

most comprehensive book is the lack of research in the Athens press for materials that Mussolini's regime considered provocative and harmful to Italy's "national dignity." It may have cast interesting light on the whole atmosphere in Greek-Italian relations during the weeks that preceded Tellini's assassination and would have highlighted the general question of the impact of a free press national system in international relations with another state, the press of which is government-controlled. Psychoanalysts of crime have suggested that sometimes the victim of a crime cooperates, as it were, with the criminal in the crime's perpetration. As Mr. Barros' book suggests, the Italians might have bombarded and occupied Corfu in 1923 even if Tellini and members of his staff had not been murdered at Kakavia, that fatal day of August 27, 1923. Would Greek government efforts to restrain the Athens press in their remarks about Italy have prevented such a happening? It should be noted that the revolutionary regime in Greece, because of the situation, was exerting at the time considerable control over the press in matters of its domestic concern. But this question is unanswerable. Aesop's fable about the wolf and the lamb, however, suggests that, even if the Greek press organs had shown a sense of greater responsibility in commenting upon Italy's activities, Mussolini's prestige-building efforts at Greece's expense might have gone on, albeit under less favorable circumstances.

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Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843*. Südost-europäische Arbeiten, 65. Verlag R. Oldenbourg, München, 1966. Pp. 124.

This well-produced publication consists of 48 pages of introductory text and 76 pages of documents, the majority of which (Appendix XVI) consist of the reports of Karl von Gasser, the Bavarian representative in Athens, to King Ludwig I and to the Bavarian Foreign Minister, August von Gise. As Barbara Jelavich points out, these reports reflect a conservative and monarchical attitude towards the Greek Revolution of 1843 and also Gise's suspicion of the hand of the Russian representative in Athens, A. G. Catacazy, a Phanariote Greek, in the engineering of the revolt. \*

For the study of the diplomacy relative to the crisis in Greece, these documents are of great importance and all students of this period of Greek history will welcome their publication. As for the other documents here published (Appendices I to XV), the content of some of them is known from other sources, but it is certainly most useful to have them in this publication, which, by their inclusion, becomes a valuable contribution to the documentation of the Greek Revolution of 1843 and of the European diplomacy. Of special importance are the dispatches of Nesselrode to Brunnow and Kiselev, October 18, 1843, to Persiani, October 18, 1843, and to Viollier, October 29, 1843 and March 5, 1844.

A collection of documents of this kind — documents which shed considerable light upon the Russian and Bavarian attitudes to Greece at this period, but which do not of themselves tell a story of events in much detail — presents a very considerable problem to the editor, who has to decide how much introductory material is required to render the documents themselves intelligible to a general reader wishing to study this important work. This problem, Barbara Jelavich has dealt with in a masterly fashion: in her introduction she not only calls attention to the already published sources but she traces with a sure hand the intricate pattern of the Russian policy towards Greece both under Alexander I and Nicholas I and, in so doing, she explains not only the policy of the other powers but also many of the subtleties of the European Concert. At the same time although space does not permit of her dealing with the intricacies of the Greek political scene, she is able to mention the major events of the 1843 revolution and to analyse the political, constitutional and religious problems to which it gave rise.

As the author points out, the Greek revolution of 1842 came at the same time when, following the Straits Agreement of 1841 and the Cretan crisis of that same year, the European powers were in an unusual state of harmony. This was perhaps surprising since the revolutionary movement, or more strictly the army revolt, which had in some measure its origins in a mounting financial crisis, was promoted to a large degree by the co-operation of the British and Russian 'parties,' the former favouring for Greece constitutional Government and, at the same time, endeavouring to combat the influence of the French, the other, spurred on by the Philorthodox Society, being strongly opposed to King Otho on account of his being a Roman Catholic and of his religious and national policy. But such was the working of the Euro-

pean Concert that once the Revolution had taken place, Anglo-French co-operation, particularly in the making of the new Greek constitution, was sufficient to prevent Russia from increasing, even had she wished to, her influence in Greece. In point of fact, however, Russia did not seek a paramount political power in Greece: the Tzar not only refused to recognise the existence of a Russian party in Greece, but he made it clear that he could not contemplate the forced removal of King Otho: all that he insisted on were the rights of the Orthodox religion according to the treaties. At the same time he refused (as did Metternich, it is interesting to note) all appeals from Bavaria for an active support of Otho. He therefore allowed the French and the British to take the initiative, secure in the knowledge that neither of these would allow the other a completely dominating position. In so far as he was prepared to accept the formulation of a new constitution, his ideas differed little from those of the British who favoured a regime rather less democratic than their own. What worried him most was the pro-Catholicism of the British who, strangely enough, outdid the French and the Austrian in this respect. On other issues, however, the British and the Russians, as so often in the nineteenth century, saw, despite fundamental antagonisms, eye to eye. Neither was prepared to tolerate any Greek movement in accordance with the *Megale Idea*—Russia because she herself hoped to acquire one day the great prize of Constantinople, Britain because an attack by Greece or Turkey might raise the whole Eastern question and end in establishing Russia on the Straits. In other words because of their rivalries St. Petersburg and St. James's could, as often as not, compose their differences within the workings of the European Concert.

Nicholas I indeed was prepared to leave a small Greece to the safe-keeping of England. Such a solution seemed at first to have been the outcome of the Revolution of 1843 which led to the formation of the Mavrocordatos-Tricoupis ministry. But this situation did not endure: it was the able Kolettis who gained the day and while he remained in power (his regime following closely the July Monarchy) it was the French who exercised the predominant influence in Athens. Kolettis died in 1848: that same year the July Monarchy disappeared in France.

In the concluding paragraph of her excellent introduction Barbara Jelavich glances briefly at the revolution of 1863 and points out that despite the Constitution of 1844 both Greece and the Powers accepted the solution, that is to say the postponement, of the question of the

religion of the heir—a policy which had always been previously supported by Bavaria. By then not only had Russia lost much of her previous influence in Athens but she had also lost any interest she may have had in Greece. Of more immediate interest to her were the points which were ultimately to lead to the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate and eventually a Bulgarian State.

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A. B. Dascalakis, *The Hellenism of the Ancient Macedonians*. Institute for Balkan Studies, No 74, Thessaloniki, 1965. Pp. viii+294.

The development displayed by the kingdom of Macedonia under Philip II and Alexander the Great, as well as the impact of the kingdom on the political life of the Hellenic city-states, have been two main reasons for which the history of ancient Macedonia draws considerable attention. Proportionate to this interest, also enhanced by specific factors, is the inclination and zeal of scholars to delve into subjects dealing with that region.

Such zeal accounts for the work cited above, the aim of which, as defined by the author in the preface, is "not so much the writing of a history of Macedonia in ancient times, as the collection, critical study and evaluation of any material capable of serving to ascertain the Hellenic identity of the Macedonians and in general to examine their life, set within the range of Greek antiquity."

Of the five parts composing this book, the first (pp. 3-57) deals with the origin of the ancient Macedonians; the second (pp. 59-95) with the language of the Macedonians according to historical sources; the third (pp. 97-146) with the Argeads-Temenids and the origin of the Macedonian royal house; the fourth (pp. 147-223) with Alexander the Philhellene and Macedonia during the Persian wars; and the fifth (pp. 225-276) with the Athenian orators and the "barbarism" of the Macedonians.

In treating these topics Professor Dascalakis starts from the sources, as it is proper in historical studies. Hence the groundwork of his treatment is continuous and consistent in all matters where the existence of ancient sources makes it possible. After such grounding there follows an interpretation of sources which, as usual in subjects of history,