Charilaos Tricoupes is generally considered as the greatest Greek statesman of the nineteenth century. His diplomatic skill and ability for cogent and persuasive argument as well as his policies have earned him a place above even that of John Capodistrias, the first President of Greece. Eleutherios Venizelos, the twentieth century politician, is the only Greek statesman who is considered more important than Tricoupes, yet Venizelos himself acknowledged his debt to his predecessor: “From Tricoupes, I received that lesson which brought the triumph of the Greek race.” Venizelos, who masterminded the Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in the War of 1912 and liberated large Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian territories from the Ottoman Empire, based his policies on Tricoupes’ earlier but unsuccessful attempts to formulate a Balkan Alliance.

Balkan cooperation in addition to the strengthening of the Greek finances and armed forces was a necessity according to Tricoupes before Greece could realize her dream of the “Megale Idea” — the liberation of all her former territories from foreign domination. The Greco-Serbian Alliance of 1867 was the first alliance by two Christian Balkan states against their common enemy, the Turks. Tricoupes who was Foreign Minister at the time played a very important role in bringing about this alliance.

1. This article is part of Chapter II of the author’s unpublished doctoral dissertation, “Charilaos Tricoupes and Greek Territorial Expansion 1862-1882” in the Department of History, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, January 1970. I am very grateful to Dr. Dona'1 Donas for helping me get permission to use the Greek Foreign Ministry Archives and to Dr. Eleutherios Prevelakis who helped me get permission to use some of the British Foreign Office Archives on Greece which are on microfilm at the Academy of Athens.


Tricoupes served as a member of parliament for his place of residence Messologhi, from May 4, 1864 to December 1866 when he became Foreign Minister in the Coumoundouros government. During this period the Cretan revolt was at its zenith. The previous government, that of Voulgares, had resigned after not getting a vote of confidence in parliament when the course of the revolt was not going well under its policies.

The Cretan revolt erupted again in 1866 after the Sultan rejected the demands of the Cretans to lower taxes, improve roads and other means of communication, abolishment of the corrupt court system, more freedom of religion, and equal property rights. The Turkish government of the island, Ismail Pasha, paid little attention to the grievances of the Cretans and he recommended to the Sultan to send a strong army to protect the Turks and their property from attack by Cretan armed bands. The situation became worse and savage fighting broke out between Cretan and Turkish forces after the Cretans unilaterally proclaimed their union with Greece in August 1866.

As one would expect, the Greeks of independent Greece as well as Greeks from other parts of the Ottoman Empire strongly sympathized with the Cretan's cause. They exerted great pressure on the government in Athens to intervene on behalf of the Cretans. The public felt that the Greek army was capable of giving substantial aid to the Cretans, but according to reliable military reports of the time, Greece had an army of only about 8,000 men, very poorly-equipped and trained. The navy was literally non-existent. It was ironic even to think that an ill-equipped and poorly-trained, small Greek army could fight effectively against an immensely superior Ottoman army. Since the Greek government

4. For details about Tricoupes' political activities as a member of parliament from July 1864 to December 1865, see Nicolas I. Spandonis, editor, Logoi politikoi Charilaou Tricoupe (Political Speeches by Charilaos Tricoupes), I (Athens, 1888), pp. 1-132.

5. See Georgios Aspreas, Politike historia tes neoteris hellados 1821-1921 (Political History of Greece 1821-1921) (3 Vols.; Athens, 1923), II, p. 18. The other members of the cabinet were: Alexandros Coumoundouros, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior; D. Botsares, Minister of Defense; K. Lombardos, Minister of Justice; D. Grivas, Maritime Minister; Ch. Christopoulos, Minister of Education, and K. Kehayas, Minister of Finance; F.O. 32/372, Erskine to Stanley, Athens, December 31, 1866.

realized that it was impossible to aid the Cretans militarily, the only other alternative was to help them through diplomacy.⁷

Delegeorges, when he was Greek Foreign Minister in the Voulgares government had prepared a memorandum on the Cretan question which he handed to the Great Powers. In the memorandum he described all the “sufferings” endured by the Cretans under the Turks since 1821 and urged the Great Powers to intervene and put an end to the grave situation. He also warned the Great Powers that even though Greece wanted friendly relations with Turkey, she could not stay idle and watch the Turkish army overrun the Cretans who were poorly armed and trained.

The Powers, with the exception of Russia, did not take any immediate action to meet the Greek demands. France, whose foreign policy changed after 1856, and England were committed to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and definitely opposed the union of Crete with Greece. However they thought the Porte should make some concessions to Greece. Austria and Prussia did not show much interest in the Cretan question since they both were recovering from their own war. Russia was the only Great Power that fully supported the Cretan demands and union with Greece. It is not clear why the Russians supported the Greeks. Perhaps, after being defeated in the Crimean War, they wanted to recover their lost prestige as the protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The support of Russia did not mean very much since England and France opposed her policy.

