

alphabet of neighboring Serbia. The evident excuse for this preference of Serbo-Croatian is of course the fact that the State of Skopje is part of Yugoslavia. However the latent and unexpressed aim is to bring forth more strongly the differences of this idiom from Serbo-Croatian and thus to protect-though partially-its independence. Because, if the significance of the words were given, e.g. in Bulgarian, with which the idiom of Skopje is more closely related instead of Serbo-Croatian, and further more, if it were written in the Cyrillic alphabet, then every word with its meaning would be a tautology and the independence of the Macedonian language would be shaken. It is well known also that the close relationship of this idiom to the Bulgarian language is the "Heel of Achilles" to the arrows of Bulgarian nationalism. I must admit that the editors of this dictionary do not lack ability in combining scholarly work with politics.

The exclusion of many words from the dictionary pertaining to religious and ecclesiastical terms, which for historical and linguistic reasons happened to be Greek, is characteristic of the actual lexicographic tendencies of the State of Skopje which follows the directions of the international communism. Common folk words, such as *agiazmo*, *agripnija*, *anafora*, *apokalipsis*, *apostol*, *arhangel*, *djavor*, *eksarhos*, *epitrop*, *efimerija*, *efharistija*, *kandilonaft*, *kolas*, *lipsana*, *mirisma*, *monoklisija*, *nimosino* etc., are omitted from the dictionary. I do not know if these words are actually useless to the people of the State of Skopje. G. Tahovski, in his book *Grtski Zborovi vo Makedonski ot Naroden Govor*, published in Skopje in 1951, proves that these words are very common to the lips of the people. We all know very well that the dictionaries are not books for propaganda but a "Thesaurus" of the words that exist in a language. If a "People's Democracy" does not respect the people's vocabulary, who is going to respect it? How will the new generation, which may happen to hear or see in texts these words, know what they mean?

I consider also a disadvantage of the dictionary the exclusion of names of countries and of national names. The reader cannot learn in the «Macedonian» idiom how the countries *Greece*, *France*, *England* etc. or *Greek*, *Russian*, *Turk*, are called. I am afraid that this omission was made in order to guard the editors of the lexicon from entering into slippery grounds such as the need to explain what *Makedonija* and *Makedonski* mean and whose people's name is *Bugari*.

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R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 244 pp.

A great many studies of communism in various areas of the world have been published in the United States in recent years. R. V. Burks's *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* is a welcome addition to such studies.

Resorting in many cases to simple and multiple correlation, Burks attempts to make some generalizations about communism in eastern Europe. In this task, however, he is hampered by the fact that it is simply not possible to get the same sort of data from all states in this part of the world and because it is not possible to carry out an applied social research project in them, Greece excepted. Therefore, for the postwar period, three sets of differing data exist: those of the satellite states of the USSR, those of the postwar period, those of communist Yugoslavia, and those, finally, of West-minded Greece. This accounts for the inevitable choppiness of the book as a whole.

For historians, his conclusions may not appear too striking, yet his sociological analysis is extremely valuable. It serves not only to confirm historical and political knowledge obtained through other intellectual methods, but also sheds light on the region as a whole through the assembly, comparison, and interpretation of common data. Burks's conclusions serve to negate—once again—Marxist superstitions about communism and the proletariat. The communist masses in eastern Europe, the author finds, are not in any real sense proletarian in character. In this movement, all classes are involved—in varying proportions—either in the leadership, the surrounding groups of activists, or the soft periphery of the party. In the rank-and-file, indeed, the peasantry is the most important element in times of tranquility or strife, while the number of industrial workers is very small. During communist-led guerrilla rebellions, it is the peasants who are the principle cannon fodder of operations, just as they have borne the full brunt of what might be termed internal colonialism or ingrown imperialism during the period of forced industrialization in the USSR.

