

## GREEK POLITICS

Twenty years ago the prospects of re-establishing democratic institutions in Greece appeared to be bleak indeed. After a decade of dictatorship, war, foreign occupation, and guerrilla warfare, democratic institutions lay shattered. Even before the advent of the Metaxas dictatorship in August 1936, they were underdeveloped and fragile. The presence of a formal structure merely camouflaged the fragmentation of political force, the narrow-mindedness and ineptitude of the political leadership, and the lack of constitutional consensus at every level. Nurtured in the legalistic approach of nineteenth century political science, the political and intellectual elites in Greece equated democracy with the formalities of electoral participation, or the barren exertions of political warfare.

During the Nazi occupation, the great majority of the Greek people embraced almost instinctively the quest for a more meaningful democratic structure, with genuine diffusion of political, economic, and social power, combined with governmental efficiency and political stability. But this quest was distorted by the Greek Communists, who sought to channel it into a totalitarian, fundamentally undemocratic mold. The Communist attempt to establish a regime of the totalitarian model eventually failed, but it left scars which cannot be ignored as we assess the state of democracy in Greece today. The guerilla war has fostered reactive attitudes and practices which continue to this day to delay Greece's political development and the full blossoming of democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the remarkable thing about Greece, as one surveys the last twenty years, is how vigorous the democratic political ethos remains in spite of the manifold weaknesses of the political system. At the same time, it must be noted that the attachment of most Greeks to a vaguely understood democratic ideal is more a matter of unquestioning faith than a conscious understanding of what democracy really means in the second half of the twentieth century. In a way this vagueness explains both the vigor of the public commitment to "democracy" and the persistence of the structural weaknesses of the political system.

To assess democracy in Greece today, we must first clear the underbrush which obscures our understanding of what democracy means in this

age of advanced technology, mass communications, urbanization and rising expectations. We have for long confused universal suffrage, the secret ballot, a limited term of office for state officials or a neatly structured constitution with the essence of a democratic system. Studies in micro-politics as well as macro-politics conducted in the United States and elsewhere, as well as comparative studies (many including non-western societies), and theoretical explorations such as Carl J. Friedrich's *Man and His Government*<sup>1</sup> or Leslie Lipson's *The Democratic Civilization*<sup>2</sup> or the works of Harold Lasswell or Gabriel Almond<sup>3</sup> have sharpened our understanding of the essential conditions which distinguish a modern democratic system. Although political systems vary in their detailed structures, it is possible to construct a democratic model which we can then employ as a measuring rod in assessing real-life political systems.

The most essential feature of such a democratic model is what some have called "pluralism" or what I prefer to call the diffusion of power; the existence of a multitude of power structures, counter-balancing each other's power potential, exerting pressure and counter-pressure, and eventually influencing to some degree the final shape of state policies, rules, and decisions in general. Political parties, pressure groups, professional organizations, religious organizations, business enterprises, and labor unions are among those power structures whose activity is essential to a modern democratic system.

This diffusion of power is incompatible with attempts by any single power structure to eliminate or subjugate all others, placing under its exclusive control all sources of power and transforming the citizen into a captive of an omnipotent state with no alternative but to accept the decisions of those who hold the levers of state power, and with no chance of injecting his own views into the decision-making process. But however essential the diffusion of power may be, it will have little significance unless it is combined with governmental stability and efficiency. After all, what is the point of trying to influence state officials who are about to leave office, or officials who are inept or indifferent and cannot act effectively and vigorously for the solution of pressing problems? In short, governmental stability and efficiency together with a meaningful diffusion of power are the essential features of a modern democratic system.<sup>4</sup>

---

1. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

2. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

3. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1965) and Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: WW. Norton, 1948).

4. For more details see the author's forthcoming book, *On Government; a Comparative Study* (Belmont, Calif.: The Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1968).

We may keep these general notions in mind as we try to evaluate Greek democracy in action today. Our task may be easier by turning the spotlight of our inquiry on such factors as the political parties and their role in the governing process, pressure groups and interest articulation, representation and governmental stability, and the ability of the citizenry to influence the decision-making process.

### *The Fluidity of Partisan Organizations*

Since World War II, at least 95 political parties have appeared on the political stage and most have offered candidates during at least one of the last nine general elections. Of the 95 parties, thirteen were ephemeral structures which appeared and disappeared without ever entering candidates for election. Sixty-three parties participated only once in a general election, and of these only fourteen were successful in electing at least one candidate to Parliament; but of these fourteen at least five were previously existing parties which had merely changed their name.<sup>5</sup> From the 95 parties, only thirteen have entered more than two electoral contests, either alone or in coalition with others.

