

veaux, selon les étapes historiques. Malgré les différences de structures mentales qui séparent le «rationalisme orthodoxe» des humanistes de la fin du XVII^e siècle de la crise du XVIII^e ou bien de l'idéal révolutionnaire de 1848, l'évolution de ce genre peut être suivie, offrant une remarquable continuité. Si l'élément traditionnel y est toujours présent, c'est surtout son adhérence aux progrès de la mentalité qui lui confère un caractère créateur et enrichissant. Le laïcisme et le patriotisme en sont les principales tendances.

En développant sans cesse le goût pour la lecture, les «divres de sagesse» ont contribué à l'essor des genres littéraires dans l'étape moderne de la culture roumaine et des cultures sud-est européennes. A ce propos, nous retenons l'importance insigne des textes isocratiques pour une meilleure compréhension du phénomène littéraire de cette zone. Le prestige que la rhétorique antique y a revêtu aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles explique cette «oralité» qui est caractéristique pour les littératures sud-est européennes. La destinée que l'oeuvre d'Isocrate a eue dans les cultures grecque et roumaine révèle les progrès de la mentalité et l'«actualité» de ces textes à différents moments. Ses préceptes ont trouvé une audience ininterrompue, depuis leur traduction en grec vulgaire par Sévastos Kyminitis, et leurs éditions dues à Moisioudax et Koray, jusqu'à leur apparition fréquente dans les cours des Académies de Bucarest et de Jassy. Evidemment, l'écho n'était pas toujours le même et c'est en retraçant la courbe que cet ouvrage a inscrite dans la littérature roumaine qu'Al. Duțu constate qu'il y fit son entrée par la traduction critique de Dinicu Golescu, précisément au moment où il perdait son actualité et après avoir eu une si riche carrière dans la tradition manuscrite.

Mais nous n'avons cité là qu'un seul exemple des procédés employés avec succès dans cette enquête. C'est le mérite de l'auteur d'avoir su établir des filiations, identifier des ouvrages peu ou mal connus et surtout d'avoir redécouvert les sens profonds de ce genre littéraire. Sans se confiner uniquement dans le cadre offert par ce dernier, Al. Duțu a également eu en vue le phénomène culturel dans son ensemble et surtout le rapport livre-société qui en dévoilant les mutations sociales contribuent à clarifier la fonction de ces écrits.

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Konrad Dilger, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des osmanischen Hofzeremoniells im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (Beiträge zur Kenntnis Südosteuropas und des Nahen Orients, IV. Band), München, Dr. Rudolf Trofenik, 1967, pp. 141.

Little substantive work has been done on the Ottoman court ceremonial during the period from the emergence of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the 16th century when it reached the height of grandeur and power. It is therefore good to have Dr. Konrad Dilger's study—albeit restricted and in some ways deficient—on the formation of the ceremonial in the century between the reign of Murad II (1421-1481) and the death of Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566, when, according to the author, the court ceremonial had become largely formalized. But Dilger is not interested merely in investigating the evolution of the ceremonial; he is concerned also with tracing and establishing its origin. In opposition to the prevailing and accepted opinion of many eminent authorities that the Ottomans had been so strongly influenced by the Byzantine Empire that they had, in fact, taken over much of its court arrangements—as evidenced by the *Qânûnnâme* (=collection of regulations) ascribed to Mehmed II the Conqueror, which contains «abundant information on the ceremonial and individual offices»—he propounds the thesis of an autonomous evolution of the ceremonial from existing situations during the period under consideration. To prove this proposition, the author had divided his study into two parts.

In the first part, Dilger attempts to demolish the accepted opinion of the Byzantine Empire's influence on the Ottoman court ceremonial through a technical examination of Mehmed II's «ceremonial law» («*Zeremoniengesetz*»), which can be referred to only briefly. Scrutinizing the three published variant texts of the *Qânûnnâme* from the point of view of «designation» of the document by the different authors, of its conceptual «character», and of the «dating» of the text on the basis of internal evidence and objective facts, Dilger reaches the conclusion that the «*Qânûnnâme* keineswegs unter Mehmed II. abgefasst wurde, sondern ein durch ständige Veränderungen und Zusätze allmählich zusammengewachsenes Konglomerat bildet, das eine einheitliche Datierung nicht erlaubt» (pp. 34-35). Consequently, «Die These, dass Mehmed II. (1451-1481) das Zeremoniell gestaltet und dies unter Nachahmung byzantinischer Verhältnisse getan habe, muss aufgegeben werden. Das Mehmed II. zugeschriebene *Qânûnnâme*, auf das sie sich allein stützen lässt, scheidet als Quelle für die Zeit der Eroberers aus» (p. 122). Such categorical rejection of the established view of Mehmed II's shaping of the Ottoman court ceremonial under Byzantine influence is unwarranted, however. This opinion is not invalidated by trying to prove that the *Qânûnnâme* was not the creation of this monarch.

