LEOPOLD AND THE GREEK CROWN

On February 3, 1830, Plenipotentiaries from Great Britain, France, and Russia, signed a protocol at London which declared Greece an independent state. This document bore traces of jealousy and distrust among the three Allied Powers and exhibited a "callous unconcern" for the welfare of the newly liberated nation. The allies arbitrarily fixed Greece's northern boundary from the mouth of the Aspropotamos River in the west, traversing the lakes of Angelocastro, Vrachori, and Saurovitza, turning toward Mount Artothina to the ridge of Mount Oxias and to the summit of Mount Oeta, as far as the gulf of Zeitoun in the east and ending near the Spercheius River. Once again the islands of Samos and Crete were excluded. The protocol further provided for the establishment of an hereditary monarchy based on primogeniture, with a prince to be chosen from outside the ruling dynasties signatory to the Treaty of July 6, 1827. By a second protocol signed on that same date, the Plenipotentiaries of the three Allied Courts offered this Crown to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. Thus, in the early months of 1830, Greece was faced with two concurrent and explosive issues: its boundary line and its new sovereign.

Nine years of civil war and anarchy had exhausted Greece; its towns were depopulated, its fields untitled. Regional and family loyalties, fed by the fires of revolt, divided the Greek people into warring factions, each with its own solution to the nation's problems. In the delimitation of the frontier


3. Divergent interests among the various Greek elements led to the civil war of 1824. Among sources on the civil war the following may be cited: D. I. Mayer, ed., *Ta Ellenika
a considerable portion of the national territory remained outside the bounda-
ries of the new nation, including the provinces of Acarnania, Vonitza, Valtos, Vlochos, Agrapha, Cravara, Carpenisi, and Potradzick. The people
of these eight provinces had fought valiantly for their freedom during the
War of Independence and had never been completely subjugated by the
Turks. Leaving them within the confines of the Ottoman Empire outraged
and alienated their fellow Greeks. It was in this emotional atmosphere that
Prince Leopold entered the Greek scene.

From the outset of the War of Independence European diplomats began
to argue among themselves over the merits of various royal candidates. France
recommended Prince Charles of Bavaria, who reluctantly refused the honor
fearing Austrian objections to his liberal tendencies. England proposed Philip
of Hesse, an Austrian general, whose candidacy the Greek leaders summa-
riely rejected. Tsar Alexander showed a marked preference for the English
favorite, Prince Frederick of Orange, but the French objected to this Prince’s
Protestant faith. Other names more or less seriously considered included
Prince Emil of Hesse (a Bonapartist and therefore unacceptable to France),
Archduke Max of Austria (unacceptable to both England and Russia), the
Margrave William of Baden, and Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz,
a nominee of the Prussian King and brother-in-law of England’s Duke of
Cumberland.

If the diplomats failed to agree upon one candidate, the Greeks them-
selves did little better. As early as 1822 several Greek politicians put forth
the name of Jerome Bonaparte, the former King of Westphalia, who was
then living in Trieste under the name of Count Montfort. Still others recom-
manded Eugene Beauharnais, Napoleon’s stepson, as a possible candidate.

nant les letters diplomatiques, administratives et particulières, écrites par lui depuis
le 20 Avril 1827 jusqu’au 9 Octobere 1831 (4 vols., Geneva, 1839), Capodistrias to Leopold.
III, 517.

5. G.G. Gervinus, Insurrection et régénération de la Grèce, trans. by J. F. Minssen and
Both men were strongly opposed by the French Bourbons, who felt little love for their hereditary enemies. Another prominent Frenchman supported by leading Greeks was the Duke of Nemours, the second son of Louis Philippe, who was soon to ascend the French throne. Through his father’s influence, Nemours secured the promise that a French contingent would be sent to aid the Greek army if he was elected. Philhellenic groups in the various countries favored their native sons, further complicating the Greek political picture.

