

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD GREECE IN THE UNITED NATIONS, 1946-1950

Twenty years after, it is well to look back at the development of American policy toward Greece during the period immediately following World War II. Whether within or outside the United Nations, this was a nodal era in Greek-American relations and in the development of United States policy. As exemplified in the Truman Doctrine, the policy was to have the most significant implications in Turkey, the Middle East, and even in the world at large. Indeed, Greece, in this critical period, became the stage for one of the great turning points in American foreign policy, even if all that followed was neither evident nor intended at the time.¹ As president Cleveland, no doubt, would have put it, it was "a condition, not a theory" which confronted the United States, and it sought to deal with it.

Political fragmentation compounded economic ruin in Greece as an inevitable heritage of the war. At the close of the war, moreover, Greece was subject to all the torture of guerilla warfare, with the guerrillas under the leadership of the so-called National Liberation Front (EAM) and the Greek Communist Party (KKE), aided and abetted not only by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (until after 1948), but by the Soviet Union, which wielded a dominant influence in the KKE and pursued sweeping, secular aims in the area.²

1. See, for example, Robert G. Kaiser, "Cold Wave in Britain Fired up Cold War," *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1967.

2. See especially Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia* (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964), 251 pp; Richard V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University, 1961), 244 pp; Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953* (Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University, 1953), 210 pp; *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party* (New York, Oxford, 1965), 306 pp; William H. McNeil, *Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath* (New York, Lippincott, 1947); General Alexander Papagos, *The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941* (Athens, J. M. Skazikis, 1949), 406 pp; L. S. Stavrianos, *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity* (Chicago, Regnery, 1952), 246 pp; C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord: a Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting* (London, Hutchinson, 1948), 320 pp.

Resting both on very old Russian imperial policies and new totalitarian Communist aims, interests and dynamics, Soviet policy had been clearly outlined in the Hitler-Ribbentrop-Molotov discussions in November 1940, and during 1945-1947, in its policies toward Turkey and Iran as well as toward Greece. Soviet policy during this period looked toward joint Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits, with bases in the area, along the lines of the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi (1833), the conversion of Greece, Turkey and Iran into Soviet satellites after the models already established in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, or, if that proved impossible at the time, the fragmentation of those states, through guerrilla warfare in Greece, the retrocession of the Kars-Ardahan region in Turkey, and the detachment of Azerbaijan and the so-called Kurdish Republic from Iran. At the same time, with the center of gravity of Soviet policy "south of Baku and Batum in the general direction of the Persian Gulf," the Arab would have fallen like ripe fruit into Soviet hands. Moreover, to round out the story, during 1945, the Soviet Union demanded a trusteeship over Libya and threatened to hold up signature of the Italian peace treaty until it obtained a commercial (*i. e. naval*) base in the Dodecanese Islands. While the latter demands were abandoned, they were symptomatic of the situation at the time.³

This was the kind of aggressive threat and menace to which the United States responded during 1946-1950. When Great Britain, weakened by the war, was no longer able to bear the burden alone in that troubled area, the United States was compelled to take decisive action. It established the Sixth United States Fleet, which still roams the Mediterranean, the strongest naval force ever seen in the inland sea in all its long history.⁴ It backed Turkey, as did Great Britain, when the Soviet Union pressed its policy relative to the Turkish Straits in 1946 and afterward.⁵ It helped to bolster Iran in its period of severe trouble with the Soviet Union, when detachment of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish region, as well as subversion under the Tudeh party, seemed on the Soviet agenda.⁶ And it came to the assistance of Greece under the Truman

3. Department of State, *United States and Italy, 1936-1946: A Documentary Record* (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1946), 208.

4. See Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947: Prelude to the "Truman Doctrine"* (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), Chs. III-IV.

5. Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1947), 68 pp; "The United States and Turkey: American Policy in the Straits Question (1914-1963)", *Balkan Studies* 4 (1963), 225-250.

6. George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell, 1949), 383 pp.

Doctrine, rendered military advice and assistance, along with Great Britain, and in the United Nations helped to focus world attention on the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.⁷

The Greek Problem in the United Nations

The initial problem to come before the United Nations Security Council, however, involved a Soviet complaint, of January 21, 1946, that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a threat to international peace and security in the Balkan area. Perhaps this was a presage of things to come, but, in any event, there was no disposition on the part of the Security Council, outside the Soviet and Polish Delegations, to accept the Soviet thesis.⁸ Similarly, on August 24, 1946, the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, charged that the "imperialistic, chauvinistic and expansionist" policies of Greece had produced a situation endangering international peace and security in the Balkans. This was to be an enduring propaganda theme, with appropriate and repetitive nuances in the years to come. The problem was discussed in the Security Council between August 28 and September 20, 1946 and, once more, with the exceptions of the Soviet and Polish Delegations, the Council declined the Soviet thesis.⁹

Meanwhile, there was a very real problem, not only within Greece, but along its northern frontiers, concerning which there was much diplomatic exchange between the Greek Government, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other, the result of which was that the problem was brought to the attention of the Security Council. On December 3, 1946, the Greek Government requested early consideration of the situation which, it was charged, was leading to friction between Greece and its northern neighbors, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Greek guerrillas, it was asserted were being trained and supported by the northern neighbors, which were also assisting the movement within Greece.¹⁰ The Security Council discussed the Greek complaint during December 10-19,

7. Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1955), I, 522-523; Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, Viking, 1951), *passim*.

8. United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records*, First Year, First Series, No. 2 p. 14; No. 7, pp. 87-102; No. 8, pp. 101-137, 137-138; No. 10, pp. 172-178. The problem was considered in February 4-6, 1946. Hereafter cited as SCOR.

9. *Ibid.*, Second Series, Nos. 7-16, 58th-71st Meetings. See also No. 5, Supplement, Annex 8, for U. N. doc. S/137.

10. SCOR, 1st Yr., 2nd Ser., Supplement No. 10: U. N. doc. S/203.

1946. The United States Representative, Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson, proposed that the Council, without prejudgment, establish a commission to ascertain the facts as to alleged border violations, with authority to conduct on-the-spot investigation in such areas of the four countries concerned as it might deem necessary and to report thereon to the Council.¹¹ In modified form, this resolution was unanimously approved on December 19, 1946. While the League of Nations, on a number of occasions, had sent out commissions of investigation, notably to Iraq, this was the first of the United Nations commissions and out of this precedent, as will be observed later, a number of interesting developments were to follow.

In its resolution of December 19, acting under Article 34 of the Chapter, the Security Council established a "Commission of Investigation to ascertain the facts relating to the alleged border violations along the frontiers between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other." It was to be composed of a representative of each of the Council members as then constituted, to proceed to the area not later than January 15, 1947, and to report to the Council at the earliest date possible, in view of the urgency of the problem. The Commission was empowered:

to conduct its investigation in northern Greece and in such places in other parts of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as the Commission considers should be included in its investigation in order to elucidate the causes and nature of the above-mentioned border violations and disturbances.

It was also authorized to call upon the Governments, officials and nationals of those countries, along with such other sources as the Commission thought necessary, for information relevant to its investigation. The Secretary-General, moreover, was to communicate with the appropriate authorities of the countries concerned in order to facilitate its work. Each representative on the Commission was entitled to select the necessary personnel to assist him, and the Secretary-General was to provide such staff and assistance as the Commission might deem necessary for the fulfillment of its tasks. The Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments were invited to assist in a liaison capacity. Finally, the Commission was invited to make any

11. SCOR, No. 27 pp. 630-631. For discussion of the resolution and amendments see especially U. N. doc. S/PV. 87. See also U. N. doc. S/339, May 2, 1947. Reprinted in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49*. Prepared at the Request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State. 81st Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 123 (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1950), 753-754. Hereafter cited as *Decade*.

proposals deemed "wise for averting a repetition of violations and disturbances in these areas." In other words, the Commission was to investigate the situation along the northern Greek frontiers, report its findings and, having drawn its conclusions, to make recommendations to the Council in the interest of possible solution of a very real set of problems. United States policy, within the United Nations, relative to Greece, was to be expressed and implemented, in the main, through the Commission of Investigation during the period of January-June 1947.

The Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents

Soon after adoption of the resolution, the UN Secretary-General began preparations for the transport and operations of the Commissions and the Representatives were appointed.¹² Mr. Mark Foster Ethridge, the distinguished editor and publisher of the Louisville (Kentucky) Courier-Journal, served as the United States Representative.¹³ The Commission held its first session in Athens on January 30 and immediately began its work. Although it ran into difficulties at the very outset, primarily on the issue of what it was to do and where it was essentially to work, with the United States and the United Kingdom insisting on an early move to headquarters in Thessaloniki, near the northern Greek frontiers, and the Soviet Union insisting that the basic problem was within Greece, not along the frontiers. There was also the question of how the Commission should plan its work. Despite the reservations of the Soviet Representative, Mr. A. A. Lavrishev, to the establishment of a planning committee, a committee of experts was set up early in February 1947, which was to serve as a steering committee, which could deal only with matters referred specifically to it by the commission.¹⁴ To cover as wide an area as

12. The Heads of the various Delegations were: J. D. L. Hood (Australia), Lt. Gen. Maurice Delvoie (Belgium), General Anor Santos (Brazil), Dr. Wunsz King (China), Mr. Francisco Jose Urrutia (Colombia), Professor Georges Daux (France), Jerzy Putrament (Poland), Ihsan el-Sherif (Syria), R. T. Windle (United Kingdom), Mark Foster Ethridge (USA). Liaison Representatives were: Col. Nesti Kerenxhi (Albania), Georgi Kulishev (Bulgaria), Alexander Kyrrou (Greece), and Jojip Djerdjia (Yugoslavia). Col. Roscher Lund (Norway) was Principal Secretary.

13. Advisers on the U. S. Staff were: Norbert L. Anschuetz, Harding F. Bancroft, Cyril E. Black, Harry N. Howard, Arthur L. Parsons, and Lt. Col. A. C. Miller.

14. On the work of the Commission, see especially SCOR, 2d Yr., Special Supplement No. 2. *Report of the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents*. S/360 /Rev. 1. Vol. I, 157 pp; Vol. II, 158-305; Vol. III, 306-460. See also Harry N. Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, cited, 1-11.

possible, it soon became evident that it would be necessary to send out field investigating teams, or subcommissions, which could operate while the Commission itself held meetings in Athens, Thessaloniki, Sofia and Belgrade. In all, there were seven such subcommissions, which made a total of some 33 field investigations in various parts of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, ranging all the way from the islands of Syros and Ikaria to Bulkes and Skoplje, Yugoslavia, and the northern Greek frontiers. All told, the Commission heard some 256 witnesses, in addition to its examination of much material available to it. Despite the fact that its work had been delayed, sabotaged and obstructed and despite its inability to make on-the-spot investigations in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, a Subsidiary Group, established when the Commission was writing its report in Geneva, held 75 meetings during May 20 - July 24, and gathered an impressive body of evidence.¹⁵

The Commission dealt with six major issues. First were basic Greek charges that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were 1) supporting the guerrilla movement in Greece, 2) interfering in Greek internal affairs with a view to detaching "Aegean Macedonia" and Western Thrace from Greece, and 3) deliberately provoking frontier incidents. Secondly were the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav contentions that Greece was 1) responsible for a state of civil war in Greece and the disturbances along the northern frontiers, 2) conducting a policy of provocation, and 3) engaging in an expansionist foreign policy which constituted a provocation to these countries.

In view of the basic conflict within the Commission over these issues, it was natural that the drafting of the report to the Security Council should occasion much controversy. This was particularly true concerning the Greek charge that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were interfering in Greek internal affairs, and more especially that they looked toward detaching "Aegean Macedonia" and Western Thrace from Greece. That there were certain aims in this connection is quite clear.¹⁶ Yugoslav officials openly proclaimed that Greece had no right to "Aegean Macedonia," acquired following the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the population of which had changed drastically as a result of the Greco-Turco-Bulgarian exchanges after 1923.¹⁷ In turn, the Bulgarian Representative repeated the Bulgarian claim to Western Thrace,

15. For a review of the evidence see U. N. doc. S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, Pt. II; Howard, 12-26.

16. See Elizabeth Barker, *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics* (London, RIIA, 1950), 129 pp; Burks, Ch. 5; Kofos, Chs. 6-8.

17. See especially Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), 849 pp., *passim*.

a matter which had been settled by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) noting that it would never be given up, while reiterating his desire (February 6, 1947) for "more friendly relations" with Greece and denouncing the Greek Government for pursuing "chauvinistic" aims relative to rectifications on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier.¹⁸ The Bulgarian claim was reiterated on February 10, 1947, when the treaty of peace with that country was signed.¹⁹ When the Soviet Representative objected to any discussion of these matters, especially as to Macedonia, Mr. Ethridge noted that if there were no denial on the part of the Yugoslav Representative, the Greek charges might be presumed to stand.²⁰

Similarly, the Greek Government was charged with conducting an expansionist foreign policy against its neighbors.²¹ It was, of course, natural that the Albanian Representative should call attention both to the Greek claim to Northern Epirus (Southern Albania), an old bone of contention, and to the fact that Greece had considered itself in a state of war with Albania, as an example of Greece's "provocative" policy relative to Albania.²² In addition, the Yugoslav Representative repeated the charge that the Greek Foreign Minister had proposed the partition of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia during 1946, although Mr. Tsaldaris had protested strongly at the time against "the absolutely untrue allegation that Greece" had "proposed the partition of Albania." Mr. Kyrou, the Greek Representative, also denounced the Yugoslav statement as false, although he remarked on February 17, 1947 that Greece, which had been attacked across the Albanian frontier on October 28, 1940, was naturally concerned with its security and had referred its claim to Northern Epirus to the appropriate international tribunals for adjustment. "Nobody in Greece," he declared on March 21, had ever "thought of occupying Northern Epirus by force." As to the state of war between Albania and Greece, Mr. Kyrou noted that some 14 battalions had fought against Greece

18. U. N. docs. S/AC. 4/PV. 10; S/AC. 4/24a, pp. 6-7; S/AC. 4/PV. 27, pp. 16, 19. See also the assertion of the claim to Western Thrace in the address of Vassil Kolarov, Provisional President of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, before the Constituent Assembly, November 5, 1946, pp. 9-10; and in the Government declaration, read by the Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, November 28, 1946, p. 12.

19. Statement in II *Free Bulgaria* 4 (February 15, 1947), p. 51.

20. See U. N. docs. S/AC. 4/PV. 61, pp. 1-8; PV. 64, pp. 1-25; PV. 65, pp. 2-22; PV. 69, pp. 1-29; PV. 70, pp. 1-10. For the Ethridge letters see S/AC. 4/146, 192 (March 16, 31, 1947; Greek reply (S/AC. 4/174), Bulgarian reply (S/AC. 4/175).

21. U. N. doc. S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, 155-163.

22. See especially Col. Kerenxhi's statements on February 7, 1947 (U. N. doc. S/AC 4/12, p. 18), March 21 (S/AC. 4/PV. 59, pp. 1-5), letter of March 28, 1947 (S/AC. 4/182).

during the struggle with Italy.²³ The Greek claim to strategic rectifications on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier in Western Thrace, like the Bulgarian claim to the Greek province of Western Thrace, was reaffirmed when the treaty of peace with Bulgaria was signed on February 10, 1947. But Mr. Kyrrou denied any "chauvinism" in connection with this matter, while charging Bulgaria with an attempt to gain by other means which it could not achieve during World War II.²⁴

It is not difficult to see why the Soviet Representative was somewhat reluctant to discuss these charges, while pressing certain aspects of them in the Commission and later in the General Assembly, for the fact was that the KKE - EAM had not only supported the official Greek claims to Northern Epirus and to rectifications on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier in Western Thrace, but openly boasted of its claim to Eastern (Turkish) Thrace as well. These claims were advanced in cables to the Paris Peace Conference on July 31, 1946 and to the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York on November 11, 1946. In addition, the EAM coalition demanded that states which had attacked Greece be compelled to pay reparations.²⁵ It was clear, indeed, that if the charge of chauvinism were to be leveled against the Greek Government, it would also have to be leveled against the KKE - EAM, or the charge against the Greek Government, in all honesty, could not stand. That, at any rate, was the position of the United States Delegation which, however, took no substantive stand on the issues, but insisted on the right of the Greek Government to present its position in open forum.

Whatever the weaknesses of the Greek Government of the day, the United States rejected the charge that Greece itself was responsible for the so-called "civil war" or for the disturbed situation along the northern frontiers. To the contrary, it accepted the evidence that the northern neighbors of Greece had aided and abetted the Greek guerrillas, who also sought sanctuary beyond the Greek frontiers to the north, as did eight Delegations on the Commission.²⁶ Moreover, these Delegations recognized that the disturbed conditions in Greece at the time were a heritage "of the tragic events of the consequent

23. For Mr. Djerdja's statement see U. N. doc. S/AC. 4/PV. 21, pp. 2-11; Kyrrou (S/AC. 4/PV. 27, Annex I, 3, 6-8. For the denials of the Yugoslav story, taken from the records of the Paris Peace Conference, see U. N. doc. S/AC. 4/251. See also *Paris Peace Conference 1946. Selected Documents* (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1947), 402-403. See also U. N. doc. S/AC. 4/PV. 59, p. 7.