To the contrary, historical evidence, in fact, points to Byzantine influences on the ceremonial. For over a century the Ottomans had lived in close proximity of this empire of an ancient and high civilization and they had political, social and even matrimonial relations with the rulers in Constantinople. Hence they undoubtedly were acquainted with the court ceremonial there, which offered them, mainly a warrior people of a lower cultural level at the time, an appropriate model—a phenomenon that has been observed many times in history, and, of course, does not preclude earlier Seldjuk, Persian or other influences—for their own court arrangements. Especially so, if it is remembered that Mehmed II's ambition was to conquer Constantinople and establish himself «successor» to the emperors of Byzantium. Mehmed's (an historically conscious prince's) view of himself as successor to the emperors is not fanciful at all; nor had this idea escaped the minds of leaders in the Christian world, for both the Orthodox Church and the Church of Rome were (for different political reasons) interested in legitimizing this succession through their futile proposals to the Conqueror for conversion to Christianity (Georges Th. Zoras, «Orientations ideologiques et politiques avant et après la chute de Constantinople», in *La Cinq-Centième Anniversaire de la Prise de Constantinople 1453-1953* [Athens, 1953], pp. 103-123; here pp. 117-119). Further, it is known that after the capture of Constantinople, Mehmed II had ransomed important Greek personages to assist him in organizing the new imperial administration. From the start, Greeks controlled the sultan's chancery and they also must have served as a channel for influence on the court ceremonial. Additional evidence of the Byzantine influence was the retention of Greek as the official language of the new empire, at least to the middle of the 16th century. The Greek language, says A. Argyropoulos, «était demeurée la langue officielle du nouvel empire dans plus d'un secteur des activités de l'Etat, dans les relations du Conquerant avec ses propres sujets et avec l'étranger», and gives many examples of this («Les Grecs au service de la empire ottoman», in *La Cinq-Centième*, pp. 157-177; here p. 159). Finally, there was, I believe, a direct Byzantine influence on the theory and practice of Ottoman relations with the European nations that had an important bearing on some aspects of the ceremonial, which Dilger has completely overlooked¹.

On the basis of these and other historical facts, it is my view that the *Qânûnnâme* was indeed begun late in the reign of the Conqueror (with the aid of his legal counselor Qaramani

1. The writer is preparing a study on the subject.

Mehmed Paşa and probably of some Greeks, as indicated above) but that in the expanding and dynamic Ottoman state of that era various developments were bound to affect changes in the structure of the central administration and through it the court ceremonial. Hence as Franz Babinger states: «Vergleicht man freilich die von Mehmed den Eroberer gegen Ende seiner Regierung verfügten Vorschriften mit denen die sein Urenkel Suleymân der Prächtige, den die Osmanen den Gesetzgeber (*qânuni*) nennen, verkündete, so wird ...klar in welchem Ausmass, die politische Gesetzgebung des suleymânischen Weltreichs die Bestimmungen der Erobererzeit ausser Kraft setzen oder ausgestalten musste» (*Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit. Weltensürmer einer Zeitenwende*, München, 1953, p. 469).