The striking characteristic of the party structure is its mercurial character. With the greatest of ease, parties appear, titles change, and parties recede into oblivion. This organizational fluidity, however, does not reflect an equally wide fragmentation of political orientation in the electorate. If we take a closer look at the Greek political scene since 1945 we shall discover that the voting population falls into three basic groupings. One part of the electorate is composed of those who generally favor stronger ties with the West, find Communist ideology and practice particularly distasteful, are usually sympathetic to the Crown, and have a stronger emotional attachment to the nation's traditions.

The second major grouping consists of those who tend to attach great importance to social policies designed to improve living standards for lower income groups, are easily aroused by charges that cooperation with the West has degenerated into submission, are rather indifferent if not unsympathetic to the Crown, and favor greater flexibility in dealing with domestic Communism and the so-called Socialist countries. It must be empha-

---

5. For example, George Papandreou's Democratic Party was renamed the Democratic Socialist Party after the War. It was replaced by the Party of George Papandreou in 1950, and was dissolved in 1951. The Greek Rally established by Papagos in 1950 was replaced by the National Radical Union (ERE) established by Karamanlis after Papagos' death in 1955.

sized that the division between those two groupings is not as clear-cut as appears from reading the press or the pronouncements of political leaders.

The third group comprises those who accept Marxism-Leninism or at least favor a basic re-orientation of the sociopolitical structure toward a command economy and close ties with the Soviet Union. This group includes many who feel dissatisfied with their economic and social status or the existing disparities in the distribution of national wealth and who seek to register a protest.

Around each of these three core groupings we find floating elements which gravitate to any of the three because of impressions gained just before a general election. Although our data are insufficient to warrant firm conclusions, the first two groups appear about equally divided, with group A (which we may designate for reasons of convenience as "conservative") attracting approximately 36-38% of the voting population, group B (which we may designate as "liberal") approximately 35-37%, and group C (which we may designate as the "left") approximately 11-12%. This leaves 13-18% as the floating electoral population. Normally, only 2-3% of the total move in and out of the third (left) group. The remainder fluctuates between the other two major groupings (See: Table A).

At first glance one may conclude that the necessary conditions exist in Greece for the emergence of two or at most three viable, competitive political parties—two of them with a definite democratic orientation and the capacity to give the country a stable and efficient government and an effective opposition. This impression is not necessarily correct. What pass for political parties in Greece are largely coalitions of influential politicians, each with his own political fief, and each surrounded by less prominent political associates. Such major personalities may form a new party by merely consulting with a few key persons and making an announcement to the press. Or they may decide to join another party, re-name an existing one, or move from one party to another. This is vividly illustrated by observing the post-war careers of three leaders who have figured prominently during the past two years: Stefanos Stefanopoulos, the former premier, Panayiotis Kanelopoulos, the leader of the ERE; and George Papandreou, the leader of the Center Union (See: Appendix).

In the election of 1946, Papandreou and Kanelopoulos found themselves together on the "liberal" side of the fence. Stefanopoulos began his post-war political career with the Populist party, on the "conservative" side. After 1951 Kanelopoulos moved toward the conservative side while Papandreou except for a brief moment of electoral cooperation in 1952 with Papagos'

conservative Greek Rally stayed on the liberal side. Stefanopoulos crossed from the conservative to the liberal camp in 1961. These, however, are only the highlights. In fact, during this period Papandreou established and dissolved two parties of his own, joined and left another two, and finally emerged as the leader of the Center Union. Kanelopoulos established and dissolved one party, joined and left two, and rejoined one of them (ERE) in 1961, emerging eventually as its leader. Stefanopoulos established three parties, dissolved two, joined and left two more, of which one was on the conservative side (the Greek Rally), and the other on the liberal side (the Center Union). These political leaders did not usually move alone, but were followed by other politicians of lesser stature. However, very few secondary politicians remained consistently attached to each of these principals, and faithfully followed their moves.