24. U. N. doc. S/AC. 4/PV. 27, Annex I, 4-5, 8; U. N. doc. S/PV. 84

25. U. N. doc. S/AC. 4/56, p. 24; EAM Annex No. 29, pp. 4-5.

26. See especially U. N. doc. S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, 167-82.

problems facing the Greek Government since the liberation in its efforts to carry on a program of economic rehabilitation.”²⁷ Despite these conditions, “a considerable degree of political freedom, freedom of speech, press and assembly”, was noted and observed, although the Commission duly recorded charges as to persecution of opposition political and minority elements. It also called attention to conflicting territorial claims as a factor contributing to tension in the area, noting, however, that the EAM coalition had supported the same territorial claims as the Greek Government.²⁸ The Soviet and Polish Governments, of course, did not accept this assessment of the situation since they contended that the problem was internal and held the Greek Government entirely responsible.

The Commission proposed that the Security Council recommend that Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia do their utmost to establish normal, good-neighborly relations, to abstain from all action, direct or indirect, likely to increase or maintain the tension and unrest in the frontier areas, and rigorously to refrain from any overt or covert support of elements in neighboring countries aiming at the overthrow of the lawful governments in those countries. Indeed, it believed that “future cases of support of armed bands formed on the territory of one state and crossing into the territory of another State, or of refusal by a government in spite of the demands of the State concerned to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive such bands of any aid or protection, should be considered by the Security Council as a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Chapter of the United Nations.”²⁹ It also recommended that the Security Council propose that

27. The United States began its basic assistance to Greece under the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947), during this period. It is noteworthy, however, that under Public Law 75, of May 22, 1947, it was stated that assistance was in support of the principles and purposes of the United Nations and was to be withdrawn, *inter alia*, if the Security Council (with the United States waiving its veto right) or the General Assembly found the action taken or assistance given by the United Nations had made “the continuance of such assistance unnecessary or undesirable.” See Ambassador Austin’s statements of March 28, April 10, 1947 (SCOR, Nos. 30, 35, 123rd and 128th Meetings); *Decade*, 1252-1270; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 337-352.

28. U. N. doc. S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, 167.

29. These stipulations were taken bodily from the treaties which the Soviet Union signed with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Rumania, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan on July 3, 1933, and with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Turkey on July 4, 1933. See Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente’ 1930-1935* (Berkeley, University of California, 1936), 228-230.

the governments concerned enter into conventions along the lines of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention of 1931. Thirdly, it was proposed that the Security Council establish a body, either in the form of a small commission or a single commissioner, to investigate frontier violations, hear complaints, use its good offices, conduct studies and report to the Security Council. The proposed commission was also to have supervisory powers over refugees. Finally, it was proposed that the Security Council recommend study of the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities.

Both the Soviet and the Polish Representative rejected these recommendations.³⁰ The Soviet Delegation contended that the Commission should make no proposals at all since, it was held, the proposals were not related to the evidence, but rested "merely on the unfounded assertions" of the Greek Government, and the problems arose from the internal situation in Greece. Moreover, in the Soviet view, the proposal for a permanent frontier commission and the conclusion of conventions among Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was "tantamount to a limitation of sovereignty of these States in settling their relations among themselves."

The Security Council and the Report of the Commission

The Security Council discussed the Greek problem during June 27 - August 19, 1947.³¹ At the very outset, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, of the United States, noted the serious character of the problem, declared the case to be "one of the most serious which the United Nations up to this time" had "been called upon to consider," and reminded the Council that its action would be of "vital importance to all Member States" and might be "a decisive factor in strengthening the confidence of the world in the effectiveness of this body to deal with situations such as the one before us." In an obvious warning to the northern neighbors of Greece, Ambassador Austin thought the Council could not "overlook the fact that the Charter" also contemplated

30. See U. N. doc. S/360/Rev. 1, Vol. I, 173-238, 245-245b. The Belgian and Colombian Delegations felt the charges against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia justified, but did not believe the Commission established to give any decision as to responsibility, while the French Delegation was doubtful as to the advisability of formal conclusions. All three Delegations thought the task of the Commission should be one of pacification and conciliation.

31. See especially SCOR, 2d Year, Nos. 51, 53, 54, 57, 59-66, 71-72, 74, 76, 79 (147th-148th, 150th-151st, 156th, 159th-170th, 174th, 177th-178th, 180th-181st, 183rd-184th, 187th-188th Meetings). For convenient excerpts from the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission see *Decade*, cited, 754-762.

"enforcement action when a situation" became "aggravated to a sufficient extent to warrant it." Ambassador Austin presented a draft resolution, largely embodying the proposals of the Commission, calling for the establishment of normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbors, the development of frontier conventions, and the establishment of a Commission composed of representatives of members of the Council, with broad powers of observation, good offices, conciliation and pacific settlement.³²

While Mr. Kyrou, the Greek Representative, immediately expressed approval of the resolution, the Representatives of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia essentially repeated the propaganda assertions which had become familiar in the meetings of the Commission of Investigation. Indeed, the discussions during July and August 1947 brought forth no surprises. Mr. Gromyko, who spoke on July 8, sounded a familiar note when he completely denied any responsibility of any kind on the part of the northern neighbors of Greece for the situation and declared that all the Greek charges rested exclusively on the false testimony of false witnesses. Once more he employed all the standard clichés about the "monarcho-fascist" Greek government, financed by American money and supported by British arms. Rejecting both the conclusions and the recommendations of the Commission, together, of course, with the draft resolutions before the Security Council, the Soviet Representative proposed that the Greek Government take measures to stop frontier incidents, that normal diplomatic relations with Albania and Bulgaria be restored, that new bilateral arrangements be drawn up, that the refugee problem be settled through direct negotiations, that discrimination against national minorities in Greece cease, and that the four countries concerned inform the Security Council every three months as to their progress in the execution of these recommendations. Finally, it was recommended that foreign troops and military personnel be withdrawn from Greece and that a special commission be established to guarantee that foreign economic assistance to Greece be used "only in the interest of the Greek people."³³

While there was overwhelming support for the American proposal, both that resolution and the later attempts at compromise ran into stiff Soviet opposition, and the Polish Representative submitted a resolution on August 4 which merely called on Greece to establish normal good neighborly relations

32. U. N. docs. S/PV. 147; S/391.

33. U. N. docs. S/PV. 153; S/404. See also Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, Annex 5, p. 80.

with its northern neighbors, together with new frontier conventions.³⁴ On August 12, Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson declared that Greece was "in grave peril," and warned that the United States would "not sit idly by while" its "territorial integrity and political independence" were challenged. Nor did Ambassador Johnson consider the obligations of the United Nations "ended merely because we have seen our objectives frustrated by the veto" of the Soviet Union, exercised on July 29, and used "in defense of the aggressions of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. Greece's right to exist is involved in this case." Mr. Johnson then noted the course which might be followed:³⁵

We wish to make it very clear that we shall not hesitate to exhaust every available means within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and to provide Greece with whatever protection she may need in the future.

The continued failure, so far, of the Security Council to take effective action in this case because of the Soviet Union veto cannot, in the opinion of the United States Government, preclude individual or collective action by States willing to act, so long as they act in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United Nations. This is particularly true when such individual or collective action is in support of a policy or course of action which has the approval of a clear preponderance of the permanent and non-permanent Members of the Security Council.

In the case of the blocking of Security Council action by the veto, we are confident that the General Assembly will exercise its powers to the limit for the protection of Greece.

The United States, for its part, would be prepared to comply with any General Assembly recommendations for the solution of this problem. It would also be prepared to co-operate with like-minded Members of the United Nations in taking any steps which might become necessary, within the terms of the Assembly recommendations or within the provisions of the Charter, to afford Greece the protection to which we think she is entitled under the Charter.

The United States, in other words, was prepared, not merely to take the case before the General Assembly, in the event of a final Soviet veto, which was one thing, but to act under Article 51 of the Charter, which was quite another.

34. See especially U. N. docs. S/PV. 174-177; S/464.

35. U. N. doc. S/PV. 180; *Decade*, 756-768.

After some five months of investigation, the Commission had submitted its findings to the Security Council. Thrice a majority of that body, with only the Soviet and Polish Representatives dissenting, approved a set of proposals looking toward a pacific adjustment of the troubled situation along the northern Greek frontiers. Thrice — once on July 29 and twice on August 19 — the Soviet Representative vetoed these proposals and thereby thwarted the clear-cut will of the majority of the Security Council.³⁶ But the United Nations had not finished with the Greek problem. To the contrary, the problem would now come before the General Assembly. On August 20, Ambassador Johnson requested the Secretary-General to place the problem on the supplementary list of the agenda of the General Assembly.³⁷

The Greek Problem in the General Assembly: 1947

Along with the problem of Palestine, the threat to Greece constituted one of the most serious questions to confront the General Assembly in the fall of 1947. As Secretary of State George C. Marshall told the American Association for the United Nations on September 14, there were:³⁸

serious matters in the political and security field which require prompt action by the Assembly. We are particularly concerned with the aid and assistance which are being provided by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to the guerrillas in Greece — a direct threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of that country. We seek nothing in that situation but the protection of the Greek people which is their due under the Charter. We have no interest beyond the pacification of that troubled area. The solution must be the cessation of the threat — and we hope that the General Assembly will be able to devise means for accomplishing that end.

