

THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS:
AN END TO A PEACEKEEPING ERA?

For more than eighteen years statesmen at the United Nations have been confronted with some aspects of the «Cyprus Question». Yet the problem remains largely unresolved and every few years it rises to crisis proportions involving not just Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities, but the superpowers themselves. At the same time the United Nations itself remains deadlocked over peacekeeping after more than sixteen years of operational experience in the field, and nearly as many years of superpower disagreement on the subject.

In the pages that follow the reasons for peacekeeping will be examined briefly in order to place in a better perspective the nature and functions of UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus). Also, the reasons why UNFICYP came to be the choice not only of those immediately involved in the post-1963 facet of the «Cyprus Question», but also of the superpowers themselves at a time when their confrontation over peacekeeping was moving toward its climax will be analyzed. The general organizational characteristics, the problems and the achievements of UNFICYP will also be analyzed in this article. Finally, a brief analysis of the prospects for peacekeeping will be presented, given the experience of UNFICYP and the continuing superpower deadlock in the negotiations over the future of peacekeeping.

United Nations Peacekeeping Prior to Cyprus

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations had engaged in a variety of peacekeeping and peace observation activities prior to 1956¹. Yet the idea of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, as developed by the United Nations since 1956, represents an example of the organization's innovativeness in the area of peace and security at a time when collective security was all but a dead letter in the Charter.

The essence of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in particular is one of containing the Cold War and ideally avoiding its spread into potential crises areas in the uncommitted world. Therefore, peacekeeping is more «pre-

1. Such as the Saar plebiscite of 1934; UNSCOB; etc. For detailed accounts see: David Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

ventive» than therapeutic; it is a stabilizer, intended to create conditions conducive to the settlement of a local dispute; and it prevents local conflicts from becoming global disputes by keeping the great powers out of the conflict area. Contrasted to earlier security schemes, peacekeeping operations are based on the consent of the host state; are carried out by forces of other states than the permanent members of the Security Council; do not involve the use of force except in self-defense, nor do they require the identification of an aggressor. Peacekeeping then is supposed to be an exercise in neutralism made to meet the requirements of a three world system. It thus concedes the organization's inability to influence superpower conflicts and attempts to provide an alternative which is «harmless» to the interests of the superpowers by being applicable to disputes not yet within the scope of their competition.

The United Nations undertook two major peacekeeping operations prior to the establishment of UNFICYP¹. Both UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), established in 1956 following the Suez Crisis) and ONUC (Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo) provided the organization with invaluable operational experience. But most importantly the two operations, and especially ONUC, showed that preventive diplomacy in practice does have political implications affecting the fundamental interests of the superpowers. The financial crisis of the United Nations and the Soviet attack against the Secretary-General reflected concern with the direction, control and powers of the organization in an area not clearly anticipated by the framers of the Charter. Other problem areas involved the extent of consensus among the superpowers in establishing and maintaining a peacekeeping operation; the fact that peacekeeping without peacemaking contributed to the perpetuation of the dispute;

1. There were other peace observation and peacekeeping activities undertaken by the UN between 1956-1963. None of these approximated the complexity of UNEF or ONUC. The other operations were: UNOGIL, 1958, in Lebanon; UNTEA, 1962, in West Irian; and UNYOM, 1963, in Yemen. See a useful comparative chart in James A. Stegenga, «United Nations Peacekeeping: Patterns and Prospects», in Robert S. Wood (ed.), *The Process of International Organization*, New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 300-301. In addition the following are some of the major recent in-depth analyses of peacekeeping. These titles are chronologically arranged: Arthur L. Burns, *Peacekeeping by UN Forces*, New York: Praeger, 1962. Ruth B. Russell, *UN Experience with Military Forces*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964. Per Frydenberg, *Peacekeeping-Experience and Evolution (The Oslo Papers)* Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute Conference on UN Forces as Means of Preserving Peace, 1964. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *International Military Forces*, Boston: Little Brown, 1964. Oran R. Young, *Trends in International Peacekeeping* Princeton: Center for International Studies 1966. Arthur M. Cox, *Prospects for Peacekeeping*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967). Rosalyn Higgins, *UN Peacekeeping 1946-1967, Documents and Commentary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). Alan James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping*, New York: Praeger, 1969.

and finally the inevitable indirect involvement of the organization in the domestic affairs of the host state.

