

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 353.

A distinguished Yugoslav economist of skeptical demeanor was recently asked about President Tito's assertion in 1955 that Yugoslavia could form a bridge between East and West: «When you're a bridge», the gentleman observed, «people sometimes march over you». So much for the prospects of small-state diplomacy.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein has undertaken to describe the major sustained initiative on the part of a small state in post-war world affairs, the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment. As a catalogue of diplomatic initiatives and personal acts of statesmanship, the book abounds in detail and is an important source on the subject. Rubinstein is very much impressed with the high quality of Yugoslav diplomacy and with the great energy which has been exerted at all levels to put nonalignment into practice. He is undeniably correct in stressing Tito's own role for, as Rubinstein puts it, «That the leader of a small, weak, insufficiently developed country in the Balkans could have an impact far beyond the logic of his power position needs to be mentioned, for whatever importance nonalignment had in the past, holds presently or aspires to in the future inheres in a central consideration of diplomacy: its human ingredient» (p. 117). Tito and Nehru are especially well characterized.

This emphasis on the personal character of nonalignment is compatible with Rubinstein's attention to the techniques and outcomes of foreign policy. Perhaps the book's chief contribution is its account of Yugoslav use of the United Nations as a vehicle for the development of a foreign policy. Students of international relations will find rewarding reading in Rubinstein's portrayal of that organization as a school where Yugoslavia's talented diplomats learned not only to deal with the postwar world but also to make new friends, particularly among Asian socialists, with whom they could form coalitions of varying permanence to defeat their natural disadvantages as representatives of a small state and a latecomer on the international scene. U.N. activity was also responsible for the well developed sense of entrepreneurship which is evident at many levels of Yugoslav diplomacy. The calculated risk-taking behind Yugoslavia's early support of Egypt and Algeria is attributable in large part to the careful application of lessons learned at Turtle Bay. Similarly, Rubinstein's emphasis on the conditioning role of the U.N. on Yugoslav foreign policy reflects his recognition of the undeniable impact of Great Power motives and reactions upon that policy.

Rubinstein quotes an associate of Tito to the effect that «Nonalignment is not the soul of his policy: the soul is the active struggle for a new pattern of international relationships» (p. 113). This is true and essential to an understanding of Yugoslav foreign policy; however herein lies one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the book, for Rubinstein fails to get at the underlying causes of this struggle. He agrees with official Yugoslav historiography about the Cold War origins of nonalignment. Arguing that «Yugoslavia drifted into nonalignment» (p. 69) to satisfy various Party factions in the years following the expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, he is at pains to demonstrate the improvisational and even serendipitous aspects of nonalignment. By calling attention to the «inadvertent» and «fortuitous» nature of Yugoslav foreign policy (p. 72), he fails to consider the ideological underpinning of that policy and thus to explain what otherwise has sometimes appeared to be questionable behavior. As the leading Yugoslav authority on the subject, Leo Mates, often has pointed out, nonalignment was not the only possible course open to Yugoslavia after 1948 but was rather the most risky of all options. It would have been far more reasonable for Yugoslavia to have allied either with the East or with the West as far as its national security and prospects for economic development were concerned. That nonalignment was the chosen course can be

traced to careful ideological preparation before the outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet Union. The very obstinacy of the Yugoslav leadership in maintaining its nonaligned associations in the face of increasing recognition of their «Europeanness», a recognition which Rubinstein shares, is continuing evidence that nonalignment is more than an expedient.

Rubinstein is aware that Yugoslavia is not just another opportunistic small state, acknowledging that politically conscious Yugoslavs «would hate to see Yugoslavia become the Switzerland of the Balkans: prosperous, smug, insular» (p. 222). He is also concerned to get at the relationship between Yugoslavia's communism and its foreign policy. Although he poses the «crucial question: how does Yugoslavia's being a Communist country contribute to shaping its behavior and foreign policy?» (p. 109), his stress on diplomacy at the expense of ideology and history condemns him to leaving the question unanswered. He asserts that «Yugoslav leaders are driven by their ideology to international activism» (p. 287) but fails to explain how or for what reasons. He has similar difficulty when he comes to discuss the connection between socialism and nonalignment or, more narrowly, between domestic and foreign policy. There are numerous intriguing hints throughout the book regarding such connections, but they are badly illuminated. Making the important observation that, when nonalignment conflicts with a more generalized internationalism, the Yugoslavs have opted for the former, as in the case when Yugoslavia supported Egypt in its call to have UNEF forces withdrawn in 1967, he attributes the action to Yugoslavia's disbelief in international organization as a stepping stone to world government (p. 145). Again, he does not get at the positive sources of nonalignment.