Ambassador Johnson introduced a resolution in the Security Council on September 15, requesting the General Assembly to consider the Greek problem noting that it should be free "to discuss and make recommendations in this matter, as it sees fit." With only Soviet and Polish opposition, this procedural resolution was approved, and the question was duly inscribed on September 17.³⁹

Secretary of State Marshall highlighted the significance of the problem

36. U. N. docs. S/PV. 187-188.

37. U. N. doc. A/344.

38. XVII Department of State *Bulletin* 429 (September 21, 1947), 542.

39. U. N. docs. S/PV. 202; S/552; A/BUR/SR. 35.

in his remarks in the general debate on September 17.⁴⁰ It was "a universally accepted principle of international law," he said, that for one nation "to arm or otherwise assist rebellious forces against another government is a hostile and aggressive act," and the Assembly could not "stand by as a mere spectator while a Member" was "endangered by attacks from abroad." The United States would, therefore, submit a resolution containing a finding of responsibility, calling upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cease and desist, and establishing a commission with powers of investigation and conciliation. While the Soviet *bloc* representatives made their customary attack on this position, it was fully adopted by the United Kingdom and others, and the problem was placed on the agenda of the Political and Security Committee (First) of the General Assembly, where the substantive discussion took place during September 25-October 21, 1947.⁴¹

The resolution of the General Assembly, approved on October 21 by a vote of 36 to 6, with 10 abstentions, took due note of the work of the Commission of Investigation.⁴² It called upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia "to do nothing which could furnish aid and assistance" to the Greek guerrillas, and upon the four parties "to cooperate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means," and recommended that they 1) establish normal diplomatic and good neighborly relations among themselves as soon as possible; 2) establish frontier conventions providing for effective machinery for control of their common frontiers and pacific settlement of frontier incidents and disputes; 3) cooperate in the settlement of problems arising out of the presence of refugees in the four states through voluntary repatriation wherever possible and take effective measures to prevent the participation of such refugees in political or military activity; and 4) study the practicability of concluding agreements for voluntary transfer of minorities.

40. GAOR, 1947, Vol. I, A/PV. 82; XVII Department of State *Bulletin* 430 (September 28, 1947), 618-622. For a general review see Harry N. Howard, "The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece," XVII Department of State *Bulletin Supplement* 440A (December 7, 1947), 1097-1149. In general, see also David Wainhouse et al., *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast* (Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University, 1966), 221-241.

41. GAOR, 2nd Year, 1947, especially U. N. docs. A/C. 1. SR. 60-73.

42. See General Assembly Resolution 109 (II), October 21, 1947. The text is also in *Decade*, 768-769, and Howard, "The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece," cited 1121-1122. It is noteworthy that, with the exception of Iraq, which voted for the resolution, the Arab States abstained, not because they disagreed with it, but because of their anger at the United States relative to the Palestine problem, which was before the General Assembly at the same time.

Moreover, a United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was established to 1) observe compliance with these recommendations and 2) be available to assist in the implementation of the recommendations. The four Governments were urged to cooperate with UNSCOB and, if it deemed fitting and useful, the Committee was authorized to recommend the urgent convening of a special session of the General Assembly. UNSCOB was to consist of Representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States with seats held open for Poland and the Soviet Union, which held the Committee to be illegal and refused representation, while Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia rejected cooperation. The Committee was to have its headquarters in Thessaloniki and to perform its functions "in such places and in the territories of the four States concerned" as might be deemed appropriate. Reports were to be rendered to the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General was to assign the necessary staff, and to enter into agreements with the four Governments "to assure the Special Committee, as far as it may find it necessary to exercise its functions within their territories, of full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities for the performance of its functions within their territories, of full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities for the performance of its functions."⁴³

*The Work of the United Nations
Special Committee on the Balkans*

As evidence mounted concerning the situation along the northern Greek frontiers, UNSCOB entered immediately on its task.⁴⁴ It held its first organizing meeting in Paris on November 21 and in Athens on November 25, when it asked the Secretary-General to request Soviet and Polish representation, and the next day moved toward establishment of observation groups, a principle contested by the Australian Representative.⁴⁵

43. Needless to say, only Greece entered into such an agreement, and UNSCOB was never permitted to carry out any investigation in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and was thoroughly denounced, especially by Albania and Bulgaria, throughout its history.

44. See the summary of evidence accumulated by the Subsidiary Group of the Commission of Investigation, for example, in Howard, 1129-1149.

45. While Greece announced its readiness to cooperate on December 1 (U. N. doc. A/AC. 16/12), Yugoslavia (A/AC. 16/23; A/574, para. 35; November 28), and Albania (December 23) refused, and the Bulgarian Government did not respond. Headquarters were moved to Thessaloniki on December 1 and remained there until 1948. A first interim report was sent to the United Nations on December 31 (A/521) and a second on January 10,

As even a cursory reading of the resolution of October 21 demonstrates, UNSCOB had broad conciliatory authority, in addition to that of observation and reporting, although it was never quite able to exercise the former because of the refusal of the northern neighbors of Greece to cooperate with the Committee, which remained in being until February 5, 1952. UNSCOB reported in June 30, 1948⁴⁶ that it had consistently tried to assist in establishing normal diplomatic and good neighborly relations but, while the Greek Government had cooperated, the others had not and had even refused, in abusive language, to recognize its legitimacy.⁴⁷ It appeared to the Committee that the Greek guerrillas had received assistance from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in war material and other supplies, the use of their territories, both for tactical operations and as a refuge. Moreover, much moral support had been given through Government-controlled radio stations, the Greek guerrilla radio on Yugoslav soil, and the systematic organization committees. So long as such support was given, UNSCOB was convinced that "a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" would exist, and international peace and security in the Balkans would be endangered. UNSCOB was convinced that it could assist the parties, in the interest of all, to reach a pacific settlement of their differences, if the Governments would all act according to the resolution of the General Assembly and in the spirit of the Charter.⁴⁸ So long as the disturbed situation obtained, the Committee considered it necessary that a UN agency exercise both observational and conciliatory functions, although it recommended consideration of the Special Committee in a form which would not entail "so heavy a financial burden on the United Nations and on the nations members of the Special Committee." It further recommended reimbursement to those Governments which had provided observers and equipment, with the United Nations itself meeting future ex-

1948 (A/522). Six observation groups were established in the field, with one in reserve, each composed of four observers and auxiliary personnel, although the plan was modified later in implementation in accordance with financial resources and availability of equipment and personnel (See U. N. doc. A/574, para. 13; A/AC. 16/7/Rev. 1; A/AC. 16/SC. 1/29. The American representatives on UNSCOB were Admiral Alan G. Kirk (1948), Gerald A. Drew (1948-1950), and Jefferson Patterson (1950-1952).

46. GAOR, 3rd Session, Supplement No. 8: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*. A/574; H. N. Howard, "U. N. Special Committee on the Balkans," *I Documents and State Papers* 6 (September 1948), 363-412, especially 376-412.

47. See also H. N. Howard, "The Refugee Problem in Greece," XVIII Department of State *Bulletin* 453 (March 7, 1948), 291-293.

48. U. N. doc. A/574, paras. 185-190.

penses. Finally, it desired consideration of ways and means of obtaining Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav cooperation.⁴⁹

The Third General Assembly and the Greek Question

Two supplementary reports were filed as the General Assembly prepared to discuss the Greek problem in the fall of 1948, one on September 10 and the other on October 22.⁵⁰ Among other things it was noted that there had been no substantive response to an UNSCOB resolution calling upon the northern neighbors to disarm and intern Greek guerrillas entering their territories. On August 21, however, the Greek Government had repeated its willingness to resume normal relations with Albania if the latter would 1) cease assisting the guerrillas and 2) reach a settlement of the problem of Northern Epirus, conditions which Albania rejected. Greece was ready to resume diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, which had indicated its readiness, provided Greece renounced "its annexationist aims towards Bulgaria," and ended its alleged violations of the Bulgarian frontier and its "warmongering" campaign against Bulgaria. There was little change, as yet, in Greco-Yugoslav relations, despite Yugoslav defection from the Cominform in June 1948.⁵¹ In its report of October 22, however, UNSCOB hinted at something of a change along the Greek-Yugoslav frontier, with some indication that Yugoslav border patrols now had orders "to prevent illicit frontier crossings and to disarm Greek guerrillas."⁵²

But there was no essential change in the positions of the powers at the General Assembly in 1948, and the debate was as noteworthy for its length as for its acrimony.⁵³ The discussion produced an anticipated sharp cleavage between the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations

49. *Ibid.*, paras. 191-194. UNSCOB's cost had been estimated at some \$ 611, 440 in the fall of 1947, and at \$1, 347, 520 in 1948, some \$ 750,000 of which went to financing the observation groups.

50. GAOR, Third Year, Supplement No. 8A: *Supplementary Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*, 17 June-10 September 1948. A/644; *Supplementary Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*, 11 September 1948. A/692.