Thus one can safely say that what Korea was for the idea of collective security, the same was the case of the Congo for United Nations peacekeeping¹. By 1963 serious doubts persisted as to whether the United Nations would or could ever again engage in another peacekeeping operation.

At this critical point in the political evolution of the United Nations the crisis on Cyprus erupted during Christmas of 1963. In the next two sections two related issues will be examined. One is why both superpowers as well as the parties involved in the Cyprus dispute found UNFICYP as an acceptable alternative to other forms of conflict management. The other is the thesis that UNFICYP represents a reaction to the earlier United Nations peacekeeping operations and the experience in the Congo in particular.

The United Nations and Cyprus in 1964

It is not the intention of the author to analyze in detail the causes of the post-independence crisis on Cyprus, nor to attempt to place guilt on any side for the fighting that broke out on the island over Christmas of 1963. The following propositions then may suffice for background information at this point. The unique Zurich and London Agreements and the Cypriot Constitution contained within themselves the seeds of the destruction of the first Cypriot Republic. Therefore, it was not a question of whether the Agreements and the Cypriot Constitution would last, but only a question of how long they would last². Makarios' «thirteen points» for revisions in the Cypriot Constitution³ became the catalyst in a broader political conflict involving a minority bent upon maintaining the 1959 *status quo*, and a majority equally determined to revise an unacceptable *status quo*. With the rising suspicions, tension, inter-communal violence and threats of intervention in December 1963, the question arises as to why the parties to the dispute as well as the superpowers eventually turned the conflict over to the United Nations.

The fact remains that up to February 15, 1964, when Britain and Cyprus formally appealed to the Security Council⁴, most of the efforts by the United

1. One of the early discussions on the subject is by Inis L. Claude, Jr., «The United Nations and the Use of Force», *International Conciliation*, No. 532, March, 1961.

2. For a substantive examination of the collapse of the Cypriot Republic see: Stanley Kyriakides, *Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968, pp. 53-149. Also: Thomas Ehrlich, «Cyprus, the 'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis», *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 18, May 1966, pp. 1031-1047

3. Stanley Kyriakides, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

4. There was an earlier discussion of the Cyprus problem at the Security Council on De-

States, Britain, and Turkey centered upon solutions outside the United Nations. With the exception of the Turkish insistence on the right of unilateral intervention in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee, it appears that all three states did initially favor various degrees of NATO intervention in Cyprus. Britain, since the early days of the intercommunal conflict, had been carrying out a limited peacekeeping action on Cyprus. Interested in a quick settlement of the conflict, Britain called the guarantor powers and the two Cypriot communities to a conference in London on January 15, 1964. The conference soon turned its attention to the more pressing problem of broadening the British peacekeeping effort, once it became apparent that the positions of the two communities were irreconcilable. With prodding by the United States and Turkish threats of unilateral intervention, the plans for a peacekeeping force under NATO auspices were developed.

The United States always concerned with NATO's cohesion, suspicious of the Soviet plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and reluctant to contribute a new cause to Soviet propaganda at the United Nations, wanted the Cyprus problem dealt «within the family». Turkey therefore was to be kept from unilaterally intervening on Cyprus, and thereby causing a Greco-Turkish confrontation, while, in a parallel fashion, providing through NATO a broadened peacekeeping mechanism so that conditions conducive to a settlement could be created. As for Turkey, the growing realization that an effective unilateral intervention on Cyprus was nearly impossible, NATO also provided a better alternative than the United Nations. Not only was the political climate at the United Nations more favorable to the Greek Cypriots¹, but also a United Nations presence on the island would make it politically more difficult for Turkey to intervene.

The plans for a NATO intervention in Cyprus run aground though mainly because of the Greek Cypriot opposition to these designs, and because of the reluctance shown by Greece and most other NATO members to get involved in these Anglo-American schemes. By internationalizing the Cyprus problem the Greek Cypriot government could count on broad political support in the

cember 28, 1963. Cyprus accused Turkey of threatening to intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic. There was no resolution adopted at that meeting. As a result of this session of the Council though the Secretary-General dispatched, later in January, 1964, Lt. General Gyani as his personal representative to observe the limited peacekeeping action that British troops carried out since the early days of the intercommunal conflict.