The kaleidoscopic movement of the political leadership reflects the realities of politics in Greece. First, the two major groupings, the "conservative" and the "liberal" are not irrevocably separated by ideological or programmatic differences. Second, the various parties do not necessarily represent different programs or political orientations. They are essentially convenient vehicles for the activities of prominent politicians' parties of the *personalista* type. If they have any organization at all, it seldom becomes anything more than a mechanism for helping prospective supporters in their dealings with the state bureaucracy and other power structures. This sort of client-type relationship between politicians and voters definitely warrants our attention. A random sampling in one village of about 600 families on the island of Euboea in 1963 (followed by a similar sampling in 1966), indicated that approximately 30% of these families had been assisted in one form or another by a liberal deputy, who had polled between 55 and 69% of the community votes in the elections of 1958, 1961, 1963 and 1964. Of course, one such informal survey cannot yield conclusive generalizations, yet those familiar with Greek politics will agree that the illustration is probably far from unique. Only a radical shift toward the extremes of left or right would probably cause wholesale desertion of this deputy. Because of this relationship, this deputy was able to move from one party to another (though all were on the liberal side) at least three times during this period without any appreciable change in his following.

Thus a successful politician may join a new party and bring along his local following as a sort of dowry. If he ever feels that the party where he is currently housed does not serve his interests or ambitions, he may withdraw and join another, or, if he is bold enough or prominent enough, form one of his own.

Obviously this system, while it undoubtedly expands the diffusion of power, does not contribute much to the stability and efficiency of government. We might postulate two possible causes of this fluidity at the top; socioeconomic factors, or else the electoral system. As we have seen new parties appear and disappear with remarkable ease, through decisions made by prominent politicians. It is hard to accept the notion that socioeconomic groups appear and disappear with equal facility. In any case, these parties do not necessarily express the views of distinct socioeconomic groups. Furthermore, while Greek society includes many socioeconomic groups, political and partisan groupings do not seem to follow strictly socioeconomic divisions. Detailed study of electoral results shows that the major parties draw their support from a cross-section of Greek society. Only the EDA appears to draw its major support from lower income groups in the larger cities, such as Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki and Volos.

### *The Effects of the Electoral System*

If socioeconomic factors are not responsible for the fragmentation of political leadership, we cannot help but turn to the other possible cause: the electoral system. The prevailing view in Greece is that the essence of representation lies in the more or less equitable distribution of seats in parliament, thus giving some expression in the legislature to all important shades of opinion. To reconcile this principle with the obvious need for stability in government, restrictive variations of the Reinforced Proportional Representation system have been applied during the last four elections, thus favoring the more popular parties. In fact, the electoral law has been revised to a greater or lesser extent before every general election since war.

We may exclude from consideration the first post-war election (1946) because the extraordinary conservative victory over 64% of the vote was largely due to abnormal conditions prevailing in the countryside in the aftermath of the war and to the public revulsion against Communist excesses during the last years of the Occupation and the December Revolution. A detailed study of the results of the last eight elections in correlation with the different electoral systems yields several interesting insights. The electoral system seems to have a direct bearing on the number parties participating and the degree of vote-concentration.

If we take the percentage of votes cast for the democratic parties (excluding the pro-Communist left) and divide it by the number of political parties or party coalitions gaining significant representation in parliament, we may establish a yardstick for measuring the degree of vote-concentration and,

by extension, the degree of political consolidation. The lowest degree of concentration was under the electoral system of Pure Proportional Representation in 1950. It stands at 8.1. It went up to 14.20 in 1951, with the introduction of a Reinforced Proportional variety, and it was more than tripled (to 45.15) in 1952 when a system of Plurality Vote was used — despite the fact that there were at least six serious contenders. These three elections, conducted in less than three years, seem to indicate the strong influence of the electoral system on the fragmentation or the consolidation of partisan forces (See: Table B).

A further study of the last five elections (1956, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1964) is equally instructive. In 1956, the electoral system was a combination of Plurality with Reinforced Proportional Representation. To compete successfully at the polls, six — entitled the parties of the liberal camp — joined the left EDA in a coalition Democratic Union. This was a temporary grouping forced on them by the exigencies of the electoral system, and it broke up immediately after the election. Although the participation of EDA somewhat distorts the picture for our analysis, the detailed statistical figures indicate again a rather high level of concentration with at least 85% of the total vote going to the two major contenders, i.e. ERE and the group of non-Communist parties in the Democratic Union. This will give us an adjusted index value of 42.50. In 1958 the reintroduction of Reinforced Proportional Representation —and the effect of dissatisfaction over Western policies in Cyprus — apparently encouraged a certain fragmentation of the vote and some movement to the left. As a result, the index of vote-concentration dropped to 18.10. But in the following years this electoral system, combined with the emergence of the Center Union in 1961, raised the degree of concentration to 41, reaching almost 43 in 1964.

