

## THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE

I have been given the privilege of speaking to you on what is at the same time the most comprehensive and the most ill-defined of the topics on your program—the United States and Greece. This generosity offers me the widest possible scope to deal with what is perhaps of most intimate interest to us, Greeks and Americans, at this symposium, that is, the whole remarkable, almost unique range of relationships between our two countries. At the same time the variety and depth of our program clearly places on me the obligation not to duplicate what others will be saying and not to intrude into special fields where others are better informed than I am.

What I propose to do, therefore, is, first, to say a few words about what has since the establishment of the United States given peculiar strength and poignancy to the Greek-American relationship, and then to touch mainly on those aspects of our relationship since World War II in which I played some small part, that is, the development of Greece's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance in the early 1950's, and the character of our association in the United Nations, particularly in connection with the Cyprus problem, during the present decade.

I will not labor the most enduring aspect of our relationship of which we are all so keenly aware, that is, the immense debt which the United States, like all of the Western world, owes to Greek thought, to Greek art and to Greek political achievement. The 18th century, when the United States was born, was a time when classical antiquity was particularly admired and imitated, and its spirit permeated intellectual, political and artistic life. The American Founding Fathers received a classical education and their handiwork, our basic institutions, clearly reflects the classic inspiration.

You will recall that Heraclitus said: "The people must fight for their laws as for their walls." Most of our Founding Fathers were lawyers and our Revolution was, in contrast to most revolutions, fought more over laws and institutions than over social injustice. Werner Jaeger wrote of Solon: "Because he brought together the state and the spirit, the community and the individual, he was the first Athenian. By creating that unity he struck out the type to

which all the men of his race were to conform." These are examples of the insights which influenced men like Jefferson, Hamilton and Madison, which were reflected in our Declaration of Independence, Federalist Papers and Constitutions, and which indeed have made easy and natural the close association of our two peoples in peace and war in recent years.

We are familiar with the enthusiasm with which the Greek struggle for independence in the 1820's was greeted in the young United States. In his annual message to Congress in December 1822 President Monroe said: "The name of Greece fills the mind and the heart with the highest and noblest sentiments. Superior skill and refinement in arts, heroic gallantry in action, disinterested patriotism, enthusiastic zeal and devotion to liberty are connected with our memories of old Greece... It was therefore natural for the reappearance of this people in its original character, fighting for its liberty, to arouse enthusiasm and sympathy everywhere in the United States."

This enthusiasm and sympathy were reflected in the collection of funds and supplies for Greece throughout the United States and in the devoted personal efforts of such individual Americans as Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe.

In the latter part of the century Greece for her part made a further substantial contribution to American life through the flow of Greek immigration, amounting to almost half a million persons between 1880 and 1925. These sons and daughters of Greece, as we all know, have since that time played a role of increasing influence and distinction in many fields in their adopted country, yet continue to retain a passionate interest in their motherland, to contribute generously to economic and social development in the villages from which their families came and to serve as an enduring link between the two countries.

In recent years of course a further significant binding element, both sentimental and practical, has been the great flood of American tourists visiting Greece each year. This annual migration has played a significant part in Greece's economic recovery. It moreover redoubles the attachment of those Americans who already know Greece and creates an awareness and a new affection among those thousands who visit it for the first time.

To return to more serious themes, Greece and the United States have in the last half century been allies in two World Wars and in two civil wars of Communist origin, that in Greece itself and that in Korea. In the two World Wars factors of distance for the most part prevented soldiers of the two countries from fighting side by side, though in the US there was keen appreciation of the part the Thessaloniki campaign in 1918 played in bringing that war to an unexpectedly early close, of the incredibly gallant Greek resistance in Epirus

in 1940-41, of the possibly decisive delay imposed by the Greek campaign in April-May 1941 on the Nazi time-table in Russia, and of continuing Greek resistance to Nazi and Fascist occupation through the remainder of World War II.

I shall not deal with the immediate postwar period because that has been described thoroughly and with distinction by our speakers this morning. I should like rather to comment particularly on the remarkably intimate association between the two countries which I found existing when I arrived in Greece as Minister in our Embassy under John Peurifoy at the end of 1950. The civil war had closed with complete victory for the Royal Government and for the Greek armed forces under Marshal Papagos. However, profound economic and political dislocation consequent on nearly ten years of international and civil war remained. Moreover, the Greek civil war was unhappily only one manifestation of a much broader ideological and military conflict between nations and systems which had divided Europe, which had occasioned the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty, and which had just exploded into open war in the Far East with the attack on Korea.

Greece had been able, between Ochi Day in October 1940 and the end of the civil war, to do little more than defend herself and indeed to do that successfully in view of the great forces arrayed against her, only with substantial help from allies and friends. The need for such help, in both reconstruction and defense, was still in 1950 very large indeed, but already Greece was herself beginning to make a significant contribution. Her people were displaying their characteristic industry, ingenuity and persistence in commencing to rebuild their shattered economy, her expanded, experienced and well equipped army was one of the best in Europe, she was able to despatch a gallant and effective detachment to Korea, she was preparing to apply for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and thus, with Turkey, to confirm and stabilize the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean which the Truman Doctrine had begun.

