

of everything, σὸ κάτω-κάτω τῆς γρᾶφῆς, that is how the Nazi occupation was defeated.

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Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire 1717-1740*. London: John Murray, 1966. Pp. 226.

In August 1717, Prince Eugene of Savoy, though greatly outnumbered, routed a Turkish relief below the ramparts of Belgrade and took possession of "Stadt und Festung Belgrad" in the name of Emperor Charles VI. The hard thus pressed Porte was forced to sign the Treaty of Passarowitz in the following year surrendering to the Habsburgs the remainder of Hungary, most of Serbia, and parts of Wallachia and Bosnia as well. The military humiliation of the Turks dismayed the French, who for nearly two hundred years had been able to count on the Ottoman threat against the southeastern frontiers of the Habsburg dominions.

In the period following the Passarowitz Treaty, the Turks suffered further defeats by Persia; the time appeared ripe for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, for the next twenty-two years, Austria and Russia in concert attempted to exploit the weakness of the Turks, and at times the prize, total or partial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, seemed well within the reach of their military and diplomatic resources. France, on the other hand, tried to stiffen the Turkish will to resist, and the hero of this book is the French ambassador to the Porte, the Marquis de Villeneuve, who, in Mrs. Cassels words, "achieved one of the most brilliant diplomatic coups of the century," by mediating the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739.

When both Russia and Austria attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1737, the Turks, with French military advice and assistance, were able to withstand the Austrians on the Danube and to contain the Russians along the Black Sea. Then Villeneuve's skillful diplomacy split the alliance and induced Austria, badly served by the unlucky Count Neipperg, to sign the Treaty of Belgrade, which returned to the Turks all the territory (including the fortress Belgrade) gained by the Habsburgs at Passarowitz. As an unavoidable consequence, Russia concluded the Treaty of Nissa barely one month later, thereby leaving the Ottoman Empire substantially intact.

The story of Villeneuve's mission, a triumph for France, a victory for the Turks, a humiliation for Austria, and a setback for Russia, has of course been told before, most notably in Vandal's, *Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV: La mission du Marquis de Villeneuve 1728-41*, which appeared just eighty years ago. What makes this book nonetheless appealing is its readability, its vivid style, and above all the broad approach which places the events within the over-all history of what Professor William McNeill has called "Danubic and Pontic Europe."

Here we have amateur history at its best. The account takes us to the various courts involved, gives vivid glances at the various personalities helping to shape policy, and also provides a fascinating glimpse of life in the foreign colony at Pera, isolated from home, and living in a semi-barbaric, Oriental environment, subject to the abrupt whims of Ottoman policy. To be sure, the book does not escape some faults of amateur history. The author is on much less safe grounds when she leaves personalities and descriptions of the contemporary scene and moves on to military and diplomatic analysis. While the author describes briefly the mercurial career of the Chevalier de Bonneval, she differs with Max Braubach, and does not assign de Bonneval much credit for the improvement in discipline and tactics revealed by the Turkish forces after 1737. At the same time, Mrs. Cassels uncritically accepts the often told tale of interference in military operations by the *Hofkriegsrat* and of the alleged habitual incompetence of the Habsburg generals following the great Eugene. Here she fails to give due weight to the Turkish strategy, which contained the Russians by a scorched earth policy, while concentrating a four to one superiority against the Austrians on the Danube.

The book is primarily based on printed materials. The author has used some documents in the Public Record Office, but unfortunately has not consulted the Turkish, Austrian, or Russian archives. In regards to printed works, Mrs. Cassels is fairly up to date regarding sources and secondary accounts, though again the omission of Russian and Turkish works is regrettable. In addition, the reviewer noted the absence of the useful accounts of the Venetian ambassadors, *Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs über Österreich im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*, edited by Alfred V. Arneth.

All in all, however, these are relatively minor faults in a brief,

but stimulating, volume, which provides a good introduction to a highly complicated topic for the non-specialist reader.

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William St. Clair, *Lord Elgin and the Marbles*, Oxford University Press, London, New York and Toronto, 1967. Pp. viii + 309 + one map + 14 plates.

In the Epilogue to this scholarly and well-written book, Mr. St. Clair touches on the vexed question whether the Elgin Marbles (which are so excellently cared for and displayed by the British Museum) should be returned to Greece. He tells us that since 1890 the question has been raised on an average every five years and that on every occasion the debate on either side of the question has been emotional and ill-informed. Emotional, certainly: it could hardly be otherwise; and should the Marbles ever be returned —and many English hope they will be— the decision will be taken on purely sentimental grounds, perhaps even on artistic grounds, but never on the principle that all works of art should automatically be returned to their place of origin, or even on the legal ground that the Marbles were illegally acquired. We have indeed examples of restitution of stolen works of art. In 1815, but not in 1814 —the European Powers at first were quite content to allow France to retain Napoleon's loot— it was decided that the restored Bourbon monarchy should return to their owners all the treasures that had been stolen. Again after the late war Germany was forced to relinquish the collections made by the Nazis. In these two cases the issues were clear. Two of the world's tyrants had looted territories they had invaded: both were decisively beaten; and it was not only highly reasonable, but indeed feasible, to compel France and Germany to restore the loot. In the case of Lord Elgin's collection, however, the question is not so simple. First of all, his aims, like those of nearly all the early collectors, were entirely honourable: he wished to discover, preserve, and assemble as a collection the best examples of classical Greek art; and he thought that the study of his collection would lead to an improvement in European artistic standards. He certainly had no wish to make personal financial gain; he asked only for reimbursement of his expenses, and he received in fact only rather less than half. Moreover, he obtained as much legal authority as he could from the Turkish Government to remove the trea-