives a brief account of the military politics involved in the appointment and recall of the various commanders and gives his greatest admiration to the stout-hearted George Milne and the dashing Franchet d'Esperey.

The author is too good a historian not to realize that the conduct of military operations cannot be divorced from political considerations, and he fully recognizes the important, and often adverse, effects of inter-Allied rivalries on the campaign. He is critical of both the French and the British governments for their interference in Greek affairs; he brief-
ly touches on the internal struggles within the Serbian camp, and he gives brief mention to Italian aspirations in the Balkans. But this justifiably broad approach also leads to what the professional historian might regard as two main shortcomings of the book.

From beginning to end "the Salonika venture" remained a controversial side-show—a campaign into which the Allies had been drawn despite their misgivings and which had enlarged with much hesitation. This was above all due to the great debate between supporters of the Western Front school of military thought and the supporters of the Eastern Approaches idea, the proponents of what Liddell Hart would later call "the strategy of indirect approach." To military men like Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig, supported by a strong majority of French commanders who quite naturally were pleased to have France considered the primary theatre of operations, the Western Front was the only place where a decision could be reached. To the opposition, including Lloyd George, France was a bloody deadlock in which the Allied armies were slowly being chewed to pieces. The controversy still rages, and historians are still debating the wisdom of the two opposing strategies. Mr. Palmer leans towards the Eastern Approaches school, but he does not provide any new or conclusive evidence to buttress his point of view. While casualties on the Western Front were truly appalling, it still is by no means clear that a major shift of effort from the West to the Balkans would have ended the war in shorter order. To be sure, the Army of the Orient made a remarkable and extremely swift advance in 1918, but its victory was achieved against an exhausted and essentially second-class Bulgarian army, stiffened by only ten German battalions. But if pressure on the Western Front had been materially reduced, Germany's control of interior lines would have enabled her to rapidly shift substantial reinforcements to the Balkans and to take advantage of the great number of excellent defensive positions available there. In this connection it might be well to remember that in World War II last ditch German resistance in northern Hungary, Slavonia, and Croatia was broken only when events to the north forced strategic withdrawal from these positions.

The second shortcoming, and this was perhaps unavoidable within the chosen limitations of the book, is that this is the story of "one side of the hill" only, a shortcoming shared by practically all of the recent spate of books about World War I. The author has based his account on the large number of available printed sources, memoirs, and biographies. He does include some German accounts, but surprisingly neglects the
major Austrian works. He provides some appreciation of the Bulgarian dispositions, but gives little on the Germans and next to nothing on either the German or Turkish forces. In short then, this is a very fine book, but it is not a definitive study.

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GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG


In the past, Western historians of the Balkans have tended to view the peninsula in terms of the negotiations, alliances, and political maneuvers revolving around the Eastern Question. Attention has shifted more recently to nationalism and the way in which nations once inundated by the Ottoman and Habsburg tide have gained national consciousness and independence. By contrast, economic history has received short shrift, in part because of the difficulties facing the scholar: statistics have been scanty and unreliable; business enterprises have been small-scale, decentralized, secretive; and, above all, the scale of economic growth since independence has hardly encouraged even the most optimistic historian.

Professor Sugar's book therefore represents a distinct break with tradition. His theme is a specific case of industrial development, its origins, characteristics, scale, and economic consequences. His angle of vision is refreshingly new: he implicitly rejects the nationalist contention that foreign occupation is invariably a setback, economic growth allegedly being sacrificed to the interests of the conqueror. Sugar clearly regards the Habsburg government, and particularly Benjamin von Kallay, its Common Minister of Finance during 1882-1903, as both generating and directing whatever industrialization occurred in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Sugar's frame of reference also breaks with tradition. He does not try to deal with an entire national economy, as do historians who follow Marx by consciously searching for the economic "foundations" of national unification. Instead, Sugar follows the precepts of the classic monograph, painting carefully on a small canvas, assembling and collating evidence from a number of archives, his goal being quite simply "the gathering of information" (viii). This is appealing. However, it tends to side-step the essential task of considering motivation and causation. Hence the book rests on a shaky foundation from the outset.

Sugar sets the stage with a succinct, balanced account of the poli-