

not even substantially raised the aggregate output elsewhere in Yugoslavia. For the productivity of labor in Slovenia has been so consistently superior to that in the rest of Yugoslavia that the marginal efficiency of capital in Slovenia has remained well above that in the underdeveloped republics of Yugoslavia. Thus income transfers from Slovenia have hurt the Slovenes without benefitting Yugoslavia as a whole.

In exploring the modalities and effects of these income transfers, Hocevar offers further significant findings. While such transfers have primarily been accomplished by fiscal means (for the Yugoslav government has extracted more tax revenue from Slovenia than it has spent there) additional income has been transferred from Slovenia by artificially depressing the price of Slovenian lumber, by uniform rail freight rates based on much higher unit costs on non-Slovenian railroads, by providing insufficient depreciation allowances for Slovenian industry, and by the various other devices available to the Belgrade government.

Of the many negative effects of these income transfers from Slovenia, two should be pointed out. First, Slovenia's competitive position in international trade has been impaired thereby. Second wide gaps have been created in Slovenia's infrastructure, particularly in facilities for higher education, research, and transportation.

Hocevar's ethnic theory of economic development, so useful in explaining the earlier economic development of Slovenia, becomes less useful in explaining the repercussions of these income transfers. When the fiscal and regulatory powers of government become so great as they are in a one-party state, the force of ethnicity cannot be relied upon to guide a nation's economic development unless it is sustained by the institutions of government. Hence, Slovenia is now struggling for political independence within a Yugoslav state organized on a federated basis. This development, greatly aided by the downfall of Alexander Ranković in July 1966, may be expected to continue.

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Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. 224.

Among the many fascinating aspects of the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, none is more compelling for the scholar than the struggle

between the forces of disruption and those of cohesion. Nationalism in its various forms presented the chief force of disruption; the crown and the army were important focal points of cohesion. As presented in this book, these two cohesive influences were especially favored by circumstances, having an unparalleled opportunity to triumph over nationalism: If ever the "Austrian Idea" could hope to prove itself, it was on the Military Border of Croatia in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century.

The early history of the Croatian Border has already been carefully studied in Professor Rothenberg's earlier book<sup>1</sup> and in several subsequent articles. He brings impressive scholarly and linguistic skills to the study of this most unusual component of the Habsburg Monarchy (his unfamiliarity with Magyar is not damaging, for the materials are very largely in Latin, German, and Croatian, with some important documents in French for the Napoleonic period). His efforts have brought rich results.

Rothenberg opens with a review, based on his earlier work, of the foundation of the border and its development to the crucial era of the mid-eighteenth century. The Border originated as an instrument by which the Habsburgs, in response to the supplications of the estates of Inner Austria and of Croatia, had attempted to stem the tide of Islam in Croatia-Slavonia. A fundamental difference in the socio-political organization of the border, sharply distinguishing it from the other polities of the Monarchy, was the absence of a historic constitution upon which claims of independence from the Habsburgs could eventually be based; the border was, from its beginning, a creation of the central administration of the monarchy. Moreover, no established nobility stood between the monarch and the inhabitants, resisting monarchical strength and influence. Here the first loyalties of men were to the emperor, and their obedience was insured by military discipline and administration. A militarized territory was created, where martial law prevailed among its peasant inhabitants, many of them refugees from Serbia, who were organized into "regiments" (the word has territorial as well as organizational meaning) under military officers. The refugees were given land from the crown, free of the usual manorial obligations, which they tilled, none too successfully, until such time as the Turks threatened to raid or invade, an occasion distress-

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1. *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 48, Urbana, Ill. (Illinois University Press, 1960).

sing in its frequency. At such moments the peasant seized a weapon, transformed himself into a soldier and stood ready to do battle. This seemed to be the best and least expensive way to maintain constant vigilance and defense along the border.

In the 1740's, Maria Theresa turned a deaf ear to the lingering pretensions of the estates to influence affairs in the military border and brought the area under close state control, even as she did other portions of her empire. This unique moment, when the power of the supranational empire of Austria was asserting itself and the stirrings of nationalism were as yet unheard, marks the starting point for Professor Rothenberg's narrative, which he carries to the dissolution of the border organization in 1881. By then it stretched the entire length of the southeastern frontier of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from littoral Croatia to alpine Bukovina. Rothenberg devotes his attention, however, to the Croatian segment of the border, for he regards this as the most important as well as the oldest of the border establishments.

This compact work is essentially a descriptive narrative of events with some commentary; it is not primarily an analytical study. The archival material used was chiefly military and organizational in nature and has left stamp on the work itself. There is only passing concern with social and economic problems, subjects which very much need analysis if we are to understand the border properly and assess accurately its role in the monarchy.

One very great satisfaction that the work affords is its objectivity. In an area where passions have so long ruled both the making and the writing of history, dispassionate scholarship is a quite welcome rarity. Rothenberg counters the legend, long cultivated, that the *Grenzer* were enthusiastically, unswervingly, and uncritically loyal to the House of Habsburg. He recounts how the *Grenzer* loyalty was subverted by French propaganda after the Napoleonic conquest and occupation of Illyria. He points out that Serbs showed as much national resentment and animosity toward Croats, despite their common Slavic background, as toward non-Slavs. But the author is more concerned with other problems than nationalism in explaining the demise of the military border.

The state, the administration in Vienna, strove to accomplish a dual purpose, whose elements, however, may have been incompatible. The border area was to flourish economically, and simultaneously maintain a strong military organization. The initial hope was that economic prosperity could be won without the presence of tradesmen and men

of commerce; but later, even when the trades were admitted in great number, the military community remained poor and failed to keep pace with the rest of the monarchy either in agriculture, small industry, or trade. The author asserts that this dichotomy of purpose, unrealized, was one reason for the failure of the border and its abolition in 1881. A socio-economic study which could analyze and verify this thesis would be most appropriate; Professor Rothenberg is clearly the man for the job.

The border was further weakened by the passing of its *raison d'être*, defense against the Turks. As the danger of invasion waned with the diminishing vitality of the Ottoman Empire, the inhabitants of the border, no longer being so sensitive to their grand mission of defending Christendom, had the opportunity to contract the virus of nationalism.

Religious controversy also impeded the continuation of the border community. Neither the state nor the Roman Catholic Church ever reconciled themselves to the Orthodox religion of the numerous Serbs of the border. At least the state never brought itself to curb the attempts of the Roman Church to harass or convert the Orthodox. Even the Uniates were treated with scorn, intolerance, and excessive missionary zeal by the Church.

The author's style is generally pleasing and he has conveniently included a map of the military borders for the reader's benefit. The bibliographical essay is interesting and valuable; most of the unpublished documents came from the *Kriegsarchiv* in Vienna, the *Državni Arhiv* in Zagreb, the *Archives Nationales* in Paris, and the *Archives de la Guerre* in Vincennes.

This is a valuable work on a subject which deserves more attention. We are indebted to Professor Rothenberg for his service to scholarship in general and to its English-speaking component in particular for this exact and careful study.

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*The Cambridge Medieval History*. Vol. IV: *The Byzantine Empire*. 2d ed. rev. Part I: Byzantium and Its Neighbors. Edited by J. M. Hussey, with the assistance of D. M. Nicol and G. Cowan. London: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. xi+1168.

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