ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS

TURKISH POLICY TOWARDS GREECE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON GREEK-TURKISH DETENTE

Immediately after the Anatolian War (1919-1922), the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk expressed his readiness to forget old grievances by declaring:

«I could never myself keep on hating a nation for the mistakes of its Government... And towards the Greeks I feel the same. I am confident that we shall soon be great friends, friends as we were before the Powers intervened»1.

This spirit of conciliation was shared by the former protagonist of the Megali Idea, Eleftherios Venizelos, who, after the traumatic experience of the destructive Asia Minor campaign, realised the futility of enmity between the two Aegean neighbours. After his return to power in 1928, the Greek leader embarked on a determined policy of mending fences with Ankara2. In this he was seconded by the Turkish premier, İsmet İnönü, with whom he had been closely associated during the Lausanne negotiations (1922-1923)3.

The new spirit of goodwill among leaders in Athens and Ankara led to the signing of the so-called Rüştü-Polychroniadis agreement of 10 June 19304, which liquidated disputed points arising out of the Lausanne Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Popu-

1. This statement was made during an interview granted to a British journalist, Grace Ellison, soon after the conference of Lausanne had assembled (November 1922), for details see Grace Ellison, An Englishwoman in Angora, London, 1923, p. 175.


3. For the relationship that developed between the two statesmen at Lausanne see Alexis Alexandris, «Η Συνδιάσκεψη τής Λωζάνης, 1922-1923: Η διευθέτηση του θέματος του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου και τον 'Ελλήνων της Κωνσταντινούπολη», in Δελτίον τής 'Ιστορικής και 'Εθνολογικής 'Εταιρείας τής 'Ελλάδος, 24 (1981) 303-38.

lations. The ratification of this agreement by both governments paved the way for a major Greek-Turkish political rapprochement that was sealed during Venizelos’ visit to Ankara on 30 October 1930. While in the Turkish capital, the Greek premier signed a treaty of neutrality, conciliation and arbitration, a protocol on parity of naval armaments and a commercial convention. The June and October 1930 agreements set the cornerstone of a relationship which was to last throughout the interwar period.

Cordial Greek-Turkish relations were placed on a firmer basis when on 3 October 1931, Premier İsmet İnönü, along with his foreign minister Rüştü Aras, arrived in Athens to return Venizelos’ visit to Turkey a year earlier. The warm welcome accorded by the Athenian population to the Turkish leaders was remarkable, the more so as the crowds were comprised mainly of Anatolian Greeks who had been driven out of Turkey in 1922-1924. At the official level, the two prime ministers held intensive negotiations on 5 and 6 October and succeeded in resolving all but few minor outstanding issues. During a banquet at Grande Bretagne hotel, the Turkish Prime Minister expressed his confidence that if a war was to break out, Turkey and Greece would be the two countries that would abstain from taking part in it.

Despite the painful concessions, particularly on the question of compensations for the exchanged Anatolian and Thracian Greeks, Greece reaped substantial benefits from the Aegean rapprochement. The years of diplomatic isolation after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 illustrated the vulnerability of Greece as well as its need to find friends who shared her dedication to the preservation of existing


8. On the negotiations between 5/6 October 1931 see the minutes in BMAEV (Benaki Museum Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos)/61.


10. For a detailed analysis of this issue see Anastasiadou, *op. cit.*, 309-426.
boundaries in the Balkans\textsuperscript{11}. But, not all her neighbours shared her adherence to the \textit{status quo}. With the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly on 27 November 1919, Bulgaria was deprived of an exit on the Aegean Sea. Sofia refused to come to terms with this loss and sought ways to reverse the clauses of a treaty which was imposed upon her following her defeat in the First World War. Thus, during the interwar period, Bulgaria became the major revisionist power in the Balkans\textsuperscript{12}.

Unlike Bulgaria, Turkey was satisfied with her borders drawn at Lausanne\textsuperscript{13} and was as anxious as Greece to preserve the \textit{status quo} in the Balkans. As a result, Greek/Turkish friendship acted as a deterrent to Bulgaria’s designs at the expense of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. Further, Turkish Premier İsmet İnönü reassured the Greeks that Turkey did not have any territorial ambitions in Western Thrace and that her only concern in the area was the well-being of the Thracian Muslim minority.

Further, the Greek/Turkish détente put an end to the military and naval arms race in the Aegean which was a serious drain on the weak Greek economy. Instead, close ties with Ankara offered considerable commercial opportunities to Greek businessmen and the possibility to redress the existing trade imbalance between the two countries whereby Greek exports to its eastern neighbour did not exceed one-fifth of the imports from Turkey. In a move to strengthen commercial relations on 9 February 1931, the Venizelos government granted to Turkey the status of the most-favoured-nation on condition of reciprocity\textsuperscript{14}.

Throughout his tenure in office, Venizelos eagerly seized every


\textsuperscript{12} Pipinelis, \textit{op. cit.}, 75-110.

\textsuperscript{13} Halûk Ülman, «Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Yerendeki Nedenler, 1923-1968» (Controlling factors of Turkish foreign policy, 1923-1968), \textit{Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi} (Review of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University), 23 (1968) 241-73; Mehmet Gönülöb, «Atatürk Devrinde Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası» (Turkish Foreign Policy During the Atatürk Era), \textit{Turkish Yearbook of International Relations}, 2 (1961)210.

\textsuperscript{14} For a copy of the decree (law no. 3364) of 9 February 1931, FO 371/C15232 88, Ramsey, Athens, to Foreign Office, 25 February 1931. This was reciprocated by Turkey on 5 March 1931, see A.Ş. Esmer and O. Sander, \textit{Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası} (Turkish Foreign Policy with events), Ankara, 1968, p. 74.
opportunity to promote Greek/Turkish understanding and he even went so far as to proposed the imaginative idea of some kind of union between the two countries, which he discussed at some length with Kemal Atatürk in October 1930. This policy of cordial relations towards Turkey was followed by the combined Populist, anti-Venizelist and monarchist forces, who managed to form a coalition government after the elections of March 1933. Soon after assuming power the Panagis Tsaldaris government arranged a meeting between the new foreign minister, Dimitri Maximos, and his Turkish counterpart, Rüştü Aras, which took place in Geneva. This meeting set in motion a new round of negotiations which came to a successful end with the signing of a commercial treaty in Athens on 9 May 1933. The new agreement was negotiated by the Turkish Minister of national economy, Celâl Bayar, and the undersecretary for foreign affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, who paid an official visit to Greece between 28 April and 10 May. The commercial agreement was intended to enable Greece to redress to some extent its adverse trade balance by means of a guaranteed share of freight in Greek ships. Under this agreement Greek exports to Turkey would reach 100 million Dr. annually (as compared to 10 million in 1931) and Greece would be paid 15 million Dr. in freight. In return Turkey would export to Greece goods to a value of 350 million Dr. 10.

On 10 May, Premier Tsaldaris and Foreign Minister Maximos gave account to a special conference of the party leaders (Μεγάλη Επιτροπή τών Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων) of the conversations they had had with the Turkish ministers in Athens and Geneva. The party leaders were also informed that the government intended to conclude a pact supplementary to the treaty of October 1930 which would be signed during an official visit by the Greek premier to Turkey scheduled for September 1933. Opposition leader Venizelos wholeheartedly approved the government’s overtures towards Ankara and expressed his conviction that soon Greece and Turkey would establish an «Eastern Federation» (Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία) 17.

16. Ramsey, Athens, to Henderson, 10 May 1933, FO 371/C4369/2496; The Times, 11 May 1933. For a speech given by the Turkish finance minister on the occasion of the signing of the commercial agreement see, Celâl Bayar, Söylev ve Demecleri (Speeches and pronouncements), Ankara, 1956, pp. 61-64.
17. The minutes of this conference can be found in BMAEV/64. See also Kitsikis, op. cit., 117-20; Constantine Svolopoulos, Το Βαλκανικόν Σύμφωνον και η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική, 1928-1934, Athens, 1974, p. 109.
The road to more intimate diplomatic ties was opened in June 1933 when the two foreign ministers met in London while attending an international monetary conference. On his way back to Turkey, Rüştü Aras stopped in Athens on 16 July and held conversations with members of the Greek government.

This diplomatic activity resulted in the signing of the Ankara Accord, also known as the Greek/Turkish Friendship Pact, of 14 September 1933 during Premier Tsaldaris' official visit to the Turkish capital. With the new treaty Greece and Turkey mutually guaranteed the inviolability of their common frontiers. This was a diplomatic guarantee limited to the Greek/Bulgarian and Turkish/Bulgarian frontiers in Thrace. Conscious of Italian interests in the area, Greece and Turkey avoided any mention in the treaty of their common Aegean borders. Further, the new pact stipulated that Greece and Turkey would consult each other on questions of common interest and would pursue a policy of friendship, understanding and collaboration. Thus, from 1933, the Greek/Turkish bilateral entente constituted a formidable defensive block against a possible Bulgarian attack against Thrace. Commenting on the importance of the new pact, the British ambassador in Ankara, Sir George Clerk, stated that in September 1933 Greek/Turkish relations «attained their apogee».

Following the Ankara Accord of 1933, Greek/Turkish exchanges of goodwill became even more frequent. During a short visit to Athens on 23/24 November 1933, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras stated that Greece and Turkey «have almost become one country». Nor did such exchanges limit themselves to the diplomatic field. In July 1933, the Greek naval training ship, Aris, visited Istanbul. This was the first time that a Greek man-of-war entered Bosphorus since the establishment

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19. On Tsaldaris' visit to Turkey, Clerk, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 13 September 1933, FO 371/C8372/2496; The Times 15 September 1933.


of the Turkish republic. A year later, the Turkish airfleet was dispatched to Greece to participate in the celebrations on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Greek republic\textsuperscript{22}.

