la Yougoslavie a pris, surtout par la réforme de 1965, une voie mixte caractérisée d’une part par la propriété collective des moyens de production et d’autre part par le rôle accru du profit dans les échanges, ainsi que par les investissements des capitaux de provenance occidentale. De ces diversités résultent les différences de niveau de croissance entre chaque pays.

Mais, malgré ces différences et ces particularités, le niveau de croissance apparaît comme à peu près semblable pour les trois pays balkaniques, c’est-à-dire à l’exception de l’Albanie, dont le développement économique dépend de ses rapports avec son lointain allié, la Chine populaire. Cela ne signifie nullement que les économies des autres pays soient indépendantes.

En tous les cas, l’économie des pays balkaniques, si l’on prend comme critère la structure de leurs échanges commerciaux, est une économie arriérée: les importations en produits manufacturés (machines et matériel d’équipement) représentent pour eux tous entre 49% (Albanie, 1964) et 58,5% (Grèce) du total des importations.

En revanche la composition des exportations est assez différente: L’Albanie et la Grèce exportent surtout des produits agricoles et des matières brutes, tandis que les exportations en produits manufacturés ont une place importante dans la balance commerciale de la Bulgarie et de la Yougoslavie.

Le livre de MM. P.-Y. Péchoux et M. Sivignon apporte non seulement “la vérité quantitative” pour la dernière décennie, mais aussi l’ensemble de l’histoire du développement économique des pays balkaniques surtout depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale.

VASSILI KREMNYDAS


In this excellent monograph, Mr. Barros, with his accustomed meticulous scholarship, deals in depth with the Greek-Bulgarian border incident of 1925 on the basis of intensive research in official Greek, British, Italian, German, American and League of Nations archives.

Like the Aland islands question, with which Mr. Barros dealt in an earlier study,¹ this conflict was successfully settled by the League of

Nations. However, the Greek-Bulgarian conflict of 1925, unlike the Swedish-Finnish dispute, involved the use of military force by one of the parties to the conflict. In consequence, as Mr. Barros clearly demonstrates, settling this conflict required threats of coercion on the part of the Great Power members of the League and of the League itself as a corporate body for the purpose of achieving a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Greek forces from the Bulgarian territory they had invaded. More analytically and in chronological order, this goal was attained by collective and at times joint demarches by Britain, France, and Italy through the diplomatic channel; by a public threat of collective severance of diplomatic relations and of economic sanctions against the "attacker," a threat conveyed by Lord Robert Cecil in a speech delivered in Scotland and reported to the Greek government; by an urgent appeal of Aristide Briand, Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations, who called for the suspension of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces; and by a call issued by that Council for such withdrawal behind respective frontiers within sixty hours, and for the cessation of all acts of hostility.

Meanwhile the governments of the Great Powers concerned with preventing any wider Balkan conflict, as well as the Secretariat of the League studied contingency plans for implementing, if necessary, these threats of coercion. As for the Bulgarian government, at first it proposed to the Greek government the establishment of a bipartite commission for investigating the responsibility for the border incident which triggered the Greek invasion of Bulgaria; then it resorted to the Council of the League. Simultaneously, it secretly sounded out the attitude of the Yugoslav government with a proposal for immediately concluding a military alliance to carry out joint action against Greece and seize Thessaloniki, Kavala, and Alexandroupolis as spoils. Had the Yugoslav government accepted this proposal instead of rejecting it, a general Balkan conflagration might well have resulted from what had originally been a purely local and centrally unauthorized border incident.

The Greek government's compliance with the various diplomatic demarches and appeals obviated the necessity of implementing any of the contingency measures of coercion discussed backstage by the Great Powers concerned. These included not only the measures publicly mentioned by Lord Cecil but also a collective naval blockade of Greece. A relevant League Secretariat memorandum indicated that such a measure might be more effective and less costly than economic sanctions for attaining the desired goal.
It is not clear whether the Greek government actually became aware of the backstage discussions of such contingency plans for coercive measures. The League and the Great Powers concerned, however, found it unnecessary to remind it formally of Greece's vulnerability to naval pressures, because of its geographic location, configuration, peninsular character and economic structure. Presumably they assumed that the Greek government, led by General Theodore Pangalos, would be aware of this vulnerability. Several times in its history as an independent state Greece had been subjected to Great Power coercion through pacific blockades, the earliest one being the one imposed by Britain in 1850 with the Pacifico affair as a pretext, and the most recent one being the one imposed by the two Entente Powers in 1917 during World War I. Mussolini's bombing and occupation of Corfu in 1923 was an additional reminder of this vulnerability to sea power.

As it turned out, it was found that the Greek government's decision to invade Bulgaria was based on a misinterpretation of the dispatch sent from Demir Kapu on the Greek-Bulgarian border to Athens concerning the border incident there, during which a Greek border guard had been killed in an exchange of shots with Bulgarian border guards, and a Greek officer who had arrived on the scene, ostensibly to arrange for a ceasefire, had suffered the same fate. As a footnote to Mr. Barros's account, this reviewer suggests that the word ανέρχονται (amount) in this dispatch, whether the latter was in code, cipher, or en clair, was misread as εισέρχονται (are entering), so that Athens believed that Bulgarian forces had entered Greek territory whereas the dispatch merely reported that the Bulgarian forces on the spot amounted to battalion strength. This act of reprisal which was based on a subjective rather than objective reality, was accompanied by a qualified ultimatum which resembled the one delivered by Mussolini to the Greek government in 1923 on the occasion of the murder of General Tellini and members of his team, as they were engaged in the task demarcating on the spot the Greek-Albanian border. For in its ultimatum to Bulgaria, the Greek government demanded an exemplary punishment of the military commanders responsible for the killing of the two Greeks; an official expression of regrets for the incident; and an indemnity of six million drachmas (£142,000) for the families of the slain men.

The misdeciphered or misdecoded or misread and unchecked dispatch from the Greek border authorities which elicited both the qualified Greek ultimatum to Bulgaria and the order to occupy Bulgarian territory evidently until the ultimatum’s orders were fulfilled, proved to be quite costly to the Greek taxpayer. The special commission of the League of Nations under Sir Horace Rumbold which investigated the whole affair after the hostilities had ceased and the troops had been withdrawn, decided that Greece should pay to Bulgaria an indemnity of thirty thousand leva (about £ 45,000)—twenty million leva for material damage done on Bulgarian territory by the invading Greek troops and ten million leva for moral damages.

From the viewpoint of the League of Nations, which provided the corporate veil behind which the governments of the Great Powers concerned acted in response to Bulgaria’s recourse to the League Council, the whole settlement was hailed as a tremendous success and as an omen of the League’s effectiveness in dealing with the unauthorized use of governmental force in international politics and in implementing Articles 10 of the League Covenant, under which members states undertook to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of states. In retrospect, however, as Mr. Barros underlines in his conclusions, this success merely demonstrated that the preconditions for League (or UN) effectiveness in controlling and managing the use of organized violence by governments in the multistate system are Great Power unanimity and fights between lesser states. In the 1930’s this became abundantly clear with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia.

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Evangelos Kofos makes another contribution, with this work, to

1. There are also some documents of 1877.