gouvernement communiste. L'auteur relève aussi la migration massive de Turcs dans les provinces européennes de l'Empire, comme fait de nos jours la Turquie dans le Nord de Chypre. L'auteur s'occupe beaucoup de la tendance systématique du gouvernement ottoman à réglementer l'activité économique en général et les prix en particulier sans néanmoins s'étendre sur l'importance des abus des fonctionnaires, d'autant plus qu'ils sévissaient contre les ressortissants des nations soumises, la non application des décisions administratives et l'importance des transactions du marché noir. L'auteur relève l'importance dans l'Empire Ottoman des corporations et de leur soutien par l'administration, sans néanmoins relever les abus que soit seules, soit en collaboration avec l'administration elles faisaient aux dépens de leurs membres et des clients de ces derniers. Il ne semble pas que l'auteur ait raison en constatant qu'il y ait eu développement économique digne de mention dans les provinces européennes de l'Empire Ottoman aux XVII-XVIIIes siècles. Il se base sur l'augmentation des créances et des disponibilités dans les inventaires dressés après la mort de plusieurs Musulmans, mais il semble oublier la contribution à ce sujet de l'inflation presque permanente dans l'Empire Ottoman. Par contre il explique très bien pourquoi les investissements industriels n'étaient ni populaires ni indiqués dans l'Empire Ottoman. En exposant les charges fiscales des habitants de ce dernier l'auteur crée l'impression que l'administration fiscale y était satisfaisante, ou au moins correcte, ce qui ne semble pas avoir été le cas. Il est très intéressant que les migrations à l'intérieur de l'Empire et entre les professions étaient importantes et que Thessaloniki en attirait beaucoup, comme il arrive aussi de nos jours, que la polygamie était relativement rare parmi les Musulmans et que 81% des familles n'avaient que 1-3 enfants, enfin que beaucoup d'agriculteurs provenaient des villes ce qui confirme l'auteur dans son opinion que ces dernières servaient de lieu de transit épongeant les surplus de la main d'œuvre rurale. La non participation des Musulmans dans le développement économique est fort justement remarquée. Je me demande pourquoi il en serait autrement puisqu'ils pouvaient s'attribuer tout ce qui appartenait aux ressortissants des nations soumises au joug ottoman.

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*Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947*, edited by John O. Iatrides, is an invaluable contribution to the literature dealing with Greece's recent history and more specifically with the subject of Greek American relations. This large volume of nearly 800 pages is a painstaking work of synthesis by John Iatrides' fine editorial hand working on Lincoln MacVeagh's colorful and insightful descriptions of events in Greece where MacVeagh spent the most fruitful ten years of his interesting diplomatic career.

The editor has processed a voluminous assortment of MacVeagh's intimate wartime diaries, hundreds of diplomatic reports and other documents prepared by the prolific and cultured American ambassador, and about seventy well-balanc-
ed letter summaries written by MacVeagh to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In Iatrides' words, his primary aim as an editor was to «preserve in its original form source material, and to help capture the psychological climate of the time».

MacVeagh's diplomatic career included posts in countries such as Iceland, South Africa and Portugal. But, Iatrides, as the book's title indicates, focused mainly on materials dealing with Greece. As a result, diary entries during the relatively brief wartime periods MacVeagh spent as ambassador to Iceland and then to South Africa are digested and summarized by Iatrides. The story ends in 1947 with MacVeagh's transfer from Greece to his next post in Portugal.

In reading this volume one quickly realizes that Iatrides' contribution well exceeded the standard expectations of pure editorial duties. The editor did much more than sort, logically organize, select and present in meaningful sequence the most relevant passages from MacVeagh's work. Rather, Iatrides composed well over 100 pages of introductory, transitional and concluding essays which have added a sense of coherence and continuity to the raw data. In addition, he provided a very large number of carefully researched reference footnotes containing useful back-ground and explanatory information on numerous personalities, places, acronyms, organizations and events that parade through the colorful pages of this flawlessly edited work.

The volume should attract audiences from a variety of disciplines and orientations including those focusing on diplomacy, negotiations, U.S. foreign policy, and Greek politics and foreign policy. The students of these orientations will find in MacVeagh a wealth of insights into the life, style, trials and tribulations of a very able ambassador. The intimate diary entries for example, shed light into the frustrations of a hard working diplomat who is often left uninstructed by his home office for long weeks, especially in the mid and late 1930's when the role of the U.S. in Greece was that of a sympathetic observer with commercial and humanitarian interests, while Britain was fulfilling the role of the primary external interventionary power.

In reading this volume one constantly shares in a number of MacVeagh's professional disappointments: His yearning for a more «important» assignment, especially in Turkey, which MacVeagh considered a more challenging post than Greece; his impatience with the «bureaucrats» back in Washington who were insensitive to the human needs and expectations of those serving them abroad; his steadily growing self-perception of marginality given that FDR (MacVeagh's hero figure) apparently had no time to prepare substantive responses to his devoted ambassador's long and information-packed personal letters.

