

uncle Vlado. This is clear, but it is not convincingly realized. Though all of Andrić's works are more epic than dramatic, the strength of such novels as *The Bridge on the Drina* lies in his ability to achieve a tingling immediacy of atmosphere. In *The Woman from Sarajevo* he fails to do this, perhaps because of the complexity of his symbol. Yet it is a failure only by comparison with Andrić's other novels. It remains a work of profound interest and a worthy contribution to contemporary literature. As a statement it is significant, even though it fails to achieve the stature of a great novel.

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Wolf Seidl, *Bayern in Griechenland. Die Geschichte eines Abenteuers*. München: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1965. Pp. 246.

This book deals with an important yet long neglected topic: the pivotal role played by Bavarians in laying the foundations of the Greek state during the decade of royal absolutism from 1833 to 1843. Major policy decisions were in the hands of Bavarians—Ludwig I, king of Bavaria; his son Otho, the newly-elected king of Greece; and various bureaucrats temporarily released from Bavarian state service to act as officials of the Greek crown. Despite its importance for the history of both Greece and Bavaria, despite the substantial data available in various works on other themes, this subject has received little attention from historians. Hence this work is a milestone, the first book to focus exclusively and completely on the subject. This of itself gives it major significance.

The decade 1833-43—what the author calls “the last world-political adventure” of Bavaria—constitutes the focal point of the book and the subject of two chapters (IV and V) of its seven. There the author attempts to describe and evaluate Bavarian policy and practice. The aim of the book, however, is more comprehensive. It is concerned with origins, the aftermath, and the lasting effects of this brief but close connection between Greek and Bavarian history. The author traces the origins back to two basic sources in the eighteenth century: the European neo-classical movement which culminated in nineteenth-century Philhellenism, and the emergence of Greek nationalism which led to the Greek War of Independence. The first source,

described in Chapter I, is important because Ludwig I became caught up as a youth in this cultural and artistic movement, and through it developed his love of classical art and ancient Greece to the point where he responded romantically and generously to the Greek bid for independence. Chapter II deals with the second theme, the Greek War of Independence. Through a bird's eye view of earlier Greek history and of internal conditions in the 1820's, the author describes how contemporary Greeks differed from the opinion of them held by European lovers of antiquity. Chapter III, dealing with the international recognition of Greek independence, the establishment of a Greek kingdom, and the election of Otho, shows how these two strands of history became intertwined, how, as the author puts it, an essentially cultural-artistic development took concrete political form. In these three chapters, the author analyzes what he considers the basic cause of Bavarian failure in Greece—the contradiction between romantic ideal, which gave the Bavarian program its inspiration and content, and hard reality, which made the implementation of that program impossible. The last two chapters constitute a kind of epilogue. The sixth, entitled "Greece in Bavaria," focuses on the influence, under Ludwig's aegis and patronage, of neo-classicism on Bavarian public architecture. The last deals with the period 1844-62, when constitutional monarch Otho remained the sole Bavarian in Greek public affairs.

This book, written by a professional drama critic and television producer, is the outgrowth of a Bavarian television documentary series on Greece and is the eleventh in the continuing "Unbekanntes Bayern" series devoted to Bavarian culture. As might be expected, it is a short, attractively printed, richly illustrated, popular work addressed to a Bavarian audience and intended to recall to public memory a fascinating chapter of Bavarian history. Because of its subject and the comprehensive treatment this receives, it will also appeal to anyone interested in Greek history or European cultural history. Though popular in character, the book displays high standards of accuracy and great skill in synthesis and exposition. Indeed, its popular character accounts for some of its outstanding merits—its panoramic scope, its broadly interpretive and narrative form, its concern for the cultural and artistic aspects of the Bavarian enterprise, and a dramatic quality which emphasizes the contingent and the unexpected, good intentions gone amiss, and the role played by individuals.