It is interesting and important to note, however, that at this juncture, just when the commitment of the United States to the defense and support of Greece was greatest, when the collaboration between the two countries in almost every field was unprecedentedly close and the feelings between the two peoples keenest, nevertheless, at precisely this point the political relationship were the most delicate. There were moments of rather sharp tension between the two governments during this period and the fact that they were not more disruptive was a tribute to the good will and patience displayed, for the

most part, by both sides. The relationship, so consonant in spirit and objectives but so unequal in physical resources, is one with which the United States has necessarily become very familiar during the past three decades and from which useful lessons for the future can be drawn.

American aid to Greece in these years was running at the rate of some 400 million annually, roughly 70% economic and 30% military. It was not easy to obtain sums of this magnitude from Congress. From the US point of view it was essential that the money be spend wisely and effectively, that the policies of the Greek Government be conducive to a stable and expanding economy, that they not be undermined or distorted by inordinate political conflict or too frequent political change. It seemed equally necessary to the US, in view of the international tension created by aggression in Korea and the fear that it might be repeated in Europe, that the Greek Army be maintained at the highest possible pitch of efficiency, even though it constituted a heavy burden on the Greek budget, that there not be changes of command for political purposes which would lower its morale, that facilities be provided for US air and naval bases which seemed vital to the maintenance of NATO's Eastern flank, and that avowed or clandestine Communist political movements not be permitted to exercise any decisive influence over government policy or to undermine the victory so recently won.

Fortunately neither the Right nor the Center parties in Greece, whose adherents during these critical years made up the vast majority of the voters, disagreed with any of these objectives. Adherence to NATO, for example, was put through by the Center Government of General Plastiras and the broad lines of economic reconstruction which should be followed were agreed by his government, by that of Sophocles Venizelos which preceded it, by that of Marshal Papagos which followed, as well as by the American Embassy and Aid Mission. All of these Greek governments were, however, very naturally concerned to protect Greek sovereignty and to see to it that the enormous leverage which American aid provided the Embassy and the Mission was not used to interfere in Greek internal affairs.

But what in fact constituted "interference in internal affairs?" That was the rub. Both the maintenance of the armed forces and the restoration of the economy, that is, the defense and the well-being of the Greek people, depended on the continuance of American aid at a very high level. It was continued at a very high level, amounting to about \$ 2 billion in the ten years 1947-57, a larger amount per capita than that extended to any other country in Europe at that time. The executive branch of the US Government was able to justify to the Congress sums of such magnitude by demonstrating, on

the one hand, the conspicuous contribution which Greece was making to the defense of the West and, on the other hand, by rapid progress toward the common goal of Greek economic self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

Collaboration between the two governments in pursuit of these goals for the most part proceeded harmoniously and efficiently, but it was inevitable that differences of opinion should occasionally appear and that some of them should be aired publicly. The characteristic vivacity of Greek political life ensured that whatever party was in opposition would accuse the party in power either of being subservient to the Americans or, on the contrary, of jeopardizing common objectives for partisan purposes. The Americans of course found these charges highly embarrassing and did their best to avoid becoming entangled in Greek politics. At times, however, they felt obliged to object, privately or even publicly, either to political maneuvers or to economic shortcomings which they believed would, if persisted in, decisively undermine the common objectives. These were the occasion for charges that they favored one party or another or sought to overthrow one government and bring in another. As a matter of fact, they were more than willing to work with each and every party which was prepared to display the political courage, the economic sagacity and the administrative consistency necessary to reach the goals on which all were agreed.

Fortunately, on account both of the practical common interest they shared and of the underlying mutual respect and affection they felt, it was possible to overcome the difficulties and embarrassments inherent in this unique relationship which required substantial sacrifices, but of different kinds, on both sides. Greece joined NATO early in 1952, General Eisenhower visited Athens as NATO Supreme Commander shortly thereafter, very substantial infrastructure in the form of bases, roads, communications and other facilities were constructed over the next few years, US-Greek army, navy and air force cooperation became more intimate and effective, and Greece along with Turkey became firmly integrated into the structure of European and Mediterranean defense. On the economic side the joint effort was equally successful as you will be hearing in later addresses today and tomorrow. Within a very few years Greece was restored to full economic independence and moved forward to a level of economic development and prosperity which she had never known in the past. Americans could and did cite Greece as one of the outstanding success stories in the checkered history of US aid programs.

I should like now to deal briefly one further issue which, without fatally damaging, has nevertheless repeatedly clouded the Greek-American relationship during recent years, the question of Cyprus. This is of course both a highly

complex and a highly delicate issue and I shall not go into it in detail. It has, however, had such a considerable and such an unfortunate effect on Greece's relationship to two of its NATO partners, the United Kingdom and Turkey, that it could not but affect the authority of NATO itself, and hence to cause the US the greatest concern.