Such visits gave rise to a plethora of flattering articles in both Greek and Turkish press which were filled with praise for the Greek/Turkish entente and urged closer collaboration between the two nations\textsuperscript{23}. Even the foreign press stressed the significance of the Greek/Turkish friendship. Thus, the \textit{Economist} of London, on 20 May 1933, in an article entitled «Sound Sense in the Near East» asserted:

«Indeed the history of Turkish/Greek relations since 1930 ought to be read, marked and inwardly digested by all nations of Europe. For, if the hatchet can be buried by two peoples who have been burdened by the terrible Greek/Turkish heritage of mutual injury and mutual hatred, there is no excuse left for any of the rest of us to confess ourselves morally incapable of performing the same feat».

Between 6 and 10 May 1934, the Greek minister of war, George Kondylis, held talks in Ankara with members of the Turkish government and there were signs that the two countries were about to extend their alliance to the military sphere as well\textsuperscript{24}. During negotiations in Ankara on 4 November 1934, the two sides agreed to enlarge the diplomatic accord of 1933 concerning the defence of the common Thracian border into a full-fledged military treaty. The draft agreement, however, negotiated by the two foreign ministers and scheduled to be signed in Geneva in January 1935 was finally cancelled because General Kondylis expressed opposition to a formal defence alliance with Turkey\textsuperscript{25}.

Instead, Greece and Turkey limited themselves to the signing of a commercial agreement signed on 13 November 1934 by the finance ministers George Pesmatzoglou and Celâl Bayar in Ankara. The prime objective of the treaty was to improve economic ties between the two countries. With it Greece and Turkey sought ways to increase the ex-

\textsuperscript{22} ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{23} Greek and Turkish journalists had come to an agreement to promote cooperation between the two nations, see Ahmed Emin Yalman, \textit{Yakın Tarihte Gör-düklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, 1922-1944} (Events that I saw and experienced during the recent history, 1922-1944), vol. 3, Istanbul, 1970, pp. 226-27.
\textsuperscript{24} Dafnis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 256.
\textsuperscript{25} Pipinelis, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 273-74.
Turkish Policy towards Greece during WW II

The commercial pact, according to the Vakit of 14 November, illustrated the two nations' mutual interest in each other's economic development. Meanwhile, with official approval, Greek and Turkish businessmen formed an import-export company whose primary aim was to promote commercial intercourse and coordinate trade between the two countries. On 24 May 1934, a Greek/Turkish commercial bureau, with its central offices in İstanbul, was founded.

More significantly, the alliance with Turkey became a mainstay of Greek security. Thus, when the abortive Venizelist revolt took place in 1935, it was above all the concentration of Turkish troops in Eastern Thrace that prevented Bulgaria from trying to turn it to her advantage. In return, Greece expressed sympathy with the Turkish desire to refortify the Straits and the Greek delegate at the Montreux conference, Nicholas Politis, supported wholeheartedly Ankara's position.

Greek/Turkish cordiality was strengthened and enlarged after General John Metaxas assumed power in Greece in August 1936. The Greek leader was aware that Greek and Turkish identity of interest in the preservation of Balkan status quo constituted a real guarantee of Greek territorial integrity. Assisted by two able Greek diplomats, Nicholas Mavroudis, the secretary-general of the Greek Foreign Ministry, and Rafail Rafail, the Greek ambassador in Ankara, Metaxas sought to enlarge Greek/Turkish solidarity.

Thus, the new government established a dialogue with the Turkish foreign minister, Rüştü Aras, who visited Athens in September, December 1937 and January 1938. During these visits Aras gave Metaxas an undertaking in writing that Turkey would collaborate with Greece in resisting any attempt by Bulgaria to raise the question of a terri-

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26. The Greek minister arrived in Turkey on 30 October and remained there until 15 November. Pesmatzoglou, who spoke Turkish fluently became a close friend of Kemal Atatürk, see Ayın Tarihi, No. 1934, pp. 11-12 and Dec. 1934, pp. 3-4. On the negotiations, Morgan, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 10 November 1934, FO 371/R6316/45.

27. Ayın Tarihi, Jan. 1934, p. 34.

28. ibid., June 1934, p. 104.

The strength of the Greek/Turkish connection was reaffirmed when Premier İsmet İnönü arrived in Athens on 25 May 1937 for a brief diplomatic visit to Greece. On his arrival in the Greek capital İnönü confirmed in no uncertain terms the solidarity of the Greek/Turkish friendship. During an official banquet given for him before his departure from Greece, the Turkish premier conveyed to Metaxas a telephonic message from President Kemal Atatürk. The Turkish leader stated:

«I am happy to tell you that it gives me pleasure as a man and a soldier to declare to you that our frontiers are the same and that the forces which defend them are one and inseparable. The frontiers of the allied Balkan states constitute a single frontier. Those who may have designs on this frontier will expose themselves to the burning rays of the sun and I advise them to beware. Founded on this basis Balkan friendship will gain in plentitude and in humanitarian and civilising influence.»

The message also described the Greek/Turkish entente as «eternal». Replying to Atatürk's message, General Metaxas stressed that the Greeks shared this sentiment of «deep and unchangeable friendship towards the sister nation».

Atatürk's message illustrated the importance that he placed to the formation of a solid front against the designs of the Great Powers in the Balkans. The vision of a Balkan alliance was shared by numerous Greek politicians, and particularly by Alexander Papanastasiou who initiated the movement for a Balkan détente in the early 1930s. Already an alliance between four Balkan states — Greece, Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia — had been achieved on 9 February 1934 with the signing of the Balkan Entente pact in Athens. A treaty of mutual defence, the pact held that should a non-Balkan power attack any of the signatories and be assisted by a Balkan power, the other signa-

32. ibid., p. 226.
34. ibid.
tories would also be obliged to go to war against the aggressor.

The Balkan alliance, however, suffered from serious handicaps. Bulgaria, who in 1919 was deprived of an outlet in the Aegean Sea, became a leading revisionist state during the postwar period. As a result Sofia refused to join the Balkan Entente which stood for non-revision of the postwar treaties. For this reason, the Balkan alliance may be seen primarily as an effort by the «satisfied» Balkan states to oppose irredentist Bulgaria. Italy’s efforts to exploit Bulgaria’s dissatisfaction — symbolised by the marriage of King Boris of Bulgaria to princess Giovanna of Italy — added fuel to the fire.

Further, the effectiveness of the alliance was limited by the desire of Greece and Turkey to avoid entanglement in the ambitions of Italy and Russia. At the same time, Yugoslavia, which was at first somewhat reluctant to sign the Balkan Entente pact of 1934, sought to achieve a bilateral reconciliation with Sofia. The movement towards a South Slavic rapprochement was illustrated by a meeting between King Alexander of Yugoslavia and his Bulgarian counterpart King Boris in Belgrade as early as 1933. The Balkan alliance was further weakened when on 24 January 1937 Yugoslavia, in violation of article 2 of the Balkan Pact, entered into a separate and far-reaching agreement with Bulgaria. On 31 October 1938, she premiers of Yugoslavia, Milan Stojadinovic, and of Bulgaria, Georgi Kiosseivanov, met at Nish for secret talks. In a joint communiqué they proclaimed total agreement between the «two brother nations» and their «determination to deepen and widen their cordial relations».

Renewed fears about a possible Southern Slavic attempt to dominate the Balkans drew Greece and Turkey even closer. Such apprehensions were intensified by the growing influence of Germany in Bulgaria and by the signing of an Italo/Yugoslavian agreement on 25 March 1937. Further, the German invasion of Austria on March 1938 and

36. The Balkan Entente developed after four meetings held in Athens (1930), Istanbul (1931), Bucharest (1932) and Thessaloniki (1933).
39. ibid., pp. 246-53.
40. ibid.
the declaration of Anschluss the following month shocked both Athens and Ankara. For the creation of a German/Yugoslav border brought the most powerful revisionist power in the gates of the Balkans. As the situation in Central Europe grew more unstable, Greece and Turkey felt the disturbing pressures of the Drang nach Osten.

There is evidence suggesting that as early as 1937 Kemal Atatürk foresaw the approaching Second World War. According to the Turkish foreign minister and close friend of Atatürk, Rüştü Aras, the Turkish leader was convinced that only a strong union of the Balkan states would keep the Great Powers from attacking Southeastern Europe. But as the Balkan alliance looked increasingly like a tattered shield, Ankara concentrated its efforts on expanding its bilateral alliance with Greece. Further, Greece’s value as an ally had been enhanced in the eyes of the Turks following the re-organization of the Greek army under the leadership of General Metaxas.

As a result, on 2 October 1937 Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, the Turkish chief of staff, was dispatched to Athens where he negotiated a new military pact with his Greek counterpart, General Alexander Papagos. Negotiation continued in Ankara during General Metaxas’ visit to Ankara between 18 and 23 October. Finally, during a three-day meeting of the Permanent Council of the Balkan entente, held under the presidency of General Metaxas in Ankara on 25/28 February 1938, Greece and Turkey announced the conclusion of an additional agreement to supplement the existing treaties of 1930 and 1933. The agreement, however, was only signed on 27 April 1938 when the new Turkish premier, Celâl Bayar, and Foreign Minister Rüştü Aras visited Greece on 27 April 1938. Under this treaty, which was to stay in force for ten years, Greece and Turkey promised to remain neutral if one of them was attacked. Each country would prevent the transport of troops, munitions or armaments through its territory to any state attacking either of them.

41. See article by Tevfik Rüştü Aras in the Milliyet of 13 March 1971. This view is also supported by another of Atatürk’s close associates and minister of the interior, Şükrü Kaya, as well as the Turkish leader’s private secretary, Hasan Rıza Soyak, see H. R. Soyak, Atatürk’ten Hıratılar (Memories from Atatürk), Istanbul, 1973, vol. 2, pp. 526-31.
42. Waterlow, Athens, to Foreign Office, 5 October 1937, FO 371/R6778/214.
Each also promised to use her good offices for mediating in case of attack. If, however, war would break out the two states would reconsider the situation and would reach an agreement corresponding to their interests46. Indeed by 1938 the solidarity between the two Aegean neighbours appeared to be deeply-rooted. Nor was this goodwill confined to diplomatic or military purposes. Increasing intellectual, artistic and commercial bonds between the two nations was a tangible result of the Greek/Turkish entente. Soon after the 1930 rapprochement university students, journalists, academics, theatrical companies and football teams exchanged visits. Thus, in September 1934, Professor Dimitris Glinos and the renowned Greek poet Constantine Varnalis were warmly received by Turkish intellectuals and journalists in Istanbul, while three years later Greek sculptor Dimitriadis Athinaios presented to the Turkish nation a statue of Kemal Atatürk as a token of Greek/Turkish friendship47. Likewise, in February 1937, Thessaloniki municipality presented Kemal Atatürk his birthplace, situated next to the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, where the Turkish leader spent his youth48. To increase Greek/Turkish understanding in the cultural field, exhibitions with emphasis on the costumes and habits of the two peoples were organised in Ankara, Athens, İstanbul and Thessaloniki49 50. In 1938, a chair of Turkish literature was founded at the University of Athens by the Greek government and Turkey reciprocated by creating a chair of Greek literature at the University of İstanbul50.