Although the Reinforced Proportional system does not guarantee a large majority of seats in Parliament for the strongest party to the extent that a majoritarian system does, it has served the requirements of governmental stability rather well, mainly because the conservative camp has coalesced into one party, first the Greek Rally of Marshal Papagos and then the ERE of Mr. Karamanlis. This development was later assisted by the emergence of the Center Union and its ability to win a substantial majority in Parliament. (The period of governmental stability from 1952 to 1965 was interrupted in the summer of 1965 when the leader of the Center Union resigned the premiership in a quarrel with King Constantine over the alleged secret military organization ASPIDA).

It seems to me that if this electoral system or some version of Plurality

with Single Member District were to be established on a permanent basis which was impervious to easy change, a reasonably stable party system with two well-organized and politically developed democratic parties might well emerge. In fact, after a decade of using the Reinforced Proportional system (with variations), the emergence of two major parties was well underway until the crisis of July 15, 1965. Since that time the promise of a return to a Pure Proportional system has rekindled a trend toward a fragmentation of the political forces at the top.

### *Other Power Structures*

That there is considerable diffusion of power in the political sector seems an indisputable fact. In addition to the free-wheeling play of politicians and partisan organizations, there are such centers of power as the armed forces hierarchy, the Palace, and the American embassy, but these rather heterogeneous centers do not make all decisions nor can they always move events in the directions they favor. Besides, there are many other power centers of varying degrees of effectiveness. The criterion we may use in determining their effectiveness is their influence on the major decisions made by the political executive. To use Harold Lasswell's familiar aphorism, the question is "who gets what and how" — to the extent at least that the distribution of slices from the national pie of material benefits can be determined by legislation or executive action.

Among the identifiable power structures we may include those of the "big" industrialists (including bankers and shipowners), the Orthodox Church hierarchy, the labor syndicates, peasant organizations, civil servants' organizations, professional associations, and the like. There is no evidence that any single power structure exercises overwhelming, let alone monopolistic, influence over the decision-making process. There is evidence, however, that in the contest for obtaining a larger share of benefits, certain groups have been more successful than others. It must be noted that there is no convincing evidence that certain power structures are primarily associated with one political party or another in a kind of sponsor-type association. Instead, there are indications that influential spokesmen in the various groups have connections with both political camps and can use whatever political or economic assets they have to exert pressure on the state authorities regardless of what political party may be in power. We may cite for example the influence of the industrialists on trade and investment policies. Protective tariff legislation has usually benefited the small-scale, family type of industrial enterprise long

prevailing in Greek industry." Such legislation has often been perpetuated long after the need for protection had diminished. Tax legislation has also favored —and continues to do so— the higher income strata. In 1962, for example, out of a total of Dr. 16,532 million taxes collected by the central government, only 427 million or approximately 2% came from corporations. On the other hand, more than 80% or Dr. 13,196 million came from all types of indirect taxes, which tend to fall more heavily on the lower income groups.<sup>6</sup> But not all state decisions tend to favor the wealthy. The decision to sign the Treaty of Athens and make Greece an associate member of the European Economic Community (or Common Market) was in many respects unfavorable to the more immediate and narrow interests of many industrialists. Under article 18 of the Treaty, Greece is required to eliminate within prescribed time-limits most protective trade barriers. The application of the agreement may eventually have beneficial effects on the Greek economy as a whole, but it is obvious that the immediate demands on Greek industrialists were in their view overly burdensome while the long-range benefits were too uncertain. Yet the treaty was negotiated and signed by the Karamanlis government, (ERE), which draws most of its support from the conservative camp.

While the labor syndicates have been weak since 1945 (their leadership often appointed by the state largely out of fear of Communist infiltration), Greek governments have not ignored the most pressing demands of labor. Social insurance coverage and benefits have been substantial for many years, with contributory rates for the Social Security Institute (IKA) being allocated at 2/3 for the employer and 1/3 for the employee. A sustained program of economic development has also created opportunities, but the supply of unskilled or semi-skilled labor in particular still exceeds the demand. Inevitably wages remain low.

