
This book, published by the Institute for Balkan Studies, is naturally written with understanding and sympathy for the Greek standpoint in the complex disputes over Macedonia of the last hundred years. Nevertheless, it achieves a respectable level of objectivity and balance, although there are occasional one-sided assertions (for instance, on p. 13, referring to the fifty years following the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870).

These are however very minor blemishes in a work of real value. The first part of the book (54 out of 240 pages) deals with the struggles of Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek nationalists over Macedonia from the 19th century up to World War II. This contains little fresh material but is a competent summary. The second part of the book, "Balkan Communists and the Macedonian Question" constitutes its main contribution, since it contains material not previously published. Mr. Kofos has been able to make use of the archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry for the years 1940-50, including those of the Axis-imposed Athens governments of 1941-44 and of the Royal Government in exile during the same period. He has also made good use of published material not normally available in the West — documents of the Greek Communist Party, and the numerous rival Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist accounts of the Macedonian dispute, published after the Tito-Cominform split of 1948.

All these combine to produce a lucid and convincing, if complex, story. Most of it up to the time of the Axis conquest in 1941 was already known in the West (though Mr. Kofos adds some fascinating sidelights, as, for instance p. 62, the fact that around 1909 "the most genuine socialist movement in Macedonia was neither Bulgarian nor Serbian nor Greek, but Jewish. The 'Socialist Federation' with headquarters in Thessaloniki, though listing among its members Greeks, Bulgarians and Turks, was mainly composed of Jews" — and, Mr. Kofos adds, wealthy Jews). From 1941 onwards, Mr. Kofos has a good deal of fresh material, and fresh interpretation, to add to previously published accounts.
One major theme is, of course, the permanent feud, only temporarily damped down between 1944 and 1948, between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communists over Macedonia. Even more interesting — in this book — is the appalling dilemma which the Macedonian dispute, and the existence of a Slav-speaking population of around 80,000 in Northern Greece, presented to the Greek Communist Party from its earliest days. The Party leaders were constantly torn between their desire to maintain at least the outer appearance of good patriots and their obligation to pay heed to the directives of Moscow or the demands of the Yugoslav or Bulgarian Communists.

Mr. Kofos fairly consistently gives the Greek Communist leaders the benefit of the doubt: he presents them as attempting to lean to the side of Greek patriotism. He writes (p. 128): “throughout the occupation [1941-44], the communist-led Е. А. М. appears to have avoided committing itself to either Yugoslavia’s or Bulgaria’s plans for Macedonia.” He thinks that it was only in individual cases that certain local Communists tended to ally themselves with alien causes. He discounts the authenticity of the alleged agreement between the Е. А. М. and the Bulgarian Army in January 1944. In the later phases of the Greek civil war, in 1948-49, the Greek Communist leaders, hard pressed, made various desperate efforts to propitiate the “Slav-Macedonians” of Northern Greece, on whom they relied heavily: Mr. Kofos (p. 176) quotes captured documents to show that in January 1949, 30 per cent of the rebel forces were “Slav-Macedonians.” But the friction between the Greek Communists and the “Slav-Macedonians” together with their Yugoslav or Bulgarian supporters continued to the bitter end. The Greek Communist Party never solved its dilemma. The Macedonian question was one of the main causes for its loss of prestige and support in Greece.

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Navarino was a major sea-battle only in the sense that within a few hours the Turko-Egyptian forces lost 60 vessels out of 89 (2240 guns) and altogether some 8000 men. As a battle it has little or no interest for naval historians, for it was simply a firing match at close range within an almost landlocked bay. The victors were the combined English, French, and Russian Squadrons consisting of 27 ships (1324 guns) under