In the second part, Dilger undertakes a reconstruction of the «actual formation» of the court ceremonial on the basis of a limited number (3) of reports of western ambassadors to the Porte, of accounts of merchants and travelers in the Levant and of reminiscences of Christian prisoners who had either escaped or been ransomed from Ottoman captivity. He traces the developments and changes in the ceremonial in: 1) the meeting of the foreign ambassador with the sultan, including such matters as the leading of the envoy to the audience, his behavior and that of the highest Ottoman dignitaries during the audience, the verbal exchanges between the sultan and the ambassador, and the latter's submission of his letters of credence to the sultan; 2) the essence of the gift system at the Porte, describing the presents given by the sultan to the ambassador, and the delivery by the envoy of the presents sent by his prince to the sultan and the highest officials, and 3) the entertainment in the imperial seray, including the dinner given for the visiting envoy, the seating arrangements and the customary behavior of the sultan during the dinner. From this investigation Dilger concludes that in actual operation the ceremonial had not reflected the provisions in the *Qânûnnâme* ascribed to Mehmed II, but that «Das osmanische Hofzeremoniell hat sich vielmehr im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert zwanglos aus der jeweiligen Situation heraus verändert, ohne dass es in irgendeinem Zeitpunkt zu tiefgreifenden Neuerungen gekommen wäre». He argues that «Die entscheidenden Impulse dieser allmählichen Entwicklung gingen von der Erhöhung des Sultans aus, die durch die gewaltige Machtzunahme des osmanischen Reiches unter Mehmed II., Selim I. und Suleymân bewirkt wurde». The elevation of the sultan, he contends, had resulted in his «Absonderung» from the activities of the court which brought about the changes that were «für das Zeremoniell von unmittelbarem Einfluss» (pp. 122-123).

These conclusions do not square with the historical facts. During the period covered in this study the Ottoman Empire had reached the height of political power under its greatest, most ambitious and aggressive sultans. While this had indeed elevated them (starting with Mehmed II (see Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 469) not only in their own eyes but also in the eyes of the Christian world, it had not resulted in their withdrawal from court activities in the Dilger sense—which leaves the impression that they had become mere figureheads. Consider, for example, the relations of the two most important Ottoman monarchs with their grand viziers and the *divan*. In the case of Mehmed II who through most of his reign presided over the deliberations of the *divan*, his delegation of this function to the grand vizier toward the end of his life was due *solely* to the grave deterioration in his health which actually led him to isolate himself completely from the life of the court. His «Absonderung» from the deliberations of the *divan* and other activities had nothing to do with his «elevation». (Babinger, *op. cit.*, p. 460 ff). Or take Suleiman the Magnificent. This sultan had endowed his grand vizier Ibrahim-Paşa (a Greek by birth) with powers, which none of his predecessors would have dreamed of allowing to their grand viziers; but when Ibrahim allegedly threatened the throne and the Ottoman dynasty, Suleiman (with a pronouncement by the Mufti) had him murdered. (For this interesting Ibrahim-Paşa episode, including a discussion of the extraordinary diploma

[*berat*] in which Suleiman conferred on him absolute powers, see J. W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, III, pp. 69-81). This incident shows clearly where the *locus* of authority and power had remained during that era (Cf. *Hofzeremoniell*, p. 37 ff).

What history does show, however, is that with acquisition of a vast empire, many of the functions formerly carried out by the rulers themselves had to be delegated to others for whom new positions or functions were created. «Je mehr», says Zinkeisen, «das osmanische Reich an Umfang, an politischer Bedeutung, an Machtentwicklung und weltgeschichtlichem Einfluss nach Aussen hin gewann, desto mehr musste es sich auch offenbaren, dass selbst ein Mohammed II. und ein Suleiman I., wenn auch ausgerüstet mit allen Attributen geistlicher und weltlicher Machtvollkommenheit, doch nicht im Stande seien, die Regierung eines solchen Staates allein und überall selbstthätig eingreifend zu führen» (*op. cit.*, III, p. 60). Thus in the conduct of foreign relations, for instance, while Murad II or even Mehmed II could personally negotiate a treaty with an occasional envoy from the West, this became extremely burdensome and complicated when with Bayezid II (1481-1512) Ottoman relations with Europe greatly expanded and the tasks had to be assigned to the grand vizier and other high officials. One begins to appreciate this when perusing the extant dispatches, diaries and reports of eastern and western ambassadors to the Porte describing their intricate negotiations with the respective officials of the provisions in the various treaties of peace or of capitulations during that period.