Within the limited potentialities of the country, the farmers have been able to obtain benefits in the form of subsidies (security prices), public investment in reclamation projects, and potentially wider markets for choice products through Greece's association with the EEC. Greece has also instituted since 1961 —with what we may term bi-partisan support— a social insurance system for farmers and farm-workers (financed largely from surcharges on stamp duties, and on corporate and personal income taxes, supplementary excise taxes on luxury items, and a share from the agriculture sales tax; only 25% consists of contributions from beneficiaries).

---

6. Figures contained in George F. Break and Ralph Turvey, *Studies in Greek Taxation* (Athens: Contos Press Co., 1964), pp. 22-23. Preliminary figures for 1966 do not show any substantial change.

Professional associations have also been rather successful in securing favors and benefits for their members through legislation. An illustration of the capacity of such organizations to preserve law-acquired rights is the continuation of social insurance funds for special categories of employees or professionals. There are no less than 200 separate, law-established, social insurance funds under the jurisdiction of the government. While experts have long since asserted that efficiency could be increased through consolidation with the IKA, very little has been accomplished in this direction largely because of the opposition of the related organizations.

The absence of time and space do not permit further illustrations of our thesis. But one can generalize that wealthy individuals are able on occasion to influence leading party members in government posts, especially when favoritism is not likely to cause widespread disapproval among the voters. On the other hand, it is equally evident that legislators and members of the executive or leaders of the opposition, conscious of the effect of popular support on their careers, cannot ignore the aspirations of large bodies of voters.

### *Conclusions*

Twenty years after the United States under the Truman Doctrine joined in preserving democratic institutions in Greece, we find that the effort has been largely successful. Today's political institutions in Greece correspond in most respects to the democratic model. There is considerable diffusion of power with no single power structure claiming, let alone effectively holding, exclusive control over political, economic, and social life. Within this democratic framework, considerable progress has been registered since 1945, primarily, in the economic rather than in the political sector. In the economic sector, the country recovered from war and revolution by the middle fifties and forged ahead toward the expansion of productive capacities and the take-off stage. In the decade 1952-62, total output increased by 84.4% and per capita product by 67.8%. During the same period, the figures for Bulgaria—a country comparable in most economic variables—were 70.1% and 55.5% respectively.<sup>7</sup> Greece developed more rapidly in a democratic framework than Bulgaria under a command economy replete with restrictions on individual freedom.

In the political sector progress has not been as substantial. Certain weaknesses persist. For example, there is a tendency among liberal politicians to

---

7. Simon Kuznets, *Postwar Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 129.

question, however covertly, the validity of the constitutional foundation, above all the role or even the utility of the Crown. On the other hand, conservative leaders tend to accuse their liberal opponents of being dupes or willing collaborators of the pro-Communist left, and by implication of being untrustworthy as potential decision-makers in government. These two tendencies, which flare up especially at moments when they do the greatest harm, largely account for the persistent instability of the system.

Another serious handicap is the deliberate inefficiency of the bureaucratic structure. Transactions which could be easily and speedily completed by correspondence, are not settled except after personal and persistent pressure with the aid of an influential politician. Most deputies apparently find that rendering such assistance strengthens their ties with their constituents. On the other hand, the civil servants involved apparently trade their cooperation for future favors from the deputies — favors which are essential to their advancement in the bureaucracy.

One could also mention the abandon with which the press exploits and even foments political disputes in order to increase circulation, especially in times of crisis or when strong leadership is lacking and the competing politicians seek support through the exploitation of passions rather than the enunciation of their political programs. Another difficulty is the uncertainty which perennially surrounds the electoral system. There is an inherent dishonesty in the frequent changes of voting procedure, which can have no other objective than to improve the position of those who can influence the shape of the electoral law before Parliament.

These are only a few of the most significant weaknesses of the political system. Unless such weaknesses are fully understood and unless such understanding sparks corrective action, the political development of Greece will be retarded. Political modernization is no less important than economic modernization: the two go hand in hand. Greece, while a country which corresponds politically to the democratic model, still has a considerable way to go before it can reach that level of political modernization at which diffusion of power is combined with stability. That point will be reached sooner if those who occupy key positions face the problems squarely and with what might be called intellectual honesty.

Howard University,  
Washington D.C.