The book has the added merit of making extensive use of pub-

lished original sources (correspondence, memoirs, and travel accounts). The author uses quotations from these sources for two purposes: to support his judgments, and as a dramatic device which allows the reader to see events through the eyes of participants. But these sources do not serve him as they might a professional historian, as a way to unearth new or little known information, to arrive at original interpretations, or to delineate clearly a variety of Bavarian and Greek points of view. Instead, the sources are largely used to illustrate factual or interpretive statements made in secondary sources. Moreover, the title and page reference of the quotations are not given, a particularly serious omission for a pioneering book which will doubtless serve as the logical starting point of any further study. The book really uncovers no new information and offers no new interpretations. No one familiar with the existing literature, scattered and fragmentary though it may be, will acquire any greater understanding than he had. The value of the book is rather that it presents a succinct synthesis of scattered, often relatively inaccessible materials and does so in an engaging and intelligent way.

Because the subject is important, especially for Greek history, its conclusions and its general interpretation require particular consideration. According to this book, in the final analysis the only lasting achievement of the Bavarians in Greece was the restoration of the Acropolis as a historic monument and the transformation of Athens into a modern, functional, rationally planned city, capable of absorbing the growth which has characterized it ever since. Is this interpretation really convincing? Various institutions of the twentieth-century Greek state—the army, centralized administration, church, education, and legal system—have their foundations in the work of the Bavarians and still reflect the form given them in the 1830's.

In its evaluation of the Bavarian performance, this book reaffirms a view which, since its authoritative expression by Mendelssohn-Bartholdy in the 1870's, has in some form or other dominated the historical literature on the subject ever since. According to this view, the Bavarians—doctrinaire, ethnocentric, without adequate knowledge of Greek circumstances, and without consulting Greek wishes—attempted to apply to the alien conditions of Greece a theoretical scheme drawn from Western, more specifically Bavarian, experience. For doctrinaire reasons, Ludwig and Otto denied the Greeks the constitutionalism which had been an aim and product of the Greek revolution. The Bavarian

regency replaced the militarily effective Greek irregular forces with an expensive, not very effective, Western-style regular army of foreign recruits. Finally, the regency created an elaborate administrative and judicial apparatus which far outran both the needs and financial resources of the state. This criticism appears in the accounts of many, though not all, contemporary observers and finds some confirmation in fact.

In the opinion of this reviewer, however, this is only a half-truth which has been uncritically accepted for too long. In the first place, though most Bavarians went to Greece without first-hand knowledge of the country or people, there were channels of information available which they in fact used. In the second place, the traditional view is not the only plausible explanation of Bavarian behavior. The policies pursued by the Bavarians can be explained in terms of actual Greek conditions and the Bavarian response to them. Greece, plagued throughout 1832 by civil war, had demonstrated that opposing political factions were so evenly balanced that civil strife threatened to become a permanent feature of Greek life unless a powerful neutral force was introduced from the outside. This was the fundamental reason for establishing a monarchy of foreigners. Absolutism and centralization, quite apart from the personal preferences of Ludwig and Otho, were devices for limiting decision-making to men who were not identified with any faction and who could be trusted not to exploit state authority for partisan purposes. Since all Greeks of any political stature did have partisan affiliations and thus stimulated the suspicion of their rivals, power was withheld from them and granted to Bavarians. The irregular forces had always been difficult for the state to control and were, by their very organization, more loyal to various political leaders than to the state as such. Unless dissolved or incorporated into, a state-controlled military structure, the rewas always the danger that they would challenge the authority of the state, play into the hands of the parties, and wreak havoc among the peasantry, as they were later to do when irregulars were reconstituted (after a policy shift by the Bavarians) on a limited, *ad hoc* basis. The elaborate administrative and judicial machinery was introduced, in part, on the valid assumption that, until the state could provide for the protection and advancement of individual interests, Greeks would remain faithful to the parties which had come to perform **this** function. Since the parties, regarded by the Bavarians as a major source of civil disturbance, controlled the indigenous system of justice

and administration, a new administrative and judicial apparatus, impartial, non-partisan, and amenable to central control, was considered necessary.