France changed her position later on because of the threat the newly unified Germany posed to her and since she also desired to annex Belgium or at least Luxemburg to increase her strength, she needed Russian support and so France sided with Russia on the Cretan question to please her. She joined Russia in supporting the full autonomy for Crete with a Christian governor for the island. Both France and Russia tried to press the Sultan to yield to their demands but he refused. He told both Powers that they were violating article IX of the Treaty of Paris 1856 which said that no Power had the right to intervene in Turkish internal affairs.⁸

Nothing came of Delegeorges’ memorandum for the Powers did not actively

⁷ S.T. Lascares, Diplomatike historia, p. 113.
⁸ Ibid., p. 116; In his book, John Mavrogordato, Modern Greece: A Chronicle and a Survey 1800-1901 (London, 1931), p. 59 says that all the Great Powers had supported the union of Crete with Greece which contradicts S.T. Lascares who maintains that it was only Russia who supported it. France joined Russia later to demand an autonomous island, a Christian governor and not union with Greece.
interfere on behalf of the Cretans. This diplomatic setback of Delegeorges coupled with the military defeat of the Cretan guerillas forced the Voulgares government from office and brought in the moderate Coumoundouros regime.9

Tricoupes, as the Foreign Minister in Coumoundouros' government, seeing the inaction of the Great Powers on the Cretan question, embarked on a new foreign policy which was to become a major turning point in Greek foreign policy. Instead of relying on the Great Powers as in the past, Greece now, for the first time, sought cooperation and support from the other Christian Balkan nations for a common military action against Turkey. Tricoupes was the chief architect of this policy. He felt the only way to fight the Ottoman Empire effectively and to liberate the unredeemed Christian Balkan peoples from the Turks would be through careful economic and military preparation and diplomatic cooperation. He put little faith in the Great Powers and in their support of independence for the Christian Balkan peoples and thus he urged exclusive Balkan cooperation. Tricoupes privately told Erskine, the British ambassador to Athens, that Greece ought to have not only Crete, but also Epirus and Thessaly and that Greece would never stop preparing for the acquisition of these territories. However, being able to acquire them, he added, was a question of timing and using the appropriate tactics. The British Ambassador, writing to the Foreign Office about Tricoupes' views, said that

> it would then be more prudent to remain quiet for a time and that in fact it might take some years before Greece would be in a condition to proceed with the work of yet further aggrandizement. It was obvious however, that like many amongst his more sanguine countrymen, he (Tricoupes) does not despair of one day planting the Hellenic standard on the cupola of St. Sofia.10

This statement supports the contention that Tricoupes strongly believed in the Megale Idea, but he now thought that only through joint Balkan cooperation could Greece achieve her aspirations. Tricoupes realized that in 1866-67 Greece was very weak and could not act alone, so he took precautions to avoid a direct confrontation with Turkey. In the meantime, he gave strict orders to the Greek

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9. Coumoundouros promised King George that he would not do anything to provoke conflicts either with Turkey or the Great Powers. The cabinet was to observe neutrality during the pending struggle on Crete. F.O. 32/372, Erskine to Lord Stanley, Athens, January 1, 1867. Even though Coumoundouros might have made this promise, it was impossible to keep because some cabinet ministers—Christopoulos, Botzaris, and Lombardos in particular—made no secret of their enthusiasm for the Megale Idea.

armed forces not to encourage another revolt in Epirus and Thessaly and to stop all Greek volunteers from entering Turkey. Erskine, in a dispatch to Lord Stanley wrote:

Tricoupes requested me to assure your Lordship most solemnly that the present government were determined to use their utmost exertions to prevent the outbreak of any movement in Thessaly and Epirus. He could not of course be answerable for anything which might be done beyond the frontier, but the most stringent orders had been given to prevent the entrance of armed bands into Turkey from Greece and efforts should be made to deter persons in this country from exciting the Christians in Thessaly and Epirus to take up arms.11

The Greek Foreign Minister was afraid that if uprisings began in Thessaly and Epirus, Turkey would be provided with an excuse to invade Greece. But he realized that if Greece had an alliance with the other Balkan nations and they coordinated their efforts in common, it would be much easier to deal militarily with Turkey.

As for Crete, Tricoupes told the British Ambassador that the whole situation was so explosive that it was impossible for any Greek government to check the sympathy which was felt by every Greek for the cause of the insurgents. If any government tried to oppose the insurgents openly, it would be definitely overthrown. Erskine pointed out to Tricoupes that large numbers of Greek volunteers were entering Crete regularly and since there was no Greek law to prevent them, one should be passed to put an end to this activity. Tricoupes opposed this and said that “in the interest of peace the Greek government should not be required to do that which was condemned by public opinion.”12 He also cautioned the British that the king’s throne would be endangered, if the Greeks were pressed hard on the Cretan question.13 Evidently the earlier assurance of Coumoundouroso to Erskine that Greece would not support the Cretans was merely lip service.

The Cretan question was so explosive that no one could predict what would happen, so Tricoupes was eager to enter into alliance with the Balkan States, mainly Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro. Concerning this alliance, Tricoupes wrote to Panayiotes Delyannes, the Greek ambassador to Constantinople,

12. Erskine to Stanley, ibid.
13. This kind of situation is also apparent today with certain Arab countries in the Middle East. The Jordanian King and government, for example, could not last more than a day if they tried to stop Arab guerrillas from attacking Israel, because the sentiments of Arabs run very high on this issue.
It is in the interest and the duty of Greece as a Christian nation of the East to have very friendly relations and cooperation with the rest of the Christian races of the East. Greece must have brotherly cooperation, especially with the autonomous Christian nations of Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro, for the common interests of Christianity in the Ottoman Empire.\(^\text{14}\)

This was not the first time an attempt had been made to bring about an alliance between the Christian Balkan States. In 1861 King Otho tried unsuccessfully.\(^\text{15}\) At that time, Greece had consular representation neither in Belgrade nor Serbia in Athens. It was difficult for both countries to communicate, so they both sent special representatives to Constantinople to discuss the possibility of a mutual alliance and they decided to invite Roumania and Montenegro to join them later. Greece sent as ambassador to Constantinople the well-known diplomat Marcos Renieres to conduct secret negotiations with the Serbian representatives, Ilija Garašanin and Jovan Ristić.\(^\text{16}\) Garašanin was already in Constantinople on a mission to negotiate the emigration of Moslems from Serbia. This alliance did not materialize because, according to P. Delyannes' report, the Serbs were unprepared as they had too many urgent internal problems and their army was not equipped for a major campaign.\(^\text{17}\) Ristić informed the Greek representatives, however, that Serbia would like to see itself and Greece ally in the future and urged that both countries should work to achieve this goal.