51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, *White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania Towards Yugoslavia* (Beograd, 1951), 481 pp.

52. U. N. doc. A/692, paras. 35-45. See also Cyrus L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: Twenty Years After," *New York Times*, March 12, 1967.

53. For discussions, essentially, see GAOR, Third Session, 1948, A/PV. 139, 141-148, 165-167, First Committee (October 25-November 11, 1948), A/C. 1/SR. 143. 166-195.

and a small group of six members, led by the Soviet Union. With variations on an identical theme, the latter persisted in its usual charges, adding that UNSCOB had been established to conceal American and British imperialism and had only served to bring about a deterioration of conditions within Greece and of relations between Greece and its neighbors, while its observation groups were largely composed of intelligence officers who received specific instructions as to what to report. The genuine solution of the problem, it was asserted, called for discontinuance of UNSCOB, the removal of Anglo-American military and economic assistance, and the withdrawal of all personnel from all aid missions, after which the Greek people would be allowed "freely" to choose their own government.

In contrast, the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly accepted the evidence presented by UNSCOB, with its more than 700 witnesses and direct observation that Greece had been definitely threatened by the actions of its northern neighbors. It was also pointed out that UNSCOB, with full cooperation on the part of Greece, had attempted to carry out a conciliatory role, but that success in this field had been crippled by the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia either to recognize or cooperate with it. Finally, the work of the Special Committee was considered a positive achievement of the United Nations, since the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece had been maintained and it was considered imperative that it be maintained with full authority.

At the very outset of the General debate on September 23, Secretary of State Marshall took a strong and forthright position relative to the problem, noting among the ends to be sought:⁵⁴

A Greece made secure from aggressive and unlawful interference from without; ordering its political life by the democratic process and by respect for law; enabled to build its economy and to provide its people with the essentials of a decent life which they have been without for so long.

General Marshall also observed that machinery for the adjustment of differences had been established, although the process had been "seriously hampered by the refusal of a group of nations to participate in certain of the important commissions established by the General Assembly, such as the Balkan Commission, the Korean Commission, and the Interim Committee". Ernest

54. U. N. doc. A/PV. 139. For summary and analysis of discussions see H. N. Howard. "The problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly," *I Documents and State Papers* 10 (January 1949), 545-614.

Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, was, if anything, even more blunt in his comments on September 27.⁵⁵ He called attention to the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, stressed the abuse of the Greek Government, and declared that "the blame for the woes the Greeks have suffered" could not "be pinned on the United States and the United Kingdom", which had "merely been trying to assist the Greek people to reconstruct their own lives and defend their own country." And he added: "We all know of the desire on the part of her northern neighbors for territorial aggrandisement at Greece's expense: that has never been disguised."

Mr. John Foster Dulles was in charge of the Greek problem for the United States when it came before the Political and Security Committee on October 25, and Mr. Hector McNeil, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, for the United Kingdom, and the two worked well together. As the discussion opened on October 26, Mr. Dulles stressed the threat to Greece as but one aspect of a much wider problem, namely the spread of communism over the world through incitement to violence from the outside.⁵⁶

In Greece, Communists are attempting to overthrow the Government by violence and in this effort they are receiving aid from other countries that are already Communist controlled. This violent effort to establish in Greece a Communist government is but part of a general effort to extend the power of Soviet Communism throughout the world. The Security Council has been considering another phase of this problem as it dealt with the coercive measures being taken by the Soviet Union to extend its power over all Berlin. This Assembly will deal with another phase when we take up the agenda item of Korea. Wherever one looks, whether it be to Europe, Africa, Asia, or the Americas, there is apparent the same pattern of effort — namely the incitement from without, of coercion, fear, and violence to achieve international political objectives. The manifestations of this effort differ only as they are adjusted to meet local situations. Greece had not only survived, but, in Mr. Dulles' view, thanks to its own efforts and to those of the United Nations and of other friendly states, was making steady progress in rehabilitation and making good the terrible losses suffered during World War II. Mr. McNeil agreed with Mr. Dulles and gave full support to the draft resolution, submitted in behalf of China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, as did M. Couve de Murville

55. U. N. doc. A/PV. 144.

56. U. N. doc. A/C. 1/SR. 172.

of France,⁵⁷ which called for continuation of UNSCOB, and clearly authorized observation groups, a point on which there had been much difference of view with the Australian Delegation.

Indeed, the Australian Delegation, although represented on UNSCOB, and concurring generally in its findings, pursued an interesting course at the third General Assembly largely under the influence and leadership of Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt, Minister for External Affairs and President of the General Assembly. It was really opposed to the observation function of UNSCOB, but had agreed to compromise, provided the resolution were clarified. But, while Col. W. R. Hodgson, of Australia, who spoke on October 30,⁵⁸ accepted the observation function, he considered it quite secondary to that of conciliation and thought it should be concentrated on the observation of government compliance in political cooperation, not frontier incidents. Col. Hodgson believed that if UNSCOB were reorganized, and stressed its mediatory role, northern neighbors of Greece would cooperate with it.

Under the leadership of Mr. Vyshinsky, the Soviet Delegation adopted an anticipated position. On October 28, Mr. Vyshinsky thoroughly denounced the American position, to say nothing of Mr. Dulles personally, and castigated UNSCOB and all its works. On October 29, he circulated a draft resolution, once more placing all responsibility on the Greek Government, condemning UNSCOB and calling for a "settlement."⁵⁹

In the end, however, the First Committee adopted a resolution on November 12, which was approved by the General Assembly on November 27 by a vote of 47-6-0.⁶⁰ UNSCOB was now to be maintained, and the new resolution called for the renewal of frontier conventions, diplomatic relations, settlement of the refugee problem and repatriation of some 25,000 Greek children who had been removed to the north.

This was not, however, to be the end of the Greek problem at the third General Assembly, for on November 10, despite the promise of the Australian Delegation that no new proposals were to be presented the First Committee unanimously adopted an Australian proposal establishing a Conciliation Committee, to be composed of the President of the General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General, Chairman Paul-Henri Spaak of the First Committee, and Ambassador Selim Sarper, the Rapporteur, to act in the capacity of

57. U. N. doc. A/C. 1/SR. 172; A/C. 1/352.

58. U. N. docs. A/C. 1/179, 359, 362.

59. U. N. docs. A/C. 1/PV. 57. SR. 57; A/C. 1/358 corr. 1.

60. Resolution 193 (III), November 27, 1948.

conciliators jointly and to convene in Paris meetings of representatives of the four states to explore the possibilities of reaching agreement as to the "methods and procedure" for "resolving present differences between them."⁶¹ The United States, in fact, was opposed to this more, not because it opposed conciliation, but because it did not believe that a Conciliation Committee of this sort could accomplish any more than UNSCOB, already charged with these functions, and because it was convinced that the policies of Albania and Bulgaria, especially, could not and would not change, granted the Soviet position relative to Greece. Moreover, it considered that the Australian Delegation, to put it mildly, had taken the Assembly in a surprise manoeuvre in the Greek problem.

Whatever the roadblocks en route to conciliation, at the very outset, Dr. Evatt set forth an eight-point program at a meeting on November 15, 1948, embodying principles which, in one form or another, had already been covered by UNSCOB: 1) diplomatic exchanges, 2) frontier conventions, 3) mutual patrol of frontiers, 4) assistance of UN observers, 5) acceptance of existing frontiers, 6) repatriation of Greek children, 7) agreement on minority questions, and 8) establishment of a small body for good offices and mediation. While there was considerable discussion and an exchange of counter-proposals from the participants, essentially little progress was made at Paris. Some steps appeared to have been taken toward the possible establishment of mixed frontier commissions and the drafting of frontier conventions, but the Albanian Government refused to sign any agreement unless Greece formally renounced its longstanding claim to Northern Epirus, and the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments refused to sign unless the Albanian Government did so.

During the period of December 1948 - April 1949, when the General Assembly resumed, there was much controversy concerning these discussions. Dr. Evatt reactivated the Conciliation Committee in April 1949, but perhaps the more serious discussions were those among Dean Rusk, Under-Secretary of State, Hector McNeil and Andrei Gromyko, who led the Soviet Delegation, during April and May, during which Mr. Gromyko repeated the Soviet position that the USSR would be willing to participate with the Great Powers in the supervision of a new Greek election and would join in a commission to "control" the northern Greek frontiers, provided all foreign assistance were

61. See U. N. docs: A/728, p. 9; A/C. 1/380. For a detailed account see H. N. Howard, "Greece and its Balkan Neighbors (1948-1949): The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation," 7 *Balkan Studies* 1 (1966), 1-26.

withdrawn from Greece. There was also a vague Soviet hint, as there had been during 1947, that the USSR and the United States might reach an agreement relative to Greece, a position which the United States could not accept. As the United States saw the problem, the basic issue was:⁶²

the violation of Greece's northern frontier by military and other assistance to the rebel forces in Greece. This illegal foreign intervention has been repeatedly exposed by the competent organs of the United Nations and denounced by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly as endangering the peace and as inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. . .

