

à faire connaître, au monde occidental, l'Eglise Orthodoxe néo-grecque. C'est à cela qu'ont contribué M. Argyriou et les éditeurs "du Soleil Levant."

La communion des Saints est un lieu théologique qui peut servir à l'Unité des Chrétiens. Il est indiscutable que la spiritualité ne connaît ni frontières, ni schismes, ni quelque obstacle que se soit. La connaissance des spirituels d'une Eglise par les fidèles d'une autre Eglise aide toujours à percevoir le degré d'une spiritualité vécue.

L'A. limité par le petit nombre des pages de son livre, craint d'être critiqué pour son thème si vaste et si considérable. "Des spécialistes, surtout Grecs, nous reprocheront d'en avoir donné une image mutilée." Non! il n'y a pas de crainte à avoir. Ce travail, vu par quelqu'un qui connaît le monde occidental, est parfait dans son genre. L'A. dans les 192 pages du livre parvient tout à fait à faire connaître les principaux courants de la spiritualité néo-grecque.

Il ne reste plus qu'à souhaiter à cette collection de continuer d'apporter aux Chrétiens ce qu'ils en attendent.

Institute for Balkan Studies

CONSTANTIN PAPOULIDIS

Pisma I Memorandum Frana Supila (1914-1917), (Letters and Memoranda of Frano Supilo), By Dragovan Šepić. Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti. Posebna Izdanja, Knjiga CDI. Odeljenje Drustvenih Nauka. Knjiga 57. Beograd, 1967. Pp. 224.

In pre-war Yugoslavia, histories of the contemporary period were written mostly from the official point of view, and without much regard for first hand documentation. In this respect, Yugoslav historiography has undergone a great change for the better. Histories dealing with Yugoslav unification and the interwar period published in recent years are examples of objectivity and thorough scholarship. In fact, there has occurred a real upsurge of interest in the period of the First World War and the early 1920s when the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was in the process of formation. This concern may be explained by the fact that many of the problems which came to the fore during the years preceding unification still plague Yugoslavians.

Dragovan Šepić's volume of letters and memoranda of Frano Supilo is a valuable addition to the growing library of books that have been published in recent years on the genesis of Serbo-Croat unifi-

cation. Undoubtedly, this volume presenting Supilo's thoughts and proposals for an equitable Yugoslav union is an essential primary source for a knowledgeable appraisal of Yugoslav unification.

Franjo Supilo (1870-1917) was unquestionably one of the most dynamic and revolutionary leaders in Croatia at the beginning of this century. A publicist and editor of the *Novi List*, published in Rijeka, Supilo was also one of the leading political leaders in the Empire during the decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War, serving a number of years as a deputy in both Croatian Diet in Zagreb and the Hungarian parliament in Budapest. Supilo was one of the organizers of the Croat-Serb coalition and authors of the 1904 Rijeka Resolution expressing the demands of a united Croat and Serb opposition in the Habsburg monarchy. Soon after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, Supilo took refuge in then neutral Italy. There, together with Dr. Ante Trumbić, the leader of the Croats from Dalmatia, and the sculptor Ivan Meštrović, he formulated plans for the establishment of a Yugoslav Committee in exile, that would popularize the cause of Yugoslav union in the Allied camp.

The Yugoslav Committee also sought to formulate in cooperation with the Serbian government an equitable basis for the unification of South Slav provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro. Supilo was the first to realize—as his correspondence shows—that the conceptions of the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee were far apart. While the Serbs, especially Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, conceived of the union as an expansion of the existing Serbian state, the Croats were thinking in terms of a wholly new state within which Serbia and Croatia would be equal partners and would preserve their separate national entities. Supilo warned again and again that the Croats would never accept to be absorbed into a Greater Serbia. The triumph of the Serbian centralistic conceptions would shipwreck the union by putting the Croats against the Serbs. History has shown that Supilo's views were tragically prophetic.

Supilo's letters and memoranda, written between 1914 and his untimely death in London in 1917, are variously addressed to Pašić and other members of the Serbian government and opposition, to fellow members of the Yugoslav Committee, such as Trumbić and Meštrović, and several Allied statesmen and publicists. Among the latter should be mentioned Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, who held Supilo in particularly high esteem, R. W. Seton-Watson, the British

historian, W. H. Steed, the diplomatic editor of the London *Times*, and the Italian historians Guglielmo Ferrero and Gaetano Salvemini, all of whom contributed to a greater or lesser extent to the cause of Yugoslav unification.

Supilo was a man of liberal views and stubborn convictions. He was often at odds not only with Pašić, but with the majority of the Yugoslav Committee as well. Trumbić, the President of the Yugoslav Committee, did not share Supilo's radicalism nor his suspicions of Serbian intentions. This led to sharp disagreements between the two leaders, and Supilo resigned from the Committee in 1916. From then on, until his tragic death, he continued a solitary struggle for what he considered the only realistic basis for a lasting Yugoslav union.

