

relationship between Rabbi Koretz of Thessaloniki and Prime Minister John Rallis. The collection also contains a memoir from the *Yad VaShem* oral history depot by Mauricius Soriano of Rhodes describing the fate of his community as well as several eye-witness accounts of the Romanian Jews from *Yad VaShem*. Finally, while scholars and general readers will no doubt find Mr. Hilberg's book of great interest, its major use will be as an excellent supplementary text for general and specific courses in European history.

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E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslav Piekalkiewicz, eds., *The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia; Its Effects on Eastern Europe*, «Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs», New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972, pp. 214.

This is a collection of eleven articles and essays by ten authors of various points of view and disciplines on the aftermath of the events of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Piekalkiewicz, a political scientist, and Czerwinski, a literary critic, contributed the first and last selections. The diversity of their fields characterize the range of the other contributors—who include three other political scientists, three other linguists, a philosopher, and an economist. The perspectives of the selections include some which are highly technical and scholarly, others which are polemical, and some merely observational. The title of the collection is somewhat misleading, as there is no coherent attempt to describe the aftermath of August 1968 in Eastern Europe in general. Each article or essay stands by itself. Several of the authors discuss other Eastern European countries—namely Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary—while half of the essays deal exclusively or chiefly with Czechoslovakia itself. Professor Ivan Svitak in his essay «Crisis of the European Left» in fact extends the scope beyond Eastern Europe by writing about similarities between Prague and Paris in 1968.

The book is presented as a work of scholarly impartiality, but despite the merits or drawbacks of any of the individual essays (all of which, I should add, show merit) the total impression of the presentation is that of a political assault. The format of the book—the printing having the appearance of typewritten reports with documentation at the end of each article—detracts from its scholarship and leaves the reader with the impression that he is being «let in» on the latest governmental or foundation information based on hitherto unrevealed facts. All of the essays are unreservedly anti-Soviet in their outlook. Moreover, the publishing house itself has the reputation of being an ideological attack unit in the cold war.

The lead article of the collection is by editor Piekalkiewicz, «Public Political Opinion in Czechoslovakia During the Dubcek Era». It is a summation of six opinion polls conducted by a team of professional poll-takers from April 1968 to May 1969. The six are part of a larger group (twenty) discussed in the author's earlier Praeger monograph, *Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968-1969* (1971). The author states that the polls included here were taken from representative samples and the statistics used seem characteristically large enough, but for obvious reasons a complete revelation of the polling sample is not possible. In any case, the results are not surprising. The samples include the Czechoslovak public at large, members of the Communist Party, and the Communist Party leadership. The polls reveal that the Czechs and Slovaks wanted a liberalization of the socialist system but not its replacement, and Piekalkiewicz concludes that this demonstrates that the Soviet justifications for the entry of troops—threats of foreign invasion from the west or counter-revolution—were not true. He does indicate that there was a nationalist, anti-Russian aspect to the Czech Spring but does not fully develop this. Furthermore, in something of a historically inaccurate non sequitur his final paragraph reads:

«There was no rejection in Czechoslovakia of the socialism of Marx and Engels, but only of Leninist 'revisionism'. The Czechs and Slovaks tried to free themselves of the Russian system of despotism that Lenin had borrowed from (Nicholas) Ogaryev and (Peter) Tkachyev, and that had little to do with the logic of social and economic development under Marxist socialism. Hence, the prevailing motif after the invasion and, in many ways, the reason for the invasion itself has been not only 'Rusky Go Home', but, more precisely, 'Lenin Go Home'». (p. 41).

This paragraph is highly revealing: Piekalkiewicz bases his association of Lenin with Ogaryev and Tkachyev on Utechin's *Russian Political Thought*. The identification of Bolshevik (Leninist) principles with conspiratorial formulas, as here with the ideas of Ogaryev and Tkachyev, has been a cornerstone of the anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevik ideology for over half a century. It is the basis of the attempt to disassociate Leninism from Orthodox Marxism, as well as to create the impression that Soviet Marxism is abnormal, unstable, and hence temporary. This interpretation neglects the important factor that Lenin among all Russian socialists of the revolutionary period was best able to adapt Marxism to Russian conditions and that the extension of this adaptive, or as Piekalkiewicz calls it, revisionist principle has proved successful under other conditions as well. Significantly, Ivan Svitak, an important initiator of the Czech Spring, writes that he is still an «advocate of Lenin's idea of revolution» (p. 87).

