and the personalities, will be readily recognised as familiar by those who fought over the same area in not dissimilar circumstances more than a century later.

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This volume was prepared for the intelligent layman, one who wishes to have in brief compass all the essential data necessary to understand the revolutionary changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe in recent years. The volume begins with a geographical and ethnic survey, summarizes the chequered history of the area in three chapters and then devotes approximately its remaining half to the current situation. A final chapter puts in summary form the generalizations required by the intelligent layman for an understanding of Eastern Europe.

The essence of what Mr. Singleton, who is Lecturer in Social Science at the Bradford (England) Institute of Technology, offers is to be found in this last chapter, although the preceding material is closely related to the conclusions which he presents there. Very briefly, these conclusions may be put as follows:

I. The Soviet interest in Eastern Europe is determined primarily by security considerations and only secondarily by ideological concerns. In view of the fact that Germany has twice in the twentieth century invaded Russia by way of Eastern Europe, the Soviet interest is understandable, as is the equanimity with which many in Eastern Europe view the permanent division of Germany. Free elections in both parts of Germany are not likely because their results would run directly counter to Soviet security interests. Had the Western powers not evinced such pathological fear of Bolshevism, Germany might have been contained in 1938, and Eastern Europe would not today be a Russian sphere. The most that can be expected for the future is the neutralization of the area along Swiss lines.

II. The principal objective of the Communist regimes has been the industrialization of the area. Industrialization is at best a difficult process, especially so where foreign capital is not available, and inevitably
brings with it popular sacrifice and the loss of liberty. At least the Communists have tried to shorten the process which, with its emphasis on heavy industry, is a prerequisite to higher living standards. In agriculture, forcible collectivization has reduced output, but the Communists are right in pushing for larger agricultural units and Eastern Europe should prove able to feed itself in the future.

III. The populations of Eastern Europe are not so terribly unhappy under Communism as is generally believed in the West. These populations definitely do not wish to return to the situation of 1939 and they accept as definitive many of the economic and social changes which Communism has brought about. There is little serious opposition to Communism and no alternative program has been put forward. The true Communists, as distinguished from the careerists who inevitably join any established church, are dedicated men more Victorian in their outlook than otherwise. The local apparatchik is a kind of parish priest, looking after but also scolding his flock. The disturbances of 1956 resulted from popular discontent with the failure of the Communists to live up to their promises.

In the opinion of this reviewer, Mr. Singleton's presentation contains much that makes sense and is worthwhile. But it also contains much nonsense and is, on the whole, he is sorry to say, a tendentious book with enough of a scholarly scaffolding to seriously mislead our intelligent layman. The basic difficulty with Mr. Singleton's approach is that, in presenting the facts about Eastern Europe, he ignores some and invents others. Here is a case of invented fact:

The first elections which were held after the war conformed in most cases to the general line of the Allied directive concerning freedom of political life. In most countries the Communists and their associates did not receive a majority of the votes. This resulted in the formation of coalition governments. In Poland, for example.... [p. 112].

Thus Mr. Singleton first of all asserts by implication that the elections held in Eastern Europe just after World War II were generally free elections, that in some cases the Communists and their allies received a majority of votes, and that where they did not the result was the formation of coalition governments.

The sad truth is that there were free elections in only two of eight countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary). Only for Czechoslovakia could the argument be made that the Communists and their allies attained a majority — the Communists and the Social Democrats got a little more
than 50 per cent of the total vote — but even this is straining the truth because the Social Democrats were bitterly opposed to any establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The coalition governments formed in Eastern Europe, even in these two countries, were phony coalitions, in the sense that the Communists controlled the key ministries as a consequence of Soviet pressure, worked to undermine and overthrow the coalition and ultimately replaced it with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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Between 1943-1949 — the dates in the book’s title notwithstanding — the Greeks faced three successive rounds of unconventional warfare waged by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) whose aim was to include Greece in the Soviet sphere of political control in the Balkans. Mr. O’Ballance gives a straightforward and thorough account of the military operations of these three armed encounters which were symptoms of the growing bipolarity occurring in the global arena. In the first of these three “rounds,” it had been the British who had armed their potential foes, the communist-controlled National Liberation-Front (EAM), in the expectation (not substantially realized to any great extent, as this study indicates) that it would turn its weapons against the primary foe, the Axis occupiers, not against fellow Greeks in an effort to transform “an imperialist war” into a civil, “class” struggle. In the second of these rounds, on the other hand, the British — with Stalin on the sidelines behaving as a perfect gentleman, at least in state-to-state relations — had to resort to force to defeat the forces they themselves had largely armed. And in the third of these rounds, the Americans, who had been quite critical of the British action in the previous round, provided massive aid in military hardware, auxiliary equipment, and other goods, under the “Truman Doctrine,” to help the Greek Government, its armed forces, and the majority of Greeks to beat the communist-led “Greek Democratic Army”, which was getting material and moral aid from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, with the encouragement of the USSR, at least until early 1948.

In his conclusions, Mr. O’Ballance sums up effectively the reasons for the victory of the Greek Government and its armed forces, judicious-