1. Ex. At the Security Council, the presence of France, and the USSR. In the General Assembly Makarios had widespread support among the newly independent and neutralist states for his cause of Cypriot self determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was clearly shown on December 18, 1965, when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2077 (xx) on the Cyprus Question.

General Assembly, and French and Soviet support at the Security Council. Thus a limited international presence under Security Council control was not incompatible to the objectives of the Greek Cypriot policymakers. To them the United Nations provided the forum of pursuing, if not also legitimizing, the Greek Cypriot quest of revising the *status quo* of 1959, and for protecting the territorial integrity of the Republic¹. In contrast, NATO traditionally represented the negation of these objectives to the Cypriot leaders.

With the rejection of NATO's peacekeeping schemes by Cyprus, the failure of the American mediation efforts², the recurrence of fighting on Cyprus, the dispatch of a Turkish invasion force toward Cyprus, and the Soviet threats in case Turkey or NATO intervened in Cyprus, Britain appealed on February 15, 1964, to the Security Council to consider the deteriorating situation in Cyprus. Hours later a similar appeal was made by the Greek Cypriot government.

The Security Council Decides

Discussion on the two appeals at the Security Council opened on February 18, 1964. Rather than concentrating on the debates at the Security Council the focus will be on the decisions of the Security Council and their significance. On March 4, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186³ which in its most significant paragraphs provided for: (a) The creation, with the consent of the government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peacekeeping force, (b) The composition and size of the force to be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, (c) The functions of the force to be to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to assist in the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions, (d) The force to be stationed on Cyprus for three months, (e) The force to be financed by voluntary contributions, and (f) A mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General in agreement with the four governments

1. For a discussion of the attempted NATO actions in Cyprus 1964-65 see Philip Windsor, «Nato and the Cyprus Crisis», *Adelphi Papers*, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964. James A. Stegenga speculates that Makarios may have purposely provoked the fighting on Cyprus in 1963. Lacking other avenues of negotiating changes to the 1959 Agreements, he «shot his way» in the agenda of the United Nations where the political climate was more conducive to the Cypriot objectives. See *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968, pp. 57-66. Stegenga also provides considerable insights into the establishment and organization of UNFICYP. A more recent work on UNFICYP is that by Michael Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, who served in the late 1960's as commander of the peacekeeping force.

2. See the visits by George W. Ball and General Lemnitzer late in January and early in February, 1964, to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

3. Sponsored by Brazil, Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Norway.

for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem.

Resolution 186 was significant in that all permanent members of the Security Council supported the creation of UNFICYP at a time when the confrontation over article 19 of the Charter was moving toward its climax. The resolution was also significant in that it sharply differed in its provisions from both ONUC and UNEF and in many ways it represented a repudiation of these earlier precedents. It can be safely said then that UNFICYP did serve the interests of all the permanent members of the Security Council. Undoubtedly both the United States and Britain would have preferred a NATO solution, but in its absence and given the explosive potential of the Cyprus situation, UNFICYP was acceptable even if certain compromises on the subject of peacekeeping had to be made. To the French and the Soviet Union UNFICYP represented both a way out of a dangerous crisis and a solution outside of NATO. And as long as the authorizing resolution acknowledged the position of the two parties on peacekeeping the two states extended their minimum consensus for establishing UNFICYP¹. Thus in authorizing UNFICYP the organization proved its flexibility at a time of a serious international crisis, despite the fact that at the same time a major battle was being waged within the organization about the application of article 19. And this points to the fact that the conflict over peacekeeping was not one of disputing the validity of peacekeeping *per se*, or of challenging the organization's existence. It was rather a conflict involving the determination of the powers, the role and the direction an evolving United Nations was to take.

In examining the specific provisions of Resolution 186 some significant contrasts with UNEF and ONUC are quite evident. These contrasts are also indicative not only of the shift in the American position on peacekeeping but also of the reasons why both France and the Soviet Union readily accepted the establishment of UNFICYP. First, there is the three, and later on six, month limit on UNFICYP's mandate. In contrast to the open ended mandate of both ONUC and UNEF, the Security Council would have to authorize any future extensions of UNFICYP. Conceivably, in case of a veto, an extension of the force's mandate could also come about by action of the Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. But given the impact of the Congo experience on the organization, the present American shift back to the Council, and the

1. Since its entry in the United Nations the People's Republic of China has consistently abstained from all votes authorizing an extension of UNFICYP. This stand is characteristic of PRC's cautious behavior in the organization and its general opposition to UN peacekeeping which PRC views in the light of Korea.

status of the negotiation for breaking the deadlock over future peacekeeping operations, such a maneuver is not likely.