Educational and cultural exchanges were foreshadowed by economic co-operation. In an attempt to foster trading relations a new company, Société Anonyme Hella-Turk, was inaugurated in Athens in October 1938. Soon after another company with similar aims was established in İstanbul51. By the end of 1938 Greece and Turkey had signed a new commercial agreement designed to improve trading exchanges between the two countries52. With the approval of their governments, the press

46. Also Waterlow, Athens, 27 April 1938, FO 371/S4407/172; Ayın Tarihi, May 1938, pp. 99-102; The Times, 28 April 1938.
48. ibid, pp. 64-65. Today this building is preserved as a museum.
49. Ulus, 7 February 1937 quoted in ibid, p. 66.
52. This agreement was signed in Athens on 15 December after protracted negotiations which started at the end of October 1938, ibid.
in both countries eagerly advocated the expansion of Greek/Turkish economic co-operation. In an article published in the İstanbul daily Tan of 25 May 1937, the influential Turkish journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman argued that economic co-operation in the Aegean would enable Greece and Turkey to reach economic self-sufficiency.

Yet, the death of Atatürk on 10 November 1938 was a severe blow to the Greek/Turkish alliance. The Turkish leader was committed to Balkan co-operation and in particular to the Greek/Turkish entente. Thus, the news of his death was received with genuine grief in Greece and Metaxas approached the new president, İsmet İnönü to determine whether Turkish foreign policy towards Greece would remain unchanged. On his return from Ankara, where he had attended Atatürk's funeral, General Metaxas informed the British ambassador in Greece, Sir Sydney Waterlow, that he had no misgivings about any re-orientation of Turkish policy under the new president.

Soon, however, the new president of Turkey brought to bear his well-known innate sense of caution to Turkish foreign policy. The subtle re-orientation of Turkish policy under İnönü was illustrated by the resignation of Rüştü Aras and his replacement as foreign minister by Şükrü Saraçoğlu in January 1939. Aras had been Turkey's foreign minister since 1923 and was instrumental in the development of a professional diplomatic service. He was one of the architects of Kemalist foreign policy which steered away from alliances led by one of the great powers. Instead, Turkish diplomacy sought to involve the Balkan states into an alliance system which would be able to withstand the pressures of any great power. Just as Kemal Atatürk, Aras viewed favourably the establishment of a Balkan Federation, as a kind of third force, between the rival Axis and Western powers, Turkey, Aras felt, should play a leading role in such an alliance. In 1937, Rüştü Aras supported Atatürk's tough line on the question of Alexandretta/Hatay and opposed İsmet İnönü's cautious position, who feared that Turkish claims in the region might antagonise French interests.

57. For differences of opinions between the Turkish leadership see İsmet Boz-
Meanwhile, Italian and German aggression in the late 1930s demonstrated to the Greeks the inadequacies of the Athens agreement of 1938. Under the terms of that treaty Greece undertook to prevent, by force of arms if necessary, and third power from crossing its territory to attack Turkey. Ankara, on the other hand, agreed to maintain a similar attitude if Greece was attacked from the East. Soon the Greeks realised that it was unlikely they would find a foe in the hinterland of Asia. It was quite evident, particularly after the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939, that any attack on both Greece and Turkey would inevitably come from the West. Thus, according to the treaty of Athens, which stipulated that Greece had to fight against Italy if that country attacked Turkey, the Turks were not bound to do the same if Italy attacked Greece.

The Greek government pointed out this discrepancy during the visit of the new Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, to Athens on 26 February 1939. A few months later, Nicholas Mavroudis was dispatched to Ankara to discuss the political implications of a possible new military pact. In September 1939, Lieut. Col. Dovas went to Turkey and held talks with the Turkish chief of staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, on the possibility of a Greek/Turkish military convention. High level contacts were continued in November 1939, when General Alexander Papagos, the Greek chief of staff, met with two senior representatives of the Turkish General Staff to whom he presented a draft of a military treaty. The Papagos' proposals envisaged the formation of a combined military defence in Thrace to contain an Axis-


58. It is rather interesting that at the time of the signing of the Athens treaty Metaxas did not seem to give much significance to this point and in a conversation with the US ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, he confidently stated that the pact was simply the extension to the naval sphere of the previous Greek/Turkish agreements (1930, 1933). The new treaty, Metaxas underlined, was intended to bind both countries in the Aegean as already they were bound in Thrace, see Iatrides, op. cit., p. 133.


cum-Bulgarian offensive. By the end of December, the Turkish chief of staff replied by expressing the view that such a military alliance existed already among the members of the Balkan pact and therefore he did not see the purpose of a further Greek/Turkish military treaty. Although negotiations between the chiefs of staff continued during the early months of 1940, the Turks remained non-committal; refusing to become party to a bilateral military alliance with Greece.

Ankara, instead, sought to form with Greece, Bulgaria and Romania a Balkan front under the auspices of Britain and France. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935) and Albania (1939) and the conclusion of a Nazi-Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939 were dramatic warnings to Turkey that the storm was gathering not far from its borders. This, along with Mussolini's rising interest in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and Hitler's obvious intentions in the Balkans alarmed the Turkish government. Turkish apprehensions about a Soviet-Axis thrust against Turkey were intensified when during Saracoğlu's visit to Moscow in the Russian foreign minister, Molotov, demanded the modification of the Straits Convention. Consequently, Ankara abandoned its hitherto self-imposed isolation from European affairs and concluded a treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France on 19 October 1939. According to this agreement, Turkey would «collaborate effectively» and lend to Britain and France «all aid and assistance in her power», in case of an act of aggression by a European power which led to a war in the Mediterranean area, or if they had to go to war in fulfilment of their guarantees given to Greece and Rumania in April 1939. Britain and France, for their part, would aid Turkey to the limit of their power if she were the victim of aggression by a European state. The Western powers also committed themselves to assist the Turks

62. ibid., p. 106 ff.
63. ibid.
65. On 13 April, Foreign Secretary Chamberlain, in a momentous statement in the House of Commons announced that British had pledged full support to those Balkan countries in the event of any action being taken which threatened their independence. Metaxas accepted the guarantee soon after the Italian invasion of Albania. For an analysis of Metaxas' foreign policy during this period see Dimitri Kitsikis, «La Grèce entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne de 1936 à 1941», Revue Historique, 91/238 (1967) 85-116.
should they become involved in a war in the Mediterranean area because of their commitments under the Balkan Entente. Protocol No. 2, attached to the treaty, exempted Turkey from any action in case of an armed conflict between her allies and the Soviet Union.

Thus, by late 1939, both Greece and Turkey came under the diplomatic and military umbrella of the Franco-British bloc. With Allied encouragement Turkey submitted a plan for collective self-defence against aggression of any non-Balkan state, with the exclusion of the Soviet Union, during the annual conference of the Balkan entente on 2/4 February 1940. But the efforts to transform the Balkan entente into an effective instrument failed as the more exposed members, such as Yugoslavia and Rumania, were unwilling to join. More significantly, while the Balkan entente was unable to reach an agreement for effective mutual aid, Bulgaria continued to press for a revision of her frontiers and manifested readiness to collaborate with the major revisionist powers in order to achieve her aims.

On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France. Officials in London and Paris felt the Italian declaration rendered operational Turkey’s obligations under Clause 1 of the second article of the tripartite Anglo/Franco/Turkish agreement of October 1939. As a result, Sir Hugh Knutchebull-Hugessen, the British ambassador in Ankara, was instructed to enquire whether Turkey was ready to take action in accordance with her treaty obligations. There were signs, however, that Turkey did not wish to go to war. On 11 June, during an interview with British Foreign Secretary Lord Edward Halifax, the Turkish ambassador in London, Rüştü Aras, adopted an evasive attitude and stressed that Turkey had to act with prudence.

After a meeting with Turkish Premier Refik Saydam on 13 June, Knatchbull-Hugessen reported that the Turkish government invoked Protocol No. 2 of the tripartite treaty as a reason for adopting an attitude of non-belligerency. The protocol referred to Russian misgivings about Turkey’s involvement in the war. Indeed, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had already made it clear that Moscow disapproved of a Turkish intervention. The fact that Russia used this opportunity

66. For the negotiations see Les Balkans, 12 (1940) 118-24.
67. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 10 June 1940, FO 371/R6510/316.
68. ibid.
69. ibid.
to improve its own military position and revived her «historic» move-
ment southwards was bound to cause alarm in Ankara70.

Faced with the reluctance of Turkey to declare war on Italy, the
British government instructed Knatchbull-Hugessen on 14 June to sug-
gest that the Turks should add «for the present» in the wording of
their declaration about Turkish non-belligerency. Likewise, the British
expected the recall of the Turkish ambassador from Rome, the expul-
sion of the Italian ambassador from Ankara and a formal break off
diplomatic relations with Italy71.

On 17 June, however, the French government collapsed and Mar-
shal Pétain announced his intention to seek armistice terms from the
Germans. As a consequence, on 18 June, the Turkish foreign min-
ister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, informed Knatchbull-Hugessen of Turkey’s
refusal to enter the war with Britain as its only ally. Turkey, he
declared, did not intend to break off diplomatic relations with Italy72.
Finally, in his declaration to the Turkish national assembly on 26
June, Premier Refik Saydam omitted any reference to the tripartite
agreement or a hint that Turkish non-belligerency was only provi-
sional72.