\(^{14}\) Archeion YpouriGeiou Exoterikon (Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry) file 1867/c C. Tricoupes to P. Delyannes, No. 1, confidential, Athens, January 11, 1867; hereafter cited as A.Y.E. P. Delyannes was a cousin to Theodore Delyannes, the future archrival of Tricoupes.

\(^{15}\) For detailed information on the 1861 attempt for a Greco-Serbian alliance, see Tsirintanes, \textit{op. cit.}, II, pp. 20-40.

\(^{16}\) A.Y.E., file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, No. 1, confidential, Peran (Constantinople), January 24, 1867; S.T. Lascares, \textit{Diplomatike historia}, p. 118, says that the Serbian representatives at the secret conference between Greece and Serbia in 1861 in Constantinople were Garašanin and Petronièvić. Delyannes in his dispatch to Tricoupes mentions Ristić but not Petronièvić. Petronièvić was also a Serbian representative with Garašanin in Constantinople, but he was replaced later by Ristić.

\(^{17}\) Serbia and Greece agreed, however, in principle on the division of European Turkey in case of a victory as follows: "Greece would in principle have Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and the islands of the archipelago, while Serbia would obtain northern Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro if the latter did not oppose union." L.S. Stavrianos, \textit{Balkan Federation} (Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1964), p. 86; S.T. Lascares, \textit{Diplomatike historia}, p. 119.
The 1861 attempt for a Greco-Serbian alliance set the basis for the revival of the negotiations between Greece and Serbia in 1866-1867. Coumoundouros, under Tricoupes' instigation, was the first who thought of reviving the talks, even though he was not in power at that time. Under his own initiative he sent in May 1866, the able diplomat, Michael Antonopoulos, to Constantinople to meet Ristić and discuss this possibility. Ristić, like Coumoundouros, was known as a great supporter of the Greco-Serbian alliance. After the Greek and Serbian diplomats met in Constantinople, Antonopoulos sent a letter to Coumoundouros on June 12, 1866 outlining the Serbian conditions. First, Serbia wanted a change of the Voulgares government in Greece because it opposed Greek military cooperation with any Balkan nation. Second, Greece must increase and improve the condition of its military forces.\(^\text{18}\)

In September 1866, Ristić sent the Serbian military attaché, Ljubomir Ivanovic, to Athens to study Greece's military strength as well as to determine the enthusiasm of its politicians for Greco-Serbian cooperation. Ivanovic also carried a confidential letter from Ristić to Coumoundouros elaborating on the question of Greco-Serbian cooperation. Coumoundouros told Voulgares and his Foreign Minister, Delegeorges, about Serbia's proposals but they both were uninterested. They claimed that Greece was totally unprepared militarily and economically and should avoid a major confrontation with Turkey. Furthermore, they did not want "to tie the Cretan question to the Eastern question."\(^\text{19}\) It is not clear for what reason they wanted the Cretan problem separated from the Eastern question.

Ivanovic reported back to Ristić that the Greek army was in poor shape and the existing Greek government too unreliable to begin negotiations. Evidently the negotiations failed from the very beginning and were not revived until Coumoundouros returned to power in December 1866. Thereupon Tricoupes embarked on the same project again and after hard work he succeeded in bringing about the long desired Greco-Serbian alliance.

He first sent a note to Delyannes in Constantinople instructing him to discuss with Ristić the Greek government's plans to examine the possibility of a Greco-Serbian alliance. Ristić was personally assured by Coumoundouros that he desired to renew the Greco-Serbian talks.\(^\text{20}\) Both Greece and Serbia, according to the new proposals, were to increase their armed forces, encourage

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In a confidential letter to Delyannes on January 11, 1867, Tricoupes outlined in broad terms the Greek position on the proposed Greco-Serbian alliance. Since Tricoupes did not yet know Serbia’s position on the proposed alliance, he asked Delyannes to discuss the Greek views with Ristić and send him a reply.

The major points in Tricoupes' program for an alliance with Serbia were the following: (a) Serbia and Greece were to unite militarily and prevent Turkey from attacking either one or both of them. (b) Both countries were to act together to liberate all the Balkan Christians from Turkish domination. (c) Greece was to raise its nation’s income through increased taxation and obtain new loans if necessary to prepare a strong army and navy. (d) Serbia was to make similar commitments in preparing its armed forces. (f) Both countries were to be responsible for preparing their respective peoples in the Ottoman Empire to accept and fulfill the conditions of the alliance, providing weapons and ammunition for them in due time. (g) Each country was to exercise its influence on the Albanians. (h) Both countries were to reach a mutual understanding before declaring war on Turkey, but if Turkey declared war on both or either of them, then the alliance would be in effect the day of signing. (i) Once war was declared, neither country was to lay down arms without fulfilling the purpose of the alliance, that is, reaching an agreement first. (j) Greece and Serbia were to work towards the liberation of their co-religionists in the Balkans and oppose any other power that tried to occupy any part of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. (k) Neither country would enter into any form of agreement with a foreign power without previously informing the others. (l) Each country would have the responsibility of checking premature uprisings. (m) Both countries were to make special efforts to bring Roumania and Montenegro into the alliance.

On January 14, 1867, the confidential report of Tricoupes reached R. Delyannes in Constantinople. He read the instructions carefully and he hastened to meet Ristić to discuss the possibility of an alliance. After he talked to Ristić, the latter promised to study the report carefully and give P. Delyannes an answer in a few days.


