factories and which only empirical description can provide. The story is well told and the text uncluttered by jargon. On this basis it can be warmly recommended as a contribution to the still thin body of literature in English on the Yugoslav economic experiment.

University of California, Berkeley

BENJAMIN WARD


The second siege of Vienna and the defeat of the Turkish army before the city's walls was one of the most dramatic events of the late seventeenth century. The battle and the campaign that followed reversed the long standing Turkish threat to Western Europe and opened the epoch in which the Ottoman Empire rapidly sank to the level of a second rate power. The bitter siege, the gallantry of the garrison, the diplomatic maneuvering for the great armed coalition to free the city, all occupied and excited the minds of Europeans and the victory was celebrated throughout Christendom by solemn ceremonies and a spate of newsletters, broadsheets, and other publications. Interest in the siege continued in a stream of publications and the 250th anniversary in 1933 produced another substantial body of literature. Nonetheless, there has been no modern account in English, and this volume does much to fill this void.

Mr. Stoye has written a good book, in which perceptive and well-written page follows perceptive and well-written page. Yet this reviewer completed the book thinking, yes, the author has done a fine job, but he has not written a definitive account of the campaign. The reviewer has no quarrel with the principal points made regarding the actual siege and the diplomacy relating to the formation and dispatch of the relief army. To be sure, there is little in the narrative that is not familiar to the professional historian from such earlier accounts as Reinhold Lorenz', Türkennacht 1683 (Vienna, 1933), though the present volume is in certain respects a definite improvement over Lorenz because it is free of the Grossdeutsch ideology permeating the earlier study. Still, Mr. Stoye leaves some questions unanswered. For instance, was there indeed a strong citizen faction in Vienna favoring capitulation? What were the exact relations between Leopold I and John Sobieski before, and especially after, the siege? For answers to these and other points the reader will
look in vain. On the credit side, the author provides an excellent description of Turkish siege methods and of the garrison's efforts to contain them. He rightly stresses the ambivalent policies of the Magyar magnates who played a waiting game, opening the gates of their fortresses to the pretender Thököly, but who also did not rally to him in strength, and submitted with equal grace to the approaching Habsburg forces after the relief of Vienna.

The author also emphasizes, and with complete justification, the role of diplomacy. The Austrian defeats in Hungary had in large part been due to preoccupation in the West and one of the decisive questions in the months preceding the relief was whether the imperial diplomats would be able to secure the Rhine frontier and provide for the mustering of a large enough force to save the city while time remained. Once such an army had been raised, however, the outcome could only be the defeat of the Turks. To contain the garrison and at the same time defeat the approaching relief army was quite beyond the cumbersome and obsolescent forces of the sultan. To demonstrate this, an analysis and comparison of the opposing field armies is required; such an appraisal is lamentably lacking.

The relief army was a composite force, primarily of Habsburg and Polish troops, reinforced by contingents from many of the states of the Holy Roman Empire. The level of competence in the army varied, but it far surpassed that of the Turks. During the seventeenth century the reforms of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus had produced a revolution in the art of war which had made the tactical employment of infantry and artillery more flexible and which stressed a combination of fire and shock. These changes had, albeit slowly, been adopted by the emerging regular Austrian forces and by the imperial contingents, which moreover had undergone long tempering in the Thirty Years' War and in the more recent campaigns in Flanders and on the Rhine. And while the technical expertise of the Western allies was greater than that of the Poles, the latter, with their recent combat experience and their excellent cavalry, constituted a significant force. Disunity in command delayed the approach of the allied army, but once battle was joined technical superiority more than compensated for this factor.

In contrast, the Ottoman Empire had not kept pace with the evolution of warfare and never was able to rid itself entirely of old traditions and vested interests. To be sure, the old-fashioned feudal spahi cavalry had been more or less abandoned and new infantry units, recruited from Moslems of Anatolia, had been raised. The Janissaries, too,
regained some of their old prowess under the reforming Köprülü vezirs, but these troops were no match for the veteran regulars in the Habsburg service. And even the most prodigious effort could not overcome the fact that the Turkish army before Vienna operated at the extreme end of its logistic support. Though the sultan still possessed a powerful artillery, the heavy siege train never reached Vienna, and the Turkish field guns were inferior in speed of fire and battlefield mobility to their Western counterparts.

The lack of discussion and analysis of the field armies constitutes perhaps the greatest shortcoming of this study. There are, however, a few additional weaknesses which require mention. The author, Fellow at Magdalen College, Oxford, and University Lecturer in Modern History, presumably had access to the continental military archives, yet his documentation is surprisingly weak and rests primarily on published materials. For example, there is but one sole reference to the great mass of documents in the Kriegsarchiv Wien, while reference to the Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv are few indeed. The absence of a map showing the city and its fortifications makes it difficult to follow the narrative, and this lack, considering the many excellent contemporary maps available, is hard to understand. A map of the Wienerwald is not an adequate substitute. Finally, the reviewer also wondered about the author’s use of the term “Burgenland” for the western counties of Hungary. This name was specifically coined in 1919 and never was employed previous to that date.

To sum up then, this is an extremely well written book of considerable interest to the non-specialist. The definitive military account of the great 1683 campaign, however, still needs to be written.

The University of New Mexico

GUNTER E. ROTHENBERG


The field work on which this book is based was carried out in the villages of central Anatolia in the early 1950’s. There have been, it is true, great economic and political changes in Turkey and in central Anatolia since that time. This has not detracted from the value and interest of this careful work. Prof. Stirling’s researches in Turkish villages were known to Middle East specialists from a few articles and his docto-