As all diplomatic efforts to persuade Ankara for a more satisfac-
tory statement failed, the general impression in Britain and Greece
was that Turkey had moved towards strict neutrality. Apprehensive
about Turkey’s precise intentions, the British strove to determine what
was the Turkish attitude towards Athens in the event of a direct
Italian attack against Greece. On 18 August, three days after the sink-
ing of Elli, Knatchbull-Hugessen was instructed to explore discreetly
the possibilities of Turkish aid to Greece in the event of a Greco/

70. For a detailed analysis of the Turkish foreign policy during the Second
World War see Fahir H. Armaoğlu, «İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye» (Turkey dur-
ing the Second World War), Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi (Review of the Pol-
itical Science Faculty of Ankara University), 13 (1958) 148-57; Altimur Kılıç,

71. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 14 June 1940, FO 371/
R6459/316. See also memoirs of Faik Ahmet Barutçu, Siyasi Anlar (Political re-

72. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 18 June 1940, FO 371/
R6510/316.

73. For an excellent analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy in 1940 see Selim De-
ringil, «The Preservation of Turkey’s Neutrality During the Second World War:
Italian war. Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu, however, gave a non-committal reply. Further, after an interview with the Turkish foreign minister on 20 August, Knatchbull-Hugessen reported that Turkey «will certainly not send troops to Greece». In a reference to Turkish neutrality, the British ambassador expressed his personal view that on balance Turkish belligerency would not be an advantage.

But, the British ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, disagreed with the evaluation of his colleague in Ankara. According to Palairet, the question was whether Turkey would fight while Greece was still able to resist Italy, or wait until, after a Greek defeat, to fight under much less favourable conditions. Brushing aside the argument that the Soviets would object to Turkish aid to Greece, Palairet argued that a warning from Turkey might deter Italy from attacking Greece. Expressing his strong disapproval of Ankara’s non-committal attitude, the British ambassador described the Turkish policy as «pusillanimous» and «evasive».

After a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff in London on 23 August, however, the British had already decided to avoid an open dispute with the Turks over their obligations; and they instructed Knatchbull Hugessen to try and get a general declaration from Turkey which might hold back the Italians from attacking Greece. The Turks avoided the issue by maintaining that the Italians were simply bluffing and that they did not intend to attack Greece. As a result, the Turks argued, the question of Turkish intervention was unlikely to arise. On 3 September, Foreign Secretary Halifax, in a telegram to Palairet, underlined that it was necessary «to exercise caution in urging Turkey to

80. ibid.
go any further than she is prepared to go. This view was shared by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office.

Yet, as Axis designs against the Balkans became more evident, the Foreign Office instructed Knatchbull-Hugessen to stress that any weakness demonstrated by Turkey with regards to an Italian attack on Greece would be more than likely to encourage both the Germans and the Soviets to attempt to intimidate Turkey into submission. The Turks, however, were determined to stay out of the war. This became apparent by their refusal to activate the alliance with Britain after Germany invaded Rumania on 7 October. The Turkish reluctance to participate in the hostilities may have strengthened the belief in Rome that Turkey would not help the Greeks if Italy attacked. Thus, ten days after the Nazi occupation of Rumania, the Italian foreign minister, Conte Galeazzo Ciano, boldly stated that «Greece is isolated» and that «Turkey will not move» in the event of an Italian offensives.

Finally, on 28 October Italy invaded Greece from Albania. Once again, the invasion placed Turkey under obligation to declare war on Italy, because of the tripartite agreement of October 1939. But, as in the previous June, the Turks did not fulfil their obligations and remained neutral. On the other hand, although refused to actively involve themselves in the Greek/Italian war, the Turks gave a clear warning, through diplomatic channels, that a Bulgarian attack on Greece would bring Turkey into war. On 1 November, President İnönü, in a speech to the national assembly, declared that Greece's fate was of «vital» interest to Turkey and warned that, although the Turkish

86. Armaoğlu, op. cit., 148-150.
88. It should, however, be pointed out that neither the Greek/Turkish treaties nor the Balkan Entente pact obliged Turkey to declare war on Italy, see Armaoğlu, op. cit., p. 151.
89. This was announced by Saraçoğlu during an interview with the British ambassador on 28 October, see documents FO 371/R8069/764 and FO 371/R8092/764.
government would not go to war at the present moment, it remained «faithful to its commitments and friends»

On 28 October, Şükrü Saraçoğlu reassured Rafail Rafail, the Greek ambassador in Ankara, that Greece could count on Turkey in the event of a Bulgarian attack. The foreign minister elaborated further on Turkey's position by underlining that a Turkish declaration of war at this stage would be counterproductive since it would only antagonize the Bulgarians. Aside from holding Bulgaria in check, Saraçoğlu explained, a Turkish expedition across Macedonia would be small by necessity. On the other hand, by reinforcing the Turkish forces in Eastern Thrace and by notifying Sofia that a Bulgarian attack against Greece would be regarded as a *casus belli*, he pointed out, Turkey had already contained the Bulgarian threat; this enabled Greece to move its troops to Albania from the Thracian front.

The same view was expressed by Ambassador Aras when he met Lord Halifax on 30 October. The British foreign secretary, however, drew attention to the gravity of the threat posed by the Italian attack against Greece and went on to suggest that this was the first step in a long-term Italian plan to dominate the entire Eastern Mediterranean. Concurrently, the British government tried to persuade the Turks to make public the warning that they had given privately to Bulgarians.

On 3 November, the Turkish government clarified its position by proclaiming that Turkey was not obliged to intervene as long as Bulgaria remained neutral. Three days later in an interview with the Greek ambassador, Rafail Rafail, Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu praised the Greeks for rising to the defence of their independence, honour and integrity and hinted that Turkey would fight over any impairment of

93. ibid.
95. Simopoulos, London, to Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1940, GDD, no. 18.
Greece's northern frontiers. The same view was reiterated by the Turkish ambassador in Greece, Enis Akaygen, in a conversation with his American colleague MacVeagh. On 4 December, Knatchbull-Hugessen reported that the Turkish government seemed prepared to fight if the Germans penetrated Bulgaria. During his tour in Turkey, Col. William Donovan, gathered the same impression and reassured Rafail that in case of a combined German / Bulgarian attack against Greece, Turkey would honour her pledges and take an active part in the hostilities.

Notwithstanding these informal Turkish hints, Greece appeared satisfied with the prudent approach adopted by Turkey during the Greek / Italian war. Thus, Ambassador Rafail held the view that «all that Greece requires or can expect» from Turkey «is a guarantee that Turkey would actively involve herself in the war in the event of a Bulgarian attack». Likewise, Nicholas Mavroudis, the undersecretary for foreign affairs, described the Turkish position as wise and helpful to the Greek effort.

The Greeks also viewed favourably the encouragement given by the Turkish government to the Constantinopolitan Greek community for its efforts to contribute to struggle against the Italians. Thus, with official approval, the Hellenic Union of Istanbul organised the dispatch of reservists and volunteers from among the members of the Greek minority in Turkey. By early November 1940 hundreds of Constantinopolitan Greeks departed for Greece in order to take part in the Greek / Italian war. At the same time, a committee of prominent Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Jews was formed in İstanbul to collect subscriptions for the Greek Red Cross fund and on 18 November, the in-

96. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 6 November 1940, transmitting a telegram from Rafail (Ankara), GDD, no. 22.
97. Iatrides, op. cit., p. 252.
102. The Times, 10 November 1940.
fluential Turkish journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın gave a lecture on Greek civilization for the benefit of the fund 103.

More significantly, there is evidence indicating that the Turks indeed checked a probable Bulgarian offensive against northern Greece in the winter of 1940. Thus, when in October 1940, Rome encouraged the Bulgarians to join in an attack against Greece, King Boris appeared reluctant. The Italian foreign minister Ciano attributed this reluctance «to the King’s fear of the Turks» 104.

By 14 November, the Greek army, after a heroic defence of its western border, was able to take the offensive and by December had driven the invaders back into Albania. Anticipating Italy’s humiliation, Hitler had foreseen the necessity of German intervention in the Balkans. Once the Nazi designs in southeastern Europe began to take shape, the British renewed their efforts to form a front in the Balkans by drawing Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey into a great coalition against the Germans. In response to British overtures, on 19 January 1941, Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu informed Knatchbull-Hugessen that Turkey would go to war:

i. if she were directly attacked by any power
ii. if Bulgaria, or Germany by an advance through Bulgaria, attacked Greece
iii. if Thessaloniki were threatened 105.

The Turks, however, were only prepared to give these assurances in private and refrained from any public declarations. Throughout the early months of 1941, the British strove to persuade Turkey to declare unequivocally their precise position. On 31 January, in a personal message to President İsmet İnönü, Sir Winston Churchill pointed out that the Germans were consolidating their position in Bulgaria and soon would be in a position to dictate their terms under the threat of invasion. They could, the British prime minister underlined, thus reach Thessaloniki unopposed, secure air bases in Greece and on the Greek islands which would threaten communications between Turkey and the Middle East, deny the use of İzmir to the British fleet, and close the exits from the Dardanelles. To prevent the isolation of Turkey,

103. ibid., 19 November 1940.
104. Ciano, op. cit., p. 299.
Churchill proposed that the British should be given similar facilities in Eastern Thrace airfields that the Germans enjoyed in Bulgaria.

Under the protection of British airpower, Churchill assessed, Turkey would probably be able to deter Germany from overrunning Bulgaria and Greece. The Turkish answer, however, was unfavourable. President İnönü found the British offer of assistance far too small and reiterated the argument that Turkey was short of essential war material. The entry of Turkey into the war, the president concluded, would be against both Turkish and British interests.

Meanwhile, in February 1941, Nazi troops moved without any opposition into Bulgaria. Alarmed by these developments, Ankara hurried to achieve an arrangement with Sofia. Thus, on 17 February, the Turkish and Bulgarian governments issued a declaration reaffirming their pact of friendship and stating that they had agreed on the following points:

i. the unchanging basis of the foreign policy of both countries was to abstain from aggression,

ii. the two governments would maintain and develop good neighbourly relations.

