

to his patron, describing the missions which he and Professor J. D. Carlyle made to the Troad, Mount Athos, and to Athens in search of antiquities and manuscripts. It was Hunt who, after the visit to Athens, initiated the famous *firman*, which came to be regarded as an adequate authority for the removal of the Marbles; it was Hunt who, on a visit to Mycenae, "cast covetous eyes over the Lion Gate but decided regretfully that it was too far from the sea for there to be hope of removing it." It was Hunt again who proposed that the whole Caryatid porch of the Erechtheum should be taken to England and there reconstructed.

To the insatiable appetites of the despoilers much of this study is directed and Lord Elgin's place among them is sympathetically examined. Of especial interest, however, is Mr. St. Clair's account of the controversies to which the Marbles gave rise when a part of the collection was exhibited in a shed behind Piccadilly in June 1807. Some of the artists considered these treasures superior to those of Italy—to the Apollo Belvedere, the Laocoon, and the Medici Venus, which had been generally considered to be "Greek" and the noblest examples of "Ideal Beauty." But the majority of the patrons and connoisseurs accepted Richard Payne Knight's view that the Parthenon Marbles were Roman of the time of Hadrian—that they were mere architectural sculptures fashioned by workmen and not by artists. These views were readily accepted by the Society of the Dilettanti and, strange to say, by Lord Byron.

But though Byron did not rate highly the artistic value of the Marbles he raged furiously against Lord Elgin for despoiling a building which had stood for over two thousand years. As Mr. St. Clair rightly points out, "*Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* and *The Curse of Minerva* have coloured the world's view of Lord Elgin's activities ever since they first appeared." Indeed, Elgin's reputation received a blow from which it has never recovered, and, one might add, from which it will never recover, for Byron's invective will always be read when scholarly studies like this have been forgotten.

Birkbeck College

DOUGLAS DAKIN

Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966; London: Pall Mall Press, 1966. Pp. 232.

This is a short book; but its width of view, clear arrangement

and general impartiality make it the best introduction now available in any language to the recent history of Cyprus and to the still unsolved problem which the island poses for the statesmen of the world. Its emphasis, as might be expected from an author who is Foreign Editor of the London *Observer*, is heavily upon modern and indeed contemporary history. The British occupation of 1878 is reached less than a third of the way through the book, while at least half the text deals with the events of the last two decades. For most readers its value will lie mainly in its account of the movement for *enosis* which developed rapidly in the island after the end of World War II, and of the Anglo-Greco-Turkish frictions to which this gave rise and which culminated in the Zurich and London agreements of 1959 and their breakdown in the "Christmas Crisis" of 1963. Mr. Stephens' discussion of these events gains very substantially from the fact that it is based in part on conversations and personal contacts with a number of leading participants (though clearly he has drawn more information of this kind from the Greek than from the Turkish or British sides).

From what he says several general points emerge clearly. One is the essential unimportance of Cyprus from the convention of 1878 onwards (except perhaps to some extent in the middle and later 1950s) to Britain's political and strategic position in the Near East. Another is the way in which, on two occasions at least, in the proposal by the British government of the Winster constitution for the island in May 1948 and in the Harding-Makarios negotiations early in 1956, good chances of a satisfactory and constructive compromise settlement were thrown away. In the first case the obsession of the Greek Cypriots with *enosis* was mainly to blame; in the second the vulnerability of Makarios to the demands of his more extreme followers and the increasing distrust which, justifiably or not, he now aroused in London created insurmountable obstacles. Yet another inescapable conclusion, perhaps the most depressing of all, is the extent to which the attitudes of the Greek and Turkish governments, and to some extent even of that of Britain, were complicated and bedevilled by internal political pressures. Thus the domestic difficulties which the Menderes cabinet was encountering in the later months of 1957, probably account for the increasingly rigid attitude it then adopted over Cyprus; while six years later the opponents of the Karamanlis government in Athens were able to use as a weapon against it the promise that, once in power, they would actively help the Cypriots to achieve *enosis*. Inevitably, as the struggles

over the future of Cyprus went on, there was some tendency for attitudes to become more uncompromising and for the leverage exerted by extremists to increase. This growing bitterness and extremism underlay the dramatic collapse of the short-lived Cyprus Republic at the end of 1963; and though Mr. Stephens finishes his book with some suggestions for its re-establishment as a multinational and demilitarized state with its independence guaranteed by the United Nations, these are put in very general terms and are clearly an expression of hope as much as of expectation.

Those parts of the book which deal with the history of the island before the present century, though very readable, inevitably seem superficial at times, as the author lightly skims over three millenia or more in a mere fifty pages. Moreover, they contain a number of factual errors. Some of these are minor: for example the statement that the Levant Company was founded in 1592, when the correct date is eleven years earlier; or the rather misleading description of John Capodistrias, first president of Greece, as "the former tsarist foreign minister" (p. 59). Others are more serious. It is quite untrue (though the error is repeated depressingly often in textbooks) that the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji of 1774 gave Russia "a virtual right of protectorate" (p. 40) over the Orthodox Christian subjects of the sultan. She was in fact given merely the right to make representations at the Porte on behalf of a new Orthodox church (and its servants) to be built in Constantinople. Again the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi of 1833 certainly did not make the Ottoman Empire "virtually a Russian military protectorate" (p. 60). But it would be ungenerous and unfair to harp too much on these errors in a book whose emphasis is on recent politics rather than on history in a wider sense. The many merits of Mr. Stephens' work, among which an unadorned but clear and effective style is far from the least, entitle it to a wide readership. It is equipped with three maps, footnote references (gathered together at the end of the book) and a useful bibliography.

London School of Economics

M. S. ANDERSON

Ivo Andrić, *The Woman from Sarajevo*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.; London: Calder and Boyars, 1966. Pp. 245.}

It is generally accepted that "Gospodjica," the original title of this novel, is less successful than Andrić's other novels. Of all his works,