The essence of the Serbo-Croat conflict clearly emerges from Supilo's correspondence, now published for the first time in its integrity. Supilo argued that the Croats would only accept a Yugoslav union which would give full scope to the development of their national individuality. On the other hand Pašić was suspicious of the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes who had for centuries been part of the Habsburg Empire. He feared with reason that Serbia would be weakened through the accretion of large foreign and ultimately indigestible elements. For this reason he opposed for a long time the establishment of a Yugoslav state, and instead advocated the incorporation into Serbia of predominantly "Serbian" lands of the Dual Monarchy (Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Dalmatia, to insure for Serbia an adequate outlet to the sea). It is only after the collapse of Imperial Russia, which was the principal advocate of the exclusivistic Serbian and Orthodox conceptions, that Pašić finally acquiesced to the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. But even then he remained as determined as ever to preserve Serbian hegemony in the multinational Yugoslav state.

In 1917, under the pressure of events (by then the Serbian government was itself in exile on Corfu) and of the British, Pašić signed with Trumbić the Corfu Declaration, which proclaimed the common resolve for union of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who were said to constitute one nation with three names. The Croats, including Supilo, greeted the Corfu Declaration with unlimited enthusiasm, as one of Supilo's last letters eloquently shows. They believed that Pašić and the Serbs had irrevocably committed themselves to a federation within which the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be fully equal. But this was a misunder-

standing. Pašić did not consider that he had pledged his support for federalism and anyway regarded the Corfu Declaration not as a fundamental state act but as a necessary expedient. In 1921, completely disregarding the principle proclaimed in the Declaration, Pašić pushed through the Belgrade Skupština the Vidovdan Constitution that established a unitary state ruled by the Serbs.

In one letter, dated June 29, 1916, Supilo succinctly sums up the basic Croat demands for a federal union. "We Croats . . .", wrote Supilo, "must work for union with Serbia and the Serbs on condition that they are willing to reach a compromise and concede Croat equality and individuality. They must agree that in the process of melting together our individualism will not be disregarded nor will it be overwhelmed and absorbed into the Serbian exclusivism" (p. 125). In short, Supilo demanded that union be the result of a negotiated compromise between equal partners, something that the official Serbdom always refused to concede.

It is while visiting Russia in 1916 that Supilo first discovered the true intentions of the Russian and Serbian governments for the creation of a predominantly Orthodox Greater Serbia. In a letter he wrote from Russia, Supilo stressed that the "Yugoslav question will not, and cannot be solved only through the help of Russia, but requires an agreement between Russia and the West, in the first place with England. This sort of agreement implies a compromise between our own microcosmic East and West, that is, between the Serbs in the one hand, and the Croats and Slovenes on the other" (p. 129). Supilo informed Trumbić of his discovery, and the latter shared his fears that Serbia might annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and a large part of Dalmatia while leaving the remaining Croat territories to Italy and their own uncertain fate. This is one of the very reasons that made a more realistic Trumbić conciliatory and pliant vis-à-vis the Serbs.

At times Supilo appears to be full of hope that a compromise with the Serbian government could be reached. At other times he was overwhelmed by despair. In one of those dark moods he wrote, "If we cannot be one large and powerful state, then it is better that we form two smaller and separate entities" (p. 132). He expressed the foreboding that the Serbian insistence on centralism would only lead to bitterness, strife and endless antagonism. Then, at other times again, he feared what would happen to Croatia if it did not unite with Serbia. Sometimes he shared Trumbić's conviction that Serbo-Croat union was the first

imperative, that had to be achieved at all cost, and would plead with Seton-Watson, Steed, Ferrero and Salvemini to help the cause of Yugoslavia's unification. These doubts, these fears, this duality of feelings were shared by other members of the Yugoslav Committee underscoring the difficulty of the Croat position during the First World War. Croatia was, after all, a part of the "enemy" Austro Hungarian Empire upon whose territories both the Italians and the Serbs had recognized claims. In this and other respects Supilo's correspondence confirms the testimony of Ivan Meštrović published in *Memoirs*, which appeared in 1961.

Šepić has published Supilo's letters and memoranda in the original languages in which they were written, whether in Croatian, English or Italian, depending on the addressee. He has also contributed a valuable and comprehensive introduction, as well as an index identifying the individuals mentioned in Supilo's correspondence, which is helpful to the reader. The very fact that Šepić's book was published in Belgrade by the Serbian Academy testifies to the high esteem in which Supilo's statemanship is held fifty years after his death, not only by Croats but by the Serbs as well.

Fairleigh Dickinson University
New Jersey

BOGDAN RADITSA

Leo Valiani, *La dissoluzione dell' Austria Ungheria*. Biblioteca di Storia Contemporanea 8. Casa Editrice Il Saggiatore. Milano, 1966. Pp. 505.

Recently Italian historiography has been enriched by a valuable new volume that deserves careful reading by all scholars interested in the perennially fascinating problems of the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy. Leo Valiani had previously drawn attention by publishing some of the chapters of his book in the *Rivista Storica Italiana*. Though a massive library already exists on the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, Valiani has succeeded in offering original interpretations and making valuable new contributions to a more complete and balanced understanding of a complex and controversial subject.

Valiani is the first Italian historian to use extensively important Slavic source materials that are indispensable to the understanding of the centrifugal nationalism that contributed so much to the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, whose approach Metternich had already sensed a hundred years earlier. In writing his study, Valiani consulted the