D. GEORGE KOUSOULAS

TABLE A

Election date	CONSERVATIVE		LIBERAL		LEFT	
	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats
31 March 1946	64 %	235	33.70 %	117		
5 March 1950	38,37 %	93	46,97 %	139	9,70 %	18
9 September 1951	43,29 %	146	44,76 %	132	10,57 %	10
16 November 1952	50,22 %	242	34,88 %	51	9,15 %	0
19 February 1956	50,48 %	165	Approximately 40% plus 9,52% for Left (EDA) (49,52%) (135)		(9,52 %)	18
11 May 1958	44,10 %	175	31,29 %	46	24,42 %	79
29 October 1961	49,60 %	174	34,3 %	103	15,10 %	23
3 November 1963	42,85 %	134	42,18 %	138	14,34 %	28
16 February 1964	35,26 %	105	52,78 %	173	12,00 %	22

TABLE B.

VOTE-CONCENTRATION INDEX (% of non-Left votes)  
(No. of parties rep. in Parliament)

Date			Index	Electoral System
5 March	1950	$\frac{89.90\%}{11}$	8.1	Pure Proportional (with three successive distributions)
9 September	1951	$\frac{89.4\%}{6}$	14.2	Reinforced Proportional (Only the first 3 parties with at least 17% or 20% if in coalition, participate in the 2nd and 3rd distribution)
16 November	1952	$\frac{90.4\%}{2}$	45.15	Plurality (SMD or Multi-member districts)
16 February	1956	$\frac{85.00\%}{2}$	42.50	Combination of Plurality with a variation of Reinforced Proportional.
11 May	1958	$\frac{75.58\%}{4}$	18.89	Reinforced Proportional (Only parties with 25%, two-party coalitions with 35% and more than two-party coalitions with 40% participate in 2nd and 3rd distributions)
29 October	1961	$\frac{84.99\%}{2}$	41.29	Reinforced Proportional (revised to give advantage the stronger parties during the first distribution)
3 November	1963	$\frac{85.46\%}{2}$	42.73	Reinforced Proportional (further revision concerning the participation of single parties in the 3rd distribution)
16 February	1964	$\frac{87.78\%}{2}$	42.98	No change in the electoral system

## APPENDIX

### Political Migrations of three political Leaders

#### *Panagiotis Kanelopoulos*

Leader of the National United party;

Elections of 1946 ; with G. Papandreou and S. Venizelos as co-leaders of the National Political Union.

Elections of 1950 ; with S. Stefanopoulos as co-leaders of a new party labeled Populist Uniting Party.

Elections of 1951 ; the Populist Uniting Party is dissolved and both Kanelopoulos and Stefanopoulos join Papagos Greek Rally.

Elections of 1956 ; With the dissolution of the Greek Rally and the establishment of ERE, Kanelopoulos joins ERE.

Elections of 1958 ; Kanelopoulos competes as co-leader (with Tsaldaris) of the Populist party.

Elections of 1961 ; Kanelopoulos joins again the ERE.

Elections of 1963 ; After the departure of Karamanlis, he becomes the leader of ERE.

#### *George Papandreou*

Leader of the Democratic Socialist Party;

Elections of 1946 ; with P. Kanelopoulos and S. Venizelos (N.P.U.).

Elections of 1950 ; Leader of the new Party of George Papandreou.

Elections of 1951 ; His party wins no seats.

Elections of 1952 ; He joins the Greek Rally as an associated political personality.

Elections of 1956 ; He becomes co-leader of the Liberal Party in 1953 and forms the Democratic Union (electoral coalition) with six other parties including the Populist party from the conservative side and EDA from the Left.

Elections of 1958 ; Following the elections of 1958, the Liberal party splits and Papandreou establishes the Liberal Democratic party.

Elections of 1961 ; Prior to the election several parties of the Liberal persuasion form the Center Union with G. Papandreou as the leader.

#### *Stefanos Stefanopoulos*

Elections of 1946 ; One of the leading personalities of the Populist party (conservative).

Elections of 1950 ; With Kanelopoulos form the Populist Uniting Party.

Elections of 1951 ; He joins Papagos's Greek Rally.

Elections of 1956 ; Prior to the elections (following the death of Papagos) he establishes the Populist Social Party.

Elections of 1958 ; He participates in the Union of the Populist Party (electoral coalition).

Elections of 1961 ; Prior to the election he joins with other parties in the formation of the Center Union. (September 1961) September 1965, he leaves Center Union and becomes Premier. December 1965, he forms a new Party labeled Liberal Democratic Center.