

Great also sought an outlet to the Baltic sea which was controlled by Sweden of Charles XII. Involvement of the other great powers in the war of succession in Spain offered him an opportunity to make war on Sweden without fear of intervention against him. To have a free hand, however, he had to secure peace with the Ottoman Empire, and «il était nécessaire de passer de l'armistice à la paix». Camariano shows that in the hard negotiations which followed with the czar's plenipotentiary Ukratzov, Alexander Mavrokordatos, though he, like all Balkan peoples, considered the czar of Russia the defender of the Orthodox faith and «comme le seul prince qui peut délivrer les Grecs de la tyrannie des Turcs et rétablir l'ancien empire grec», nevertheless defended the interests of the empire. As both sides were (for different reasons) interested in a peace settlement, the two delegations signed on 13 June 1700 in Istanbul a peace treaty for thirty years. While Russia got Azov on the Black sea and the right to have «un agent diplomatique permanent à Constantinople», the czar failed to obtain provisions for expanded commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire. But the negotiations with P. A. Tolstoi, the first Russian permanent representative, continued and, despite the steady opposition by France, and Charles XII's and Poland's incitations of the Porte to a war with Russia, Mavrokordatos and Tolstoi succeeded in concluding a definitive treaty in November 1709. This was Mavrokordatos' last diplomatic act, for he died on 23 December 1709.

Nestor Camariano's book is an interesting contribution to the history of the Ottoman Empire in the period of decline and to the diplomatic activities of the Fanariot Alexander Mavrokordatos in defense of its integrity and interests.

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ARTHUR LEON HORNICKER

Evangelos Kofos, *Greece and the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975, pp. 260.

Almost a hundred years ago the Greek state faced problems not too dissimilar from those that it faces today. The problem then was continental rather than insular and the kaleidoscopic relationships between and among the powers were as complicated as they are today. Originally written as a doctoral dissertation at the University of London and now revised, Kofos' study of Greek foreign policy during these three crucial years delves into areas where the works of Langer and Seton-Watson were unable to go. It brings to light new material concerning Greek-Serbian and Greek-Rumanian negotiations for an alliance; a previously unknown attempt to bridge the Greek-Bulgarian ecclesiastical schism; material on the Turkish cession of Cyprus to Great Britain as well as interesting information on the role and participation in the formulation of Greek foreign policy during this period by those Greeks residing in the Ottoman Empire. Clearly-written and based on a wealth of material published and unpublished, some of the latter in private hands, it is unlikely that this work will be superseded.

The study naturally is of interest to the historian and particularly to that breed interested in Greece and the Balkans, and also to students of international relations. The actions of small states in the international arena are rarely examined in depth. This is one of the book's values. Aside from describing the twists and turns of Greece's decision-makers to the changing international situation and their attempts to thwart the southward thrust of the Bulgars, Czarist Russia's satellite-protégé in the Balkans, it also gives us a view of Greek measures both official and formal, but especially

those which were unofficial and informal and meant to support or implement Greek foreign policy desires. Equally interesting are the glimpses that one gets of the internal movements and events that impinged on the Greek foreign policy process—a murky corner in the best of times. It emerges clearly from Kofos' work that if Greece was in any way successful during this period in partially implementing its foreign policy aims it was due less to its intrinsic strength, indeed it was at this point impotent militarily, but to its ability to find common ground for mutual advantage with other more powerful states disinclined to see in the Balkans an enlarged Bulgaria marching to Czarist tunes. Athens' success ultimately was to be found in patience and in the ability to wait for the never static international situation to change to its advantage. For small and weak states like Greece this is the wisest policy to follow even in the best of times.

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JAMES BARROS

George B. Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914-1917*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1974, pp. xiv + 521.

In this excellent book Dr. George Leon has made a most important contribution to the history of Modern Greece. It is not, as he himself says, a definitive study, for, owing to considerable gaps in the source material, a definitive history of the crucial period 1914 to 1917 cannot be written. On many of the controversial issues the Greek sources, although in themselves extensive, do not provide the answers. This goes both for the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry and for the Archives of Venizelos, which were probably mutilated at the time of the Metaxas regime. As Dr. Leon says, many of the aspects of the policies of King Constantine and Venizelos must be sought in foreign sources. To this end he has drawn extensively on the microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives and upon the British Cabinet papers, but not apparently upon the British Foreign Office records except for those documents which found their way into the records of the British Cabinet. As for the French, Italian, American and Russian sources, he makes full use of published documentary collections and throughout his work he uses to good advantage the many secondary sources which are well set out in his bibliography.

Like Serbia, Bulgaria and Roumania, Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 as a by no means negligible military and naval power and because of this and also because of her geographical position she had become a most important make-weight in the balance of power system that had formed in Europe in the decade 1904-1914. When she had joined her Balkan allies in 1912, she had made an obvious choice, which was hardly challenged and which appeared to most Greeks to be fully justified by the results—the victories on land and sea and the considerable gains in territory and population. In 1914, however, the choice of action—and the same goes for Bulgaria, Roumania and even Turkey—was fraught with difficulties. Balkan conflicts remained unresolved and it was by no means clear whether the Entente or the Central powers would gain the upper hand in Europe. Neutrality seemed the obvious course but that too might ultimately raise more problems than it solved and, in any case, as Dr. Leon says, «neutrality meant different things to different people».

The dilemma which faced Greece at this time was to give rise to a conflict between King Constantine and Venizelos, to bitter constitutional struggles, andulti-