However, we should conclude this review by pointing out to the credit of Mr. Bitoski that in spite of the shortcomings of his book, the material he has collected—especially that from the archives of the Greek Bishopric of Pelagonia—would eventually be quite useful for an objective study of the history of Modern Greece.

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Among the various indicators useful in “measuring” the intensity of the Cold War conflict none is more interesting than governmental as well as academic preoccupation in the United States with developments in Communist-ruled Europe. In the past, as Soviet-American tensions ran high, there was a strong temptation to dismiss the regimes of that region as mere extensions of Soviet power and politics, unworthy of official attention and detailed study. More recently, as relations at the higher level appear to be improving, however haltingly, the Iron Curtain tends to become a transparent muslin drop allowing not only a close scholarly look at these countries but giving rise to the question whether a “viable, mutually beneficial relationship” across this barrier can now be fostered. In turn, the careful study of Eastern Europe and particularly of its efforts to shrug off the after-effects of Stalinism might have positive influence on East-West relations. Thus, *The United States and Eastern Europe,* published by The American Assembly, is welcome evidence of such a trend. Unfortunately, events which followed its publication also show clearly that, even today, in attempting to examine developments in certain countries of East-Central Europe, one must not underestimate the ability of the Soviet Union to impose its will, by force if thought necessary.

This small volume is the work of a number of well-known specialists, each approaching the subject matter from a different perspective. The result is a very brief but comprehensive description of principal developments in Communist Europe. It would appear that “Eastern Europe” has become a political-ideological rather than a strictly geographic term: the book’s scope includes Communist Germany but not
Austria (which is not mentioned), or Greece (regarded here a “more Mediterranean than Eastern European”).

The declared purpose of the volume is to “put into historical perspective some basic facts that Americans must take into account when considering policies and positions in our relations — social, political, economic — with the countries of Eastern Europe.” Thus the authors address themselves to a broad reading audience, whose ignorance of Eastern Europe is said to be “colossal.” In his introduction the editor emphasizes the importance of the region as a whole while pointing out that diversity and disunity have characterized its past. Despite the more ambitious title, only the last section deals with American policies, while another examines Western Europe's relations with the Continent's Communist regimes.

In the first section Stephen D. Kertesz, former Hungarian diplomat and now at the University of Notre-Dame, offers a sketchy description of the region’s “Land and Peoples,” providing a historical frame of reference for the chapters that follow. Kertesz’s interpretations contain no surprises. He laments the divisive impact of nationalism, particularly after 1919, and its exacerbation by outside forces. In the period since World War II the role of the Soviet Union is analyzed in thoroughly “traditionalist” manner, proclaiming Moscow guilty of precipitating almost single-handedly the tensions of the Cold War. The author emphasizes the difficulties encountered by the Soviet Union in dealing with its unwilling satellites which, in his view, have lately become “transmission belts... serving to introduce Western influence into the U.S.S.R. itself.” The disruptive effects of narrow nationalism make him an advocate of some form of “economic and political unification from the Baltic to the Aegean,” believing — with unsubstantiated optimism — that an “Eastern European federation could cooperate with the Soviet Union and be part of a new European system.” Otherwise, he warns, “If these small nations are unable to cooperate and achieve some unity among themselves, they will remain pawns in the hands of outside forces.” One could hardly take issue with Kertesz’s admonition. Yet East Europeans have thus far demonstrated little aptitude for benefiting from history’s bitter lessons.

In “Politics and Political Change” Alvin Z. Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania deals with the changes which have accompanied the gradual weakening of Moscow’s authority over the region since the mid-1950’s and the reassertion of Eastern European nationalism.
The author regards such changes as both genuine and important and traces their characteristics in each country. Their aim is claimed to be revitalization of political and economic institutions and the lessening of Moscow's control without, however, destroying the Party's dominant role.

Reforms in Yugoslavia receive special attention. In the author's view, "Nowhere else in Eastern Europe is a Communist system experimenting with so sweeping a range of daring and liberalizing innovation, and nowhere do political liberalization and economic reform mesh, interact, and generate such promising currents of change." Similarly Ceausescu's program of "Romanization" is perceived as an attempt to establish a "mass Party, which will be both representative of all social classes and nationalist in loyalty." On the other hand, reforms in Poland are seen as least effective because of intra-Party feuds, low industrial productivity and high costs, lack of capital, inadequate agricultural output, and corruption. Bulgaria's "Stalinism without terror" is shown to be plagued by economic stagnation and political apathy: in a statement that demonstrates how quickly such observations become horribly dated, Rubinstein declares that "from Sofia, even Prague seems in ferment...." Clearly, the reforms undertaken in Czechoslovakia and their dramatic consequences since August 1968 were not anticipated by this author.

In his all too brief but thoughtful conclusions Rubinstein stresses the need for continuous and careful study of the regimes of Eastern Europe. He regards nationalism as a mixed blessing and adds: "In "building bridges" to Eastern Europe, the West should strive for liberalization and stability. This entails a sympathetic understanding of legitimate Soviet security and economic interests in the area. Friendly relations between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union need not be incompatible with Western objectives of a stable Eastern Europe of liberalizing societies which is also participating in the creation of a new Europe." Yet the drama of Czechoslovakia was to cast new light on Soviet "interests" in the area...