These developments alarmed both Athens and London. During an interview with Rafail, Saraçoğlu reassured the Greek ambassador that the Turkish government made it clear that the declaration would not prejudice Turkey’s contracted agreements with other countries. Expressing his government’s grave apprehensions, Rafail stressed that the Turco-Bulgarian agreement would give the general impression that Turkey did not intend to act in the event of German invasion of Greece through Bulgaria.

Describing the Turco-Bulgarian declaration as ill-timed, the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Enis Akaygen, admitted that his government had made a «psychological error». But, Greece, isolated and vulnerable, had little choice except hope that her powerful eastern

107. For İsmet İnönü’s reply and Foreign Office comments see FO 371/R871/274 and FO 371/R898/236.
neighbour would provide assistance in case of a German attack against Thrace. Thus, during an interview with the Turkish ambassador in Greece, General Metaxas stated that he was fully confident about Ankara’s will to fulfil her obligations\textsuperscript{111}.

The British, however, considered the Turco-Bulgarian declaration of friendship a green light for Nazi troops to pass unchallenged through Bulgaria and attack Greece. Further, as Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out to Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu, the declaration would only encourage Bulgaria to adhere to the Axis bloc\textsuperscript{112}. On 22 February, Knatchbull-Hugessen requested a formal clarification of Turkey’s position with regards to the Bulgarian agreement. The foreign minister simply noted that this was an attempt to include Bulgaria in the Balkan security system\textsuperscript{113}.

Concurrently, Turkish diplomacy tried to belittle the Nazi threat against Greece by challenging the view that the Germans had aggressive intentions against the Greeks\textsuperscript{114}. As a result, arguing that there was no German threat, the Turks refused to discuss Nazi invasion of Greece\textsuperscript{115}.

The British, however, who took seriously the German threat to southeastern Europe, continued with their initiatives to form a Greek / Turkish front against the Axis. To encourage resistance against the Germans, they dispatched some 30,000 British troops in Thessaloniki during the early months of 1941. On 22 February, Foreign Secretary Eden and General Dill flew to Athens and after holding talks with the Greek leadership at Tatoi went on to Ankara on 26 February. The British negotiators returned to Athens on 2 March while Antony Eden met once again with the Turkish foreign minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, in Cyprus on 18/19 March.

During the Tatoi meeting on 22 February, General Alexander Papagos stressed that active Turkish participation in a defence against a German offensive was crucial and urged the British to press for the

\textsuperscript{111} ibid. See also Pipinelis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 343.

\textsuperscript{112} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Saraçoğlu, Ankara, 18 February 1941, FO 371/R3941/91.

\textsuperscript{113} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 22 February 1941, FO 371/R4370/91. On 1 March, Bulgaria joined the Axis.


\textsuperscript{115} For a thorough treatment of this issue see Dimitri Kitsikis, '\textit{Η Ελλάς τῆς Α' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου}', Athens, 1974, pp. 113-19.
establishment of a common front in Thrace\textsuperscript{116}. The British military authorities, as well as the US military envoy Col. Donovan, shared the Greek viewpoint and held that a combined British / Greek / Turkish force in the Macedonian / Thracian front would probably contain a German / Bulgarian attack on Greece\textsuperscript{117}.

On their arrival to Ankara, Eden and Dill found that the Turks were unwilling to risk provoking the Germans even if the Nazis invaded Greece. President İnönü reiterated that Turkey would only fight if attacked. At the same time, due to their inadequate military equipment and the lack of air power, the Turks were not prepared to enter the war. As a result, the Turkish leader repeated that Turkey would serve the «common cause» better by remaining neutral until she had made good these deficiencies and deploy her army with the maximum effect\textsuperscript{119}.

Thus, when on 2 March, Eden met Korizis he could do no more than let him know that the Turks, while not stating categorically that they would not declare war, could not give an undertaking to do so\textsuperscript{119}. Indeed, at this stage the Turks themselves feared a German attack against Eastern Thrace. On 1 March, Saraçoğlu told Rafail that «you will be attacked first, and then it will be our turn»\textsuperscript{120}. But, both the Germans and the Bulgarians informed Ankara that the German military built up was not directed against Turkish Thrace but against the British attempt to gain a foothold in Greece\textsuperscript{121}. This promise acquired a formal character when on 4 March, the German ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen, handed to President İnönü a letter declaring

\textsuperscript{116.} The declaration of the Greek premier and foreign minister, Alexander Korizis during the Tatoi meeting on 22 February an the minutes of the talks in GDD, no. 123.

\textsuperscript{117.} On the Tatoi negotiations see FO 371/R3870/1109 (1942), annexes 2, and 3.

\textsuperscript{118.} The argument of lack of \textit{matérial} is frequently cited by modern Turkish historians in vindication of Ankara's violation of the stipulations of the tripartite agreement of 1939, see Ataöv, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 81-89; Kılıç, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 85-86.

\textsuperscript{119.} The undersecretary for foreign affairs, Nicholas Mavroudis, remarked that the only new element that Eden brought from Ankara was the certainty that if Greece was attacked she could expect no military assistance from the Turks, Iatrides, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 307. For the minutes of the 2 March 1941 meeting see GDD, no. 145.

\textsuperscript{120.} \textit{Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945}, vo. 12, p. 277 (henceforth \textit{DGFP}).

\textsuperscript{121.} Mavroudis, Athens, to Pipinelis, Sofia, 4 March 1941, \textit{GDD}, no. 154 and Pipinelis, Sofia, to Foreign Ministry, 4 March 1941, \textit{GDD}, no. 155.
Germany's intention to respect Turkish territorial integrity so long as the Turkish government remained neutral122. On 12 March, the Turkish leader replied by affirming his country's determination to preserve its non-belligerent posture123. Under these circumstances, Turkey rejected yet another British proposal, recommended by Palairer, the British ambassador in Greece, that the Turkish government should take over the defence of the Didymoteichon / Alexandroupolis positions in Western Thrace124. Further, by mid-March, Turkish forces withdrew from the Çakmak line around Edirne / Kırklareli in Eastern Thrace to the Enos / Midia line further east; this made it even easier for the Germans to occupy the Greek territory between the Maritza and Struma rivers125.

Turkish conduct throughout the winter of 1940/1941 did not reassure the Greeks. Yet, while adopting a neutral posture towards the Greek / Italian conflict, the Turks maintained an enigmatic attitude; often hinting at the inevitability of a Turkish involvement in a war against a combined German / Bulgarian attack on Thrace. This impression was gathered by the Greek ambassador in Ankara, Rafail Rafail, as late as 7 April after his interview with Saraçoğlu126. Only a three days earlier, the chief of staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, informed the Yugoslavian ambassador in Ankara that a German attack, in concert with Bulgaria at the expense of Greece, would be regarded as a casus belli127. After frequent meetings with his Turkish colleague, the US ambassador in Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, believed that the Turks would finally fight along with the Greeks against the Axis128.

Whatever guarded optimism this statements may have aroused in Greece was soon dispelled by the invasion of Macedonia and Thrace by the Wehrmacht on 6 April. The same day, Ambassador Papen, in-

122. This letter was dispatched from Berlin on 1 March 1941 and can be found in DGFP, vol. 12, pp. 199-200.
123. ibid., pp. 286-87.
124. Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 6 March 1941, FO 371/ R3870/1109.
126. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 7 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara who described the Turkish position as «not very encouraging», GDD, no. 211.
forming the Turkish government of the German declaration of war against Greece and Yugoslavia, reiterated that Berlin would respect Turkish territorial integrity as long as Ankara remained neutral. To the great disappointment of the British, the Turks, pleading lack of matériel, complied with the German wishes.

On 8 April, Rafail Rafail met with the Turkish foreign minister and handed him a Greek démarche requesting Ankara to clarify its position in the event of a Bulgarian involvement in the hostilities. The Greek ambassador reminded Saraçoğlu that according to the stipulations of the Balkan Entente, Turkey was under an obligation to help Greece, if that country was attacked by Bulgaria or by a third power acting in concert with Bulgaria. He went on to point that Turkey was also treaty-bound to assist Greece if she became involved in hostilities in the Eastern Mediterranean which in turn brought into play the British guarantee and the tripartite agreement of October 1939. Turkey, however, declined to reply to the Greek démarche.

Finally, Bulgaria, with the permission of Germany, occupied Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia on 17 April. Characteristically, on 26 April, the secretary-general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioğlu rejected a Greek suggestion that Turkey should repudiate the Turkish / Bulgarian declaration of February 1941, even though he acknowledged that the Bulgarian attack against Greece violated that agreement.

Ankara's neutrality, inspite of repeated statements that Turkey would help Greece in the event of a combined German / Bulgarian offensive, created a strong feeling of resentment in Greece and marked a turning point in Greek / Turkish friendship. In Greek eyes, the Turkish refusal to honour its commitments towards Greece constituted concrete proof that President İnönü regarded Greek / Turkish friendship in a very different light from that of Kemal Atatürk.

130. Mavroudis, Athens, to Simopoulos, London, 10 April 1941, transmitting a telegram from Rafail in Ankara, GDD, no. 221.
132. Rafail, Ankara, to Foreign Ministry, 14 April 1941, GDD, no. 231.
133. Rafail, Ankara, to Foreign Ministry, Chania, 26 April 1941, quoted in Kitsikis, Η Ελλάς της 4ης Αύγουστου, p. 119.
134. On 4 March 1941, the US ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, on
The new Turkish policy towards Greece culminated with the failure to appoint an ambassador to the Greek government after its establishment in Crete in April 1941\textsuperscript{135}. It was only in the summer of 1943, that the Turkish government decided to appoint an ambassador to the Greek government - in exile in Cairo\textsuperscript{136}.

