Reviews of Books

dealing with the Greek War for Independence and with the period 1941 - 1952.

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Relations between sovereign states often have such complexity that only when examined in the minutest detail can they be made fully comprehensible. Consequently, for the student of diplomacy there is no greater source of satisfaction than the opportunity to examine the confidential papers of decision makers for clues which give meaning and depth to officially released evidence. One can then analyze overt action with an eye to motivation and calculation, thus minimizing the risk that one's interpretation might require altering after subsequent disclosures.

In presenting this massive work, Professor Xydis has indeed greatly minimized such a risk. For in addition to tapping sources accessible to the diligent, he has achieved a veritable researcher's scop^ by using the relevant papers of Evangelos Averoff-Tossitza, the Greek Foreign Minister during 1956-63. Although scholars may find it disconcerning that these papers are referred to without systematic documentation, one suspects that proper identification could not be offered at this time. Even with this limitation, Mr. Averoff has rendered scholarship a very great service by making available this material so soon after the events to which it pertains.

In addition to the Averoff papers, the author has relied very heavily on the official and verbatim records (which sometimes do not exactly tally!) of the United Nations General Assembly's sixth-thirteenth sessions, the published records of the debates in the Greek Parliament (1955-59), the Turkish Grand National Council (1956-57), and the British House of Commons (1951-58). He also refers to numerous other official and unofficial publications. There is an extensive bibliography, and almost one hundred pages of notes constitute a real mine of information. Various diplomatic exchanges connected with Greece's resort to the United Nations are included in the appendices.
The study encompasses every aspect of the Cyprus problem as it evolved from 1954, when Greece officially brought the matter before the United Nations, to 1958, when the road was paved for a settlement (in the Zurich and London agreements of February 1959) outside the framework of that organization. And although the author’s primary attention is devoted to the diplomatic battles fought in and around the General Assembly, flashbacks and brief excursions into closely related areas of activity afford a rather complete picture of the conflict during those five crucial years.

The author’s intention is to present the positions of all the principal actors (Greece, Britain, Turkey, Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots), and to analyze the role that American and NATO diplomacy played in the controversy. His effort to investigate and document all these different positions is honest and creditable. Yet the result, as Xydis clearly realizes, is quite uneven: the material obtained from Greek sources is far superior in both volume and quality to that from the other parties. This probably could not be otherwise at present, as official records and opinions on this still explosive issue are simply not available for scholarly study. However, the resulting account is not so much a study of “conflict and conciliation” over Cyprus, but rather, in the author’s own words, the “case history of the handling of the Cyprus issue by the Greek ‘External Decision-maker’ inside and outside the United Nations...” Unlike the exhaustive analysis accorded the Greek and Greek Cypriot positions, the British, Turkish and American views are presented formally, almost superficially, without benefit of analysis and in-depth interpretation.

This unevenness in documentation becomes quite apparent when one notices that, for example, the source on a reported Turkish-American exchange is the Grivas Memoirs. Turkish and British views are obtained by hearsay, as received and reported by a Greek source. This may well be the best that can be done at present. But the record remains unnecessarily incomplete until the positions of all the parties can be reported from their own sources, much as Xydis handles the Greek side.

The student of Greek diplomacy and of the relationship between Athens and Makarios will find this book tremendously important and replete with revealing information, some of it tucked away in footnotes. One has not only a ringside seat but a clear view of the locker room where errors are analyzed and strategy for the next play is decided. For example, it is disclosed that Papandreou advised the Mayor of Ni-
cosia in June 1950 that Athens could do little for the cause of enosis because “Greece breathes with two lungs, a British and an American one. It cannot therefore risk suffocating because of the Cyprus question.” Makarios and Grivas are shown clearly to have disagreed on various important occasions, and Athens, while finding ingenious ways to supply E.O.K.A. with arms, was often unsuccessful in restraining the tenacious colonel. Makarios is thought to have nearly accepted Governor Harding’s proposals in February 1956 for a limited constitution but to have finally rejected them, perhaps under pressure from Grivas. In 1957 Averoff appeared prepared to recommend that Greece withdraw from N.A.T.O. if the General Assembly, under the weight of the Anglo-American bloc, rejected the Greek draft resolution on Cyprus then under consideration.

In August 1956 the American ambassador in Athens was sternly advised by Averoff that Turkey was contemplating solving the Cyprus issue by invading Greece and that Greece would then not only counter-attack, but would appeal for assistance to Turkey’s enemies, presumably including the Soviet Union. In June of 1957, Averoff, speaking to the same diplomat, asserted that a partition of Cyprus might have such a violent impact on the Greek political scene, as to cause chaos. It is also reported that for several months in 1957 the British embassy is believed to have tapped the telephone lines of several prominent Greek officials, including that of the Prime Minister.

In light of the 1958 agreements which established the Republic of Cyprus, it is significant that independent status for the island was originally suggested by India. In April 1957 Venizelos conceded that self-determination, Greece’s official aim, was not feasible and that independence (with guarantees against enosis and a 33 % power ratio for the Turkish Cypriots) would have to be accepted. Yet in August of the same year a senior State Department official bluntly told Ambassador Melas: “You will not get independence now.” The previous year the United States had pressured the Greek government against raising the question of Cyprus during the General Assembly’s debate on the Hungarian revolt, and Athens had grudgingly complied.