The two essays by Professor Svitak are probably the most valuable in the collection. Professor Svitak, now a member of the department of philosophy at Chico State College (California), was an intellectual leader of the Czech Spring before the events of August 1968. He is a Social Democrat and his essays «Crisis of the European Left» and «New Approaches and Political Realities» are polemical rather than scholarly, but it is this very subjectivity of a participant that give the contributions their value. Not all of Svitak's conclusions have been borne out. For example, he saw polarization of East and West as a result of the «Soviet invasion» (p. 78), but the aftermath has been further detente. Also, he predicted a strengthening of conservatism both in East and West in the short run, but a resurgence of the democratic left later on (pp. 65, 80). The accuracy of this is still perhaps debatable, but recent successes of moderate and left parties in various western countries may indicate that the conservatism may be briefer than Svitak feared. In general, Svitak staunchly believes in the ultimate triumph of democratic socialism and defends the principles of polycentralism and liberalization in Eastern Europe. In «New Approaches» he writes:

«We, humanist Marxists, defending the alliance of workers and intellectuals, do not blame the Communist Party for the revolutionary transformation of society, for the creation of the economic conditions of socialism. We never have been and will not be opposed to the socialist system. We blame the Communist Party only for its conservatism, for its inability to lead the people in defending the national interests, and for its lack of faith in the people» (p. 86).

Conservatism among Communists he identifies with Stalinism and neo-Stalinist forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe. He correctly states that in order to reduce humanistic criticism in Eastern Europe the parties are furthering material benefits, but thinks this is impossible to maintain as long as «Soviet world-power ambitions»—a «neo-stalinist political line»—consumes resources (p. 71).

Roger E. Kanet in his article «Czechoslovakia and the Future of Soviet Foreign Policy» concludes that the events of 1968 will affect adversely the influence of the Communist party of the USSR on the international Communist movement, but not the foreign policy role of the Soviet Union. He believes that the latter is determined by international politics rather than

ideology. Post-1968 events which have led him to this conclusion about Soviet foreign policy seem to have justified his statements, which contradict Ivan Svitak's conclusion on the effect of the Czechoslovak events on USSR-Western relations. However, the opposition to the sending of Warsaw pact troops into Czechoslovak territory by world Communist parties might have been more of a temporary phenomenon than Kanet believed. Most probably the Soviet leaders expected world Communist opposition to their actions to be just that. As a viable, i.e., working, alternative to the capitalist system, they correctly trusted that the world Communist parties would continue to look to them for leadership and the passage of time would heal differences arising out of 1968. To be sure, the Chinese Communist leadership is always present as a possible alternative but undoubtedly the Soviet party confidently expects to hold its own in that competition.

Werner Sichel (*«The Economic Effects on Yugoslavia of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia»*) has a conclusion similar to Kanet's on Russian Foreign Policy—namely that 1968 will not change existing trends. Sichel states outright that it is too early to come to any definitive conclusions and his remarks are as much observational as scholarly, but they are based on judicious observation and speculation. He gives a number of examples of «business as usual» between Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact despite the uneasiness after the «invasion» expressed by the Yugoslav leaders and public. For example, a Yugoslav light industry exhibition in Leningrad from August 30 to September 15, 1968, was held in the most cordial atmosphere with mutual expressions that trade between the Soviet Union and the FYR would continue to develop.

Three selections concern Hungary either wholly or in part. Both George Gomori in «Hungarian and Polish Attitudes on Czechoslovakia, 1968» and Rudolf L. Tokes in «Hungarian Intellectuals' Reaction to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia» comment on the surprising lack of sympathy in Hungary for the Czechs and conclude that a nationalist, anti-Czech basis was the cause of this attitude. Ivan Volgyes («The Hungarian and Czechoslovak Revolutions: a Comparative Study of Revolutions in Communist Countries») seeks underlying bases for the nature of revolutionary dissent in socialist Eastern Europe. He concludes that the uprisings are generally nationalistic but not opposed to socialism. They are a response to the failure of the Communist party bureaucracy to accomplish the goals promised to the population—a response to modernization. Also there is a desire of the revolting population to rejoin the European community. Both the nationalist component and this last—the desire to join Europe—are indicative of an anti-Soviet element present in both the Czech Spring and the Hungarian uprising of 1956.