At the same time, rumours of Turkish territorial designs deepened Greek suspicions which had already begun to cloud the Greek / Turkish entente. In April 1941, Foreign Minister Saraçoğlu suggested to the Germans that Turkey garrison the Greek islands of Chios, Samos and Mitylene for the duration of the war\textsuperscript{137}. In order to justify their position, the Turks hastened to explain to the British that such a move would benefit the Allies and spare the islands the hardships of enemy occupation. Suspecting more sinister motives, the Greeks vigorously protested against such a move\textsuperscript{138}. By the end of April, however, German troops occupied all the Greek - owned Aegean islands. A month later, the German ambassador in Turkey, Papen, in his efforts to consummate a German / Turkish alliance, offered to the Turks considerable territorial concessions; including «two or three Aegean islands off the coast of Anatolia»\textsuperscript{139}. Keeping his government up - to - date with these developments, the British ambassador in Ankara, Knatchbull - Hugessen reported that, despite statements that Turkey had no expansionist ambitions, the Turks actually coveted a great deal of territory. The Turks, he stated, would try to gain control of neighbouring territory including Samos, Mitylene and other Greek islands, on the grounds that this informed observer of the situation in Southeastern Europe, remarked: «I must admit that Ismet has always seemed to me to be a doubtful quantity. If only Kemal were alive, I think Turkey would have entered into the game squarely long before this», quoted in Iatrides, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 307.

\textsuperscript{135} During the 1930s, Greece and Turkey promoted their respective legations to embassies. In 1934, Turkey appointed as her representative in Greece, Rüştən Eşref Ünaydın, a distinguished diplomat and a personal friend of Atatürk. In 1939, Ünaydın was replaced by Enis Akaygen. In 1936, Greece, sent to Ankara, Rafail Rafail, a career diplomat and a staunch supporter of Greek/Turkish entente. Rafail spoke Turkish fluently.

\textsuperscript{136} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to the Foreign Office, 14 June 1943, FO 371/R5292/1417, informs that Ambassador Enis Akaygen was ready to leave for Cairo to assume his duties as ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile.

\textsuperscript{137} Frank G. Weber, \textit{The Evasive Neutral. Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War}, Columbia, 1979, p. 82.


\textsuperscript{139} Weber, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.
was vital to their security\textsuperscript{140}. The issue of substantial territorial compensation in return for Turkish participation in the war against the Axis was raised as early as July 1939. On that occasion, the Turkish government suggested to the British that in the event of an Anglo/Franco/Turkish victory Turkey should recover the Dodecanese; a mainly Greek-inhabited group of islands in the southeast Aegean held by Italy since 1911\textsuperscript{141}.

Almost a year later, on 28 May 1940, the Foreign Office instructed Knatchbull-Hugessen to promise the reward of the Dodecanese in exchange for a Turkish declaration of war in the event of a direct Italian attack against Greece\textsuperscript{142}. Although reluctant to make such a commitment, Rüştü Aras, the Turkish ambassador in London, expressed his country’s interest in the future of these islands\textsuperscript{143}. Soon after the outbreak of the Greek/Italian war, Aras reiterated the Turkish position and intimated that Ankara considered the Dodecanese, Bulgarian Thrace and Albania as being within her sphere of influence\textsuperscript{144}. On another occasion, the Turks hinted at the possibility of extending Turkish control over to the Greek port of Thessaloniki. This, it was argued, might be beneficial to the Allied war effort, since it might deter Bulgaria from attacking northern Greece. Assessing the Turkish objectives, Knatchbull-Hugessen felt that such a reward might sway Turkey to enter the war against Italy\textsuperscript{144}.

These exchanges, however, remained inconclusive as long as Turkey refused to commit herself to the war. The issue of the Dodecanese

\textsuperscript{140} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Lyttelton, Cairo, 13 July 1941, FO 371/R7421/236.
\textsuperscript{141} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 21 July 1941, FO 371/E5247/143 and FO 371/E5248/143, and FO 371/E5315/143, 26 July 1941.
\textsuperscript{142} Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 28 May 1940, FO 371/R6269/58.
\textsuperscript{144} Foreign Office to Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 30 October 1940, FO 371/R8130/316.
\textsuperscript{145} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 28 November 1940, FO 371/R8697/316. Knatchbull-Hugessen’s predecessor in Ankara, Sir Percy Loraine in a report about İnönü described him as a calculating individual determined to see that Turkey not only survived but even profited from the Fascist aggression in Europe, Loraine to Foreign Office, 25 January 1937, FO 371/E657/132.
was again revived during the Stalin / Eden talks in Moscow in December 1941. In a reference to Turkey, the Soviet leader suggested that certain unspecified Aegean islands, the Dodecanese according to the Greeks, should be awarded to Ankara in return for their help in the war against the Axis.146

Nor did the Germans remain idle. Ambassador Papen advised his government to facilitate the cession of some of the Dodecanese, such as the island of Kastellorizo, to Turkey. The occupation of islands only few miles off the Anatolian coast by Italy, the ambassador remarked, was a standing insult to Turkish sovereignty. Their return to Turkey, Papen concluded, might persuade the Turkish government to sign a lasting alliance with Germany.147

As the Second World War intensified, Turkish determination to remain outside the war became a major bone of contention. After the elimination of Italy from the war, the British prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill, contemplated the formation of a Second Front in the Balkans, the "soft belly" of the Axis. The British felt that Turkish participation in a Balkan front would be crucial. As a result, in January 1943, Churchill arrived in Adana in an attempt to persuade the Turks to reconsider their neutral position. These developments intensified Greek fears that the annexation of the Dodecanes was Ankara's price for participation in the Second Front.148

Already, in March 1942, the secretary-general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioglu, had told the Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara that if attacked by Germany, Turkey was ready to occupy the Dodecanese.149 On the eve of the Churchill - İnönü meeting in Adana, Rauf Orbay, the Turkish ambassador in London, in a conversation with the Greek premier-in-exile, Emmanuel Tsouderos, probed the possibility of restoring certain Mediterranean islands to Turkish sovereignty. The Turkish ambassador went to great lengths to point out that he was only speaking in an unofficial capacity and carefully avoided referring specifically to the Dodecanese. The Greeks,

147. DGFP, vol. 6, pp. 544-46.
148. Memorandum on Greek/Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept. of the Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/R2128/1417.
however, interpreted this as yet another Turkish attempt to stake a claim over these islands\textsuperscript{149}.

Finally, given the strong pro-Allied stance of the Greeks during the war and the existence of a predominantly Greek population on the islands, the Turkish government considered it unwise to oppose overtly the merger of the Dodecanese with Greece\textsuperscript{151}. As a result in March 1943, Ambassador Orbay informed his Greek colleague in London, A. Agnidis, that so long as the Greek government remained on friendly terms with Turkey his government would not object to the annexation of the Dodecanese by Greece. This position was reiterated during a conversation between Rauf Orbay and the Greek vice premier, George Roussos, on 26 August 1943\textsuperscript{142}.

At this stage the Turks were more concerned with the postwar disposition of Cyprus, the strategically situated Mediterranean island with a predominant Hellenic population. The Turks strongly suspected that the British, who governed the island since 1878, planned to transfer Cyprus to Greece as a compensation for the heroic resistance of the Greek people to the Italian and German aggression. Indeed, while still in Crete, after the fall of Athens to the Nazis, the Greek prime minister, Emmanuel Tsouderos, suggested to the British ambassador, Michael Palairet, in a letter on 1 May 1941, that Cyprus «be granted at this moment to King George as a personal present» in order to stimulate Greek morale and encourage unity within the Allied war effort\textsuperscript{150 151 152 153 154 155}. Michael Palairet did not require much persuasion. As early as December 1940, he had recommended the cession of Cyprus to Greece\textsuperscript{154}. On 29 September 1941, the Greek government-in-exile submitted to the Foreign Office an aide-mémoire demanding that Cyprus, the Dodecanese Northern Epirus be awarded to Greece as part of a postwar peace settlement\textsuperscript{155}. These national claims were repeated in a memorandum of 12

\textsuperscript{150} Palairet to Howard, London, 6 January 1943, FO 371/R214/214 Palairet to Howard, London, 14 January 1943, FO 371/R464/464 giving details of the meeting between Tsouderos with the Turkish ambassador in London Rauf Orbay.

\textsuperscript{151} See Foreign Office minutes on Turkish territorial aspirations in FO 371/683/55, 8 July 1943 and Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara to Foreign Office, 9 July 1943, FO 371/R6011/55.


\textsuperscript{153} ibid., pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{154} Palairet, Athens, to Foreign Office, 19 December 1940, FO 371/R397/198.

\textsuperscript{155} The aide-mémoire can be found in Dixon, London, to Eden, 25 November 1941, FO 371/R10112/198.
June 1942 which was delivered personally by King George to President Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{156}

Both the Turkish government and the vociferous Turkish Cypriot minority found these developments disconcerting, and urged that they would not tolerate a change in the status of the island. To allay Turkish displeasure the Foreign Office publicly stated that no Anglo-Greek negotiation on the future of Cyprus had taken place. At the same time, Foreign Secretary Eden summoned the Greek premier, Emmanuel Tsouderos, and advised him to refrain from referring to the Cyprus issue publicly.\textsuperscript{157} Thus, during the Second World War, the British government used Turkish susceptibilities as a means of curbing Greek and Greek Cypriot demands for union. The same argument was to be employed in the 1950s when the Greek Cypriots renewed their struggle for self-determination.

It can be safely argued that the present day Greek / Turkish antagonism in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced to the period between 1940 and 1943. Thus, after the Anglo-Turkish negotiations in Adana in January 1943, the Greek government-in-exile feared that the British might come to some bargain with Turkey at the expense of the predominantly Greek Dodecanese. But, even more significantly, they suspected that the British might commit themselves to allow the Turks to play a leading role in the postwar Balkans. This, the Greeks felt, would not serve Greece's interests.\textsuperscript{158} Accordingly, in a conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden on 1 March 1943, Tsouderos pointed to the comparative weakness of the Greek navy and urged the need for it to be of greater strength than that of Turkey in order to safeguard Greek interest in the postwar Aegean.\textsuperscript{159} Thus, the future of the strategically situated Dodecanese and Cyprus served only to deepen the mutual suspicions that had already seriously undermined Greek / Turkish friendship.