After weighing all possible repercussions of his acceptance, Leopold replied favorably to the tentative overtures from Greece hoping in this manner to insure a formal invitation by the Greek government. With this in mind, therefore, he asked Charles Stockmar, his personal physician’s brother, to sound out the Greek president. In early May, 1829, Stockmar departed on his unofficial mission bearing a personal letter to President Capodistrias. In discussing the Protocol of March 22, 1829, with Stockmar, Capodistrias expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the exclusion of Samos and Crete from the Greek state. He advocated a complete revision of the boundary provision without which he could not commit himself to accept this treaty. To Stockmar’s suggestion that he publicly ask for Leopold’s services, Capodistrias bluntly replied that the Prince should first make known his views on Greece’s boundary and should attempt to secure a rectification. “I beg the Prince,” Capodistrias told Stockmar, “to use his influence, that the islands of Samos and Crete may be added to the territory mentioned in the Protocol of March 22.” If this is not done at once the Greek National Assembly meeting at Argos will judge the protocol terms contrary to the policy and interests of the state and will undoubtedly instruct the President to take diplomatic steps in order to rectify the situation. To reassure the deputies and win over Leopold’s adherents, the Prince should demand that Samos and Crete be integrated in the new state. Without delay, therefore, Capodistrias enjoined Prince Leopold to commit himself irrevocably to revision.


of the protocol, if he wished to avoid ambiguity about his intentions.

Capodistrias had met the charming and urbane Prince on several occasions and entertained a very high opinion of his abilities. He felt it his duty, however, to place national and political considerations above his private inclinations. Preoccupied with internal reforms, Capodistrias wished to see a ruler on the throne who would strengthen Greece’s position in Europe and continue his own domestic policies. If Leopold could not secure a revision of the March 22 Protocol, the President would have to support another candidate. Thus, the Capodistrias-Leopold relationship became a crucial actor in the life of the young state with both men relying on the other’s attitude. Without Capodistrias’s support Leopold’s rule in Greece would become a primordial struggle for survival, a desperate and perhaps a hopeless fight.

In the autumn of 1825 Greek representatives had opened negotiations simultaneously with Prince Leopold and the British Government, hoping to secure a firm commitment from Leopold. These overtures proved unsuccessful, however, since George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, urged Leopold to remain in England as an advisor to his niece, the young Princess Victoria. In Canning’s view conditions remained too unsettled in Greece to permit the establishment of a foreign prince on the throne. Three years later, in 1828-1829, another Greek delegation, this time sent by Capodistrias himself, called upon Prince Leopold in Naples.

As the third son of a minor German princeling, Leopold had been waiting a long time for a throne of his own. He knew perfectly well the complicated and difficult political situation in Greece but he could not dismiss lightly the thought of ruling over an independent state. He was now almost forty years old and such an opportunity might not arise again. There seems to be little doubt, moreover, that Leopold was also actuated by humanitarian considerations, perhaps more so than by mere ambition. He welcomed


10. At the time of Leopold’s candidacy, in 1830, George IV was dying. His brother, who would succeed him as William IV, was sixty-five years old and in uncertain health. Next in line to the throne came Leopold’s young niece, the eleven year old Princess Victoria. In the light of her daughter’s prospects Leopold’s sister urged Leopold not to settle in faraway Greece thus abandoning his nearest relatives. He would be needed at home, she said, to advise and assist the young Queen.
the chance, he said, "to do good in a country where there would have to be a good deal of reconstruction before it could be anything like what it was even in the Middle Ages."\textsuperscript{11}

Although Leopold was regarded in diplomatic circles as the leading contender for the Greek throne, he was by no means the only candidate at this time. Both France and England continued to put forth the claims of other princes who seemed to them equally well qualified. France, fearing that Leopold might turn Greece into an English satellite, strongly recommended Prince John of Saxony; England put forward Prince Frederick of Orange largely as a counter ploy. Meanwhile, Leopold put an end to all speculation concerning his availability by announcing publicly that he wished to be considered for the Greek throne.\textsuperscript{12}

The major opposition in England to Leopold's candidacy came from King George IV, who supported a family connection, Duce Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz. This prince was a brother-in-law and particular friend of the Duke of Cumberland, George's younger brother. Haughty and overbearing by nature with a quick and violent temper, Cumberland tried to force the ministry to champion Meclenburg's candidacy. The Tory Prime Minister Wellington took up the challenge and came out strongly in favor of Leopold, partly for personal reasons and partly to get this strong partisan of the Whigs out of the country. Finally, after much pressure had been brought to bear on George IV, the King reluctantly approved Wellington's recommendation of Prince Leopold.\textsuperscript{13}

Leopold had no illusions about the difficulty of the task before him nor about the personal sacrifices that would be required in accepting the Greek throne. He knew perfectly well that he must give up his English citizenship and a relatively large income to rule over a people unaccustomed to


\textsuperscript{13} Karl Mendelsohn Bartholdy, \textit{Istoria tes Ellados apo tes en etei 1453 Aloseos tes Konstantinoupolojes upo ton Tourkon mechi ton kath' enas chronon}, trans. by Angelos Blachos (2 vols., Athens, 1873), II, 263-264. See also the excellent study by C. W. Crawley, \textit{The Question of Greek Independence: a Study of British Policy in the Near East}, 1821-1833 (Cambridge, 1930), relating to this question.
his habits and way of life. Lord Durham, his closest friend in England, expressed dismay and shock at the news. "I cannot conceive Leopold's wishing the thing," he remarked to Lord Grey. "He has no activity of mind or energy sufficient for the ruler of such a lawless set of pirates. He has very good sound sense, and is well informed and would make a very good King for England but not for a country like Greece." Other people who knew Leopold equally well reacted similarly to the news of his formal announcement.

