arest's independence from the Kremlin, publicly leading the country on a national path in economics and foreign policy despite increased tension with the countries of the Warsaw bloc.

At his conclusion, Fischer-Galati pronounces the regime of the Romanian Communist Party successful. Under the leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej and more so under Ceausescu the government has succeeded in gaining the loyalty of the population. Not only has the leaders' independent stand vis-à-vis Moscow accomplished this, but the progress over the last quarter century which has made Rumania an economic power in Europe has also gained the support of citizenry. The author sums up this performance somewhat humorously, but still seriously, with the statement that the old "derogatory evaluation that 'Rumanian is not a nationality but a profession' — is no longer relevant to the country's achievements" (p. 215).

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Among the many turning points of the postwar era few contained the drama and lasting impact of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948. By exposing the self-serving nature of Moscow's policies toward the "People's Republics" and without officially abandoning the tenets of communism, Tito's regime succeeded in discrediting Stalinist methods more effectively than the western world could ever hope to do. Thus any account of the Stalin-Tito feud, but especially one by an "insider," continues to attract much attention even though the basic facts of the story are by now essentially established. A book on this subject by Vladimir Dedijer, author of the much-quoted Tito Speaks (1953), friend of the maverick Djilas, and an intellectual of recognized integrity and depth is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the communist world.

Dedijer's own role in the events he describes (he served as director of the government's information office and as delegate to the United (Nations) was minor, and he was not privy to the decision-making pro-
cess under Tito’s powerful leadership. Thus one learns nothing of substance about the early signs of tension, or Belgrade’s foreign policy aims during 1945-1948, including the scheme for a “Balkan federation” which appears to have intensified Stalin’s mounting displeasure with his Balkan neophytes. Albania and Bulgaria receive scant attention and there is only a rather casual mention of Yugoslav “assistance to the Greek liberation movement from its very inception early in 1946 [my emphasis], despite Stalin’s attitude that Greece was in the Western sphere of influence and not to be tampered with.” (pp. 269-270) Instead, the charge is made that early in 1948 Stalin decided to subjugate Yugoslavia as a prelude to the incorporation into the Soviet Union of all of Eastern Europe. He would not, however, resort to armed aggression because he was “wise enough to know he could not predict the outcome of such a step—a mere local war or a world-wide conflict.” (pp. 33-35) Moscow’s methods for the exploitation of Yugoslavia’s economy are described in some interesting detail. But in general one is disappointed to discover that the book’s subtitle, “Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-1953,” is not meant to be taken literally.

However, if Dedijer fails to offer important and heretofore unknown facts, he succeeds in recreating much of the drama of those moments when Yugoslavia’s communist leaders discovered that their “Socialist Fatherland,” for which they professed to feel only admiration and trust, had suddenly decreed their destruction. While Tito himself remains largely out of focus in this picture, his entourage is portrayed as idealistic and naive, unable to grasp the painful realities of Soviet imperialism and living a simple, peasant-like existence full of self-sacrifice and dedication to the common cause. In engaging frankness Dedijer describes the shock and confusion which Moscow’s attack created for him and his comrades.

Indeed, one finds it difficult to accept Dedijer’s principal thesis that for him and his friends a clash with the Soviet Union in 1948 had simply been unthinkable. No matter how much faith they may have placed in the bonds of a common ideology, their knowledge of history both recent and past (including that of their resistance to the German occupation) should have prepared them at least for the possibility of such a rift. After all, it is Dedijer himself who proclaims in these pages that “The conflict between the new Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948 was fraught with passion, with a strange kind of fire, like the disputes between medieval Christian sects.” (p. 36) Moreover, after the summer of 1944 persistent rumors that a secret Anglo-Soviet agreement had
divided Yugoslavia into two spheres of influence must have aroused some fears for the future of their country. Yet Dedijer asserts that he had dismissed these rumors as absurd until Churchill himself confirmed them in January 1951, in private conversation with Djilas.

On the other hand, a Balkan intellectual who confesses that he lost his faith in God (in 1931) after witnessing discrimination against blacks in the United States may well have been unprepared for the power-politics of the Stalin-Tito battle... The many references to his brooding, soul-searching and self-criticism render Dedijer’s explanations refreshingly simple and straightforward, if not always altogether credible. As he puts it, “To be sincere and honest and to be a revolutionary is always right even when it is naive...” (p. 320) It is a measure of Stalin’s poor judgment of character that he compared the author of these words to Metternich and Talleyrand!

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