Internal questions such as an amnesty and elections are matters for determination by the Greek Government. We believe that that Government has made a sincere and genuine effort to settle the matter with the help of the United Nations and in a manner consistent with the security of Greece. United States military assistance became necessary because of the direct threat to the independence and integrity of Greece. It was in direct response to the situation created by the illegal intervention of Greece's northern neighbors. So long as that situation continues, the United States will not relax its determination to assist the Greeks in protecting themselves against this form of aggression. We would, however, welcome a *bona fide* effort by the Soviet Union to remove the threat to the peace and security of the Greek people and hope that it will use its influence in full support of the United Nations in seeking a settlement.

The United States was "prepared to discuss any matter with the Soviet Union in the proper forum," the United Nations, "in which the Greek Government would have full participation."

While Dr. Evatt, in a statement of May 19, thought Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would sign an agreement, if Greece and Albania could agree on Northern Epirus, this was an obvious stumbling block.⁶³ Meanwhile, UNSCOB continued its own conciliatory role. Once more it called the attention of the four governments both to its own competence and to the Evatt statement, and reminded them that its good offices were available. In its report of August 2,

62. Statement issued by the Department of State, May 20, 1949; *Decade*, 769-771; Howard, *op. cit.*, 16-17; British statement in *New York Times*, May 21, 1949.

63. Herbert Vere Evatt, *The Task of Nations* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), 47-55.

1949,⁶⁴ UNSCOB noted the willingness of Greece to resume relations with Albania and Bulgaria and its readiness to settle differences provided they ceased assistance to the guerrillas. Although Greece maintained its claim to Northern Epirus, it did not seek to alter the frontiers "contrary to the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter." While there was no outstanding question between Greece and Yugoslavia, Greece demanded that Bulgaria honor its treaty obligations, respect the frontiers, and repatriate the Greek children. UNSCOB received no response to its overtures from the northern neighbors of Greece.

The Greek Problem in the Fourth Assembly

UNSCOB recommended that the General Assembly remind Albania and Bulgaria of their obligations, determine that assistance to the guerrillas, for which Albania now was primarily responsible, endangered peace in the Balkans, and call upon them and all others to cease and desist. It also called upon Albania and Bulgaria to cooperate with an appropriate international body for observation of disarming and interning of Greek guerrillas in their territories, and deplored the failure to repatriate any of the Greek children who had moved across the northern frontiers. Finally, UNSCOB urged renewed conciliation efforts at the fourth General Assembly and continued provision for UN machinery with adequate powers of conciliation and observation, to keep the United Nations informed of developments, facilitate a settlement between Greece and its northern neighbors, and restore peaceful conditions.⁶⁵

Like its predecessors, the fourth General Assembly devoted much attention to the Greek problem, and the United States once more took a strong position in support of Greece. It seemed desirable to reconstitute the Conciliation Committee, a procedure which the United States now favored. The addresses of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, on September 21 and 26, stressed a conciliatory note.⁶⁶ Mr. Acheson considered it timely for the General Assembly to make a renewed effort to restore peace along the northern Greek frontier and normal relations between Greece and its neighbors. But "outside aid to the guerrillas" had to stop and Greece be permitted to "bind up its wounds," and he thought the Assembly

64. GAOR, Fourth Session, 1949, Supplement No. 8: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*. A/935, paras. 26-35.

65. *Decade*, 773; Kofos, Ch. 7.

66. GAOR, Fourth Session, 1949, U. N. docs. A/PV. 222, 229; *Decade*, 771-772.

could "afford further opportunity for continued and sincere efforts among interested parties to bring about this result." Moreover, Mr. Acheson hoped the Soviet Union would "join in renewed consultations looking toward a settlement of this persistent and serious problem." If the northern neighbors of Greece had "come to realise that their own self-interest" required "respect for the recommendations of the United Nations and an adjustment of their relations with Greece," Mr. Acheson felt that a solution could be "reached at this time." As a matter of fact, while the United States had prepared a resolution on conciliation, in view of the past, the Representative of Australia presented one on September 28 which had unanimous support in the First Committee.⁶⁷

In its approach to the problem of conciliation, the United States sought to avoid any appearance of negativism, explore any genuine Soviet disposition to settle the Greek problem on acceptable terms — a matter which sometimes disturbed the Greek Delegation — and seize the initiative from the Soviet Union in any conciliatory effort, and also to confine the discussions to the basic issue of threats to the independence and integrity of Greece, and avoid irrelevant reference to alleged interference in Greek internal affairs. It was also desired to avoid endless repetition of Soviet propaganda, although this ideal was hardly achieved, as the discussions in the First committee soon made clear. Greece was to be informed of all developments, and embarrassment of Yugoslavia, now isolated from its former Cominform associates, was to be eschewed.

The new Conciliation Committee, with General Romulo, President of the General Assembly as Chairman, held 29 meetings during October 4 - 22, 1949, and made suggestions based on the Evatt formula. It also proposed a formula to cover the Greek-Albanian frontier, by which the parties would agree, under Article 2 (4) of the Charter, to seek no change in the frontiers except by pacific procedure. The Greek Delegation accepted the proposals and submitted constructive suggestions, such as a proposal for a neutral chairman of the projected mixed frontier commissions, and a more precise formula for the Greek-Albanian frontier.⁶⁸ The Albanian Delegation, however, once more rejected the proposals without a formal Greek renunciation of Northern

67. U. N. doc. A/AC. 1/481.

68. For the Report of the Conciliation Committee see U. N. doc. A/C. 1/506; reprinted in H. N. Howard, *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations*. Department of State Publication 3785 (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1950), 1-37. The Conciliation Committee's activities were suspended on October 18.

Epirus, and rejected the idea of a neutral chairman, as well as any kind of UN verification of the Albanian assertion that Greek guerrillas had been interned and disarmed. The Bulgarian Delegation took a similar position, but the Yugoslav Delegation adopted a more favorable attitude and did not close the door to an ultimate, separate agreement with Greece.⁶⁹

With the failure of the conciliation effort, the Greek problem now followed its usual pattern in the First Committee, with Benjamin V. Cohen and Hector McNeil leading the discussion in behalf of the continuation of UNSCOB.⁷⁰ It was now clear that the situation had basically changed, thanks to the Yugoslav defection from the Cominform. Moreover, the Greek Army had won a signal victory in the Grammos - Vitsi area in August 1949, which Secretary of State Acheson hailed in a statement of October 17, in which he observed that Greek forces were now for the first time since World War II in command of the northern frontiers. There were only some 2,000 guerrillas scattered over Greece, concerned with self-protection and raiding for food, and pursued and harassed by the Greek Army. As Mr. Acheson noted, a supplementary UN SCOB report of September 16, had called attention to the virtual elimination of guerrilla warfare along the northern frontiers, to the fact that large numbers had fled into Albania (about 8,500) and Bulgaria (about 3,000), and to the closure of the Yugoslav frontier on July 10, 1949.⁷¹

In opening the discussion in the First Committee on October 27, Mr. Cohen took due note of the reports of UNSCOB and the Conciliation Committee.⁷² Together with the Representatives of Australia, China and the United Kingdom, he sponsored proposals dealing with the repatriation of the Greek children and the continuance of UNSCOB, with broad powers of observation and conciliation. Although the guerrilla struggle essentially had been won, the sponsors considered that the launching of a new armed action "would seriously increase the gravity of the danger to the peace" and would justify UNSCOB in recommending a special session of the General Assembly to deal with it. Once more the parties were urged to resolve their differences, restore normal relations and renew or negotiate frontier conventions, and

69. The attitude of the Yugoslav Delegation had changed since 1948. It exchanged information as to the position of the U. S. Delegation, often indicating its isolation from the Cominform *bloc* and its lack of knowledge of what was going on in the Conciliation Committee.

70. For discussion see GAOR, Fourth Session, 1949, U. N. docs. A/PV. 222-229. 246-247; A/C. 1/SR. 275-276, 280-284, 293-311.

71. *Decade*, 773; Kofos, Ch. 7; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath* (New York, Macmillan, 1951), 153; C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, March 12, 1967.

the Secretary-General was authorized to arrange assistance in the repatriation of Greek children. Mr. Cohen hoped that the work of the United Nations on the Greek problem would achieve success during the coming year.

