One major theme is, of course, the permanent feud, only temporarily damped down between 1944 and 1948, between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communists over Macedonia. Even more interesting—in this book—is the appalling dilemma which the Macedonian dispute, and the existence of a Slav-speaking population of around 80,000 in Northern Greece, presented to the Greek Communist Party from its earliest days. The Party leaders were constantly torn between their desire to maintain at least the outer appearance of good patriots and their obligation to pay heed to the directives of Moscow or the demands of the Yugoslav or Bulgarian Communists.

Mr. Kofos fairly consistently gives the Greek Communist leaders the benefit of the doubt: he presents them as attempting to lean to the side of Greek patriotism. He writes (p. 128): “throughout the occupation [1941-44], the communist-led Е. А. М. appears to have avoided committing itself to either Yugoslavia’s or Bulgaria’s plans for Macedonia.” He thinks that it was only in individual cases that certain local Communists tended to ally themselves with alien causes. He discounts the authenticity of the alleged agreement between the Е. А. М. and the Bulgarian Army in January 1944. In the later phases of the Greek civil war, in 1948-49, the Greek Communist leaders, hard pressed, made various desperate efforts to propitiate the “Slav-Macedonians” of Northern Greece, on whom they relied heavily: Mr. Kofos (p. 176) quotes captured documents to show that in January 1949, 30 per cent of the rebel forces were “Slav-Macedonians.” But the friction between the Greek Communists and the “Slav-Macedonians” together with their Yugoslav or Bulgarian supporters continued to the bitter end. The Greek Communist Party never solved its dilemma. The Macedonian question was one of the main causes for its loss of prestige and support in Greece.

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Navarino was a major sea-battle only in the sense that within a few hours the Turko-Egyptian forces lost 60 vessels out of 89 (2240 guns) and altogether some 8000 men. As a battle it has little or no interest for naval historians, for it was simply a firing match at close range within an almost landlocked bay. The victors were the combined English, French, and Russian Squadrons consisting of 27 ships (1324 guns) under
the command of Admiral Codrington. No allied ships were sunk, but several, including the Asia, Codrington’s flagship, were severely damaged. It is doubtful whether this battle, for all its destruction, changed the course of history. The decision of the Powers to give Greece an independent existence had already been taken in July 1827; the Greeks themselves were by no means defeated; and at the time Navarino was fought it is inconceivable that they were likely to be re-subjected to the Turkish yoke.

The chief interest of the Battle of Navarino are the events which lead to it, those that followed it, and the persons associated with them. The subject therefore lends itself to the treatment given in this book — the setting of the battle, the diplomatic negotiations out of which it arose, the situation in Greece itself, the character sketches of those on the spot. In so treating the subject Mr. Woodhouse has displayed his customary skill as a writer and the result is a highly instructive and most readable book, which, at the same time, is tastefully produced and well illustrated.

For the writing of a book of this kind on this particular subject there is certainly no shortage of material and the problem for the writer is one of deciding what to use and in what detail to sketch the background. To most of these materials there is an excellent guide in George Douin’s Navarin, a scholarly and exhaustive study, which was published in Cairo in 1927 by the Egyptian Geographical Society. This now very rare book utilizes materials in the French and British Archives and also the Abdin Palace Archives, Cairo. Douin did not, it would seem, have access to the Codrington Papers, but as Mr. Woodhouse (who has examined them) explains, these add very little to what is already known from the materials in the British Archives and from the private papers which were published by Admiral Codrington’s daughter, Lady Bourchier.

One of the great merits of this book is that it contains extensive quotations from the documents — from the various (and not always precise) instructions sent to Codrington and his colleague, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, from Codrington’s own reports and private letters, from the accounts of his naval colleagues (both English and foreign) and from the evidence supplied by eye-witnesses on a host of topics. All these — and they are invariably introduced with much art, excellent timing and careful arrangement — make the story vivid. They also make it intelligible. This is of great importance, for Navarino (except to the expert who has read the documents) has always been an obscure event. What we have here in a relatively short compass is the relevant
documentation; we also have this documentation enlivened by skilful portraits—a most essential thing, for to understand Navarino it is necessary to know what men intended when words were written and what was understood by those who heard them.