22. Tricoupes sent his instructions to P. Delyannes in Constantinople by a special messenger namely Delyannes' son.

Delyannes then sent a dispatch to Tricoupes informing him of his conversation with Ristić and that he was awaiting a formal answer from the Foreign Minister. He told Ristić that

the Greek government from 1830-1832 considered its project of establishing the Greek Kingdom in the East unfinished... and never renounced its responsibilities to the Greek people who expressed their hope in the fulfillment of the 'Megale Idea.'

The military preparations suggested by Greece and the secret plans or cooperation with the other Balkan Christians impressed Ristić. He assured P. Delyannes that the Serbian government considered the Greek proposal very important and it would be given most serious consideration.

Within a few days, Ristić submitted to P. Delyannes a long statement with detailed comments on each of the points presented by Greece concerning the alliance. P. Delyannes then wrote a long letter to Tricoupes elaborating on the Serbian comments, which concerned mostly clarifications of Greek statements and definitions of words. Some of them for example were: What is meant by upper Albania and how was it different from Epirus? What was the meaning of the word "attack" and how and when should it be applied? P. Delyannes did not confide in any other member of the Greek embassy about the proposed alliance but he let his son rewrite the dispatch clearly. After sealing it, the latter departed on an Austrian ship for Piraeus on January 24, 1867 personally to take the message to the Greek government.

In his dispatch to Tricoupes, P. Delyannes wrote that Ristić expected a Greek proposal for an alliance which he wanted to send to his government for study. He also asked Tricoupes to indicate precisely where the negotiations were to be held and who would sign the agreement. Apparently P. Delyannes had in mind one of three capitals — Athens, Belgrade, or Constantinople — as possible places for the final negotiation and signing of the alliance. He advised Tricoupes that the final negotiations should be left to others and not to Ristić and himself because he said "it is not proper that either he or I should receive the final credit and have the honor of signing the Treaty."

24. A.Y.E., file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, No. 1, very confidential, Peran, January 24, 1867.
25. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, No. 2, very confidential, Peran, January 24, 1867. P. Delyannes also sent, a telegram in secret code to Tricoupes on the same day informing him that his son would bring him three very important letters. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, confidential telegram No. 5 P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, Peran, January 24, 1867.
annes asked Tricoupes to send somebody else to continue the negotiations and finally sign the treaty of alliance was that he felt that Turkey would be alienated once she learned that he had secretly negotiated an alliance against her in Constantinople. P. Delyannes, a career diplomat, knew that this would violate certain provisions of the Law of Nations and might cause his expulsion from Turkey. To defend his position, P. Delyannes quoted from three noted scholars of international law that "the mission of the ambassador in a foreign country is one of peace and he is only accepted on this basis." 27 Indirectly he told Tricoupes it would be better if the final stages of the negotiations were carried out by representatives of both countries who were not necessarily career diplomats. The Russian ambassador to Constantinople who strongly supported an entente between Greece and Serbia somehow became aware of the secret negotiations. He advised P. Delyannes that it would be "very unwise" to sign the treaty in Constantinople. 28

After Tricoupes carefully read P. Delyannes' and Ristic's dispatches, he prepared a proposal for the Serbo-Greek alliance on the basis of the 1861 agreements. He also took into consideration the agreements between Michael Antonopoulos and Ristic in early 1867. 29

Among the important proposal that he put forth were: (a) If the Turkish army invaded the territories of Greece and/or Serbia, then both countries were to help each other militarily and declare war on Turkey. (b) Greece should acquire Epirus, Thessaly, Crete, the Aegean Islands and those parts of Macedonia that would take part in the revolt against Turkey. 30 (c) In the event that Greece and Serbia achieved their military objectives—that is the defeat of Turkey—then the Greek government would not have the right to interfere with the territorial settlements that would follow concerning Bosnia, Herzegovina, northern Albania and all the territory north of the Balkan Mountains. Similarly, Serbia also would not have the right to interfere with the territorial settlements that would follow concerning the Aegean Islands, and the areas south of the Balkan Mountains. (d) Greece and Serbia were to work together and individually to influence friendly European Powers to recognize the principle that the "Christian East" belonged to the people who inhabited the area (Euro-

27. P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, Ibid.
29. For details of Tricoupes' proposal, see, Ibid., pp. 407-409.
30. Tricoupes does not specify which parts of Macedonia Greece demanded, but most probably he meant those parts of Macedonia which were predominantly Greek, which took up arms against the Turks and which cooperated with the rest of the Greeks in the other Ottoman provinces.
pean parts of the Ottoman Empire) and that no outside power would be allowed to occupy any part of it. (e) Greece was to create a standing army of 30,000 men, and furthermore, build the strongest naval power possible. (f) Greece was to provide arms and ammunition to the people of Epirus, Thessaly, the islands, Macedonia, and Thrace. Serbia was to provide the same for Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria and northern Albania.

With the proposal, Tricoupes sent a brief letter to P. Delyannes urging him to inquire how large an army Serbia was ready to contribute to the alliance. Tricoupes suggested that Athens should be the place of signing and that he and a special Serbian representative should be the signators. For security reasons, Tricoupes did not mail his dispatch but again sent a special messenger to take the classified information to P. Delyannes in Constantinople. Although they knew that they had to overcome some important and difficult questions, both Greeks and Serbs were optimistic that the alliance between them would eventually materialize. The question of future territorial settlements, particularly that of Macedonia, was the thorniest problem. The difficulties became more apparent by the time the special messenger, I. Argyropoulos, arrived in Constantinople and handed the proposal to P. Delyannes. Without wasting any time, P. Delyannes called upon Ristić and gave him the proposal. Ristić promised to send it to Belgrade for comments and reply in a few days.