Secondly, by providing for voluntary financing the operation was made palatable to the Soviet Union and France. Although UNTEA in 1962 and UNIYOM in 1963 had their costs paid for by those immediately concerned¹, UNFICYP was the first major operation to be paid for by voluntary contributions. The United States won the tactical victory over article 19 at the International Court of Justice. But in an effort to avoid a complete paralysis, if not also collapse, of the organization over the enforcement of article 19, and in order to cope with the problems of Cyprus, West Irian and Yemen, the United States created the precedents that totally undermined the principle of collective responsibility. In that sense Cyprus was ultimately a practical victory of the Franco-Soviet position on the financing of peacekeeping. By the late 1960's it was apparent that with the changing political make-up of the Assembly, even the United States had moved away from its insistence on article 19. Thus the financing decisions of UNFICYP were a victory for political realism.

Thirdly, by insisting on a paragraph-by-paragraph vote at the first reading of the authorizing resolution, and by abstaining on paragraph 4 on the role of the Secretary-General, France and the Soviet Union once more underscored their opposition to the independent role of the Secretary-General. Although U-Thant was given, much as before, a substantial degree of independence in conducting the operation, the limited time of the force's operation at least assured control over his actions in contrast to ONUC.

Fourthly, by providing for the appointment of a mediator, the Council for the first time acknowledged that peacekeeping is not identical to or necessarily conducive to peacemaking. By appointing a mediator the Council combined the preventive and the therapeutic function. It also implicitly recognized the dissatisfaction expressed by many states about UNEF, that without an active mediation effort UNEF had contributed to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute². The terms of reference of the mediator are also significant. By providing that his task is to seek an «agreed settlement» of the Cyprus problem, the Council tacitly accepted the fact that the 1959 Independence Agreements and the Cypriot Constitution were unworkable. In that sense the Security Council through its mediator became an instrument of peaceful change in the problem

1. UNTEA: the costs were shared between the Netherlands and Indonesia. UNIYOM: the costs were shared between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

2. The six-day war in 1967 in the Middle East, and the 1967 Cyprus crisis support the thesis that pacific perpetuation of a dispute frequently leads to broader confrontations, as the unresolved issues reappear on the conflict scene.

of Cyprus. How effective has the Council been in this function will be taken up later in this article.

Composition and Financing of UNFICYP

UNFICYP became operational on March 27, 1964, under the command of Indian Lt. General Gyani, the former commander of UNEF¹. By April 30, UNFICYP, which originally consisted of British and Canadian troops, was broadened by the arrival of units from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. Australia, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden provided also approximately 200 civilian policemen. At its height in 1964, UNFICYP consisted of approximately 6,500 men, a size comparable to UNEF. By December, 1972, with the decline of intercommunal tensions and the need for economy, the force had been slowly reduced by fifty percent². In February, 1973, informed American observers even stressed the need for further reduction in the size of UNFICYP in an effort to decrease the operational deficit of the force. They also expressed concern over the Secretary-General's unilateral decision to increase the size of the costly Austrian contingent in order to replace recent Irish withdrawals from UNFICYP.

Before turning to the financial aspects of UNFICYP it must be noted that the British participation in UNFICYP, currently at 30% of the force, is not a departure from the original idea that forces of the permanent members of the Security Council do not participate in peacekeeping operations. The presence of the British forces must be looked upon on the basis of convenience and economy, given the availability of both forces and logistical support on the British SBA's in Cyprus. Another interesting characteristic of UNFICYP's composition is not only the absence, much like in all earlier operations, of any Soviet bloc states, but also the dominant presence of states belonging to NATO and ANZUS. Such participants currently make up nearly two thirds of UNFICYP, a point to be discussed shortly.

