

Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. xiii + 367.

This engrossing account analyzes how Turkish leaders coped with pressures from the Great Powers from the turning of the military balance in favor of the Allies in early 1943 to the summer of 1945, when Soviet power predominated in Eastern Europe. The author sees the «operational code» for Turkish foreign policy as consisting of twin objectives: a commitment to peace as essential for preserving the gains of the Kemalist Revolution, which had rejected expansionism in favor of internal development; and the identification of Russia as the archenemy threatening Turkish sovereignty, independence, and domestic progress.

A section entitled «Inside Turkey during the War», examines the policy-making process through the interaction of such personalities as President İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Numan Menemenciöğlu with such institutions as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers, the Grand National Assembly, and the Turkish Historical Society. An illuminating chapter on the functions of the press and public opinion is followed by an account of economic conditions in Turkey that shows how the scourge of inflation led to repressive domestic measures. In their efforts to break Turkey's economic dependence on Germany without becoming enslaved to the Allies, Turkish leaders astutely used their chromite production to bargain with both sides.

When Winston Churchill, acting for the Allies, took the lead early in 1943 in pressing Turkey to become a belligerent, the Turks used the «avoidance strategem» of agreeing in principle to enter the war while delaying action through protracted negotiations about the supplies required before they could risk German retribution. Weisband calls this tactic «operation footdrag». Under increasing pressure, the Turks maneuvered skillfully to exploit the differing aims of Britain, Russia, and the United States. The first phase of Turkish wartime diplomacy, designed to meet a military threat from both the Nazis and the Soviets, ended toward the close of 1943. Since the Turkish problem was now how to contain Allied victory, phase two saw the Turks attempting to curb the political influence of Russia in Eastern Europe. The Turks courted the Allies by making a number of internal and foreign policy changes: repealing the wealth tax and curbing Pan-Turanism, ending chromite shipments to Germany, virtually closing the Straits to Axis shipping, dismissing Menemenciöğlu because of his reputed pro-Nazi Russophobia, and finally severing economic and diplomatic ties with Germany.

The determination of the Great Powers to dominate international diplomacy as revealed at Yalta and San Francisco filled the Turks with foreboding. The scenario they had envisioned seemed to be turning into reality when the Soviets in March of 1945 denounced the old treaty of friendship dating from 1925, and then in June demanded the cession of Kars and Ardahan, and Soviet militarization of the Straits zone. Immediately the British, and soon thereafter the Americans, forgot their wartime complaints against Turkey to bolster her position.

Throughout, Weisband supplements his prodigious research into Western and Turkish documentary materials by quotations from his extensive interviews with knowledgeable Turkish and foreign personalities. The book is well organized and attractively written, with minimal flaws.