On February 14, 1867 Ristić saw P. Delyannes and instead of handing him the answer of the Serbian government, he presented P. Delyannes with a counter-proposal which, while making new demands, neglected to supply answers to comments on key points of the Tricoupes' proposal and which ignored the 1861 agreements, especially the territorial ones. P. Delyannes, in his dispatch to Tricoupes on February 15, 1867, wrote:

In answering my question promptly whether this was a contre projet that took in consideration my proposal, he (Ristić) replied that it was a proposal drafted by his government before mine had reached his country.

Ristić explained that there had been no trustworthy messenger available to send the Greek proposal to Belgrade. As a result the proposal had been retained for several days until a messenger became available. Ristić then informed his

32. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, very confidential, Athens, February 13, 1867.
33. A.Y.E., file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes No. 6, confidential, Peran, February 15, 1867.
government by telegraph of Tricoupes’ proposals in a brief summary and added his personal comments. Naturally this information did not fully explain the Greek position; therefore, the Serbian government drafted a new proposal disregarding vital elements in Tricoupes’ draft. This evidently displeased the Greeks.

The Serbian counter-proposal had fourteen articles, but the most important one for Greece was article I:

Greece and Serbia are to form an alliance. The purpose of the alliance is to liberate and annex those territories from the Ottoman yoke which surround them and which are related to them by common origin.

For Greece: the island of Crete and the districts of Epirus and Thessaly.

For Serbia: Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Old Serbia between the Drin and Iskir. If there is a military victory and circumstances permit, these territories will be united with Macedonia in such a way that the Southern part will be united with Greece and the Northern part with Serbia.\(^{34}\)

The reason that this was the most important article for the Greeks was that it touched on the controversial issue of Macedonia. The Greeks had assumed that the territorial discussions of 1861 “would serve as a basis of their talks.” These had concerned the Greek desire to annex Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and the Aegean Islands. Greece demanded recognition of her claims from Serbia, as Greece had already in the same agreement recognized the Serbian rights to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and northern Albania.

P. Delyannes informed Tricoupes that he was displeased with the Serbian counter-proposal. Tricoupes responded with a letter analyzing in great detail each of the articles in the new Serbian proposal.\(^{35}\) It was correct that Serbia had made new territorial demands in 1867 that she did not make in 1861; she advanced these claims, just as Greece now introduced new demands on northern Albania. The political situation had changed rather quickly in the intervening six-year period. Serbian military forces were now far superior to Greek forces; this gave Serbia a bargaining power she did not enjoy earlier. For example, Serbia, according to article II of her counter-proposal, was now ready to con-

\(^{34}\) Tsirintanes, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-411. For an extensive analysis of most of the articles of the Serbian counter-proposal by Tricoupes, see A.Y.E., file 1867/C, Tricoupes to P. Delyannes, confidential, Athens, March 5, 1867.

\(^{35}\) A.Y.E. file 1867/C, Tricoupes to P. Delyannes, Confidential, Athens, March 11, 1867.
tribute 60,000 troops compared to 12,000 troops in 1861 whereas the 1861 and 1867 proposal each called for Greece to provide 30,000 troops. Moreover, the Serbs had learned through reliable sources, such as Captain Ivanović’s mission to Athens, that the Greek troops were in poor shape. Serbia based her proposal on the military statistics of 1867 and not 1861. Tricoupes’ use of forceful and legalistic arguments against the Serbian counter-proposal was a common tactic that he used during the Ionian Islands question and would use again in the future in his diplomatic dealings.

It was evident that Tricoupes could not accept the Serbian counter-proposal as it stood. He sent a telegram to Delyannnes telling him that “it was pointless to send a messenger to bring him an answer, since article I of the Serbian counter-proposal makes it impossible to continue the talks.” Tricoupes once again reaffirmed his stand that the only basis of any future negotiations should be the territorial arrangements of 1861 which were accepted in the discussions of May 31, 1866.

It was true that Ristić and Antonopoulos agreed on May 31, 1866 to recognize the 1861 territorial agreements, but there is no proof that Ristić actually signed an agreement. There are no documents in the archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry to Tricoupes’ claim. Ristić was, therefore, correct in his denial that he signed such a document. There was no doubt that in the 1861 agreement between Renieres and Garašanin, Serbia had agreed to the territorial demands of Greece. Ristić and Antonopoulos did not specifically discuss the issue of territorial claims; they only agreed that the 1861 agreement should become article II of their May 1866 agreement which said: “the territory of 1861 will be accepted with the number four modification.”

Both Greece and Serbia took very strong positions concerning the issue

37. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, Greek Foreign Ministry to Greek Embassy Constantinople, telegram, confidential, March 5, 1867. No names are mentioned in the telegram because it is a copy of the original. It is obvious, however, that it was a message from Tricoupes to P. Delyannnes, Tsirintanes, op. cit., p. 414 also quotes this telegram but gives no date.
38. Modification number four of the May 31, 1866 Agreement said that “at the present time no steps should be taken to sound out the positions of the European Powers about the proposed Treaty. The two parties (Greece and Serbia) should confer on this, if it is deemed necessary.” The Serbs asked for this modification which actually referred to article IV of the 1861 agreement which stated that both parties, Greece and Turkey had to agree on a common policy so that Greece could sound out the Great Powers as to how they viewed the principles of the proposed treaty. Ristić’s demand for the modification of article IV of the 1861 agreement was interpreted by Tricoupes as meaning that the Serbs in 1866 considered the 1861 agreements valid. Tsirintanes, op. cit., II, p. 416.
of Macedonia. Tricoupes argued in effect, that Greece could never accept the partition of Macedonia as suggested by the Serbs. He suggested instead that neither of the two countries propose any decision of Macedonia in advance, but that they wait until after the liberation of Macedonia and let the people decide to join whichever side they wanted. Tricoupes made this suggestion because he was overly-confident that in case of a referendum, Greece could easily carry most of Macedonia and Thrace. Ristić, on the other hand, insisted on a definite division of Macedonia and the talks came to an impasse in March 1867.