Dilger's study of the ceremonial is restricted to its functioning within the court proper, and, moreover, the author paints an idealized picture of it. Actually, the court ceremonial extended to the envoy's entry into Istanbul and culminated in his audience with the sultan, in the following progression: 1) the envoy and his entourage were to be met by high Ottoman dignitaries and all foreign ambassadors in the capital who were to accompany them in their festive procession through the city and past the palace where they were watched by the sultan, his family and the entire court; the envoy and his retinue were then installed in quarters provided for them by the Porte; 2) on a prearranged date (usually with the chief dragoman of the Porte) there was the ceremonial ride of the ambassador on the grand vizier's horse to an audience with that dignitary, the other viziers (the *kubbe vizirleri*) and high officials. At this meeting the envoy announced the purpose of his mission and delivered the letters and gifts sent by his prince to the grand vizier and the other dignitaries. He was then interrogated on conditions in his country and on the relations of his government with the other European powers (See, e.g., the report of Erazm Otwinowski who, as an «interpreter of eastern languages», accompanied ambassador Andrzej Brzycki on his mission to the Porte in 1557, in J. I. Kraszewski, *Podróże i poselstwa polskie do Turcyi* (Kraków, 1860, p. 14 ff)¹. Though well informed on conditions abroad, information gathered in such meeting helped the Ottoman diplomats not only in the particular negotiation but also was utilized to great advantage in negotiations with representatives of other Christian nations; 3) there then followed another audience with the grand vizier and the official dinner for the envoy. Usually, steps 2 and 3 were combined; but it is important to note that the audience and the dinner were arranged for the «pay-day» of the Janizaries, so that the envoy and his colleagues could witness the ceremony connected with it and be impressed by the display of the financial strength of the Porte and the regularity of payment of its troops something which was almost non-existent in Europe at that time. Dilger devotes considerable space to the changes in the character and formalities of the dinner

1. A. Zajaczkowski - J. Reychman wrongly list Erazm Otwinowski as the envoy (See, *Zarys dyplomatyki osmansko-tureckiej*, p. 116, and *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomats*, p. 175).

(«Das Gastmahl für die Gesandten», pp. 104-121), and points out that «Solange die Osmanenherrscher öffentlichen Hof hielten, fand die Bewirtung am Schluss der Audienz statt. Der Sultan nahm also an der Mahlzeit teil» (p. 105). However, «Als seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts die Gesandten ausländischer Mächte nicht mehr in öffentlicher Audienz vom Sultan empfangen wurden, erfolgte ihre Bewirtung während der vom Grossvesir geleiteten Divanversammlungen» (p. 109). But what Dilger fails to recognize is that it was precisely because since Bayezid II the sultans no longer personally negotiated with foreign envoys that they abolished the open court entertainment, although the reception of envoys in public audience was not abandoned, as witness the Imperial ambassador Busbecq's account of his festive reception by Suleiman the Magnificent at Amasia (Zinkeisen, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 20-22); 4) after the dinner, the ambassador and a number of the more prominent members of his mission were to be led to the audience with the sultan.

A major part of the book is given over to this subject (pp. 37-103), which was outlined (on page 4) above. Space does not permit a critical examination of it, except to say that in his study of the Ottoman court ceremonial Dilger has completely disregarded the politics of the reception and treatment of the foreign envoys by the Porte. Foreign ambassadors, says Janusz Pajewski, «were received according to ceremonial, but depending on whether they represented hostile or friendly states» (*Bünczuk i koncerz. Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*, Warszawa, 1963, p. 27). And Zinkeisen, in a special essay on the subject, says: «Hatten die Verhältnisse zu einer Macht einen feindlichen oder gespannten Charakter angenommen, so wurde der Vertreter derselben zum Handkuss des Sultans entweder gar nicht oder nur unter entwürdigenden Umständen zugelassen; der Sultan gönnte ihm dann weder Wort noch Blick, das herkömmliche Ehrenbanket wurde ihm nicht gewährt und man entliess ihn ohne die üblichen Geschenke und die sonstigen Ehrenbezeugungen». («Etwas über die Stellung und Behandlung der Gesandten christlicher Mächte bei der Pforte in den früheren Zeiten», *op. cit.*, III, pp. 829-856; here pp. 855-856).

However, one point requires consideration: Dilger's discussion of the gifts given by the sultan to the ambassador. He tells us (pp. 96-100) that these consisted of «Ehrenkleidern... und Geld», the latter «zur Deckung der Ausgaben» of the envoy during his stay in the capital—the so called *ta'yin*. *Ta'yin* was not a «Geschenk», however; it was the method used by the Ottoman government of financing the exchange of envoys with European countries till the end of the 18th century. The Porte provided living quarters for the envoys and their retinues (see above, p. b) and paid them *ta'yin* in natura and money from the time the ambassadors crossed the frontier and throughout their stay in the empire. In reciprocation, its envoys had to be quartered and fed in the European countries. The costs of *ta'yin* were often exorbitant and created difficulties and complaints on both sides (See, e.g., Jan Reychman's discussion of the Polish experience during the visit of Seyid Numan-bey, the last Ottoman ambassador to Poland, in 1777, in his highly valuable *Orient w kulturze polskiego oswiecenia*, Wroczaw, 1964, pp. 23-34)¹. But as Zinkeisen points out, «Nur machte man dabei einen Unterschied zwischen den Abgesandten befreundeter und nicht befreundeter Mächte», and provides shocking details of the treatment of the Imperial ambassadors in violation of the established Ottoman court ceremonial and of international law (*op. cit.*, III, p. 850 ff.).

