than 50 per cent of the total vote — but even this is straining the truth because the Social Democrats were bitterly opposed to any establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The coalition governments formed in Eastern Europe, even in these two countries, were phony coalitions, in the sense that the Communists controlled the key ministries as a consequence of Soviet pressure, worked to undermine and overthrow the coalition and ultimately replaced it with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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Between 1943-1949 — the dates in the book’s title notwithstanding — the Greeks faced three successive rounds of unconventional warfare waged by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) whose aim was to include Greece in the Soviet sphere of political control in the Balkans. Mr. O’Ballance gives a straightforward and thorough account of the military operations of these three armed encounters which were symptoms of the growing bipolarity occurring in the global arena. In the first of these three “rounds,” it had been the British who had armed their potential foes, the communist-controlled National Liberation-Front (EAM), in the expectation (not substantially realized to any great extent, as this study indicates) that it would turn its weapons against the primary foe, the Axis occupiers, not against fellow Greeks in an effort to transform “an imperialist war” into a civil, “class” struggle. In the second of these rounds, on the other hand, the British — with Stalin on the sidelines behaving as a perfect gentleman, at least in state-to-state relations — had to resort to force to defeat the forces they themselves had largely armed. And in the third of these rounds, the Americans, who had been quite critical of the British action in the previous round, provided massive aid in military hardware, auxiliary equipment, and other goods, under the “Truman Doctrine,” to help the Greek Government, its armed forces, and the majority of Greeks to beat the communist-led “Greek Democratic Army”, which was getting material and moral aid from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, with the encouragement of the USSR, at least until early 1948.

In his conclusions, Mr. O’Ballance sums up effectively the reasons for the victory of the Greek Government and its armed forces, judicious-
ly weighing the various factors, of weakness among the vanquished and of strength among the victors. In dealing with the second round, he, however, omits, strangely enough, the mutiny of the armed forces of the Greek Government-in-Exile in April 1944 and incorrectly remarks that the USSR recognized the provisional government in the mountains (PEEA) which had been set up simultaneously with this mutiny. Also he fails to mention the famous Churchill-Stalin percentages agreement on the Balkans of October 9, 1944, reached in Moscow. In this reviewer's opinion, thanks to this agreement, a relatively speedy surrender of the rebels was achieved and at a most critical moment in modern Greek history Greece was maintained in the orbit of the West instead of being taken over by the East, or partitioned as were the Balkans or, as a matter of fact, Europe as a whole, or Korea, Vietnam, and Germany.

In connection with this particular round, Mr. O'Ballance ignores the data presented by D. G. Kousoulas, in his *Revolution and Defeat* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 201, who, on the basis of certain interviews, has reached the conclusion that the decisive outside communist factor for the outbreak of the December revolt, as seen from the Greek Communist viewpoint, was Tito's advice. Mr. O'Ballance, on p. 95, merely refers to a later allegation by Markos Vafiadis that Stalin had sent a message to the Central Committee of the KKE "which induced the revolt, but that when asked for help Stalin prevaricated."

Moreover, in connection with the genesis of the third round, Mr. O'Ballance writes on p. 121, that "the birth of the 'Greek Democratic Army'... took place on December 15, 1945, as a result of a Politburo level meeting at Petrich, in Bulgaria," which members of the Central Committee of the KKE and representatives of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian General Staffs attended. However, in accordance with his practice throughout this book, he gives no source for this information. This reviewer, in his *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947* (Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1963), p. 141, refers to a secret meeting of Greek, Bulgarian, and Communist Yugoslav communist party leaders in northern Greece in January 1946. But he, too, on the basis of his study of *Rizospastis*, KKE's press organ, reaches on pp. 138-139 a similar conclusion. On the occasion of this book review, he wishes to add two indications of Soviet collusion in the launching of the whole enterprise. First, an EAM mission visited Moscow in January 1946, with Soviet press organ merely mentioning that they had raised the question of Greece's territorial claims at the peace settlement. And, second, that the previous month,
Nikos Zachariadis, the Secretary of the KKE, before giving a very militant speech in Thessaloniki, on December 31, 1945, had been mysteriously absent from Athens for several days. Where was he? This reviewer raises the question whether he might not have met Admiral Konstantin Rodionov, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Greece, who, before assuming his post in Athens on December 30, had stopped in Sofia for three days. That Yugoslav communist writers such as Vladimir Dedijer and Milovan Djilas are strangely silent about the whole matter of Yugoslav support of the communist-led third round in Greece, while both reveal that Stalin by early 1948, i.e. after the enunciation of the “Truman Doctrine,” favored the folding up of this communist enterprise, is additional circumstantial evidence of Soviet Communist support of this venture until that time. It suggests, too, that behind Tito’s advice to the KKE in December 1944, a similar pattern of collaboration between the Yugoslav and the Soviet communists existed.

The opening chapter of this book which contains background information on Greece is marred by certain factual errors. Thus, Greece never exported grain in the period before World War II. On the contrary it had to import considerable quantities of grain for consumption purposes. Moreover, the percentage of the population employed in agriculture was far higher than the figure of forty per cent given by the author, who also clings to the rather outdated view that Byzantium was but a long decline of the *pars orientalis* of the Roman Empire. Finally, there are many mispellings of Greek proper names and toponymies throughout the whole book which easily could have been eradicated by a Greek speaking reader.

Nonetheless, these shortcomings in no way detract from the basic value of this solid study of unconventional warfare in which U.S. military forces were not used in battle and scrupulous respect was paid to the inviolability of the “privileged sanctuary” afforded to the foe on the territory of Greece’s three northern neighbours — with the result that it was the territory of one side only that suffered the ravages of a “war of liberation.” As C. M. Woodhouse points out in his introduction to this book, the story illustrates Napoleon’s dictum that “in war the proportion of moral to material factors is a three to one” — in nonnuclear war, this reviewer would add. The Greeks, Woodhouse observed, had a will to survive.

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