About a month later, the talks resumed between the Greek and Serbian representatives in Constantinople. The Greeks, who saw that they were at a disadvantage in their talks with the Serbians because of their small and ill-equipped armed forces, embarked on a program to increase and strengthen them quickly. Tricoupes informed P. Delyannes in May that Greece had already formed four new battalions, bought munitions and armaments, and sent naval officers to Europe to purchase new warships. Also, steps had been taken by Greek officials to secure a new loan for the purchase of more arms.

The Greek move to improve the armed forces made a possible alliance more attractive to Serbia. Serbia had been definitely influenced by the report of Captain Ivanović on the Greek armed forces when he first visited Athens in 1866. Serbia, therefore, had a reasonable excuse for avoiding an alliance with a country, which was not armed adequately. Another reason why the talks between Greece and Serbia were resumed was the pressure of Russia on both countries. For reasons not clearly defined, the Tsar urged King George, when he went to Russia to marry the Grand Duchess Olga, to do everything possible to bring about an alliance with Serbia. The Tsar also talked to S. Metaxas, the Greek minister to St Petersburg, in order to encourage this alliance. General Ignatiev advised both Ristić and P. Delyannes to reach a compromise and enter into an alliance soon because both countries would thereby gain many advantages. Russian influence on both Prince Michael of Serbia and King George

39. Ibid., p. 437.
40. Tricoupes gave orders to P. Delyannes to contact the Serbian representative and begin the new round of talks. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, Tricoupes to P. Delyannes, confidential, May 3, 1867.
41. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, p. 98; F.O. 32/372 Erskine to Stanley, No. 33, Athens, January 31, 1867. According to Erskine a bill had been passed in the Chamber to increase the Greek army from 11,900 to 14,300 with 1,700 in reserve which in time of war would have been raised to 31,000. The navy was to be increased to 3,000 men. The British Ambassador, however, reported that he doubted if Greece had the funds to make any serious augmentations of her armed forces which he estimated to be between six or seven thousand men.
42. Tsirintanes, op. cit., p. 437; Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, p. 98.
of Greece could have been the most important reason for the resumption of talks between the two countries.

From the middle of May to early June 1867 Ristić and P. Delyannes had several meetings to determine where the final talks concerning the alliance should be held. Both representatives agreed that it would be easier and much faster to negotiate either in Belgrade or Athens. Ristić took the initiative and invited Greece to send a representative to Belgrade to negotiate directly with the high Serbian government officials. Ristić told Delyannes that his government preferred that a Greek delegate go to Belgrade because it would be easier to disguise his mission and thus avoid Turkish suspicions. “His mission,” Ristić told P. Delyannes, “could be excused by attributing it to other reasons, for example, a mission to Vienna, or elsewhere, and thus show that this person passing through Belgrade, stopped off a brief while, and then continued on his journey.”

Tricoupes, who felt that Greece genuinely needed the alliance more than Serbia, did not like Belgrade as a meeting place and agreed to any other location outside of Serbia. He informed the Serbian government through the Greek Ambassador to Constantinople that it would be very difficult for the Greek government to send any trustworthy diplomatic agent secretly to Belgrade without it noticed by the Turkish authorities. The Serbian government understood that Greece would not accept Belgrade as a meeting place and finally gave orders to Ristić to suggest to P. Delyannes the Austrian town of Mehadia near Ostrova. When Tricoupes heard of the Serbian choice, he automatically accepted it and chose his personal friend, deputy Petros Zanos, to undertake the highly confidential mission. Both countries were determined this time to reach an agreement on the mutually-desired alliance. To make sure that no potential barriers could arise to obstruct an agreement, both sides agreed beforehand that they would not bring up the question of their future borders.

II

Zanos felt very honored when Tricoupes told him that the Greek government had chosen him for the mission to Mehadia. On July 1, 1867 he wrote a secret note to Tricoupes that he accepted the appointment and that he wanted

43. P. Delyannes urged Tricoupes to agree to the Serbian demand. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, No. 17, confidential, Peran, June 20, 1867.
44. A.Y.E., file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes, confidential, Peran, June 19, 1867.
45. Zanos had been a diplomat previously. He took part in the 1861 Greco-Serbian agreement and was in charge of the Greek Embassy in Constantinople for quite some time. Tsirintanes, *op. cit.*, p. 444.
to see all the previous correspondence between P. Delyannes and the Greek Foreign Ministry concerning the Greco-Serbian talks in Constantinope. He told Tricoupes that he wanted to leave for his mission via the island of Syros and avoid Piraeus so as not to arouse any suspicions.46

At the beginning of August Tricoupes gave Zanos written instructions on how to prepare himself and how to conduct the secret negotiations in Austria. He told him that there was not enough time to prepare copies of all the correspondence that he requested concerning the Greco-Serbian alliance. But since it was important that Zanos know of the most important results of the previous diplomatic exchanges, Tricoupes gave him copies of some of the most important documents. He also advised Zanos to defend all previous agreements made by the two countries and yield only to those Serbian demands that did not affect Greek national interests.47

After several briefings with Tricoupes, Zanos left Piraeus for Syros on August 4. He chose this detour to avoid suspicion. On August 5, he left Syros for Trieste then continued his trip to Austria. He wrote a letter to Tricoupes from Syros and asked him to send by telegraph the name of the friend who was going to the same Austrian town to take some "curative baths." By this Zanos meant the name of the Serbian representative who was to be at the conference. He also told the Greek Foreign Minister that he was going to sign his name from then on as Rossignol or not sign at all.48 49 He asked Tricoupes to telegraph him via Corfu and not Constantinople to avoid Turkish suspicions.

