ly be called a novel. Rather it is a poetic expression of human tragic existence in epic form. The voice is always the author's. It is description rather than creation yet, at its best, it is perceptive and engaging. At its worst, in the long monologues and the somewhat loosely constructed erotic reminiscences, its impact is lost. It is as difficult to "place" as Njegoš's *The Mountain Wraath*, to which it owes so much. Perhaps Džilas, in the end, says little that Njegoš did not express, but he speaks with the sincerity and freshness of a man who is himself close to the predicament he portrays. Despite its very local atmosphere, which will be immediately striking to the Western reader, this is a book of universal reference and indeed its sincerity stands as a proof that, in wisdom and honesty, Džilas is the superior of many of his detractors.

Cambridge University  
E. D. GOY


In this monograph Professor Kolaja reports on some data he collected on attitudes and decision making in two Yugoslav factories during the summer of 1959. A number of workers and managerial personnel were interviewed, over a period of two months, minutes of meetings of key committees during the previous year were analysed and a number of committee meetings were attended by Professor Kolaja. A questionnaire was administered to a sample of the employees of one of the factories; some of the results have been published previously.

The two factories, called "A" and "B" in the text, are fairly large, having 1620 and 503 employees respectively. "A", a textile factory, had 80 per cent women employees and relatively low education and skill levels throughout. "B", which produced dyes and colors, had a predominantly male workforce, 12 per cent of whom had had at least a high school education and a number of whom were graduate engineers and chemists.

A majority of the sampled workers thought that the workers' council was more influential within the enterprise than either the director, the League of Communists or the union. The latter appeared to be relatively weak despite the large membership it had in both factories. The League appeared to be more interested in the union than in the workers' council. The enterprise showed some autonomy with respect to the local government, refusing in one instance a request to make a grant from the
enterprise budget. Management representatives tended to dominate the discussion at meetings of both workers' council and management board. Though it got its way with respect to decisions outside the sphere of labor relations, the management was forced to defend its policies before the workers' council so that publicity itself set some limits to managerial freedom of action. However, the apathy and ignorance of large segments of the work force with respect to these issues meant that this control was exercised essentially by the workers' council, which contained a high ratio of members of the League of Communists (15 and 12 per cent respectively of the work forces, were League members, but 70 and 40 per cent of the councils were League members). A division of labor between workers' council and management board was apparent, the former concerning itself more with general questions of policy and the more important operational decisions, the latter being largely concerned with individual applications. An absolute majority of both management boards were either members of the managerial staff, white collar workers, or highly skilled blue collar workers. Worker conflicts with management policies were unorganized, being typically reflected in single-worker expressions of disapproval, mostly pertaining to personnel matters. Nevertheless, though there were differences in attitudes between managerial and rank and file workers in both factories, these differences appeared to be much less strong than they were in a Polish factory previously studied by Professor Kolaja.

Kolaja's own conclusion from the data was:

"that the major function of both workers' councils, as I observed them, was informative and educational. Management was informed by worker members of the council about the attitudes of the rank and file, and worker members were exposed to managerial problems. In this respect both councils were quite successful. The worker members of the councils or their managing boards participated actively when personnel questions were discussed; their participation fell short of the professed definition of workers management when technological developments as well as financial and marketing issues were discussed" (p. 77).

The great difficulties in assessing influence in a complex organization are well illustrated by this study. Kolaja did not observe an election of a workers' council or the appointment or removal of a director. It does not appear that any major decisions, such as the approval of a large scale investment program or a decision about profits division, were taken during the period he observed. Nor does he report on earlier decisions of this kind. Consequently it is not at all clear that the influence patterns
he studied would persist when really vital decisions were at issue. A second problem relates to his sample, which may not be representative in a meaningful sense. In his earlier report it is described only as "...a ten per cent systematic sample ...[which] was drawn from a list of employees." It is not described in the present work and the number of respondents (78) constitutes over 15 per cent of the reported work force of factory "B." Finally, no systematic attempt is made to assess the extent to which these factories may be representative of enterprise decision-making and worker attitudes throughout Yugoslavia, or even of these two factories at other moments in time. Consequently the data should be treated as an addition to the body of anecdotal material regarding recent Yugoslav economic-organizational history rather than as an appraisal of that experience.

In this light Kolaja's evidence indicates the great diversity of influence pattern that the Yugoslav environment can support. Power over enterprise decisions is exercised at least formally through the workers' council. The workers themselves may of course control the council. But where there is widespread worker apathy and ignorance, effective control may pass to management, to a clique of management board members, to a group of the better educated and more skilled within the work force, or even to the League of Communists or local government. However, there are at least two important factors tending to influence the relative frequency with which these patterns may occur. The first is the existence of market relations among all firms in Yugoslavia. This supports the autonomy of decision-making by the enterprise and tends to emphasize the harmony of interests — and a certain similarity of attitudes — of members of the work force vis-à-vis outsiders. The second is the publicity given to management decisions as a consequence of the formal power of the workers' councils. In the years since Kolaja's observations, legislation has tended toward an expansion of the formal authority of the council. This no doubt reflects a need to provide the councils with more authority and thus suggests something about the past. But it also suggests something about the attitude of the Yugoslav leadership toward workers' management. By firmly establishing the authority of the workers' council, an institutional basis is provided for a more or less open competition among the groups aspiring to power. And openness is one of the more important conditions for the development and maintenance of democratic decision-making.

Readers of Professor Kolaja's book will acquire a "feel" for the influence relations that must exist in considerable number of Yugoslav
factories and which only empirical description can provide. The story is well told and the text uncluttered by jargon. On this basis it can be warmly recommended as a contribution to the still thin body of literature in English on the Yugoslav economic experiment.

University of California, Berkeley

BENJAMIN WARD


The second siege of Vienna and the defeat of the Turkish army before the city’s walls was one of the most dramatic events of the late seventeenth century. The battle and the campaign that followed reversed the long standing Turkish threat to Western Europe and opened the epoch in which the Ottoman Empire rapidly sank to the level of a second rate power. The bitter siege, the gallantry of the garrison, the diplomatic maneuvering for the great armed coalition to free the city, all occupied and excited the minds of Europeans and the victory was celebrated throughout Christendom by solemn ceremonies and a spate of newsletters, broadsheets, and other publications. Interest in the siege continued in a stream of publications and the 250th anniversary in 1933 produced another substantial body of literature. Nonetheless, there has been no modern account in English, and this volume does much to fill this void.

Mr. Stoye has written a good book, in which perceptive and well-written page follows perceptive and well-written page. Yet this reviewer completed the book thinking, yes, the author has done a fine job, but he has not written a definitive account of the campaign. The reviewer has no quarrel with the principal points made regarding the actual siege and the diplomacy relating to the formation and dispatch of the relief army. To be sure, there is little in the narrative that is not familiar to the professional historian from such earlier accounts as Reinhold Lorenz*, ‘Türkenjahr 1683* (Vienna, 1933), though the present volume is in certain respects a definite improvement over Lorenz because it is free of the *Grossdeutsch* ideology permeating the earlier study. Still, Mr. Stoye leaves some questions unanswered. For instance, was there indeed a strong citizen faction in Vienna favoring capitulation? What were the exact relations between Leopold I and John Sobieski before, and especially after, the siege? For answers to these and other points the reader will