

the internal affairs of the Balkan states. The survey indicates that small states rarely became implicated into conflicts without great-power intrigues. The creation of great-power influence in this region has been responsible for all major wars which occurred in the Balkans. In this connection, it is clear that the Balkan peoples have unjustly been accused of being international troublemakers. Out of a number of eight wars which broke out in the peninsula since 1800, only two were local, the rest being military contests carried out by the European powers and the Ottoman Empire, in which the Balkan peoples were inadvertently implicated.

The dynamics of Balkan history, however, is still the powerful force of nationalism. It acted both as a unifying and disruptive element throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The authors suggest that the persistence of Balkan disunity is due mainly to this factor. The great upheavals which beset the peninsula failed to teach its peoples the necessity of solidarity and close cooperation. Instead of diminishing old passions, animosities and rivalries, instead of building bridges of understanding, the region was dominated and divided by this powerful ingredient. It is this force that drives the people to assert their national identity in the midst of great-power influence. But in spite of the resurgence of a new nationalistic spirit, it is fair to say that the Balkan states will still remain attached to one or another Great Power. It cannot be said that the process of national reassertion and the attempts at breaking away from great-power influence on the part of East European countries, including the Balkans, would be met with complete success. For one thing, the Soviet Union would never allow a realignment on its western borders, nor will she permit any of them to become a potential threat to her own security. Professor Spector suggests that the only way by which the Balkan peoples could live in peace and harmony is through the adoption of a policy of disinterestedness by the Great Powers. Such an approach has indeed considerable merit. It should be added, however, that it is the Balkan peoples themselves who could make peace work in the peninsula. To this end, they must accept the principle of «good neighbor», of learning to live in peaceful terms and friendly relations, in cooperation and mutual respect toward each other.

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Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, New York, Dell Publishing Co., 1971, pp. 128.

Though the bandit lurks on the borders of all national histories he is seldom recognized save as a sign of decline or as a euphemism for anti-establishment forces. Traditionally, unsuccessful rebels have become bandits in their failure, though currently bandits are often romanticised into revolutionaries. Perhaps the only respectful treatment of the bandit in history is to be found in those precious moments when he stands against a foreign oppressor, showing, of course, that his nationalism triumphs over his criminality, and perhaps earning a pardon in the process. But how accurate are these images and why is the bandit so ubiquitous? It is to these and related questions that Eric Hobsbawm turns in *Bandits*, an elaboration of the pattern he developed earlier in *Primitive Rebels* (1959).

Noting «social banditry» to be a phenomenon of young, unattached men on the edges of rural society, Hobsbawm ties its definition to continued popular support. The law defines Robin Hood as criminal but not the peasants who see him as righteous and heroic. Wherever an oppressed peasantry exists the social bandit appears in amazingly uniform groups to provide a hope (or myth) of justice that the law can or will not. And whenever a pre-capitalist

society reaches toward capitalism the resulting agrarian disruption increases the chances of social banditry while the completion of the transition to capitalism destroys the environment on which the social bandit depends. Generally he is anything but a revolutionary and rather than seeking drastic change instinctively favors the traditional order, complete with most of its inequities, so long as they are kept within reason. However, he may join in revolution as part of the resistance of the whole of the old order to an external or novel threat or during one of those millennial periods when people are carried away by visions of a life better than any they have known. Yet even in these cases the traditional roots are seen in the behavior expected of the bandit; though of the people, he must also be above them. In manner and dress there must be that touch of elegance that suggests superiority and leads naturally to rumors of noble ties. But in belief the bandit usually mirrors the peasantry from which he came. Thus, notes Hobsbawm, the anti-semitism of the central and eastern European peasants was found, with few exceptions, among the bandits of these areas—the Balkans being one of the exceptions. As a man of the people the bandit easily returns to the people and actually never leaves them. To survive he must maintain contact with settled communities and the frequency of merchant-bandit chiefs supports this.

The readers of this journal will probably find their greatest reward in the chapter titled, «Haiduks». Hobsbawm's admiration of this group shows as he typifies them as «the highest form of primitive banditry, the one which comes closest to being a permanent and conscious focus for peasant insurrection» (p. 62). For the Haiduk, the Klepht, the Cossack, was a national bandit always there to counter the Turk, the Bulgar, the Basurman. Theft was wrong but surely there was no crime in robbing a Turk. And so when the nation as a whole acted, the bandit, already armed, mobile, and organized, naturally acted with it.

The value of this short book lies not only in its ready applicability to Balkan History but also in the insights it provides to a global reality. From Brazil to Bombay, Sardinia to Shantung, the bandit has had an impact and Hobsbawm's convincing and witty text will help to understand it. Furthermore, the illustrations, a gallery of excessively armed and fiercely mustachioed men, are alone worth the price of the book.

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Franz Babinger, *Aufsätze und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas und der Levante*, Bd. II, München, Dr. Dr. Rudolf Trofenik, 1966, pp. vi + 310 + 72 plates [Südosteuropa-Schriften, 8. Band].

This is the second of what is now to be a three-volume selection of writings on Southeastern Europe and the Levant from Professor Franz Babinger's astounding contribution to Ottoman-Turkish studies. Like the first book, which was reviewed in these pages in 1966 (VII, No. 2), the present collection of twenty-eight articles and treatises has also been edited by Professors H. J. Kissling (*Turkish studies*) and A. Schmaus (*Balkan Studies*) of the University of Munich. So far as I know, the projected third volume of this laudable enterprise has not yet been published.

While the first book contained selections from Babinger's works in the fields of Islamic religion and Ottoman-Turkish history, the present one includes some of his representative writings on Ottoman-Turkish historiography, Ottoman foreign relations, diplomatics, cultural geography, monetary developments and Ottoman trade relations with other nations. Rather than merely list all the writings in these categories, I have chosen for consideration a number of the notable articles, which, I trust, will interest readers of this journal.