

cross-ethnic leaders, had no role in shaping the Serbo-Croatian agreement, and no political future in a confederate Yugoslavia.

A strong debilitating effect on the negotiations was also exercised by the «Great Serbs» a group whose objective was to unify all the Serbs in an agrandized Kingdom of Serbia. Like Yovanovich they too took an unyielding attitude toward Macek's territorial claims and his terms that an agreement with the Serbs could be brought about successfully only under the condition that the Serbian political parties agree to the determination of state boundaries between Serbia and Croatia before the return to Yugoslavia. As Yovanovich saw it, the political platform and influence of the «Great Serbs» became increasingly dominant among the Serbs abroad and at home. Yovanovich's efforts to moderate their influence in more Yugoslav terms were unsuccessful. Even King Peter II, who maintained cordial relations with Macek, fell, Yovanovich asserts, under the complete influence of the «Great Serbs». In August of 1948 the King informed Macek that an agreement with the Serbs could be negotiated only on condition that Macek be willing to accept the territorial and boundary situation as it existed on the 6th of April of 1941, that is, on the day the Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia. The boundaries question, added the King, would then be decided by a Constitutional Assembly upon the return to Yugoslavia. The same message was sent to Macek by the Serbian political parties to which Macek never responded. In March of 1949, the Serbian leaders communicated again to Macek that their representatives were ready to come to the United States for negotiations. Macek's laconic reply was that in his opinion the best thing would be «to postpone the negotiations for the time being». As the diary shows, this was the last exchange on the question of the Serbo-Croatian agreement between Macek and the leaders of the Serbian political parties. Yovanovich died in 1958, Macek in 1964, and King Peter II in 1971.

Perhaps the chief significance of the diary lies in its depiction of the principal contours of Croatian autonomous ambitions, and the nature of a Yugoslav confederacy which a realistic Serbian political leadership with the longitudinal view of Yovanovich could tolerate. The 1971-72 demands of the rebellious Croatian communists revealed striking similarities with Macek's constitutional and political design for Yugoslavia. Thus, the autonomous ethnic aspirations of the Croats have persisted for half a century irrespective of the differentiated ideological surroundings. Prof. Yovanovich took the latter fact into consideration already in 1946, and probably this is the factor which will remain latent in the foreseeable future in whatever kind of political contingency Yugoslavia may find herself.

The cryptic and non-annotated remarks of the diary can be understood only by readers thoroughly familiar with Yugoslav affairs. A translation of the diary into English would be warranted only if the author supplied the text with extensive explanations. This does not, however, diminish the value of the diary as a primary source material.

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Rudolf Bičanić, *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia*, Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Rudolf Bičanić's *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia* will be found valuable both by the reader who knows little or nothing about Yugoslavia and by the reader familiar with the Yugoslav economy who wants a more complete understanding of the system and how it developed. It presents not a chronological history of the Yugoslav economy, but a number of topics (e.g. planning, industrialization, income distribution, growth, and foreign trade), describing for each the evolution of policy through three periods: administrative socialism (1945-

47), the new economic system (1952-64), and the reform (post 1965). The book's greatest quality is that it gives the reader a real feeling for the way the system has actually worked (e.g. for the mix of rigid bureaucracy, laxness, and openness to political influence which characterized investment decisions during the administrative period), and for the pragmatism of Yugoslav economists (who yield to the «pressure of events on preconceived ideas, ...reconcile theory with changing conditions, ...political expediency»<sup>1</sup>).

In perfectly idiomatic, flowing English, Bićanić traces the development of economic ideologies, identifying the historical and fundamental roots of current economic problems (e.g. the effects of the change in market size which accompanied the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918). The primary attention of the book, however, is on events and policies; it thus complements Deborah Milenkovich's excellent book<sup>2</sup>, which pays more attention to the history of economic thought in Yugoslavia.

Although the book is primarily concerned with Yugoslavia, it does include some discussion of the broader relevance of the Yugoslav experiment, especially with respect to planning. It is also in the discussion of planning that the book shows its greatest weakness. Bićanić does not succeed in making clear how the newest planning system is to work. He tells us that «it would be wrong to think that polycentric planning is a system where there is no central plan at all. Indeed, there are several central plans, which differ in the agents involved, their targets, their size and policy instruments in different fields... All decisions are...made consistent...by check and countercheck»<sup>3</sup>. But the specific nature of targets and the means of reconciling conflicting plans are lost behind the somewhat vague and flowery description.

With regard to the interminable Yugoslav debate over centralization vs. decentralization, Bićanić frequently reveals his own position by adopting a mildly doctrinaire tone and implying that the proponents of greater centralization are simply power-hungry.

The final chapter of the book, written by Marijan Hanžeković after Bićanić's death in 1968, discusses the 1971 changes in Yugoslavia's economic system. Unfortunately, this chapter is considerably less clear and shows less insight than the rest of the book. It does, however prevent the book from being out of date before it is published, and does not change the overall evaluation of the book from excellent.

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William F. Robinson, *The Pattern of Reform in Hungary; A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. xx, 467.

This brilliant study covers the pattern of reform in Hungary in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres, which began with the Soviet installation of Imre Nagy as Hungary's Premier in June 1953 and the subsequent beginning of the «New Course». At Soviet insistence, the New Course —while bringing about certain limited changes in domestic political policy and practice— was primarily devoted to alterations to economic policy and planning targets. In fact, «it was only owing to this outside 'initiative' that Hungary embarked upon the forerunner of a series of attempts at genuine reform» (p. 3).

Consisting of two parts, the basic format is simple. Part I: «On the Road to Reform»

1. Page 41.

2. *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought*, Yale University Press, 1971.

3. Pages 46-47.