Among the activists, Burks finds, the middle class and city workers are overrepresented, while the hard core represents a cross section of the class structure of the area but with a strong urban bias with the leading cadres wholly dominated—to the exclusion of the peasants—by middle class professionals. Thus, the “cutting edge” of the movement consists of professional elite groups—along classic Leninist lines—leading eventually to the creation of Djilas' “new class” in the countries where the movement managed to take over state power.

On the basis of electoral returns between 1920-1928, Burks demonstrates the greater proclivity of the Slavs to Communism as against the non-Slavs such as the Rumanians, Hungarians, and Greeks—or the German and Muslim minorities. During 1920-1928, the Communist electorate was found primarily in Slavic countries, while it was negligible in non-Slavic ones. One cannot say what the picture would have been if results were available for the period 1929-1939. Greek elections, at any rate, show that in 1936 the communist vote was about double the 4.2 per cent of 1926—the maximum in that country during the period 1920-1928.

Within the Slavic area, the communist vote during this period

was sharply concentrated in provinces inhabited by some Slavic minority that had a special relationship with Russia, such as Montenegro. It was strong, too, in Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia, among other places. Burks ventures the generalization from these findings—"almost as a principle"—that in eastern Europe—presumably in individual states of eastern Europe—numerically weak ethnic groups produce above-average numbers of Communists, as long as these groups have an ethnic tie to Russia. Other factors being equal, however, the weaker the ethnic group, the greater the proclivity. On the other hand, Burks acknowledges that traditional enmity against Russia can offset even an "ethnic bond".

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In his excellent chapters and sections devoted to the study of communism in Greece (based on questionnaires submitted to a number of imprisoned Greek communists), Burks notes a certain element of deracination—two varieties, we might say—that went into the making of the leading Greek cadres and activists.

In the cadres, there was a preponderance of refugees. Of thirteen listed communist leaders, 4 were born in Asia Minor, 1 in eastern Thrace, 1 in Cyprus; in other words, nearly one-half were refugees, which was double the proportion of refugees in the Greek population. From the long range viewpoint, the assimilation of the refugee element to the rest of the population will serve to dry out this source of communist leadership.

Deracination of the other kind—is it a sort of alienation?—is more serious. The movement from the rural to the urban districts is a process that still goes on. A large proportion of the communist activists, Burks discovered, belongs to this group. The typical average Greek activist in no proletarian. Only 1 in 10 are so, in sense of lacking property altogether; 9 out of 10 are men of substance, or come from families of substance—by Greek standards at least. A typical activist thus owns a 3-room house, a farm of 4 hectares, a dozen head of livestock, and an orchard of 20 trees. Although middle class elements are no longer dominant (as is the case with the leading cadres), and both workers and peasants have increased in importance with the former having a plurality, yet the property held by all three classes—and the education achieved—suggests a distinctly middle class atmosphere, for Greece.

The soft periphery of the Communist movement is found, as mentioned already, in the rural areas. Here, in times of tranquility, such as the interwar period, tobacco workers and peasants producing a single cash crop—wheat, for instance—show a marked proclivity for communism in attitudes and voting habits. The price of both tobacco and cash crops depends on conditions of the world market. High prices may be followed by disastrously low ones. A sense of acute insecurity arises. Furthermore, both categories of workers do not work isolatedly.

Tobacco workers, during their highly seasonal employment, have ample opportunity to converse and exchange ideas. And, in times of unemployment and dole-collecting, are vulnerable to "education". The cash croppers too, living as they do in the fertile plains, have advantages of good communications with other people and the world at large. Hence, the striking strength of communists in the rural, lowland areas of Thessaly or Drama. Hence, too, we should add, the anxiety of Greek governments regarding the sale of tobacco stocks abroad and the efforts to assure new markets for Greek tobacco.

Finally, in times of strife, the guerrilla forces are composed largely of peasants and mountaineers, often impressed into the communist-led units. And the number of workers is very small.