From Aegina, meanwhile, President Capodistrias uneasily watched the secret diplomatic negotiations of the Great Powers. Capodistrias bitterly resented Greece's exclusion from any participation in the selection of its own prince as stipulated in the Protocol of March 22, 1829. Would the European Powers again ignore Greece's real interests and aspirations, he wondered? In July, 1829, the National Assembly at Argos unanimously empowered the Greek President to confer with the Allied Courts on the boundary question, the throne, and other matters of national interest. Speaking for the Greek people, the representatives of the newly emergent nation demanded the rights and privileges inherent in any organized state.

Leopold set to work energetically to secure a last minute revision of the disputed boundary line. To his importunate suggestions, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, curtly replied that further negotiation was out of the question and that Leopold's conditional acceptance of the sovereignty would be tantamount to refusal. Leopold angrily retorted that he could not in good conscience feel bound by the delimitation of the frontier and reserved the right to challenge any provision unfavorable to Greece's best interests. "The formal offer of the Sovereignty of Greece must necessarily make me a party to the Treaty to be concluded, and though I conceive that my right of free


agent in this respect is made, through existing circumstances, a very limited one, I never thought of giving up that right so far as to be precluded from objecting to any point which, in the Treaty to be made, I might consider fatal to the success of the cause I am about to undertake.”

Leopold’s natural instincts warned him to demand further clarification of the disputed clauses in the treaty. “Before I can give, therefore, my adhesion to the Protocol, I must inform myself if the consecutive Treaty will contain such provisions as are essential to the existence of the new State, and without which, born as it is under circumstances unknown in history, it would probably live a very short period.” The three Plenipotentiaries assured Leopold, however, that every clause would be carefully and meticulously restudied in the light of his objections. Relying on this promise, Leopold accepted the offer of the Greek throne on February 20, 1830.

Taking the Plenipotentiaries at their word, Leopold began at once to suggest further revision of certain controversial clauses. Lack of action on the part of the Powers in correcting these deficiencies, he warned Lord Aberdeen, could ultimately lead to his resignation as Prince of Greece. In a letter addressed to President Capodistrias Leopold admitted candidly that he had accepted the sovereignty of Greece only after “irksome discussions.” He respectfully solicited the President’s advice as to the best course of action to pursue in these troubled times. “I beg you,” he wrote to Capodistrias, “to let me know the truth because I would not want to be imposed upon the Greeks for anything in the world.”

Capodistrias felt great personal satisfaction at Leopold’s acceptance of the Greek throne, partly because of his friendship for the Prince but more importantly because he believed that Leopold would succeed in improving the boundary line. In speaking of the frontier the President complained that it excluded “a Christian population of from 80,000 to 100,000 souls, which alone furnishes two thirds of the Greek army.” In Capodistrias’s opinion this protocol denied Greece “those means of natural defence which it was

18. Ibid., Leopold to Aberdeen, February 3, 1830, 3-4.
19. Communications with His Royal Highness Prince Leopold, Leopold to Wellington February 9, 1830, 7-9.
20. Ibid., Leopold to Aberdeen, March 25, 1830, 28-29.
so important to have in order permanently to confirm the work of peace, for which the Allied Powers have sacrificed so much." Capodistrias strongly urged Leopold to hasten his arrival in Greece and to take a more active role in altering the boundary line. Unless this was done immediately, Capodistrias warned, the Greek people would undoubtedly repudiate the Protocol and perhaps the Prince himself.