During the discussion on October 29, Mr. Vyshinsky elaborated on his customary theme and then proceeded to castigate the Greek Government, especially, for its "chauvinism" in connection with Northern Epirus, which, he charged, was responsible for the failure of the Consiliation Committee to bring about a settlement.⁷² Mr. McNeil, however, stressed that the First Committee should not be deceived. Without commenting on the merits of the Greek case — as the United States had not — he pointed out that the Greek claim to Northern Epirus amounted almost to a national aspiration. Although Mr. Vyshinsky appeared unaware of it, Mr. McNeil observed that the KKE-EAM had fully supported not merely the Greek national position on Northern Epirus and rectifications on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, but had demanded Turkish Thrace as well. Mr. McNeil also noted that Bulgaria, especially, had territorial claims to Western Thrace which it had declared it would never give up, and he rejected the Soviet proposals for the "solution" of the Greek problem, which represented a gross interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Mr. Vyshinsky returned to the fray on October 28 and, while he did not deny that in 1946 the Greek Communists had supported the claim to Northern Epirus, he did not consider it of any significance. The important thing was that the Greek Government had "coveted" Albanian territory.⁷³

The deliberations of the First Committee continued, and on October 31, Mr. Cohen summarized the American position, responding particularly to the Vyshinsky charges as to American assistance to Greece:⁷⁴

Our assistance to Greece by Act of Congress not only is conditioned on the continuing consent of the Greek Government, but is subject to termination whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of American assistance unnecessary or undesirable. And what is more we have waived our

72. U. N. docs. A/C. 1/SR. 298, 299; A/C. 1/513, 514.

73. See U. N. docs. A/C. 1/SR. 299, 300, 304; S/AC. 4/PV. 10; S/AC. 4/24a, pp. 6-7; S/AC. 4/56, p. 24, Annex 29, pp. 4-5. Dr. Ales Bebler, the Yugoslav Representative, who followed Mr. McNeil, denied the Vyshinsky charge that Yugoslavia had desired to partition Albania during the Paris Peace Conference, a charge first used against Yugoslavia after the Cominform rift in 1948. See also the reply of Mr. Pipinelis, the Greek Representative, on October 31.

74. U. N. doc. A/C. 1/SR. 304; *Decade*, 774-779.

right of veto should the matter come before the Security Council. I wonder whether the friendly aid the Soviet Union gives to the Cominform countries is so conditioned.

Mr. Cohen thought it:

highly significant that at no point in the discussion has any of the spokesmen representing the Soviet viewpoint ventured to deny that material aid in substantial quantities has been given to the Greek guerrillas fighting against Greece by Albania, Bulgaria and other countries contrary to the Assembly's resolutions. This is the basic issue which confronts us here. It is of vital concern to all those interested in the maintenance of peace, because the disturbance of the peace anywhere endangers the peace everywhere.

On November 3 the First Committee unanimously approved a resolution on the repatriation of the Greek children and that on UNSCOB by a vote of 38-6-2, while rejecting the usual Soviet proposal.⁷⁵

In the plenary session of November 17, Mr. Cohen once more stressed that American assistance to Greece had constituted a threat to nobody.⁷⁶ In contrast, he charged that Cominform interest in Greece had:

rather been an interest in a fifth column in Greece, loyal not to Greece but to the Soviet-dominated Cominform. The Greeks have had good reason to fear the Cominform bearing gifts. From their ancient history, the Greeks know something about the use of the Trojan horse as an instrument of foreign policy.

The repeated statements that the Greek Government sought no change in its frontiers except by peaceful means, and its respect for obligations under the Charter, were evidence to Mr. Cohen that Greece had no designs upon the territories of its northern neighbors. Mr. Cohen thought the way to bring about an era of tolerance and good feeling in Greece was to end the external threats to that country. In the end, the General Assembly continued UNSCOB for another year (50-6-2) and gave unanimous approval to the resolution on the Greek children.⁷⁷

At the final session on December 10, 1949, President Romulo stated that the prospects for peace were encouraging, and he was confident of progress "if all parties abide in good faith by the resolutions of the General Assembly

75. U. N. docs. A/C. 1/SR. 309-311; A/C. 1/523, 524.

76. U. N. doc. A/PV. 244; *Decade*, 774-779.

77. U. N. docs. A/PV. 246; A/1014, 1117 and Corr. 1; Resolution 288 (IV), November 19, 1949; *Decade*, 780-782.

and the provisions of the Charter.” He also thought that the fact that there had been no executions in Greece — a matter on which there had been much Soviet propaganda — since the enactment of leniency legislation was a happy augury, indicating that “attitudes of humanitarianism and tolerance, compatible with security and public order,” could not “but help to facilitate the work of conciliation which must eventually take place among the states involved in this problem.”⁷⁸

There were some indications of a gradual normalization in Greece after the General Assembly. On December 22, 1949, the Greek Government advised UNSCOB of its readiness to settle all differences with Yugoslavia and reestablish relations with Albania and Bulgaria. It was also prepared to move in the matter of frontier conventions, and hoped that its neighbors would abide by the recent resolution of the General Assembly. The Greek Government welcomed the assistance of UNSCOB and would continue to give it full cooperation and support.⁷⁹

Greece and the Fifth Assembly

Although the question would remain on the agenda of the General Assembly and UNSCOB would remain in Greece, the Greek question was no longer an issue of major or urgent concern. The United States had been concerned with the question since the end of World War II and it had occupied the United Nations since the fall of 1946. But the situation had now so altered that, in the spring of 1950, the United States was ready to recommend either basic alteration of UNSCOB or its liquidation. When the attack on South Korea came on June 25, 1950, and the usefulness of third party judgement in that situation was clearly demonstrated, it was fully realized in Washington and elsewhere that UNSCOB would have to remain on the job, even if it had nothing to do at all.

The fifth annual report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly rightly listed establishment of UNSCOB as one of “the major decisions and acts of the United Nations”, and noted:⁸⁰

The progressive pacification of the northern borders of Greece after three years during which the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and its predecessor performed a useful and neces-

78. U. N. doc. A/PV. 276.

79. U. N. doc. A/AC. 16/887.

80. GAOR, Fifth Session, 1950, Supplement No. 1: *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. 1 July 1949-30 June 1950.* A/1287, p.x.

sary observer role, although unable to secure a settlement of outstanding disputes between Greece and her northern neighbors.

The UNSCOB Report of July 31, 1950 supported the picture painted by the Secretary-General.⁸¹ The Committee noted the improved situation along the northern Greek frontiers during 1950, as a result of Greek Army operations in 1949. But it pointed out that Albania and Bulgaria had persisted in attitudes and actions which were not conducive to peace and was mindful of statements of the Greek Communist Party that the guerrillas had not laid down their arms, but "only put them aside." The Committee also reported on the problem of refugees and the repatriation of Greek children and soldiers. The Committee noted the cooperative Greek attitude and the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cooperate with it, granted the improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations and the agreement of May 21, 1950 to exchange ministers.

In contrast to the reports of 1948 and 1949, the Special Committee considered that the threat to Greece had altered basically in character. The organized guerrilla movement within Greece now consisted of "the activities of scattered bands." Nevertheless,⁸²

many thousands of Greek guerrillas fled beyond the northern frontiers of Greece; the disarming and disposition of these guerrillas have not been verified by any international agency; and the Greek guerrilla leaders themselves claim that their forces still exist. While the guerrilla leaders have of necessity suspended, at any rate for the time being, their effort to dominate Greece by armed force, their aims have not been abandoned. The Greek guerrilla radio continues to operate from Romanian territory. Apart from the fact that guerrillas are being harboured outside Greece, the remnants within Greece have not been dissolved.

The Special Committee observed that Yugoslavia had maintained closure of its frontier with Greece, but called attention to the evidence that Bulgaria had "continued to give moral and material assistance to guerrilla raiding and sabotage parties on and near the Greek border." This kind of aid on the part of Albania and Bulgaria had "necessarily been considerably reduced because of the flight of the bulk of the guerrillas from Greek territory," but had not ceased. At the time, "the continuing potential threat to Greek political in-

81. GAOR, Fifth Session, 1950, Supplement No. 11: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*, signed at Geneva, on 31 July 1950. A/1307.

82. *Ibid.*, Ch. 5.

dependence and territorial integrity" was to be found primarily in Bulgaria.⁸³ The Committee also stressed the failure to permit international verification of the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas by states harboring them, and viewed "with the gravest concern" the failure to repatriate any of the Greek children.

Finally, the Special Committee concluded that United Nations vigilance had been and remained a significant factor in maintaining peace in the Balkans, and declared that "the remaining problems of Greek guerrilla warfare and outstanding international difficulties with regard to the Greek question" still constituted a "source of danger, if of a modified nature." Among the problems were 1) international verification of the disposition of guerrillas outside Greece; 2) the repatriation of Greek children, detained Greek military personnel and other Greek nationals; and 3) the conclusion of frontier conventions. Only when these problems had been solved would conditions in the Balkans be such as to permit reestablishment of normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbors.