On August 13, 1867 Zanos reached Vienna where he met Prince Michael of Serbia who was going to his private estate at Ivanka, accompanied by Ristić and Petroniević, Serbian Deputy Minister of Justice.40 Garasanin was already at Ivanka waiting for the Prince. Zanos did not expect to meet the Serbian Prince in Vienna and was surprised to see him there. "Truly what a happy coincidence" said Zanos in a dispatch to Tricoupes, "to find the Prince here as soon as I arrived..." 50 It was not a mere coincidence that Zanos met Michael in Vienna for

46. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, Zanos to Tricoupes, confidential, Athens, July 13, 1867.
49. According to a telegram from P. Delyannes to Tricoupes on August 13, 1867 at least two Serbs were to meet the Greek representative in the agreed upon place in Austria. These two were Petroniević (a diplomat who also served in Constantinople) and Pirocanac. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, P. Delyannes to Tricoupes No. 24, confidential, Peran, August 13, 1867.
50. A.Y.E. file 1867/C, Zanos (signed Rossignol) to Tricoupes, confidential, Vienna, August 15, 1867.
according to Greek reports from St. Petersburg, the Prince had already made plans to go to Austria to meet the Greek representative (and had no plans whatsoever to go to St. Petersburg as had been previously reported). Zanos, however, was naive enough to write to Tricoupes that it was just a coincidence that they met. What is surprising is that the Serbs sent at least four representatives whereas the Greeks sent only one. This was definitely a sign that the Serbs put heavy weight on the alliance.

Zanos had a long conversation with the Prince in Vienna. In his dispatch to Tricoupes written in Greek mixed with French, Zanos said that he emphasized to the Prince the necessity of the alliance and that the territorial differences between them should not be permitted to disrupt the negotiations again. "La grande politique," Zanos told Prince Michael, "ne doit pas être sacrifice à la petite et devant le grand principe que nous soutenons, devant la question vraiment nationale, qui nous préoccupe, toute question secondaire doit se taire." The Prince agreed with Zanos in everything and invited him to accompany him for a few days to Ivanka for further discussions. Zanos declined for this could be compromising and not beneficial to Greece. Then they both agreed that Zanos should meet soon with the other Serbian representatives and decide on a final meeting place since the Prince changed his mind about Mehadia and Tricoupes refused to accept Ivanka. The Prince left Vienna for Ivanka where Garašanin was waiting for him. On August 15, Petroniević visited Zanos in Vienna and arranged a meeting with Zanos, Garašanin, Ristić, and himself at the Hotel Oesterreichischer Hof, where Zanos was staying. At the hotel the representatives of the two countries considered the military and geographical implications of the proposed alliance. Zanos did not want to discuss the territorial claims at such an early time. He preferred to leave this question until after the war against Turkey, when they would know what European parts of the Ottoman Empire, if any, would be available. The Serbian representatives insisted that at least minimal claims be mentioned in the treaty. Zanos agreed to the Serbian request to avoid pointless discussion. Zanos at the beginning, insisted that they should use ethnic composition as the basis for these claims, but he yielded again to Serbian demands for territorial claims based on historical considerations. The minimal territorial claims agreed upon by both sides were Epirus and Thessaly for Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina for Serbia.
Once they had agreed to these minimal territorial claims to be included in the treaty Zanos went to Voeslau where he met secretly with Petroniević, at the hotel Belle Vue and discussed the details of the alliance. Zanos disguised his trip to Voeslau by telling friends that he was going there for baths recommended by Viennese doctor. After five days of negotiation, Petroniević and Zanos finally drafted a treaty, composed of seventeen articles, which they signed on August 26, 1867.54

This treaty, although it proved to be a mere "paper" document, was the first one of its kind among the Christian Balkan countries who tried to achieve their aims through a mutual alliance. The most important provisions of the treaty are the following: (a) Greece and Serbia were to be ready for war against Turkey by March, 1868. Serbia was to provide an army of 60,000 men and Greece one of 30,000 plus the strongest navy possible (article II). (b) If Turkey attacked either of the two countries before March 1868, then the one which wasn't attacked was to help the other by all possible means without entering the war. In the event that one of them should be attacked after March 1868, then both were bound to declare war on Turkey (article III). (c) The main purpose of the war against Turkey was to liberate all Balkan Christians and the inhabitants of the Aegean Islands. (d) In the event that the military objectives of the alliance were not accomplished, neither of the two parties were to lay down arms until Serbia secured Bosnia-Herzegovina and Greece secured Epirus and Thessaly (article IV). (e) If Serbia and Greece won the war against Turkey and liberated more territory in the Balkans than Bosnia-Herzegovina, Epirus, and Thessaly then both contracting parties were to negotiate a new treaty concerning the division of these new territories and their future relations. (f) The peoples of these liberated areas were to be given the opportunity to decide their future, either to join one of the two contracting parties or to form distinct confederated states (article VII). (g) A separate act attached to the treaty stated clearly that in the event of the union of Crete with Greece, Serbia would not have the right to claim new territories from Turkey in exchange. Zanos insisted on this special point because he believed that the union of Crete with Greece was imminent. (h) Both contracting parties agreed to use their influence to bring Roumania and Montenegro into the alliance (article XI).