The Treaty of London of July 1827 under which the Allies acted was not altogether clear. Although it did not rule out force, the precise use of force was not stipulated and perhaps it was a threat of force rather than its actual use that was envisaged. Nor were the instructions to the Admirals much clearer than the Treaty: if the Greeks accepted the proposed armistice and the Turks refused it, the Admirals were to treat the Greeks as friends and place their squadrons in a position to intercept supplies for Ibrahim Pasha from Egypt and the Dardanelle; but they were to prevent these measures from degenerating into hostilities and were to use force only if the Turks persisted "in forcing the passages which they had intercepted." Canning himself, who was trying to solve the Greek question by negotiations with Mohamet Ali of Egypt, hardly expected hostilities to ensue: he spoke of the measures contemplated in the Treaty as being "peaceful interference, recommended by a friendly demonstration of force." Although he did not scrutinize the Instructions to the Admirals, he, like others in London, evidently envisaged a position in which, in the event of the Turks' refusing an armistice, the Allied Squadron would simply, perhaps by firing over the bows of Turkish and Egyptian vessels turn them back and thus compel the armistice to be accepted.

The mixture of friendship and force bewildered Codrington and his French colleague, de Rigny; and on 11th August Codrington asked Stratford Canning, the Ambassador at Constantinople, for a clarification. He received in reply: "the prevention of supplies... is ultimately to be enforced, if necessary, and when all other means are exhausted, by cannon shot." With these instructions Codrington was still far from happy but he could console himself that in the last resort he could use force. Out of sympathy with diplomatic niceties, looking with some favour on the unfortunate Greeks and highly suspicious of their enemies, this old Nelsonian captain was not the one "to exhaust all other means." He was, however, astute enough to "cover himself" in his copious reports. When eventually an inquiry was held into his conduct he himself was the chief source of information and it was certainly not easy to make a case against him. The weak parts of his defence were never probed. He was never asked to explain why he permitted Hastings and Church to continue warlike operations within the limits of the recognized blockades.
He was never asked why he did not wait, before entering Navarino, for Ibrahim Pasha to state his instructions from Alexandria and Constantinople. Again, he made much of Ibrahim's plan to devastate the Morea, though at the time he decided to enter Navarino he had only an unconfirmed Greek report upon this matter. No one really challenged his statement that it was absolutely necessary to enter the harbour; and no one pointed out that by doing so he exposed his squadron to the risk of destruction. (Indeed, had the Turks not become panicky, thus causing the battle to begin in daylight—had they waited till darkness to use their fire ships, Navarino might well have gone down to history as an inevitable defeat instead of an untoward or unexpected victory).

In the end Codrington was recalled on another count — the decision having been taken in London upon the receipt of false intelligence that he had allowed another Turkish squadron to enter Navarino. Although this intelligence was corrected before the despatch recalling him had been written, the decision was allowed to stand. Hence Codrington was punished ostensibly for neglect but in reality for his impetuosity and stupidity in winning the victory of Navarino. But if official recognition of his victory was denied him in England, in Greece he was given a place of honour only second to that of Lord Byron. Says Mr. Woodhouse in his excellent concluding paragraphs: "Codrington was himself an accidental hero, but a true hero none the less; and as such the Greeks have always recognized him, just as his government did by turning its wrath against him."

It is pleasing to note that Mr. Woodhouse finds room in his tightly-knit narrative for the story concerning Codrington just after his arrival in England in October 1828. This story, as told by Lady Bourchier, his daughter, aptly describes the nature of the battle: "...he met an acquaintance in the street, a country gentleman of that sort to whom foreign events or public interests are a blank, who, seeming only to associate the thought of him with turnip fields and pointers, greeted him with, 'How are you, Codrington? I have not met you for some time; have you had any good shooting lately'? He merely answered 'Why, yes, I have had some rather remarkable shooting' and passed on."