The student of United Nations politics will find Xydis’ work equally revealing. He presents an absorbing and remarkably detailed account of the Assembly’s operations, both formal and informal. The cynic’s suspicions will be confirmed when it is revealed that principle was regularly abandoned in the search for a toothless compromise that could
secure the votes necessary for passage. Vote swapping was depressingly endless.

In his closely reasoned conclusions, the author raises the lessons learned from the United Nation's handling of the Cyprus issue to the level of theoretical abstraction. He is primarily concerned with the techniques of conflict analysis and resolution, though he is careful not to reduce complex political reality to overly simple theoretical constructs. Interestingly, the study is sponsored by the Ohio State University's Mershon Center for Education in National Security.

For those concerned with the more pragmatic aspects of the Cyprus conflict, the book poses a number of key questions. Perhaps the most fundamental concerns the quality and effectiveness of Greek diplomacy at this time. If, in Hans Morgenthau's famous thesis, the guiding star for a state's foreign policy must always be the national interest, how is one to judge the decision to resort to the United Nations and, thereafter, the handling of the Greek case? Viewed retrospectively, and with the knowledge that Xydis brings to us, did the final results as well as the side effects of this move justify it as effective and realistic? Was the Greek government taking a bold initiative and a well-calculated, rational risk, or was it really the prisoner of the Greek Cypriot leaders and of an aroused public opinion which political leaders had done precious little to educate about the harsh realities of Cold War politics?

If recourse to the United Nations in 1954 was for Greece merely a "leverage toward an extra-U.N. goal-bipartite negotiations with the British" (p. 15), why were the September-October "ultra-secret" British offers, which provided for self-determination within eight years and which "did not reject the possibility of some sort of enosis" ignored without any attempt to test their genuineness? Xydis, obviously aware of this question, offers this explanation:

Premier Papagos rejected further contacts (with Britain) for reasons not precisely known—possibly because of the imminent debate on the Cyprus item in the (United Nations) Political Committee and of the feeling that these negotiatory exchanges, carried through unorthodox, non-diplomatic channels, were not conducted in good faith but were merely a feint, a diversionary British maneuver, for achieving the side effect of hindering Greek 'parliamentary diplomacy' in the United Nations, by a show of willingness to negotiate outside the
world organization, or for undermining Kyrou's position in the Foreign Ministry (p. 16).

Yet this is not a particularly convincing explanation: London's "credibility gap" was certainly not so wide as to render these feelers totally unworthy of investigation. In any event, one must consider the likelihood that, in opting for the limelight with "parliamentary diplomacy," the Greek government in effect turned its back upon the quiet diplomacy of those "bipartite negotiations with the British" which it presumably was seeking.

Also, the course of the Cyprus controversy leads to the inescapable conclusion that Greece carries little weight with its Atlantic allies, and cannot in time of need rely for continuous and loyal support upon any group of "brother" nations. Ironically, Greece could only count on the Soviet bloc and even Albania, with which Greece maintains no diplomatic relations whatsoever, had to be thanked for her persistent support in the General Assembly. Obviously no one felt this lesson more bitterly than Averoff himself.

The reader may also question the author's views on the background to Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus affair. Was she essentially apathetic to the island's fate until goaded into action by clever British maneuvering, and did she act even then for primarily domestic reasons? This explanation was often offered by official Greek circles in the late 1950's, and it remains an attractive thesis. It implies that while Cyprus was a genuine and vital concern for Greece, Turkey was merely interested in getting political mileage out of the conflict. Yet more scholarly work is needed before this explanation becomes the historian's final version of these events. As for Britain's postwar policies on Cyprus, one must regard them basically not as attempts to solve the particular problems of the island, but as part of a gradual and painful adjustment to declining British power in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Another question of vital importance raised by this book concerns the role that the United Nations plays in conflicts such as that of Cyprus. Xydis shows clearly that debates are taken quite seriously and points vigorously fought over. Yet how relevant is this activity to the agreement ultimately reached? Is there any lineal link or even indirect connection between the exchanges at the United Nations and the Zurich–London agreements? It is of course quite possible that the diplomatic ground is softened by the work done at the United Nations,
and that an acceptable solution therefore eventually becomes easier to find. Yet it is just as likely that the endlessly repetitious and often rather bombastic speeches in the halls of the world organization are not only a lively debate among the deaf, but may also reduce the changes for an early and constructive compromise by rigidly defining positions publicly proclaimed, accentuating the negative, and further inflaming the home public, which in turn disdains anything short of complete victory at the bargaining table. And even if “victory” is won, what is the real value of a “favorable” resolution which cannot be enforced, which has been obtained through the support of governments that have no stake and no lasting interest in the matter, and for which the price is almost inevitably an even more alienated and uncompromising antagonist?

There can be no doubt that Xydis has reached his own conclusions on all these vital questions. However, the reader of this book will search them in vain; at best only few and scattered clues will be found. If this is intentional in order to compel one to form independent conclusions, the task will prove rather frustrating.

Professor Xydis has written primarily for the specialist who does not expect to be entertained. Yet occasionally the text makes for delightful reading: at one point the Bolivian delegate’s speech style is described as a “baroque variation of Zuleta Angel’s coolly classical quadripartite address festooned with garlands of historical examples.”

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Many books have been written on the question of Cyprus; Professor Kyriakides’s book, “Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government,” is the most objective on the topic. The author is a native of Cyprus. Nevertheless, he did not let his close attachment to the island befog his thinking. This book is clearly written, well-organized, and well-balanced.

The book is divided into seven chapters. The opening chapter