Although the decision to fund UNFICYP on a voluntary basis was earlier looked upon as an act of political realism, it has not provided adequate and steady support for the operation. This is shown in the repeated appeals for contributions made by the Secretary-General in his reports on UNFICYP, and Waldheim's January 30, 1973, urgent letter to all permanent representatives to the United Nations. UNFICYP's estimated cost for the six-month period

1. Lt. General Gyani had been in Cyprus since early January as the Secretary-General's personal representative.

2. S/10842, 1 December 1972, *Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*.

ending June 15, 1973, is approximately \$ 6.9 million. Meanwhile the deficit of the operation as of December, 1972, was approximately \$ 17.5 million, \$ 3 million of which were accumulated in 1972. Finally, the total cost of the operation from its inception to December, 1972, was nearly \$ 160 million. More interesting is the selected list of contributors as outlined below¹:

United States of America	\$ 61.7	million, 38.5 %
Great Britain	31.6	million, 19.2 %
Federal Republic of Germany	11.5	million, 7.2 %
Greece	10.9	million, 6.8 %
Turkey	1.84	million, 1.1 %
Switzerland	1.93	million, 1.2 %
Japan	.890	million, .55%
Combined NATO member total	117.5	million, 73 %

In this list the reader must notice the significant contribution of non-members and first time contributors to peacekeeping operations, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland². Also, the fact that Turkey, as an indication of displeasure over the progress of the intercommunal talks, has made no contributions in the 22nd pledging period. Furthermore, the substantial American contribution and the combined percentage of the NATO members indicate the significant concern of these states over Cyprus. This fact, along with the predominance of forces from NATO states in UNFICYP, gives an interesting perspective into Makarios' acceptance of a United Nations vs. a NATO intervention in Cyprus. As long as the peacekeeping force could be controlled through the Security Council, the preponderant financial and military presence by NATO members did not matter. Finally, the list of the non-contributors is headed by the Soviet Union, France and China³, who still maintain the need to arrive first at a great power agreement on peacekeeping. Japan, pressured for additional contributions by the United States, has frequently rationalized its small contribution by the fact that France has not contributed any funds toward UNFICYP, even if Cyprus is primarily a Mediterranean problem.

Thus UNFICYP after nine years remains in a financially precarious position which conceivably can be resolved only if the permanent members of the Security Council arrive at an agreement over peacekeeping. At this point the prospects for an early agreement are not encouraging.

1. These figures have been tabulated from the Secretary-General's letter to all permanent representatives to the United Nations of January 30, 1973, and the *Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, S/10842, 1 December 1972.

2. The Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet Nam, other non-members have also made token contributions.

3. Nationalist China never contributed to UNFICYP either.

Problems and Achievements

Although the Secretary-General points out in his latest report on UNFICYP that the situation on Cyprus remains unstable in the absence of a political settlement, the most notable achievements of UNFICYP can be seen in the relative decline in the level of intercommunal violence; the steady progress of the intercommunal talks under the auspices of B. F. Osorio Tafall, the Secretary-General's representative; and in diffusing potentially explosive intercommunal confrontations through patient negotiation. Thus with ONUC's experience in mind, and the strict directives of the Secretary-General on using force in self-defense only¹, UNFICYP has not had to use force in its nine years of operation. Nor did UNFICYP ever face the control and command problems that ONUC was confronted with on various occasions. From a technical standpoint UNFICYP has also been the smoothest and most efficient operation ever to be undertaken by the organization. This is largely due to the fact that Cyprus is a small island, with a high level of development and infrastructure facilities in contrast to the Sinai and the Congo, and the presence of a vast logistical support available through the British SBA's.

Yet larger problems remain unresolved. First of all there remains the pressing problem of financing as outlined earlier in this article. Much like UNEF in the Middle East, UNFICYP has contributed to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute. This has created concern among many of the contributors of forces and money. The United States in particular has been pressing other member states for greater contributions to UNFICYP, but also the Secretary-General for further reductions in the force level of UNFICYP. General Chand, the force commander, views further cuts in UNFICYP personnel with alarm, because it would weaken the force and undermine its credibility at a time when the intercommunal talks in Cyprus have reached a critical point. But recently in talking with American officials the author is convinced that by such demands the United States is taking a calculated risk hoping to force to a conclusion the intercommunal talks as the latest extension of UNFICYP's mandate ends on June 15, 1973.