The darkest shadow for Greek / Turkish relations during the Second World War was cast by the Turkish wartime policies towards the

\textsuperscript{156} The text in Xydis, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 693-96.
\textsuperscript{158} Memorandum on Greek/Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept. on the Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/R2128/1417.
\textsuperscript{159} Eden, London, to Palaiiret, 1 March 1943, FO 371/R1873/1417, giving details of his conversation with Tsouderos and forwarding a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Royal Hellenic Navy.
Greek minority in İstanbul. After the Venizelos / Atatürk rapprochement of 1930, the vexing question of the treatment of minorities subsided as both Athens and Ankara adopted a more broadminded attitude towards their respective minorities. Cordial relations had an equally favourable impact on the Ecumenical Patriarchate housed at the Phanar quarter of İstanbul. On the whole, the position of the minorities remained stable until the outbreak of the Second World War.

With the spectacular successes of the Nazis in the Balkans (April / May 1941) and the invasion of the USSR (June 1941), the Germans gained considerable popularity in Turkey. A number of Turkish leaders, including Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu and Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak, and some influential Turkish newspapers, such as the Cumhuriyet and Tasvir-i Efkâr, flirted with the Germans. This culminated with the signing of a Turkish / German non-aggression pact in June and a commercial agreement in October 1941.

Intensive use of Nazi propaganda, coupled with adverse economic conditions in Turkey led to the re-emergence of Turkish historical prejudice and mistrust against the non-Muslim minorities in İstanbul. It was symptomatic that just about the time of the signing of the German / Turkish agreement on 18 June 1941, the İnönü government decided to mobilise the entire non-Muslim male population of İstanbul, between the ages of 18 and 45, and intern them in special camps in Anatolia; each camp containing about 5,000 men. There, these İstanbul

160. For a detailed treatment of the minority question between the two countries see my, The Greek Community of Istanbul: The Minority Question and Greek / Turkish Relations from 1918 to the Present, in print.
161. ibid.
Greeks, Armenians and Jews were instructed to engage in non-combative capacities such as roadbuilding\textsuperscript{164}. Understandably, the concentration of the minority populations in these camps aroused great apprehension in the non-Muslim circles of İstanbul\textsuperscript{166}. These fears were intensified as rumours of the harsh conditions in the camps and the high mortality rate among the internees reached İstanbul\textsuperscript{166}. According to the British intelligence reports, the whole operation was aimed at the removal of the minorities from the strategically sensitive zones of İstanbul and the Straits. The Turkish government, the Foreign Office believed, suspected a number of non-Muslims, almost all Armenians, of being involved in «fifth column» activities against Turkey\textsuperscript{167}. On 8 December 1941, however, internees between the ages of 38 and 45 were allowed to return to their homes, while the rest spent another six months before they were released\textsuperscript{168}.

The anti-minority policies of the İnönü government culminated on 11 November 1942 with the imposition of an emergency tax measure, the \textit{varlık vergisi}\textsuperscript{169}. This drastic fiscal measure appeared at first to be a legitimate levy designed to act as a panacea to Turkey's severe economic difficulties. Concurrently, it was expected to tax the abnormally high profits amassed by a portion of the business community in Turkey since the outbreak of the Second World War and to help curb the galloping inflation\textsuperscript{170}.

In conjunction with the enactment of the \textit{varlık} tax, however, the Turkish press, with the wholehearted approval of the government,

\textsuperscript{164} Cornwallis, Bagdad, to Eastern Dept., 2/4 November 1941, FO371/R 10081/15.
\textsuperscript{165} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 19 May 1941, FO 371/ R5357/15.
\textsuperscript{166} Ankara Chancery to Southern Dept., 4 June 1941, FO 371/R5813/15.
\textsuperscript{167} ibid. Reports had reached the British Embassy in Turkey that a number of swastika flags had been found in the houses of some members of the Armenian community in İstanbul, who were apparently preparing to accord a friendly reception to the Germans when they finally invaded Turkey. The information was passed on to the Turkish government.
\textsuperscript{168} Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 19 May 1941, FO 371/ R5357/15.
\textsuperscript{169} Official French translation of the bill: \textit{Loi de l'Impôt sur la Fortune}, no 4305/1942. I have dealt with with this question in greater detail elsewhere, see my \textit{The Greek Community}, ch. VIII.
\textsuperscript{170} ibid. See also E. Clark, «The Turkish Varlık Vergisi Reconsidered», \textit{Middle Eastern Studies}, 8/2 (1972) 205-16.
launched a bitter and sustained campaign against the Christian and Jewish business community of Istanbul, accusing the non-Muslims of speculation, blackmarketing and stockpiling. The Turkish people were portrayed as the victims of some unpatriotic and unscrupulous entrepreneurs who abused Turkey’s liberals laws and managed to profit from the economic crisis.\footnote{171}{In a characteristic article entitled «Yorgi, you will no longer be allowed to do what you wish» the semi-official Ulus, on 24 November 1942, accused the Yorgis, Kyriakos, Artins and Salamons, in other words the non-Muslims in general, for bringing about the economic ills which had befallen the country, for a résumé of Turkish press reports, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 29 January 1943, FO 371/R1212/7.}

In his authoritative study of the varlık episode, Faik Ökte, the director of finance in Istanbul (deftardar) during the enactment of the tax, presented conclusive evidence indicating that the tax rates were ordered by Ankara, while the bill itself was conceived by Şükrü Saracoğlu, who assumed the premiership in July 1942.\footnote{172}{Faik Ökte, Varlık Vergisi Faciasi (The tragedy of the capital levy), Istanbul, 1951, pp. 73-76.} With marked objectivity and thoroughness, Faik Ökte reveals that taxpayers were divided into two main categories, the M group comprising those Turks of the Muslim faith and the G (Gayrimüslim) group comprising the non-Muslim Turkish citizens. Subsequently, two further categories, the D category for Dönme Turks and the E (Ecnebi) category for the foreign nationals were instituted.\footnote{173}{ibid., pp. 49, 77-82. The Dönme Turks were members of the Oriental Jewish community centered mainly in Thessaloniki and İzmir. They were converted to the Islam in the seventeenth century and played an important rôle in the development of modern Turkish society. Since the establishment of Kemalist rule in Turkey, the Dönme Turks had taken over a substantial section of the business and industries abandoned by the Greeks and Armenians in İstanbul and İzmir and had accumulated a great deal of wealth in the process. Faik Ökte reveals that past family records of Dönme Turks were investigated in order to determine which Muslims were of Jewish origin, Ökte, op. cit., p. 85.}

It has been estimated that the non-Muslim element was assessed at 233,000,000 TL (or nearly 52 per cent) while the Muslims, including the Dönme Turks, were assessed at 122,500,000 TL (or 29 per cent). The share of the foreign nationals was estimated at 79,500,000 TL (or 19 per cent). It should be remembered, moreover, that according to the census of 1935 the entire non-Muslim population of Turkey hardly exceeded 300,000 from a total of 16,188,767. Given these fig-
ures, we can deduce that on average each Muslim Turk paid 8 TL while his non-Muslim counterpart was expected to contribute about 800 TL\textsuperscript{174}. Beside Ökte’s account there is an abundance of documents compiled by the British Embassy in Ankara disclosing the extend of discrimination against the non-Muslim ethnic and religious groups in Turkey\textsuperscript{175}.

On 7 January 1943, regulations governing forced labour for the non-payment of the \textit{varlık} tax were approved by the Turkish assembly\textsuperscript{176}. By the end of January, the first group of Constantinopolitan non-Muslim businessmen was deported to a work camp at Aşkale, an inaccessible spot in the mountaneous region west of Erzurum. Altogether 1400 persons were interned in labour camps in the interior of Anatolia, while non-Muslim property in İstanbul was arbitrarily seized by the authorities and was hurriedly auctioned during 1942/1943\textsuperscript{177}.

The \textit{varlık} tax met with the vigorous disapproval of the diplomatic community in Ankara, which was particularly critical of the crippling effects of the act on foreign business interests in Turkey. Finally, faced with a sustained clamour against the tax, the Turkish government was obliged to revise the \textit{varlık} assessments of foreign nationals and issued new lists with modified levies for non-Turkish citizens\textsuperscript{178}.

There was, however, a notable exception. As late as 30 August 1943, the Greek ambassador complained bitterly that he was the only foreign representative who did not receive a list of modified levies for the Hellene nationals\textsuperscript{179}. Ever since the publication of the tax, it was evident that the harsh treatment accorded the Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals was equally extended to the Hellene Greeks, the largest single foreign group in Turkey. Up to January 1943, there were 3,000 Hellene subjects who had declared to the Greek consular authorities their \textit{varlık} assessments. The total amount of tax assessed for this group reached 18,705,412 TL. Discrimination was particularly visible

\textsuperscript{174} Memorandum of the Capital Levy prepared by the commercial attaché, N. S. Roberts, Ankara, 1 January 1943, FO 371/R645/7; Clark, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 208-209.

\textsuperscript{175} For details see Alexandris, \textit{The Greek Community}, ch. VIII.

\textsuperscript{176} Law no. 19288/1943 given in \textit{Resmi Gazette} (Official Gazette), no. 5302, of 12 January 1943.

\textsuperscript{177} Alexandris, \textit{op. cit.}, ch. VIII.

\textsuperscript{178} Ökte, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 121-26.

