to give a place to a large number of manuscripts in the general framework of the literary derivation of Slavic antiquity. However, what is of great interest in the catalogue is the Bulgarian manuscripts of the period under the Turkish domination, manuscripts which demonstrate the indubitable continuity in the history of Bulgarian philology. In fact the manuscripts provide a particular interest to specialists in Slavic, who will study them as literary monuments, and apart from this to historians who will find in them many notes, brief, indeed it is true, but valuable sources for the study of the history of Bulgaria during the time of the Turkish occupation.

Finally we should observe of this most useful work that the number of copies which has been published is rather small. The work is of general interest and supplies will soon be exhausted, at which point it will be necessary for it to be republished.

University of Thessaloniki

ANTONY-EMIL TACHIAOS


In 1874 William Stillman published his *Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8* which has become a major source for the period of the struggle of the Cretans against the Ottoman domination. By the time this book appeared the Cretan affair had almost totally disappeared from public interest, and the sale of the volume was disappointingly small. In a few years Stillman’s history of the Cretan revolt became not only rare but unknown. Professor Arnakis, on the occasion of the Centenary of the Cretan Insurrection of 1866, revised and edited Stillman’s forgotten volume and thus made it available to scholars of the history of Crete. This book constitutes the first volume of the “Cretan Series” of the Center for Neo-Hellenic Studies in Austin, Texas, in the United States of America, the founder of which is Professor Arnakis. This new edition of Stillman’s *Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8* is furnished with an extensive introduction which covers the international aspects of the Cretan war. These were, to a large extent, unknown to Stillman, or they fell outside his primary interest, which was to report on the situation in Crete. Professor Arnakis’s introduction entitled “The Cretan Question 1866-1869,” surveys the relations between Greece and Turkey,
which were pivotal in the affairs of Crete and sums up the decisive rôle of the Great Powers. The text is edited in a scholarly way: and there are to be found numerous footnotes with important details of the international and local scene, together with relevant topographical, biographical and other data, collected in the Histotikon Archeion Kretes, the Institute of Modern Greek History of the Academy of Athens and the National Archives of the United States in Washington D.C. There is also to be found an index of names and places as well as a glossary of foreign words occurring more than once in the text — additions which completed Stillman's own edition.

In 1865 Stillman was appointed as the American Consul in Crete where he remained until 1868. He carried out a policy which aimed at increasing the prestige of the United States in the East. The pursuance of such a policy in Crete was not a difficult task. Early in 1866 the Cretans approached him and proposed to him that the United States should take Crete under their protection. This proposal was repeated more intensely when rumours began to circulate that the United States would purchase an island in the Levant. Stillman, delighted with this proposal, explained to his Government that no place could be more desirable than Crete as an American harbour in the Levant. This plan did not materialize. Stillman, however, continued his policy. He took active part in the preparations of the Cretans to protest against their oppression by the Turkish authorities. He was so well in the affairs of the Cretans that he had incurred the invincible displeasure of the Turks who, as he writes himself, threatened to kill him; and during the revolt they kept a close watch on him. Yet, he remained, without hesitation, the friend of the Christians of Crete.

Stillman's narrative begins with the assembly of the Cretans on the plateau of Omalos, in April 1866, in order to decide on their future. He considered that the assembly was perfectly legal and that the Governor of Crete, Ismail Pasha, was responsible for the collision which ensued, for, making an illegal use of authority and using threats, he ordered the Committee to disperse — an order which it refused to carry out. Stillman states that, in pursuing that policy, Ismail confidently counted on the support not only of his own government but of the French and English Consuls. Stillman described the French Consul Derché with very insulting words, while the description of his English colleague Dickson was more objective. He considered both of them as the friends of the Pasha while he strongly maintained that he himself took the lead, supported by the Italian and Russian Consuls Colucci
and Dendrinos, in order to hinder any possible violence on the part of the Turks against the Christian Cretans. But what makes Stillman's book an important source is the author's reference to the Russian Consul's character and behaviour. From intensive research in that subject there is proof that Stillman's description of Dendrinos was very near to the truth. It was considered that Dendrinos played a leading part in the Cretan revolt and, as Stillman writes, was "a timid, irresolute man, but a master of the arts of intrigue who was lost as soon as he had an open part to play in which he must make an important decision. He was more concerned with his own security than with the fate of the Christians"—remarks which explain his attitude in his relations with the insurgents.