UNFICYP's most evident problem area is definitely its inability to bring about a «return to normal conditions» as charged by Resolution 186 (1964), and such objectives² as freedom of movement for all communities, evacuation and removal of fortified position starting with Nicosia; progressive disarming of irregulars; reintegration of public services, normalization of economic and

1. S/5653, April 11, 1964, «Aide Memoire Concerning Questions Relating to the Function and Operation of UNFICYP».

2. See Annex I to the *Report by the Secretary-General on the Operation of UNFICYP*, 29 April 1964, S/5671.

social conditions, etc. UNFICYP has met with only limited success in some of the above areas¹, and the most that can be said, as the Secretary-General recognizes in his latest report, is that it has been able to maintain the *status quo* and prevent a worsening of the situation.

The Council's mediation also proved abortive. Galo Plaza's mediation report of March 26, 1965², was rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership³ on the grounds that the mediator by his recommendations had overstepped his mandate. Since then the various special representatives of the Secretary-General⁴ have attempted to act in an *ad hoc* mediatory capacity and under their «good offices» have assisted in the intercommunal talks. Indeed, prior to the recent Cypriot presidential elections, these talks had arrived to a crucial point with both sides indicating significant progress. Yet this progress was due to a growing sense of realism on the part of the Greek Cypriots because of the political changes in Greece and the Cyprus crisis of 1967, rather than to the impact of the UN mediators. Furthermore, it must be noted that the UN mediators in carrying out their task had to rely on their personal prestige to influence the parties. The Security Council operating on a minimum consensus could not provide the necessary backing that would increase their bargaining power.

Actually the tasks of UNFICYP and the mediation effort were frequently effected by intercommunal violence, as in the summer of 1964 and the fall of 1967; the infiltration of outside forces on both sides; the increased combat efficiency of both sides; the Turkish unvasion threats and bombings, and occasionally, the parallel attempts by the United States and NATO to mediate the conflict, which further undermined the credibility of the UN mediators. A new and more disturbing element, especially at a time when the intercommunal talks seem to have reached a substantial degree of consensus, is the increasing intracommunal tension among the Greek Cypriots. The Secretary-General in his latest report expresses serious concern because of this development as experience has shown that inter as well as intracommunal developments affect the overall Cyprus situation and consequently the task of UNFICYP.

UN Peacekeeping and the Cyprus Experience

In the preceding pages I have discussed how flexibly the United Nations responded to the Cyprus crisis despite the political deadlock over peacekeeping.

1 See joint communal participation in some UNDP programs, some limited improvements in postal services, irrigation, and the removal of some new fortifications.

2. S/6253

3. S/6267 and S/6279 respectively.

4. The latest of whom is B.F. Osorio Tafall.

I have also shown some of the characteristics of UNFICYP which constitute a repudiation of some of the earlier peacekeeping experience of the organization. I have also discussed some of the problems and the achievements of UNFICYP, the only remaining «Model II» operation of the United Nations¹.

I would like to conclude this discussion by pointing at the following propositions: (a) That until a great power agreement is reached on the question of peacekeeping, UNFICYP, because of its characteristics, is likely to become the model for any future United Nations peacekeeping action. The changing politics of the General Assembly have slowly shifted the American position closer to that of the Soviet Union and France. (b) That as the Nigerian experience shows, states with substantial minorities within their borders will avoid going to the United Nations in case domestic violence erupts. Both the impact of the Congo, and the freezing of the situation in Cyprus has become a lesson to many states with similar problems whether in Europe, or Africa. Although such «freezing» of the situation as in Cyprus may be politically advantageous to the Greek Cypriots, it has not, after nine years, produced a satisfactory political settlement. (c) That the organization, despite seventeen years of operational experience in peacekeeping, has yet to devise broader peacekeeping plans. The political reluctance of the organization's members, and the disagreements of the superpowers about peacekeeping seem to indicate that if the need arose again the response would once more be on an *ad hoc* basis. (d) That United Nations peacekeeping seems to be by now an established international process. The deadlock of the great powers is over the direction and control of the operations rather than peacekeeping *per se*, or even the existence of the United Nations itself. (e) That UNFICYP should be considered not as the end of a peacekeeping era, but as marking the beginning of a new era of maturity in United Nations peacekeeping, one that may bring the superpowers closer to the realistic intent of Chapter VII of the Charter.

Indiana University at Fort Wayne

1. In 1969 the Committee of 33, charged with resolving the problem of UN peacekeeping, identified two general models of UN operations: Model I for military observers and Model II for the military contingent type of an operation. For the current positions of the US and the USSR on the deadlock over peacekeeping see A/8676 and A/8669 respectively.