

global activities and astoundingly varied personalities of this organization. Denied use of OSS archives, the author was forced to build from largely secondary, and often journalistic, sources, supplemented by interviews with former OSS personnel and research in OSS related materials available at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University. Referring to himself as an, «academic journalist», Smith offers his book as, «a first step toward extending intellectual responsibility into a new field of public concern», (*i.e.* the intelligence community) and, as already suggested, he has succeeded. Given the present when the CIA is targeted as the cause of every evil from domestic assassination to underwriting scholarly journals, it is important to be reminded how new that agency is and how its predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services came into being. Born in 1941 as the COI (Office of the Coordinator of Information) the new organization (and its director William Donovan) was quickly denounced by Goebbels, the United States Army, and the FBI. Though COI survived to become the OSS it never lost its aura of controversy. This is in part due to the great diversity of personalities and political viewpoints found on the staff. Extremists of any persuasion could always find their arch foes to denounce on the OSS roles, conveniently overlooking their allies in the same unit. But Donovan was interested only in winning the war and was willing to utilize any and all who could and would contribute to that end. This diversity also provides the book with a collection of personalities that is as delightful as it is unexpected. The founder of the John Birch Society, a Korean Communist, a Hollywood star, a newspaper columnist, a TV cook, and an impressive list of contemporary academicians all had a part in what appears to have been the least organized of organizations. This confusion showed rather clearly in OSS Balkan operations, covered, for all practical purposes, in a single chapter, «Of Communists and Kings», which deals largely with Yugoslavia. While the British reacted to the Chetnik-Partisan rivalry with investigation in the mountains of Serbia and Croatia, OSS inquiries were stalled by the British and stymied by the unilateral decision of an OSS major who smuggled himself into Partisan territory and later sent over four hundred tons of supplies to Tito's men before being removed from his post for his venture into policy making. With this inauspicious beginning the OSS attempted to maintain contact first with both Mihailovic and Tito, later with Tito alone, and then saw this liaison end apparently as part of the Trieste dispute. American policy and the OSS had failed in Yugoslavia. But who, in 1945, could predict things to come? And perhaps there lies the lesson for the present; today's judgements, be they easy or hard, will eventually face a final examination, that of the future. Smith's book, for the insight it provides into one aspect of World War II, will help us to write that examination. And that is all any student can ask of a book.

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Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1973, pp. xxvi+376, Bibliography, Index.

In *Codeword BARBAROSSA* Barton Whaley has attempted a variety of tasks and has succeeded in each of them. As suggested by the title, the book deals with Germany's June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), though limited to events leading to the attack. It is something of a detective story as it poses a fundamental question early in the text and provides the answer only at the end. It is also a case-study in the collection and dissemination of strategic intelligence and it offers a new operational generalization on the struggle for attention between valid intelligence and ambiguous data. The treatment of the

decision and preparation for Barbarossa makes clear Hitler's determination to attack his ally of 23 August 1939, and provides support for the often questioned contention that the coup in Yugoslavia and the resulting German reaction did delay the invasion of Russia — from the 15th of May to the 22nd of June. But the Soviet Union did nothing with this five weeks of grace and here is the, «detective story». Why, asks Professor Whaley, was German tactical surprise so complete? The answer slowly unfolds in a magnificent, and often humorous, review of intelligence operations in the early 1940's. With almost everybody's diplomatic codes known by at least one other power and with informants freely feeding foreign correspondents, the Pope, and the Soviet Union correct data on Nazi intentions, surely the, «surprise», must have been compromised. One is naturally reminded of the Pearl Harbor controversy in the United States and, significantly, it was Roberta Wohlstetter's, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, which served as the jumping off point for Whaley's investigation. But where Wohlstetter concluded that an after-the-fact clear warning could seem less clear at the crucial moment due to other equally plausible information and assumptions, Whaley offers another, most important, consideration: intentional deception. After discussing 84 specific warnings, most of which seem likely to have reached Moscow, the author turns to the German deception campaign begun 31 July 1940 and continued to the last moment, 22 June 1941. The first signs of German troops movements east were leaked as being part of preparations for the invasion of Great Britain (Operation Sea Lion), staged in an area beyond British aerial intelligence. In mid-February, 1941, this was altered to explain the eastern concentration as a cover to confuse the British and facilitate Sea Lion. As late as 13 June the German deception program allowed word of an imminent invasion of England to appear in plausible settings. A second cover for Barbarossa was to present it as simple defensive activity against a potential Russian offense. Then, with the Balkan invasion, Barbarossa was explained as part of the march into Yugoslavia, later as support for the invasion of Greece, and still later as part of the Crete campaign. Yet another cover story was that of an ultimatum. Whether or not this was the creation of the German Foreign Ministry or a fortuitous utilization of an independent rumor is undetermined but in May of 1941 a story began to circulate at the highest levels that, in effect, the German show of strength along the Soviet border was to precede an ultimatum and that war could result only after the inevitable diplomatic exchange following the Nazi demands. These represent the most important inventions utilized by the Germans and were given all the cover and routing of actual operational plans. While Germany prepared for war, the Soviet Union, overwhelmed by fact and fiction, chose one of the fictions — far more logical than the fact of Hitler's acceptance of a two front war — and secure in that fiction suffered its initial defeat. Though conventional wisdom blames Stalin for the total lack of preparation, Professor Whaley disagrees. «The great failure was, with few exceptions, a general failure». Few, indeed, interpreted the available data correctly and this, «holds a sober lesson for all intelligence services and national policy makers».

Having had some slight personal experience in military intelligence I feel safe in predicting *Codeword BARBAROSSA* will be closely read in national security circles and I only hope it will be given equal consideration by social scientists. Every act represents a selection from competing alternatives though the historian too often ignores this. Failing to find logic to support fact, he retreats to dark hints of conspiracy, plot, and subversion. But as Whaley clearly establishes, deception, properly programed and presented, can have a decisive impact on the evaluation of alternatives — ask the citizens of Troy.

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