During the whole of the Insurrection, Stillman was an acute and close observer trying always to verify the information he received from all sides. This task was very difficult, for atrocities committed were denied or exaggerated according to the purpose they were to serve. He had, therefore, organized a sort of news agency, by which he was able to get the earliest and most reliable news of all movements on the island. This is the reason why he was called "the postman of the Insurrection." Yet, he wrote his history taking the side of the Greeks, without omitting to emphasize that the different chiefs of the Greek volunteers on the island were kept ineffective by dissensions and jealousies amongst themselves, each refusing to obey any other. Also he insisted that one of the main causes of the failure of the revolt was the omission of the Greek Government to impose on the Cretans an effective organization and a supreme commander, as well as to provide them with sufficient ammunition and foodstuffs. On the other hand, he condemned the Turks for their atrocities which, he stated, were committed because they were unable to carry out successfully a battle. The commander of the United States squadron in the Mediterranean, Jeffers, who visited Stillman in the summer of 1867, wrote to his chief in Malta:

Mr. Stillman our Consul is a most estimable and cultured gentleman of superior abilities, a literary man and an artist but he is a humanitarian and sympathizer whose very good qualities make him an enthusiastic supporter of the side he espouses. He denies all the positions of the Turk and asserts that everything is the result of a systematic determination on the part of the Government to reduce the island to a desert...This appears to me to be without regard to the merits of the cause...He asserts that the facts collected by the Consular Body, when published, will prove this...

1. The National Archives of the United States, European Squadron, Navy
Stillman, in the meantime, published articles in the European press concerning the atrocities committed by the Turks in Crete. These articles excited the Turks against him. The Governor considered him as the head and front of the Insurrection and credited him with superhuman cunning. He ordered a closer watch on Stillman, which made his life in Crete very unpleasant. This affected his health and symptoms of weariness were so obvious that he requested of his Government to be transferred to another post. His request to leave Crete coincided with a shift in the Russian policy in Crete. Since the beginning of the revolt he had made, as had Morris, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, common cause with his Russian colleague in Canea and he had been in close collaboration with General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador to the Porte. However, it is clear from his narrative that Stillman at the early stages of the revolt ignored what the views of Russia were in regard to the Near East; and when in autumn 1867 he found out that Russia seemed to be in favour of only making the Greek agitation a part of her own schemes which were directed from St Petersburg, he was greatly discouraged. The State Department, however, deferred the date of his transfer from Crete until the autumn of 1868. During this last year on the island he remained almost inactive. He was convinced that the sacrifices of the Christians for their independence went in vain. He, therefore, advised them that they had better accept Aali Pasha’s propositions of autonomy and peace (September 1867) instead of continuing the seemingly pointless guerilla war. When the Cretans rejected Aali’s propositions, Stillman lost all his remaining enthusiasm for the Insurrection, and, from that date until his retirement from Crete, his activities were very restricted. His narrative of this last year of the revolt consists of a chapter of a few pages.

The history of The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8 by Stillman is a detailed and highly personal narrative in the nature of an apologia. But, it constitutes a valuable source for the history of the struggle of the Cretans, as it is written by a diplomat and an eye witness. This is the real value of Stillman’s book. Professor Arnakis has done an excellent job of editing it this year, when historians have again turned their attention to Crete of a century ago.

Athens

DOMNA N. DONTAS

Department (December 1867-December 1868), Jeffers to Farragut, Piraeus, 30 August, 1867.