When Zanos returned to Athens, Tricoupes sent a special messenger, Antonios Antonopoulos, to take the treaty to King George for ratification. Antonopoulos met the King in Frankfort and the latter signed it on September 14, 1867 with two reservations. These were: (a) If Greece and Serbia were not ready for war by March 1868, then both countries could postpone the date of attack without violating the treaty. (b) Both Greece and Serbia should refrain from any activities that would provoke a war with Turkey prematurely.\[^55\] \[^56\]

Petronievic took the treaty to Prince Michael for ratification. After he signed it, he sent Lieutenant-Colonel Frantisek Zach to Athens on January 22, 1868 where ratifications were exchanged with the Greek government. In addition Zach signed, on behalf of Serbia, a separate military agreement with Greece which changed the validation date of the alliance from March 1868 to September 1, 1868. The treaty called for this separate military agreement. Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Manos signed the military agreement on behalf of Greece.\[^58\]

It was under these circumstances that the Voelau Treaty came about. This was the first alliance between Serbia and Greece. Tricoupes hoped that the alliance would develop into a much broader one including all the Christian Balkan countries. Among Greek statesmen Tricoupes was the staunchest supporter of a Balkan cooperation which could eventually develop into a Balkan federation. Although the Bulgarians were still under Turkish domination, he hoped that with the help of the other Christian Balkan nations they would achieve their independence and join in a future federation. Contrary to Tricoupes' hopes, nothing materialized from the Greco-Serbian alliance. The war that was supposed to take place against Turkey in a year never occurred.

According to Greek sources, failure of the alliance was due to a shift in Serbia's foreign policy with a change of foreign ministers. Ristić, replacing Garašanin in November 1867, embarked on a new policy to improve relations with Austria. The reason for Serbia's change of policy towards Austria is explained in a dispatch on May 19, 1868 to Tricoupes from the Greek Consul in Vienna, Ypselantes. He wrote:

> According to the information which I received from an absolutely reliable source, who just returned from Belgrade, Prince Michael is convinced that at the time of the downfall of Turkey, Austria would

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\[^{55}\] Tsirentanes, *op. c5.*

intervene to secure Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to acquire a commanding place on the Danube. Then if Serbia made the slightest move against Turkey, she would clash against Austrian interests. Since it is doubtful that Russia would offer any aid to Serbia, Prince Michael might then be forced to embark on a project in which he would come to an agreement with Austria to unite Bosnia-Herzegovina with Hungary but with the two Serbian provinces remaining under strict control (authorite) of the Prince of Serbia.\(^57\)

Lascares records that the Greeks also accepted the Serbian argument proposed after Prince Michael's assassination that "the secret alliance bound only the Prince, who was held personally responsible for it." The treaty was never renewed after his death.\(^58\)

An important factor which cooled relations between Serbia and Greece in 1868 was the Cretan question. The Greeks, rightly or wrongly, claimed that Serbia, in April 1867, took advantage of the Cretan situation to win the fortresses from Turkey and thus remove the Turkish garrisons from Serbia, but did not help the Greeks with their Cretan revolt.\(^59\) The most pressing problem of Greece at that time was the Cretan revolt. Greece needed all the aid she could get and for this she sought assistance in the Balkans. In fact, Tricoupes pressed for the alliance in order to relieve Greece from Turkish pressure. The mistrust that was created between the two countries affected their plans to attack Turkey in September 1868.

Another explanation for the failure of this treaty is that Serbia and Greece did not have the necessary armed forces to achieve their objectives. Both countries knew that their poorly-trained and equipped armies were no match for the Turkish army. It is important to stress again that the Serbian military attaché, Captain Ljubomir Ivanović, found the Greek army in his visit to Athens in 1866 to number less than 10,000 men. He concluded at that time that Greece was unprepared for a war. Serbia had a much larger army, but it was also poorly-equipped and trained, and thus not ready for war. Both Russian and Austrian military reports from Serbia found the army very weak. It lacked properly-trained officers, supplies, and health facilities. Obviously, if Serbia and Greece put the alliance into effect and attacked Turkey, their chances of winning would have been very slim.\(^60\)

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Although the Voeslau Treaty of 1867 was not implemented within a year after its signature and was considered by both Serbia and Greece as a failure, neither of the two countries denounced it formally. The treaty was left dormant until the outbreak of the Serbo-Turkish war in July 1876. Prince Milan of Serbia declared war on Turkey and then he expected the Greeks to do the same. In a proclamation to the Serbian people, Prince Milan said: “From the Greeks proud of their passion for freedom, descendants from Themistocles and Botzaris, we can expect that they will soon follow our example.”

Prince Milan made this proclamation expecting help from the Greeks, but actually he never consulted the Greek government before declaring war against Turkey. It was only after the first Serbian military setbacks that both the Serbian Prince and his Foreign Minister secretly sent the special messenger Firmilian to Athens to convey a message to Coumoundouros, asking for Greek help against the Turks. Ristić in his letter to Coumoundouros made references to the Voeslau Treaty and wondered “how it was that Greece, an ally of Serbia, showed herself so indifferent and remained inactive, while the Serbs already had taken up arms against Turkey?”

Coumoundouros answered the Serbian request in a few days with a statement of strict neutrality. He claimed that the Voeslau Treaty was no longer valid after the death of Prince Michael in 1868 because it “had strictly a personal character.” This was the same argument that, according to Lascases, the Serbs used earlier to avoid any commitments under the treaty. Furthermore, Coumoundouros said that even if the treaty had been valid, Serbia should have first consulted Greece before she went to war against Turkey, as the Voeslau Treaty stated.

Finally one may ask, What is the historical significance of the Greco-Serbian Alliance? One key factor that is evident is that the two Balkan states for the first time showed enough proof of maturity to engage in a bilateral treaty to liberate their former territories from Turkish dominations, without the intervention of the Great Powers. Tricoupes realized the great importance of Balkan cooperation and the exclusion of the Great Powers in trying to liberate Greek territories from the Turks and pursued this policy throughout his political career.

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61. Botzaris was a famous naval hero of the Greek War of Independence 1821.
63. Ibid., p. 36.
64. Ibid., p. 32.