Reminiscent of previous reports, UNSCOB recommended that all states, and especially Albania and Bulgaria, be called upon "to do nothing which would encourage or permit a renewal of armed action against Greece." Once more, it was recommended that Albania, Bulgaria and Greece resume diplomatic relations and establish frontier conventions along the lines proposed by UNSCOB. It proposed verification of the disposition of Greek guerrillas in Albania and Bulgaria, in particular. In a humanitarian spirit, devoid of political or ideological considerations, it was suggested that the General Assembly make every possible effort to find some means of restoring the Greek children to their homes. Finally, with the Korean crisis in mind, it was recommended that the General Assembly "consider the advisability of maintaining an appropriate United Nations Agency in the Balkans, in the light of the current international situation and of conditions prevailing along the northern frontiers of Greece."⁸⁴

This was to prove the prevailing sentiment in the fifth General Assembly in the fall of 1950, when the Greek problem was overshadowed by a number of other questions, and especially that of Korea. There was no basic change

83. In 1949 UNSCOB (U. N. doc. A/935, paras. 139-141) declared that Albania and Bulgaria had "continued to give moral and material assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement," Albania being "the principal source of material assistance," while Yugoslav aid had "diminished and may have ceased."

84. For basic discussions see GAOR, Fifth Session, 1950, U. N. docs. A/C. 1/SR, 392-398.

in the positions adopted during discussion of the problem.⁸⁵ It was recognized generally that the Greek situation had improved, but that a threat did continue, concerning which the United Nations had to remain vigilant. Sir Frank Soskice, who opened the discussion in the First Committee on November 10, stressed the basic improvement, but noted that there were many, both within and outside Greece, who were watching for the moment to renew the conflict. Mr. Cohen, who once more handled the case for the United States, also took note of the improved situation, and particularly observed the new position of Yugoslavia. He thought it might be desirable to continue the UNSCOB observation function in a limited way even after UNSCOB's dissolution, perhaps under the Peace Observation Commission, established under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, adopted on November 3, 1950. After brief deliberation, which consumed only seven meetings of the First Committee during November 10-15, the General Assembly approved continuation of UNSCOB on December 1, by a vote of 53 - 6 - 0.⁸⁶

The Epilogue and Denouement

The Greek question was among the first of its kind to be considered and essentially solved at the sixth session of the General Assembly in 1951-1952. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee dealt with the problem of dissolving UNSCOB and replacing it by a Balkan Subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission, in six meetings during November 19 - 23, 1951, and considered the question of the Greek children during November 23, 26, 1951 and January 29, 30, 1952.⁸⁷ As UNSCOB itself had noted in 1950 and 1951, the character of the problem had changed and, although a threat to Greece continued, it was now part and parcel of the more general danger to the peace and security of the

85. For summary see H. N. Howard, "The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," XXIV Department of State *Bulletin* 608 (February 26, 1951), 333-348.

86. See especially U. N. docs. A/C. 1/PV and SR/292. In a statement of November 13, Mr. Cohen declared: "We want to discontinue the Special Committee at the earliest possible moment but not at the expense of Greek independence." If the Communist Delegations wanted the Committee to be discontinued, "let them see that Greece's northern neighbors leave Greece in peace."

87. Discussions in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee may be followed in GAOR, Sixth Session, 1951-1952, U. N. docs. A/AC. 53/SR. 1-6, 33-34, 55-58. See also H. N. Howard, *The Greek Question*. Department of State Publication 4568 (Washington, D. C., USGPO 1952), 283-333.

Balkan region as a whole.⁸⁸ Moreover, UNSCOB's important service to the cause of peace, since its inception in 1947, was very clear, however ineffective it may have seemed at times. The Secretary-General had pointed out that the United Nations had "been concerned over a five-year period with threats to the independence of Greece," and it was "generally recognized that the unceasing watch by the United Nations over the northern border of Greece" had "contributed largely to the amelioration of a dangerous situation between that country and its neighbors."⁸⁹

But it was also agreed that, although UNSCOB had now finished its work, observation should be continued through establishment of a Balkan Subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission.⁹⁰ Of course, the Representatives of the Soviet *bloc* agreed with none of this reasoning, repeated all the propaganda of previous years, and once more attempted to perpetrate the annual fraud relative to alleged "executions" and "mass terror" in Greece, while in their own countries the gallows and the firing squad took their toll of victims charged with sabotage, espionage and treason.

As Mr. Cohen, speaking for the United States on November 20, 1951, noted, the United Nations could "take great pride in what it has done to preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece." He pointed out that the United Nations and UNSCOB had "steadfastly maintained vigilance along the Greek frontiers" and that vigilance had been "an important and powerful factor in deterring would-be aggressors against Greece from enlarging the scope of their hostile activities against that country." UNSCOB had rendered a signal service by its "persistent watchfulness and reporting," and it had "convincingly disproved the repeated propaganda charges accusing Greece of planning some kind of aggression against her neighbors." Although its work was substantially finished, Mr. Cohen considered it rash, in view of the tension in the Balkan area, to assume that vigilance was no longer necessary. The United Nations would be well advised, therefore, to make specific provision "for the instant renewal of observation anywhere in the Balkans, on the request of any state concerned," and he believed

88. GAOR, Sixth Session, 1951-1952, Supplement No. 11: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*. A/1857, Ch. VI.

89. GAOR, Sixth Session, 1951-1952, Supplement No. 1: *Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization*, 1 July 1950-30 June 1951. A/1844, Add. 1.

90. GAOR, Fifth Session, 1950, Supplement No. 20, p. 15. Resolution 377 (V), November 3, 1950, See also Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1957), I, 187-192.

that the action should be taken under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.⁹¹

The General Assembly, on December 7, 1951, approved a resolution terminating UNSCOB and another calling upon the Peace Observation Commission to establish Balkan Subcommission, both by a vote of 48-5-1. On January 23, 1952, the Peace Observation Commission decided (12-2 (USSR and Czechoslovakia) to establish a Balkan Subcommission (Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden and the United States), with headquarters in New York. The Greek Government requested the "immediate dispatch of observers to the frontier areas of Greece" and on January 31, the new Balkan Subcommission agreed at its first meeting. With this action, the Greek problem entered a new and very subdued phase, the Peace Observation Commission had its first question and, on February 5, 1952, UNSCOB came to an end.⁹²

When the seventh General Assembly met in 1952, the problem had so changed that Ambassador Politis of Greece, referred basically only to the problem of the repatriation of the Greek children and of detained Greek military personnel. He called attention to the evolution of the political situation in "the free sector of the Balkans," noting especially the "fraternal bonds" between Greece and Turkey and the development of Greek - Yugoslav relations "in the direction of friendly cooperation." Touching on the right of self-determination, in a vague, but pointed, reference to Cyprus, Ambassador Politis hinted that problems of another kind were now on the horizon.⁹³

Some Conclusions

The Greek problem had been a center of attention on the part of the United Nations during 1946-1950, and the United States which, through the Truman Doctrine, played a primary role in assisting Greece, played a major role in the development of its policy toward Greece in the United Nations. While its direct assistance to Greece, both military and economic, along with that of the United Kingdom, was of basic significance in thwarting the aggressive aims of the northern neighbors of Greece, its policy within the United Nations was of barely less import. Through the United Nations in the view

91. U. N. doc. A/AC. 53/SR. 2; Howard, *The Greek Question*, Appendix 2, pp. 331-332.

92. See H. N. Howard, "Greek Questions in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly," Part I, XXIX Department of State *Bulletin* 739 (August 24, 1953), 252-259. Each of the five members of the Balkan Subcommission sent an observer, and on December 12, 1952, the Subcommission was continued for another two years.

93. GAOR, Seventh Session, 1952-1953, U. N. doc. A/PV. 393.

of the United States and those associated with it, the new world organization was able not merely to investigate, observe, report and recommend, but to focus the attention of world public opinion on the basic situation within and around Greece. Thanks, in part, to this function, the Greek people and army were enabled not only to "contain" the activities the Communist-led guerrillas but, by 1949, substantially to defeat them, and the Greek people were given an opportunity, within the framework of political democracy and constitutional government, to move forward in more orderly fashion toward the solution of their domestic problems. It may also be noted that, in its functions of investigation and observation, in the first bodies of the kind established under the United Nations, useful precedents were established, almost especially in the Middle East, for work of similar import and significance.

Like other supporters of the legitimate Greek Government during this troubled period, the United States was not unaware of the mixed and complicated situation within Greece, or of the foils and foibles of the Greek Government of the day. In taking its actions, whether within or outside the United Nations, granted its own national interests in the area at the time, the United States did so because of its view that the Greek people were entitled to settle their own affairs, without violent intrusion from the outside. It did so, too, as in the case of Turkey, in the light of Soviet secular aims and threat, and of the wider implications in Southeastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East, to say nothing of the possibilities in Western Europe at the time.

The United States gave no substantive support to the Greek claims to Northern Epirus, although it held that Greece had a right to present its claims, which were supported by the KKE-EAM, in appropriate international forums, and it took a similar view of the Greek claims to territorial rectifications along the Bulgarian frontier in Western Thrace. The problem of Cyprus did not arise formally in the United Nations during this period. The basic problem was that of the independence and integrity of Greece, and the policy pursued by the United States in the United Nations helped to meet it.