Bennet Warnstrom, a professor of Romance languages, was in Romania in August 1968. Hence his essay «Romania and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia» is observational rather than scholarly. Nevertheless it is an excellent account of the feeling of the Romanian population and its attitude toward its leadership in those days. Once again, the most important revelation is the nationalistic and anti-Russian and anti-Soviet nature of these feelings. Warnstrom reports that the slogan «We want Bessarabia!» appeared on a wall in Bucharest and an elderly citizen told him «I haven't felt this excited since I shot down my first Russian pilot over Iasi during the War!» (p. 166). Interestingly enough, Warnstrom also reports the same trend in Romania that Piekalkiewicz saw in Czechoslovakia and Volgyes in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary—namely, there was not a great anti-Socialist movement among the people. As Warnstrom writes, «The fact must also be categorically accepted by Westerners that Romania is a socialist state and will continue to be so into the foreseeable future» (emphasis Warnstrom's) (p. 168).

In the last article («The Invasion: Effects on Theatre and Drama in Eastern Europe»)

editor E. J. Czerwinski examines the political implications of recent plays and stage productions, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Poland. He points out that the symbol of the jester and the executioner from a 1934 Czech play (*Kat a blazen* by Jiri Voskovec and Jan Werich) has become a prominent symbol reflecting the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia after August 1968. Immediately after the events of 1968, Czech audiences found political significance in stage business and chance dialog. Since then, while some new productions and works hint at protest against the invasion, Czerwinski finds a general decline in politically oriented drama.

If common conclusions are to be found in the selections, they are the following—the Czech Spring and subsequent Warsaw pact invasion was a manifestation of nationalist competition and hostility, not a revolt against the socialist economic system. Even Piekalkiewicz, who found some hostility to socialism in his polls, agrees with this. Furthermore, the principles of *Realpolitik* and national self-interest rather than ideological factors were the major determinants in the actions of the parties involved. Another conclusion to be drawn from the various authors is that the existing political establishment in Eastern Europe is firmly entrenched and any changes which are to be brought about will be through the various national Communist Parties rather than by means outside those parties.

In the light of the conclusions indicated by the facts presented in the articles, it is somewhat surprising to find contradictions among the authors' own conclusions. Some of the contributors gave the impression that Eastern European Communism is politically monolithic and that Communist reformers have somehow taken themselves out of the movement. (See Piekalkiewicz's comments on finding that only 31 per cent of Czech Communists «felt that there must be only one political line» (pp. 14-15) and Hana Benesova's comment on Communist writers joining the dissent movement (p. 461)). It would seem that all scholars of Eastern Europe would recognize today that there are «liberals» and «conservatives» in all Communist movements and that the dynamics of socialist society is determined by the political interplay of these groups.

Furthermore, if the issue was one of nationalism and anti-Sovietism (or more specifically Russophobia), then the result of 1968 was not so much a failure of Dubcek to «give Socialism a human face» as it was an international political challenge to Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, in other words a political, not a ideological question. The development of polycentralism over the past two decades indicates well enough that Moscow does not respond with troops to all deviations and liberalizations in the socialist world. (After all, Romania and Yugoslavia were *not* invaded in the wake of August 1968). The authors skirt this fact. However, the editors would have done well to discuss the question at length.

A discussion of the role of historical development and antecedents is noticeably absent among the selections. Volgyes's comparison of the Hungarian and Czech revolutions does not really qualify because he is more interested in seeking common causes for them rather than in demonstrating a historical relation between the two. Furthermore, a number of historiographical errors appear, for example, Piekalkiewicz's identification of Leninist ideology with that of Ogaryev and Tkachev (mentioned above) and Warnstrom's statement indicating that Romanian nationalism became a factor in the socialist state only after Gheorgiu-Dej (p. 161), neglecting the work of Fischer-Galati on this question. While this collection contains many articles that can be read with profit, it is certainly not a definitive work and in total leaves the impression of a «Cold War» polemic.