MacVeagh's professional diplomatic style — which eventually cost him his job in Greece* — is obvious throughout the narrative. In effect, the ambassador's belief was that a good diplomat should know intimately the host country, its people,

* MacVeagh's duties in Athens were terminated following a serious disagreement with Dwight Griswold, chief of U.S. Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). Griswold, contrary to MacVeagh, believed in less disguised and more direct intervention in Greek politics. The Truman administration «sacrificed» MacVeagh in order to keep the republican ex-governor of Nebraska busy in Athens and out of U.S. national politics in the 1948 elections.
language, history and traditions. If he represented a major power in a smaller state, he should possess qualities of sensitivity and balance to create the appearance at least of respecting the sovereignty and independence of the local leaders. Reading through MacVeigh's diary entries, one realizes that the British—in the ambassador's view—violated this principle with impunity in the 1930's as well as during the war years and immediately after Greece's liberation. Eventually, when the U.S. inherited the British role in Greece, after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, MacVeagh realized that his own country's treatment of Greece was neither more subtle nor more responsive than that of their predecessors.

Reviewing the substance of MacVeagh's voluminous writings, this writer discerned two major themes emerging from the historical narrative: The first theme is that Greece of the 1930's reflected the traumatic experiences of a small, weak and strategically located country for which the busy (strategically and globally oriented) leaders of great powers had little time to spare. Rather, they tended to view it as a valuable piece of real-estate to be conveniently «secured» without much patience or concern for local conditions and political realities. Thus, the fate of Greece became sealed by distant, impersonal forces that were pulling the strings of history. Characteristically, the ambassador viewed the descent of Greece into the cauldron of World War II as «inevitable» given the geopolitical realities of the time. MacVeagh argues convincingly that after Czechoslovakia's collapse and Italy's occupation of Albania, Greece realized that «...its head now is right in the jaws of the advancing axis powers while its feet dangle in the Mediterranean where Britain is still powerful. Isn't this being between the devil and the deep blue sea with a vengenance?» (p. 158). In short, given the great magnitude of Metaxas' political dependence on Britain, MacVeagh suggests that the Greek dictator had no available option of remaining neutral during the second World War. In Metaxas' own words to MacVeagh, «... Greece will make no move in foreign affairs without England's approval» (p. 166).

The second major theme relates to the origins of the Greek civil war (1943-1949). The reader once again notices the pattern of tragic inevitability. MacVeagh in hundreds of pages suggests that the civil conflict in Greece was in large part the product of a number of sins of omission and commission by Great Powers and Greek politicians alike. There were five major factors accounting for the Greek tragedy of the late 1940's as far as MacVeagh was concerned: The first was Winston Churchill's (strongly backed by FDR) bullheaded support for the restoration of an unpopular monarch (King George II of Greece). This blunt instrument policy contributed to political polarization in occupied Greece and strengthened the anti-monarchist left at the expense of centrist and republican elements. A second factor was the British inability or unwillingness to land credible expeditionary forces in Athens in October 1944. This provided a highly misleading signal which tempted the well organized EAM/ELAS forces to seek a military solution to the Greek question. A third factor was the abysmally inadequate AngloAmerican response in supplying foodstuffs to the war-starved Greeks shortly after the liberation, and the grossly ineffective support for the post-war Greek governments' lame efforts to resuscitate the war ravaged economy. Predictably, economic conditions were maintained at a level of despair which contributed to chaos and revolution. The fourth factor was the low quality of Greek leadership — politicians left and right of the spectrum, the military and the King. Invariably, according to MacVeagh,
they systematically managed to put their short-term power calculations over the requirements of compromise and national unity. If one were to add to all this the fifth factor, a heavy dose of mutual misperceptions of the Soviets, British and Americans in post-war Greece, one has completed a ready-made recipe for the Greek civil war.

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In the checkered history of American involvement in Greece one of the proudest chapters is the accomplishments of American educators. Motivated by religious, humanitarian and pedagogical impulses, they founded private schools in the early years of the present century which flourished and exerted extraordinary influence upon Greek society. The subject work tells the story of the founding and early development of one of these remarkable institutions, the American Farm School, officially the Thessaloniki Agricultural and Industrial Institute.

There are various ways to tackle the history of an institution. The authoress has chosen to trace the founding and development of the American Farm School within the context of the dramatic political events which convulsed Greek Macedonia during the first half of the twentieth century. This approach has the merit of introducing the layman reader to the political history of this troubled region, a history which repeatedly impinged upon the Farm School. Within this carefully limned setting the work seeks to explain how its special spirit and sense of mission enabled the school not only to survive the conflicts which wracked this region throughout the Balkan Wars, two World Wars and the Greek civil war, but to become a haven for afflicted Greeks and an inspiration to both ministered and ministering. Founded in 1904 on unpromising land near the city of Thessaloniki and initially housing ten orphaned boys in a single makeshift building, the school grew to become one of the most respected vocational academies in Greece.

The special ethos of the Farm School is attributed to the religious devotion, humanistic principles and extraordinary energy of its first two directors and their wives, the founder, Protestant missionary John Henry House and Susan Adeline House; and House’s son and successor, Charles Lucius House, who with his wife, Ann Kellogg House, led the school from 1929 to 1955. Not only did these dedicated individuals establish and nourish an experimental school unlike anything which had existed in Greece, but they succeeded also in infecting with their enthusiasm and sense of mission their Greek colleagues and students. Consequently, the school’s unique ethos passed from being a foreign innovation to take firm root as a revered Greek-American achievement. One factor accounting for the survival and success of the school was its leaders’ scrupulous avoidance of political attachments in a highly politicized environment. Aside from political pitfalls, they had to contend also with material deprivation, indigenous diseases such as malaria and dependence upon funding from private sources in the United States which became especially uncertain during the depression of the 1930’s. The House women played indispensable roles in the Farm School drama, sharing the responsibilities