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By comparing the geographical distribution of the communist votes with the geographical distribution of industrial workers throughout eastern Europe, Burks establishes the predominance of the peasant in the soft periphery of the communist movement throughout the area. The industrial workers, during the period 1920-1928, constituted a small minority of communist voters and divided their vote among all parties, including parties of the far-right. In the trade unions, communism captured more easily control where there was less of an industrial proletariat. It tended to swallow up socialism in the less advanced lands, not the more advanced ones.

"If we proceed south and east into the more agrarian parts", writes Burks, "the communist tends to replace the socialist vote and a higher proportion of the (smaller) proletariat is sympathetic to the communist cause". This is consonant with the phenomenon of Communism taking over not the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe but relatively backward and peasant Russia.

But what non-Marxian hypotheses does Burks formulate for explaining the emergence of Communism in eastern Europe?

If he does not dwell on the fact that all states of eastern Europe, except Greece, have communist governments today thanks to the Red Army that moved into the area during World War II, this must be surely because it would be redundant to do so. For the emergence of the communist phenomenon in eastern Europe, he emphasizes three main factors. First, in certain cases, it is the byproduct of a badly disturbed social order that affected certain groups, tobacco workers, cash croppers, refugees. Second, this movement reflected, he believes, the impact of Western civilization on the more backward eastern European regions, affecting youth. It was the result—the psychological result—of looking at the world not on the basis of local standards but of Western achievements. It represented the reaction of economically poorer and less sophisticated cultures to the West, especially by persons and groups subjected to social disorganization and great personal insecurity. The revolution of rising expectations, we may say in

other words. Ethnic factors are the third important determining element in the emergence of communism in eastern Europe. But about this, something has been said earlier. At this point it should be said that his distinction between "ethnic" and "national" is etymologically somewhat infelicitous. "Several ethnic groups", he writes on p. 85, "may combine to make one nation". Does he not mean that they may combine to make "one state"? Objections should also be raised to his use of the term "supranational" (p. 192). "Multinational" or "federal" would be preferable. As for the term "anti-Western parties" (e.g. p. 185), are not all communist parties anti-Western?

A few errors of fact: p. 206: not all free elections of eastern Europe were multiparty elections based on proportional representation, for instance the Greek elections of August 19, 1928. Then, p. 147, it is likely that a Soviet, not a Yugoslav mission, reorganized the Albanian Army.

One should not cavil, however, with these semantic or factual slip—or with the misspelling of certain place and proper names, or with the absence of French accents from French words. Here is a book of excellence, a "must" not only for students of communism and eastern Europe but also for Greek politicians who wish to understand some of the problems Communism presents on home ground.

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*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Südosteuropas.*— Gedenkschrift für Wilhelm Gülich. — 596 pp. Südosteuropaverlags-Gesellschaft m.b.H. München 1961.

The Südosteuropagesellschaft is a learned German society open to foreign members. Its seat is in Munich. Its interest lies in developments of whatever nature in Southeastern Europe. The latter are studied in its numerous publications and in round table conferences. The Südosteuropagesellschaft had the misfortune to lose its first president, Professor Wilhelm Gülich and has published in memoriam the volume, which had been planned to celebrate his 65th birthday. The volume contains sixteen essays, which deal with many aspects of recent developments in Southeastern Europe. Of course the first is an analysis of Professor Wilhelm Gülich's achievements in the field of social sciences, particularly in economics and in the organisation of big libraries, last but not least in politics by Professor J. W. Mannhardt, Marburg. Economic problems are dealt with in seven essays, namely by Prof. H. Gross, Kiel, Prof. B. Kiesewetter, Berlin, Dr. B. Knall, Kiel, Dr. O. Liese, Vienna, Prof. V. Piertot, Ljubliana, Prof. H. Wildbrandt, Berlin in collaboration with Dr H. Ruthenberg, Berlin and the undersigned, Thessaloniki. Transport is dealt with by Prof. K. Förster, Munich and Dr. K. Wessely, Vienna. Legal problems are analysed by Dr. F. Ronneberger, Münster Westf. and by Dr. R. Trofenik, formerly Ljubliana. Urbanisation is dealt with by Dr. W. Kral-