Edvard Kardelj's study, *The Development of the Slovenian National Question*, written in 1938, attempts to reconcile the problems of a multinational state with the demands of Communist internationalist ideology. His solution, the recognition of the equality of all nations and the careful cultivation of the good qualities of each rather than the subordination of the nationalities to a higher authority, became the building block of successive Yugoslav Constitutions after 1946 in their efforts to create just and lasting solutions to the perennial national question in a socialist framework. At the same time, Kardelj's principles have been applied consistently to Yugoslav foreign policy. By recognizing their common material interests, all persons will eventually become direct citizens of the world; for Kardelj, socialist and nationalist consciousness are necessary complements, and international cooperation, first within the multinational state and later in the world at large, is the means by which they will be reconciled.

Tito told a group of workers in 1946 that the real international question facing the new Yugoslavia was not the existence of two geographical antagonists, as the Soviet Union held, but rather of two hostile tendencies: «Today», he said, «there are these two fronts: the front of democracy and peace and the front of reaction and of war provocateurs, and not two fronts of West and East». In January, 1947, Kardelj observed that capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union had ended and that the threat to socialism and peace was far more diffuse and thus more dangerous than the simple notion of East-West conflict had made it seem. The West itself was divided, and Kardelj found the chief enemy of peace to reside specifically in imperialism and aggression, and not in capitalism. By analyzing international relations functionally and demonstrating that forces for peace and forces of reaction vied almost in the form of class struggle within each state, he laid the foundation for the voluminous subsequent writings on the international system before and after 1948 by Djilas and others, writings which described a changed view of the international system and of Yugoslavia's place within it. The policy of nonalignment as a universally applicable system of international relations has developed gradually, as Rubinstein asserts, but the direction and nature of

its development were established well before Yugoslavia was forced to make a way for itself beyond the Soviet fold. That third world non-communist countries and even the capitalist countries of Western Europe can be regarded as progressive is a matter of ideology as well as of policy and can be traced to the Yugoslav Communists' preoccupation in the days before and shortly after they came to power with accommodating a difficult domestic situation to the projected socialist future. Rubinstein's failure to seek out the deep roots of nonalignment results in his conclusion that the Yugoslav Communists «may still feel the emotional tug of Moscow but their heads are elsewhere — in the Third World and the markets and technology of the West» (p. 328). The fact is that emotion — or, more correctly, ideology — attracts them to all three areas and indeed that the distinction between emotion and reason is much less obvious than indicated in this formulation. For Yugoslav Communists, blocs are not only wrong, they are irrelevant to the true distribution of forces in the world.

The uncertainty of the future is an inevitable conclusion in any study of international relations. Rubinstein's is no exception. His conclusion is only partially mitigated by a recognition that nonalignment is a function of longstanding ideology and is not simply a combination of Tito's personality and good fortune. Since Rubinstein completed his book, Nasser has died, the Yugoslavs have become involved in negotiations for Mediterranean cooperation, Tito has been awarded the Order of Lenin, there has been yet another Middle East war, and Yugoslavia has twice signed trade agreements with the European Economic Community. Evidence is readily available to prove that Yugoslavia is moving left, right, and center all at the same time. One cannot say that nonalignment is being sacrificed, because the motives which existed for establishing a nonaligned policy in the first place are still those which animate Yugoslav foreign and domestic policy. Yugoslavia remains in the minds of its leaders a model as well as a guiding spirit of the future international system, and this model is likely to outlive both personalities and changing fortune. As Tito once reminded critics, it is better to be a bridge than a chasm.

Center for International Studies
Cornell University

CYNTHIA W. FREY

Leo Mates, *Nonalignment — Theory and Current Policy*, Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics, and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972, pp. 543.

Leo Mates defines nonalignment as «a policy strictly based on independence, conducted by states which experience a strong feeling of insecurity but are not able to cope with events in their environment. It is substantially a defensive policy, but one that is at the same time imbued with fervent nationalism» (p. 108). Part I of *Nonalignment* focuses upon the origins of the movement, with emphasis on the problems of the developing countries, and Part II is devoted to international relations during the Cold War and beyond. The last hundred pages of the book contain an appendix of useful documents of the nonaligned movement.

It is the great strength of this book that it demonstrates the connection between the domestic needs and the foreign policies of the states which call themselves nonaligned. It is suitable that such a work be written by a Yugoslav, as that state perhaps more than any other is evidence of such a connection. Because it was written by Mates it can be taken as the authoritative statement from within the movement on nonalignment. Recently retired after ten years as Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade, Mates has been involved with the development of Yugoslav foreign policy from the beginning. A Communist from 1937, he was active in the Communist youth movement, was a Partisan, then