We have of course understood the passionate sympathy of the Greek people for their fellow Hellenes on Cyprus, their increasing determination through the 1950's that these people, like other dependent peoples throughout the world, should have a right to self-determination and independence, either in association with Greece or as a separate state, and their insistence that that independence, once achieved, should not be jeopardized. The United States, however, has always believed, and vigorously sought to assure, that differences among Greece, Britain and Turkey about Cyprus must not be permitted to threaten what has seemed to us the overriding common interest of all concerned, including the Cypriotes, that is, security and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I had the somewhat unhappy responsibility of representing the United States during most of the proceedings in the United Nations on the Cyprus issue from the time of its recrudescence in December 1963 until I left the US Mission last year. We were obliged to witness there a further tragic weakening of the admirable and sensible collaboration between Greece and Turkey which had been established by Eleutherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk. The United States, which endeavored to be a peacemaker and indefatigably labored to find compromise positions acceptable to Greeks, Turks and Cypriotes alike, suffered the fate that so often meets would-be peacemakers. The United States was roundly denounced by each of the antagonists for not wholly supporting its particular position and for adamantly opposing greater resort to force, which might have brought on a Greek-Turkish war, devastated Cyprus and decimated the Cypriotes, and fatally sapped NATO's Eastern defense. For its pains the US was abruptly confronted in both Athens and Ankara with repeated hostile demonstrations and a marked cooling of the hitherto warm and cordial relations with both governments.

Fortunately this unhappy phase seems to have passed. The United Nations, with the consent of all the parties, has been able, in one of its outstanding successes in the field of peacekeeping, to despatch an international force to Cyprus, to maintain it there for three years and to mediate peacefully the frequent dangerous confrontations which have arisen in and around the island since it assumed this responsibility. Repeatedly it has seemed that peace hung by a thread. People of both national origins have been cruelly ambushed and

slaughtered, there have been repeated inexcusable provocations on both sides, the UN Security Council has on several occasions had to make emergency action in extremis, the UN forces has been obliged again and again to interpose itself, with a rare combination of courage and diplomacy, between passionate combatants. We all owe, and most of all those most concerned, a debt of gratitude to the United Nations.

However, we must not congratulate them and ourselves too soon. No solution has yet been found to the basic issue — how Greeks and Turks on Cyprus are either to fuse their differences in a common identity as Cypriotes or are to find means of separate but fraternal existence as representatives of two great nations on whose friendship and collaboration the peace of the Eastern Mediterranean depends. Until national or communal antagonisms are overcome on Cyprus and superseded by a rational and humane spirit of accommodation, relations not only between Greece and Turkey but of the United States with both of them will be at the mercy of fanatical and irresponsible elements. Let me express the fervent hope that the governments in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia will in the nearest future find the will and the means to remove this source of peril to all of them, and incidentally this cause of deepest embarrassment and concern to all their friends.

Greece happily, like all of Western Europe, no longer needs American aid to any substantial degree and is indeed establishing new and more lasting economic relationships with the Common Market and other European countries. However, also like the rest of Western Europe, Greece *does* still need, and probably will for some time, the American security guarantee which it enjoyed through NATO. The Cold War has fortunately slackened and a limited détente with the Soviet Union is emerging but it is as yet far from clear and firm enough to permit the dismantling of Western defense.

These two factors, common to Western and Southern Europe as a whole—growing economic and political self-reliance coupled with a continuing political and military association with the US—will increasingly govern Greek-American relations. In many respects Greece will no doubt desire to follow either a more national or a more European policy, or a combination of the two, than it was able to do in the first two decades after the War, and relations with the US will in this respect be less intimate. On the other hand, unless and until the underlying differences between East and West in Europe are far more directly confronted and radically resolved than they have been so far, need for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will still remain and a close association between the US and Greece within the framework of that organization will continue. Both countries, moreover, share a particular common

concern with tranquillity in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East and will no doubt find need for lasting cooperation to this end.

Political security and economic ties between the United States and Greece will therefore inevitably, in the flux of human affairs which Heraclitus first emphasized, change, adapt or relax as the balance and direction of world power and world concern shifts to other regions. So much the better for Greece if she is able, after more than fifty years of almost constant struggle, to concentrate on internal problems and the arts of peace. Certainly her domestic politics will never lack interest and variety and the search for political stability will no doubt long provide material for the ingenuity and ardor of her citizens. Perhaps a little too much so, but who would wish or expect the Greeks to be other than Greek?

In any case we may confidently say in conclusion that Greek-American relations, after twenty years of the most intimate and sometimes troubled association, are more firmly based on mutual understanding, respect and affection than ever before. What was before 1917, or even before 1947, primarily a spiritual, a sentimental, a peripheral attachment for both peoples has now acquired a depth and a scope rarely found in international life. Two nations have rarely come to know each other so well in such a short time, and even more rarely come as a result, despite family quarrels, to love each other so well. We can only urge, as our last word, that each will continue to have patience with the other's peculiarities, will be alert in the future as in the past to overcome misunderstandings and differences, and will hand on to the next generation in each country this precious gift of friendship forged, like that of Harmodius and Aristogiton, in a common struggle and a common ideal.

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