Dilger's study is not definitive work on the Ottoman court ceremonial during the 15th and 16th centuries, which the author makes it out to be. Such a substantive work is indeed needed, but it can be produced only on the basis of intensive research in the accounts of western and eastern ambassadors to the Porte during that period. Here then is an opportunity

1. This scholarly work is still awaiting a translation into a western European language.

for a series of doctoral dissertations and an eventual synthesis of their findings in a comprehensive *opus* on the subject.

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Nicolaas H. Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship. According to the Firmāns of Murad III (1575-1595) extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik*, The Hague-Paris, Mouton & Co., 1967, pp. 203.

The ancient aristocratic Ragusan Republic (*Respublica Ragusina*; modern Dubrovnik) became a tributary of the Ottoman Empire by the treaty (*'ahdnāme*) of 1442, in which it obligated itself to pay a yearly tribute (*h̄irac*) of 1,000 gold ducats. A series of increases over the years brought the annual tribute to 12,000 gold ducats in 1481, at which sum it became fixed. It is with this tributary relationship between Ragusa/Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Murad III (1575-1595) that Dr. Nicolaas H. Biegman concerns himself in the book under review. In contrast to two earlier studies. Ivan Bužić's *Dubrovnik i Turska u XIV i XV Veku* (Beograd, 1952) and Vuk Vinaver's *Dubrovnik i Turska u XVIII Veku* (Beograd, 1960), which are based almost entirely on non-Turkish sources, Biegman's work is based on Ottoman-Turkish documents, including the *'ahdnāme* granted Ragusa by Murad III in 1575 and some hundred decrees (*firmāns*) concerning Ragusan affairs issued by the Sultan during his twenty years reign, which have survived in the Historical Archives in Dubrovnik (Historijski Arhiv u Dubrovniku). These documents as well as other (Dubrovnik) archival materials which Biegman used in writing the book (see, «Introduction») help illuminate the Ragusan-Ottoman relations during the period under consideration.

However, before entering on a discussion of the relationship between the Ragusan Republic, as a tributary, and the Ottoman Empire, Biegman first unravels the complicated legal position which Ragusa had occupied vis-à-vis the Empire (Ch. II). Briefly, he points out that although under the Muslim law of the Empire the Ragusans were *h̄irac* paying *dh̄ūmmis* or *re'īyā* and from the Ottoman point of view were under the sovereignty of the sultan, in reality, by the terms of the *'ahdnāme* and the various *firmāns*, Ragusa «had a very independent position within the Empire»: it had its own system of government (Ch. I), coined its own money, concluded its own treaties with foreign powers, and had its own consuls in the Ottoman Empire and in other countries. And in Ragusa resided consuls of Spain, France and Tuscany. Ragusa maintained contacts with the Sublime Porte and the various Ottoman authorities through its envoys, but its «most important as well as the only regular mission was that of the two ambassadors (*poklisari*) who were charged with delivering the yearly tribute to the Sultan as well as with dealing with any other questions which might need their attention in Constantinople». In a concluding section of the chapter, Biegman discusses the «objective reasons» why the sultans had never threatened the autonomous existence of the Ragusan Republic: its payment of the substantial annual tribute into the Ottoman treasury in relation to its size; its yearly payment of some 1,600 gold ducats as customs duty for goods imported into the Empire, and its expenditure of considerable sums «as presents to acquire and keep up the friendship of various Turkish authorities». Ragusa also provided a useful point of contact with Mediterranean countries, as travellers often entered or left the Empire there, and it was a suitable place for the exchange of prisoners. Ragusa, moreover, played an important «part in supplying Turkey with information» on political and other developments in Europe (See below, p. 4). In the four succeeding chapters that are the heart of the book, Biegman fo-