Part of the traditional indictment of the Bavarians is the charge that they forced their policies on a reluctant Greek populace. Actually, many prominent Greeks were, like the Bavarians, themselves Westernizers who supported the introduction of Western institutions. Looking to the liberation of Greeks still living under Ottoman rule and aspiring toward a greater Greece with big power status in the Near East, many Greeks felt that Western-style institutions were necessary to prepare them to outdistance and ultimately replace the Ottoman empire. This goal, a strong motive for Westernization, had its origins in Greece, not Bavaria. In this respect at least, the Bavarians were formulating their program in response to Greek aspirations rather than on the basis of purely Bavarian principles. Moreover, much of the Bavarian program found support among the Greeks. Though virtually all Greeks paid lip-service to constitutionalism and espoused it in principle, all but a few political leaders felt in the 1830's that the time was not ripe for its implementation. Indeed, the revolution of 1843, a concerted and successful bid for constitutional government, came only after each of the three parties had tried and failed to exercise effective power through the existing system of absolutism. In the opinion of this reviewer, the basic Greek objection to absolutism was not that it precluded the free operation of all political forces, but that it prevented one's own party from exercising effective power. Absolutism did, however, have the virtue of keeping one's political opponents from dominating the state. As for the large bureaucratic structure, though criticized as an unnecessary financial burden and considered a mere product of the Bavarian love of system, it satisfied only a part of the heavy Greek demand for public office as a source of livelihood and as a reward for revolutionary service.

If this book is judged in terms of the stated goals of the author, we must say, in fairness, that the book went only as far as the existing literature allowed and reflects the shortcomings of that literature. Had the author, however, read the original published sources more critically, and used the detailed secondary sources more fully, he might have stated the traditional view with greater caution. The purpose of the book—to make readily available to the average reader an accurate, engaging, relatively short and comprehensive account of an important

subject— is legitimate, praiseworthy, and successfully carried out. But, as the author himself points out, much more research, based on unpublished archival material, needs to be done both in Greece and Bavaria before anything approaching a definitive account is possible. And we still need a book (which could be based on primary and secondary printed sources) on the Bavarians in Greece that will question some of the traditional interpretations and point to some of the major problems needing investigation.

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Georges B. Kavadias, *Pasteurs nomades méditerranéens: Les Saracatsans de Grèce*. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1965. Pp. xi+444.

Aiming at a study of cultural and social anthropology, Kavadias has organized his book on Saracatsan society and culture into four parts: Saracatsan techniques and technology, i. e. the methods by which Saracatsan man (and woman) manipulates nature; Saracatsan society; Saracatsan rites, values, and beliefs; and the holistic aspects of Saracatsan society and culture. André Leroi-Gourhan, an innovator in prehistoric and early historic anthropology of techniques, honors the book with a preface, for it is intended to be the first volume in a series (directed by Paul Albou) entitled "Collection Sciences Humaines Appliquées." These gestures are quite appropriate, as one of the chief objectives of the author is to define and analyze Saracatsan material culture, or the relationship between man and nature, and man and man's works. While such an interest has long been prominent in Central and Eastern Europe (both pre-Communist and Communist) scholarship, major theoretical contributions to the study of man's works have primarily stemmed from French (and a few but notable American) scholars: Marcel Mauss, André Varnaguet, and Leroi-Gourhan in anthropology, Ignace Meyerson in psychology, and Marc Bloch and Fernand Braudel in history. Kavadias has profited from the studies of all these scholars except Braudel's, and has also had recourse to certain studies of the historian Lucien Febvre and the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. His approach is thus largely structuralist (or *gestaltist*), and this greatly aids the readers to comprehend Saracatsan society and culture. Kavadias is less of an innovator than the scholars upon whom he has so wisely drawn, but