\textsuperscript{179} Helm, Ankara, to Eden, 30 August 1943, FO 371/R8574/7.
in the case of employees in banks and other similar institutions. Hellenes were the only foreign group whose property was confiscated and auctioned extensively. As a result, by August 1943, 6,500,000 TL tax debts of Hellene nationals had been collected by the Turkish authorities. Commenting on the stringent measures against the Hellenes, on 23 December 1943, Sterndale Bennett of the British Embassy, remarked that «all indications go to confirm the victimization of Greek nationals» The concern of the Greek Embassy was particularly pronounced in the case of Constantinopolitan Hellene wage earners whose aggregate tax amounted to no less than 500,000 TL. According to a comparative list by professions, prepared by the Greek Embassy in January 1943, the difference between the amounts of tax claimed from the Hellenes and Muslim Turkish was tremendous. Accordingly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professions</th>
<th>Hellenes</th>
<th>Muslim Turks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importers</td>
<td>10,000/ 75,000</td>
<td>1,000/ 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporters</td>
<td>60,000/ 400,000</td>
<td>5,000/ 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>15,000/ 1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500/ 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialists</td>
<td>75,000/ 262,500</td>
<td>500/ 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocers</td>
<td>6,000/ 150,000</td>
<td>500/ 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>12,000/ 160,000</td>
<td>500/ 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>10,000/ 120,000</td>
<td>1,000/ 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant tailors</td>
<td>15,000/ 75,000</td>
<td>1,500/ 17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture merchants</td>
<td>6,000/ 140,000</td>
<td>1,200/ 3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This discriminatory evaluations were contrary to the principle of international law which forbade a state to tax its foreign residents more heavily than its own nationals. This was particularly unfortunate, for Greece and Turkey had been close friends ever since 1930.

Greek resentment to the Turkish action was immense. In a conversation with the British diplomat, Sterndale Bennett on 21 December 1943, Foreign Office, 23 December 1942, FO 371/R8890/1574.


ber, Greek Ambassador Rafail expressed the view that the tax was «a savage attack on the Greek community as a whole with political rather than fiscal objectives». The taxation demands, he insisted, «meant nothing less than the complete extermination of the Greek community, and represented a preconcerted plan to drive the Greeks out of business and take over their trade»\(^{185}\). This view was shared by the British commercial counsellor in the Ankara Embassy, who was sent to İstanbul to collect information on the tax. After gathering a mass of information, he concluded that in the case of the minorities and the Greek nationals the «taxation is absolutely crushing»\(^{186}\). The Foreign Office, too, believed that

«The Turks are determined to eliminate the Greeks from Turkish national life, whether they form part of the Greek minority or are Hellene Greeks who pleved a large partin the commercial and cultural life of İstanbul»\(^{187}\).

Although no exact figures on the share of the tax levied on the Greek community itself are available, the Greek consular authorities estimated it to be at least 60.000.000 TL\(^{188}\). The tax imposed on Greek minority institutions alone was estimated at 400.000 TL. Greek Orthodox priests, schools, hospitals and other philanthropic institutions were held liable to pay the so-called tax on extraordinary «war-profits». Yet, whereas the American hospital of İstanbul, a large and flourishing modern establishment charging 10 TL a bed per night, was assessed at 2.000 TL (another account puts it at 1.500 TL), the Balıklı hospital, a much more modest concern, was down for 68.000 TL\(^{188}\). Together with the Hellenes, the Greek element as a whole was assessed at no less than 80.000.000 TL. In other words, the Constantinopolitan Greeks, although constituting a very small proportion of the total population in Turkey (approximately 0,55 per cent), was called upon to shoulder just under 20 per cent of the total varlık taxation.

The Greek chargé d' affaires, Kapetanakis, a staunch supporter

185. Details of this conversation in Bennett, Ankara, to Foreign Office, 21 December 1942, FO 371/R8837/1574.
188. Memorandum prepared by the Greek consular authorities in Istanbul 27 January 1943, FO 371/R1110/7.
of Greco-Turkish friendship, described his six month stay in İstanbul as consul-general (September 1942 to March 1943) as «a nightmare owing to the tax»\(^{190}\). The deportation of Greeks to Anatolia and the daily auction of Greek property and merchandise shocked the community as a whole. The tax did not only embitter the Greeks against the Turkish government but also against the Great Powers, who did not wish to risk the loss of Ankara's goodwill for what was then a basically trivial matter. Thus, the news of the \textit{varlık} was hushed up in the Anglo-American press. The only exception to this was the \textit{New York Times} correspondent in Turkey, C. L. Sulzberger, who in three long and detailed articles, drew attention to the punitive tax on wealth\(^{191}\). Later on, the \textit{New York Times} took up the issue editorially and stressed:

«America and Britain cannot dictate tax laws to Turkey any more than they can to each other. But they could certainly view with some uneasiness the development in Turkey of a narrow nationalism reminiscent, even in a milder way, of that which Germany has imposed on Europe. We hope that as Turkey turns more and more away from the Nazis in other respects she will turn from them in this respect too»\(^{192}\).

Faced with the refusal of the United Nations block to intervene on behalf of the minorities, the Greek Embassy took upon itself the task of negotiating a better deal for the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Thus, the Greek ambassador, Rafail Rafail, as well as the consul-general in İstanbul, made frequent representation to members of the Turkish government, but with little practical results\(^{193}\). A bitter Greek government viewed the \textit{varlık} affair as another step in the Turkish plan to modify the basis of Greek-Turkish friendship. Old suspicions were once again revived and the Turkish failure to assist Greece against the Axis Powers in May 1941 was now described as «the treachery of an enemy who posed as a friend». At the same time, the Greeks were painfully aware of their feeble international position. The removal of the Greek government-in-exile to London and then to Cairo, after the

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190. For Kapetanakis' views, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, to Eden, 8 April 1943, FO 371/R3658/7.
192. ibid., 17 September 1943.
German occupation of Greece, decreased the influence which it could exercise on Ankara. After the German invasion, the Greeks complained bitterly, and Turkey found favourable conditions for the elimination of the Constantinopolitan Greek element.

It was mainly because of the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations that the planned visit of Tsouderos to Ankara was cancelled. Earlier, on 3 March, in a direct appeal to the Turkish premier, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Tsouderos stated that he had no doubt whatsoever that Turkey had the right to impose any tax measures on its citizens, including those of Greek origin. However, it appears, Tsouderos remarked, that the new law struck the Greek inhabitants of Turkey with singular vigour causing widespread ruin and misery. He then went on to stress

"Le Gouvernement et le peuple grecs pourront difficilement comprendre qu'à un moment où l'hellénisme subit les dures vicissitudes d'une triple occupation ennemie, la Turquie amie et alliée n'aura pas à cœur de donner des instructions nettes aux organes administratifs turcs pour que ceux-ci apportent les tempéraments nécessaires à l'application d'une loi qui sans cela risque de mener à la misère un élément dont la loyauté à la cause greco-turque est hors de doute".

In his answer Saraçoğlu, after addressing Greece as Turkey's friend and ally, insisted that all taxpayers had been treated equally. Similarly, on 16 May, in a speech at the opening of the Institute of International Law at the University of Istanbul, Foreign Minister Memençioğlu reiterated his government's commitment to Greco-Turkish friendship. It appears that the Turks failed to conceive the profound bitterness that the varlik taxation engendered in official Greek circles. This was made clear by the Turkish prime minister who, while reassuring the British that Greco-Turkish friendship was one of the main points of his country's Balkan policy, he disclosed that when the tax was imposed its effects on this friendship were not considered.

194. According to Rafail, the tax was the immediate cause of this cancellation, Knatchbull-Hugessen, Ankara, 22 May 1943, FO 371/R4609/55.
196. Saraçoğlu to Tsouderos, 7 March 1943, FO 371/1957/7.
198. Memorandum on the Greek/Turkish relations prepared by the Southern Dept. of the Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/R2128/1417.
The Greeks, however, were not satisfied with such explanations. Perturbed by the punitive character of the tax, they believed that this indicated a change of policy on the part of the Turkish government.

It is generally accepted that the *varlık* tax constituted the single most serious breach of the minority provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. The whole affair was a betrayal of Kemal Atatürk's genuine efforts to incorporate the minorities into the mainstream of Turkish society. The diplomatic implications of the *varlık* episode were equally significant. By imposing a discriminatory tax on foreign nationals, the Turkish government invited foreign interference in her internal affairs and finally it had to yield under strong diplomatic pressure. It was not coincidental that the interned non-Muslims were permitted to return to İstanbul a week before President İnönü met with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in Cairo in December 1943. A few months later, the İnönü government abolished altogether the oppressive *varlık* tax.

This mitigated to a certain extent the tensions between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, notwithstanding the Greek disillusionment with Turkey's wartime neutrality, her dealings with the Axis and the *varlık* episode, Greek/Turkish détente survived the formidable strains of the Second World War. This was primarily due two generous gestures made by the Turks soon after the Nazi invasion of Greece.

In the winter of 1941/1942 when the Axis occupation had caused widespread starvation in Greece, the Turkish government facilitated the dispatch of foodstuffs across the Aegean. A small steamer, *Kuruluş*, hired by the *Kızılay* (the Turkish Red Cross) made six trips between October 1941 and January 1942 before it sunk during a storm in the Aegean. The shipment of grain to Greece was then carried


on by another steamer, the *Dumlupinar*, until the end of August 1942.

By that time, however, significant changes had taken place in Ankara. In July 1942, after the death of Premier Refik Saydam, Şükrü Saraçoğlu took over the premiership, while Numan Menemencioğlu, known for his pro-German views, became foreign minister. This, coupled with the deteriorating economic conditions in Turkey, prompted the new government to discontinue the shipment of foodstuffs to Greece in the end of August 1942. Even though only 17,500 of the promised 50,000 tons of grain were actually sent to Greece, the Greek public opinion was grateful to the Turks for their aid, particularly since this was the only noteworthy relief that the starving Greek masses received during the war.

Equally significant, was the Turkish willingness to permit escapees from Greece, including military personnel, to pass through Turkish territory and reach the Allied forces in Egypt. Thus, soon after the German occupation of Greece the Greek warship *Adrias* found refuge in Turkish territorial waters before reaching the Allied-held North Africa.

It was these instances of solidarity, coupled with the renewed Soviet threat in the Balkans and the Straits, that facilitated the reconstruction of Greek/Turkish détente after the Second World War. In 1947, the Turks did not oppose the award of the Dodecanese to Greece and the entente between Greece and Turkey culminated in 1952 with the accession of the two Aegean powers to NATO.

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204. Kitsikis, «La famine en Grèce», pp. 36-41;
205. For an excellent analysis of the postwar relations between Greece and Turkey see Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle*, passim.