To prepare Leopold for his role as sovereign of an unfamiliar country Capodistrias took it upon himself to inform him fully of the political and economic conditions in Greece. On April 6, Capodistrias urged Leopold to come at once to Greece, indicating that he must be prepared to share "in person" the people's "miseries and their sufferings, with the sole object of alleviating them." However, "if you present yourself to them as a great personage, unable to endure their poverty and their privations, instead of inspiring them with respect for you, you will voluntarily deprive yourself of the surest means of making an useful impression upon their minds." In a subsequent letter Capodistrias elaborated on the difficulties and frustrations which he had experienced during two years as president. "There are malignant spirits and intriguers in Greece," he remarked bitterly, "as everywhere else, but here there are even more." His chamber was never empty, he added, his work never done. "Sailors, soldiers, agriculturists, public servants, all consider themselves on the eve of losing even the hope of recovering themselves from their calamities." Money was the eternal problem. "At the moment," he wrote in that same letter, "there remains in the treasury about six hundred thousand francs, whereof two hundred and fifty thousand are about to be distributed to the sailors who have money owing them by the state, and who require certain advances to set their vessels again afloat. We have to subsist ourselves during the month of April, and to prepare the quarterly pay of the army, which falls due on the 11th of May, which means, in other words, that it is above all things necessary to provide for the arrival in Greece in the first days of May, of at least a million francs."
Some historians have alleged that Capodistrias deliberately presented a dismal picture of conditions in Greece in order to discourage Leopold. The Greek President, they charged, was motivated by personal ambition and wished to perpetuate himself in office. These critics fail to take into account Capodistrias' chronic ill health and near nervous exhaustion from the responsibilities of his office. Moreover, a careful scrutiny of Capodistrias' correspondence with Leopold reveals very little distortion or change in emphasis. Nine months before Leopold accepted the Greek crown, Capodistrias mentioned in the interview with Stockmar his great anxiety over the future boundary of the Greek state. "If Samos and Crete are not united to Greece," he asserted, "I cannot advise the Prince to accept the Crown." On other occasions he informed Leopold, through Eynard, of Greece's disastrous economic situation and of the critical need for money to pay the soldiers and office holders. "The Count told me that all existing difficulties will be removed from the moment when the question of boundaries will be irrevocably settled; and if Greece is reckoned among free and independent nations, he will certainly not refuse to serve the new sovereign and will consider it an honor to show his devotion to his country." Yet we are certain that Leopold received even more discouraging information from other sources, for he says so himself.

It cannot be denied that Capodistrias painted a black picture of con-


28. Capodistrias complained of ill health early in the Russian service. See Ioanou Kapodistria, "Apercu de ma carrière publique depuis 1798 jusqu’a 1822," in Imperatorskoe Istoricheskoe Obshchestvo, III, 169, 238 (St. Petersburg, 1868). He refers to his health in the letters to Leopold. "Such is the mass of detail which overwhelms me today more than usual," he wrote in one letter, "such is the burden of work to which diplomacy condemns me at the moment, so that my strength is already beginning to fail and that I am forced to dictate even this particular letter." Correspondance du Comte Kapodistrias, III, 527, Capodistrias to Leopold.


31. Correspondance du Comte Kapodistrias, IV, 79-81, Leopold to Kapodistrias. See also Further Communications Relating to the Sovereignty of Greece, Leopold to Kapodistrias June 1, 1830, 38. Church, who was a bitter opponent of the President, also advocated a more extensive boundary line for Greece in his work: Lieutenant General Sir Richard Church, Observations on an Eligible Frontier for Greece as an Independent State (London, 1830).
ditions in Greece, but his testimony was corroborated by numerous other observers. There was so much lawlessness in this troubled land, wrote an American observer, that the soldiers were forced to rob the peasants in order to feed themselves. The provisional government could find no reliable source of revenue and lacked funds for even the most urgent expenditures. "Poor Greece," wrote Stratford Canning, "was mangled and panting like a frog just torn from the jaws of a serpent, with scarce enough life in its veins to make it capable of sustaining the preservation so miraculously offered to it." As his correspondence with Lord Aberdeen abundantly demonstrates, Leopold understood this situation and bitterly resented the supercilious attitude of the Great Powers.

Further complicating the Greek dilemma was the opposition of a number of leading Englishmen who had little confidence in Capodistrias. They suspected, falsely as it turned out, that Capodistrias was still in the Russian service and that he owed his election as president to the connivance of the Tsar. Consequently, the English Foreign Office often seemed more concerned about Russia's intentions in southeastern Europe than in bolstering the Greek state. They bitterly resented his exclusion of the English Philhellenes from the government and Capodistrias' disputes with General Church and Admiral Cochrane. Other Englishmen, particularly the business community, were anti-Greek because of their piratical raids on English commerce.