The economic aspects of development are examined by Nicolas Spulber of Indiana University. After a brief look at pre-war conditions he analyzes changes in industrialization and agriculture since the Communist take-over. Thus one learns that during 1958-64 Western estimates of the rate of growth ranged from 5.4 for Czechoslovakia to 9.9 for
Bulgaria. Official estimates are, of course, considerably higher: 7.4 for Czechoslovakia and 13.0 for Bulgaria.

Stressing the generally recognized “patent inefficiency of a highly centralized planning and management system” the author observes that throughout the region new methods of management and planning are now being explored. The model for such change appears to be the West’s type of large-scale business enterprise governed by a powerful board of directors and operating within a “pliable, adjustable, long-term planning framework to be revised each year.” The growth of agricultural production continues to lag behind other sectors of the economy, with little hope for improvement in the near future and under existing political conditions.

In “Social Forces and Cultural Change” R. V. Burks of Wayne State University sets out to examine “the efforts of the Russians to transform the national cultures of Eastern Europe, the counter forces both indigenous and exogenous which developed in the course of this effort and... the resurgence of the national cultures.” The former policy director of Radio Free Europe argues that until 1956 and under “Zhdanovism”, the satellites were treated as if they were members of the U.S.S.R. Though such Sovietization was resisted, the East Europeans could do little in the face of terror and foreign oppression. Since Khrushchev’s cautious policy of destalinization these regimes have been resorting to persuasion and material incentives, while their peoples demand more fundamental changes. At the time of writing Rumania was said to be leading the struggle for national reassertion.

The author predicts that while Albania and East Germany are not for the present likely to experience these trends, the rest of Eastern Europe will probably draw closer to the West. Although freedom of expression is not forthcoming, the public media may well become less dogmatic and less heavily censored. Such a change will signify greater toleration of the churches, autonomy for writers and artists, and improved standards for the universities.

Changes within the Communist bloc are reviewed by Kurt L. London of George Washington University, whose section displays the most inflexible Cold War mentality in this volume. The author argues that, except for Yugoslavia, Stalin succeeded in unifying and consolidating Eastern Europe under his scepter, ruling over the region directly or by “proxy.” Since 1956, a “slow progress toward sovereignty” may be detected, though it does not affect foreign policy or military strategy.
The Warsaw Treaty Organization is said to encompass "well trained and reliable units, particularly from countries whose strategic importance requires priority consideration, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary." Despite the struggle to restore independence, Eastern Europe's diplomacy remains completely subservient to Moscow, while Tito's dealings with the West are regarded as "pure opportunism." The Soviet Union is thought to possess powerful — though unspecified — means which it can employ against recalcitrant clients. Although recognizing a degree of freedom of movement now enjoyed by the peoples of the satellites, and while attaching considerable significance to the West's proclaimed desire to "build bridges" across the Iron Curtain, London sternly warns: "It is impossible to predict whether the changing Western attitude will succeed in strengthening East European independence, or whether, in the long run, it will merely fortify Communist control of the area under Soviet power. Until there is demonstrable proof one way or the other, we must not permit the recent progress toward greater Eastern European independence from Moscow to obscure our analyses." One would think that, at least in the case of Czechoslovakia, London's admonition has been fully justified.

In "Europe, East and West," John C. Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations examines the factors which have contributed to the division of the Continent into two spheres. In few closely reasoned paragraphs he raises the question whether historically a community encompassing all "European" nations has ever been a reality. He then traces the effects of the Cold War which saw the two European camps gravitating around the superpowers, thus accentuating further differences between East and West. In the post-Stalin years of relaxation the problem of Germany's continued division and rearmament, French diplomatic initiatives, declining military alliances, and trade relations across the Iron Curtain receive special consideration.

The author concludes that though most everyone advocates "joining Europe," proposals for such a new Europe vary widely and are often mutually exclusive, particularly as regards Germany's future. "Aside from historical, ideological, and institutional differences," he observes, "the mere loosening of ties with the United States on the one hand and with the Soviet Union on the other would not necessarily lead to relationships of close (European) association. The prospect of a big Europe, indeed, rested largely on the restoration of something like the prewar system of national states. What kind of security arrange-
ments would contain the nationalist pressures and rivalries inherent in such a system?" Ultimately, Campbell contends, developments within East Europe and especially a "further closing of the gap between basically insecure regimes and the peoples whom they govern" will help determine the Continent's future.

In the book's final section Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana University evaluates "American Opportunities and Dilemmas." After a brief commentary on the concepts of containment, liberation, and disengagement as applied to the case of Eastern Europe, he concludes that "American policy is now directed toward increasing the differences among the states of Eastern Europe and toward encouraging each one to strike out on its own to achieve its own goals and gradually to reestablish normal relations with the people of the West." Cultural exchanges and trade are listed as the principal means for pursuing such a policy. Despite the author's skillful argumentation, however, little evidence is offered that American activity in this direction goes beyond diplomatic rhetoric, or that it has the desired effect.

With all its brevity, and although overtaken by very significant developments in 1968, this is a penetrating analysis of changes in post-war Eastern Europe. In the years after Stalin's death, and since this book appeared, these changes have been promising and even impressive, though at times tragic. What is less impressive is the West's role: on the basis of this account the reader is tempted to conclude that the West remains essentially a passive observer of Eastern Europe's struggle for national self-expression.

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