other matters are more fully dealt with. It would seem however that they have chosen (and in my opinion quite rightly) to make this introduction to Greek history primarily a chronological outline. From it the traveller will quickly find his historical bearings and the student of classical Greece will surely find much that he will want to know about the medieval and modern periods.

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It is sometimes argued by English historians that only the Battle of Navarino saved the Greek War of Independence from annihilating defeat. True, the military fortunes of the Greeks were at a very low ebb after the disasters at Athens in the early summer of 1827. But there was still an armed force in being under General Church, which was on its way across the northern Peloponnese with the declared intention of crossing the Gulf of Corinth into the western mainland at the very moment when Codrington precipitated the “untoward event.” There was also the small but formidable naval squadron under Hastings — including the most modern ship in the Mediterranean — which the Turks had no prospect of putting out of action. Even without Navarino, it is certain that the Greeks would have fought on. The question studied in Domna Dontas’ scholarly monograph is to what extent these forces contributed to the ultimate extension of the boundaries of Greece from the Peloponnese alone to the Arta-Volos line.

The author concludes that the operations in the area north of the Gulf and west of the Pindus range did contribute substantially towards ensuring that the area was not excluded from the new Greek kingdom. Certainly it was the crucial area — more crucial than the area east of the River Aspropotamos, which was to have been included in at least one of the intermediate plans. The reason why some members of the British government in particular wished to exclude the area west of the Aspropotamos was that they did not wish to have independent Greeks close to the dependent Greeks in the British protectorate of the Ionian Islands. In a purely colonialist sense they were right: they lost their case, and in due course they also lost the Ionian Islands. In a less limited perspective,
their judgment was clearly wrong, and it is as well that they were overruled.

Did the campaign by Church and his Roumeliote chieftains help to decide the matter favourably? No doubt their presence on the ground, in organised numbers under arms, did so contribute. The author's minute and thorough examination of the documentary sources for the campaign fully supports this view. The capture of Mesolonghi and Vonitsa were clearly events of immense psychological importance. So was the fact that General Church and His Britannic Majesty's representative, Stratford Canning, met at a crucial moment on the very soil under dispute. So was the fact that local Greek chieftains, some of whom had previously made accommodations (kapákia) with the Turks, were willing to take up arms again, which they would not have done without the presence of Church and his men. So indeed was the fact, pointed out by the author, that the campaigns north of the Gulf helped to keep the Roumeliotes out of dangerous mischief in the Peloponnese. All this is true and important. Nevertheless it should not be allowed to obscure the significance of Capodistrias' diplomacy over the same period. It was he who convinced the Powers that a small Greece, limited to the Peloponnese, would be neither viable nor peaceable. Church's campaign was only one element in the political combinations of the subtle and unjustly maligned Kyverntitis.

The tragedy of the year after Navarino was that it opened up such unbridgeable gulfs between Greece's champions, particularly Church and Capodistrias. They never thoroughly understood one another, and the intrigues and jealousies of lesser men—particularly Capodistrias' brother, Agostino, and some of Church's subordinate chieftains—served to make their misunderstandings worse. The author charts the melancholy progress of their relationship with sympathetic care and objectivity, supported by some new material which adds a few details to the story. Perhaps an equally sympathetic English historian might be inclined to blame Church a little more and Capodistrias a little less. Incidentally, the narrative turns up an early episode in an even more disastrous quarrel that plagued Capodistrias— with the family of Mavromichalis, one of whom turned up with his men to fight under Church, contrary to Capodistrias' orders.

The story is well and clearly told, and admirably documented. The author is to be congratulated on a contribution to the history of the War of Independence in a sector which has been unduly neglected. Perhaps it is also fair to add that the character of the campaign, the country,
and the personalities, will be readily recognised as familiar by those who fought over the same area in not dissimilar circumstances more than a century later.

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This volume was prepared for the intelligent layman, one who wishes to have in brief compass all the essential data necessary to understand the revolutionary changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe in recent years. The volume begins with a geographical and ethnic survey, summarizes the chequered history of the area in three chapters and then devotes approximately its remaining half to the current situation. A final chapter puts in summary form the generalizations required by the intelligent layman for an understanding of Eastern Europe.

The essence of what Mr. Singleton, who is Lecturer in Social Science at the Bradford (England) Institute of Technology, offers is to be found in this last chapter, although the preceding material is closely related to the conclusions which he presents there. Very briefly, these conclusions may be put as follows:

I. The Soviet interest in Eastern Europe is determined primarily by security considerations and only secondarily by ideological concerns. In view of the fact that Germany has twice in the twentieth century invaded Russia by way of Eastern Europe, the Soviet interest is understandable, as is the equanimity with which many in Eastern Europe view the permanent division of Germany. Free elections in both parts of Germany are not likely because their results would run directly counter to Soviet security interests. Had the Western powers not evinced such pathological fear of Bolshevism, Germany might have been contained in 1938, and Eastern Europe would not today be a Russian sphere. The most that can be expected for the future is the neutralization of the area along Swiss lines.

II. The principal objective of the Communist regimes has been the industrialization of the area. Industrialization is at best a difficult process, especially so where foreign capital is not available, and inevitably