Leopold had studied Capodistrias' letters diligently and was in complete

agreement with their analysis of the Greek situation. In his opinion, the Great Powers had been outrageously unjust to Greece and their hesitation to send money tended to disrupt that nation’s economic system needlessly. On May 21, 1830, therefore, Prince Leopold formally resigned the Greek Throne. In his letter of resignation, the Prince explained that he did “not conceive it consistent with his character and feelings to submit to be thus forced on an unwilling people, and to be connected in their minds with a diminished territory.” Leopold also reminded the Great Powers that “if this Treaty has been delayed,” it was not his fault. Since he could not guarantee to the Greeks the “security of their territories, and the establishment of their independence on a permanent and honourable basis,” the Prince could not accept the throne. To accept under the Allied conditions would make him the “Delegate of the Allied Courts, appointed by them to hold Greece in subjection by force of their arms.” Ending on a sad and bitter note, he said: “The Undersigned therefore formally resigns into the hands of the Plenipotentiaries a trust which circumstances no longer permit him to execute with honour to himself, benefit to Greece, or advantage to the general interests of Europe.”

In another letter written on June 1, 1830, Leopold personally informed President Capodistrias of his resignation. This was “the only means which I found in my power,” he added sadly, “to free the Greeks from the engagements which the present arrangements imposed on them.”

Nine days later he reiterated to Stein his concern for the frontier. “For what man of honour,” he explains, “will undertake the sovereignty, with the pledge to drive the Greeks out of Acarnania and Aetiolia, in the full and quiet possession in which they find themselves.”

Quite naturally, Leopold’s unexpected resignation caused disappointment in some quarters and indignation in others. Capodistrias informed Leopold that the entire nation regretted his decision, for they had come to hold him in high esteem and affection. The Swiss Philhellene Eynard, who knew Leopold well, felt that the Prince had betrayed Greece. He deplored Leopold’s “cowardice” and “perfidy” in utilizing Capodistrias’ letters and those of the senate to justify his withdrawal from the Greek throne. “A

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40. Theotokes, Allelographia 333, Eynard to Capodistrias, 332-335.
man of this weak character is totally unfit to play a bold part in life," wrote Stein to the Archbishop of Cologne. "He has no colour."41 Prince Leopold has shown "bad faith" and "irresolution" commented the Russian diplomat Matuszewicz. These actions, Matuszewicz believed, would ruin his prospects of becoming Regent during the minority of his niece Victoria.

Leopold did not have to wait long for a throne following his unsuccessful venture in Greece. In June, 1831, thirteen months after he had resigned the Greek sovereignty, he became King of Belgium. With Louis Philippe’s daughter as his queen, King Leopold I of Belgium guided the nation skilfully until his death in 1865. Leopold never forgot his Greek experience, however, and at times expressed regret over his resignation of the Greek throne. Greece, Stockmar writes, "would have satisfied his phantasy and the political requirements of his nature more than the prosaic affairs of Belgium."43 On one occasion Leopold wrote to a friend of his sorrow for having failed to achieve his object in the east, where he could have been successful.44

Capodistrias was less fortunate than King Leopold of Belgium. His political enemies, excluded from government posts and unable to gain emoluments from the state, formed an opposition group on the island of Hydra which bitterly assailed the President and his policies.45 By late June, 1831 the opposition had assumed the proportions of an insurrection against the government. At the same time that Capodistrias was confronted with this Hydriot revolt another disturbance broke out in Mani. In the process of bringing the province under government supervision, Capodistrias became involved in a feud with the dangerous Mavromichales family which ultimately led to his assassination on October 9, 1831. His death was followed by another period of civil war and anarchy culminating in foreign intervention. On May 7, 1832, after interminable discussions, the three protecting powers, Russia, France, and Great Britain signed the Convention which made Greece an independent kingdom under a Bavarian prince, Otto I. The frontiers of this new state were extended to include both Acarnania and Aetolia, stretching from the Gulf of Arta in the west to the Gulf of Volo in the east. Ironicaly, this was the same frontier which Capodistrias had requested in his letters to Leopold, and which the latter had vainly urged upon the representatives of the great powers.

University of Kentucky

Wiliam P. Kaldis

41. Memoirs of Baron Stockmar, I, 113. Stockmar’s quotation is from Pertz, VI, 932.
42. Ibid., I, 110. 43. Ibid., I, 125. 44. Corti, Leopold I of Belgium, 56-57.
45. The opposition group established a newspaper entitled O Apollon, Ephemeres Ydras, Politike kai Philologike, March 11, Year 1, Number 1.