

those which were unofficial and informal and meant to support or implement Greek foreign policy desires. Equally interesting are the glimpses that one gets of the internal movements and events that impinged on the Greek foreign policy process—a murky corner in the best of times. It emerges clearly from Kofos' work that if Greece was in any way successful during this period in partially implementing its foreign policy aims it was due less to its intrinsic strength, indeed it was at this point impotent militarily, but to its ability to find common ground for mutual advantage with other more powerful states disinclined to see in the Balkans an enlarged Bulgaria marching to Czarist tunes. Athens' success ultimately was to be found in patience and in the ability to wait for the never static international situation to change to its advantage. For small and weak states like Greece this is the wisest policy to follow even in the best of times.

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George B. Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914-1917*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1974, pp. xiv + 521.

In this excellent book Dr. George Leon has made a most important contribution to the history of Modern Greece. It is not, as he himself says, a definitive study, for, owing to considerable gaps in the source material, a definitive history of the crucial period 1914 to 1917 cannot be written. On many of the controversial issues the Greek sources, although in themselves extensive, do not provide the answers. This goes both for the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry and for the Archives of Venizelos, which were probably mutilated at the time of the Metaxas regime. As Dr. Leon says, many of the aspects of the policies of King Constantine and Venizelos must be sought in foreign sources. To this end he has drawn extensively on the microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives and upon the British Cabinet papers, but not apparently upon the British Foreign Office records except for those documents which found their way into the records of the British Cabinet. As for the French, Italian, American and Russian sources, he makes full use of published documentary collections and throughout his work he uses to good advantage the many secondary sources which are well set out in his bibliography.

Like Serbia, Bulgaria and Roumania, Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 as a by no means negligible military and naval power and because of this and also because of her geographical position she had become a most important make-weight in the balance of power system that had formed in Europe in the decade 1904-1914. When she had joined her Balkan allies in 1912, she had made an obvious choice, which was hardly challenged and which appeared to most Greeks to be fully justified by the results—the victories on land and sea and the considerable gains in territory and population. In 1914, however, the choice of action—and the same goes for Bulgaria, Roumania and even Turkey—was fraught with difficulties. Balkan conflicts remained unresolved and it was by no means clear whether the Entente or the Central powers would gain the upper hand in Europe. Neutrality seemed the obvious course but that too might ultimately raise more problems than it solved and, in any case, as Dr. Leon says, «neutrality meant different things to different people».

The dilemma which faced Greece at this time was to give rise to a conflict between King Constantine and Venizelos, to bitter constitutional struggles, and ulti-

mately to the division of Greece into what were virtually two separate states. This story Dr. Leon tells in detail, clearly and objectively, and in passing shows how the vagaries of Entente diplomacy heightened and complicated the conflict at every turn. In telling this story he remains detached from the polemics of the earlier writing on this period and allows the facts, so far as they are known, to speak for themselves. Of particular value is his use of the German sources which show clearly that King Constantine, although apparently able to appreciate the calculations on which the policies placed before him were based, was ultimately swayed by sentiment to favour, though not without hesitation and procrastination, the Central Powers. Throughout all the pages of this volume it is abundantly clear that Metaxas and to a lesser extent Streit reaped the advantage of this sentiment and, although they were unable to promote positive plans, they were at least able to scotch the moves proposed by Venizelos. They were also able to scotch the further development of the negotiations of Prince George in Paris (see pp. 158 ff.) and Zographos' plans for limited Greek naval cooperation with the Entente powers (see pp. 172 ff.). Prince George's appeal to his brother went unheeded. He had telegraphed as follows:

I implore you on my knees with all my soul and with all my strength, for your personal interest, and in the interest of the nation whose destiny at this moment depends only on yourself; in God's name march ahead. If this is not done it will be certain suicide for you and for the nation.

A week later (18 May 1915) he telegraphed:

I am beginning to despair, for I now consider that you believe those who have an interest to make you believe what they want, and I strongly fear that it will be Greece herself who will sacrifice the interests of Hellenism to Bulgaria. Thank Heavens I am not among those who will carry this heavy responsibility before Greece's history.

The story of the final clash (21 September - 5 October 1915) between Constantine and Venizelos over the question of intervention and to the attitude to be taken towards the sending of Allied troops to Salonika is very well told indeed. Dr. Leon concludes: «To repeat here the timeworn legalistic arguments would not in any way contribute to the clarification of the issue. As already mentioned, Constantine planned Venizelos' dismissal, and considered the dissolution of the Chamber even before the latter convened. His machinations on both external and domestic questions were clearly unconstitutional». Of particular interest is the account (pp. 272-277) of the subsequent relations between the Greek Court and Berlin, of Metaxas' plan for a Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement, and of the hopes, with the help of Germany, of throwing the Allied force at Salonika into the sea. Of equal interest is the account of the founding of the National Defence Committee (pp. 312-14) and of the further Greco-German relations (pp. 335 ff.) between November 1915 and May 1916. Constantine, however, remained uncommitted. Nothing short of a German victory at Verdun and a German offensive against Salonika would bring him to the point of decision. It was his inability to come to firm decisions, and not his lack of patriotism, that was to lead finally to his undoing. As Metaxas saw clearly at the time, the failure of the Germans to break through at Verdun meant that Constantine would eventually lose his throne. The longer he dallied the stronger grew the opposition to his rule not only within Greece itself but among the Entente Powers, who, although still somewhat hesitant and at cross purposes, managed in the end to take

the initiative, King Constantine and his Queen still vainly hoping for German intervention.

The story of Constantine's dethronement is less vividly and less elaborately told than that of the events which over some two years had led to it. Indeed the book comes hurriedly to an end, there being no conclusion. Perhaps the author has another volume on the way. (If so, it will certainly be welcomed if it maintains the excellence of the volume already published). Nevertheless the author's reflections on the story he has told so well would have been useful especially for the general reader and student who at the end of five hundred pages may have begun to wonder what they were all about.

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D. George Kousoulas, *Modern Greece: Profile of a Nation*, New York, Charles Scribner's, 1974, pp. XVIII + 300.

Scholarly neglect of Greece, and other countries on the European Mediterranean periphery such as Portugal and Spain, has perpetuated historical myths regarding these countries—conventional wisdoms with little foundation in empirical reality. Most studies have been superficial historical surveys often riddled with time-honored assumptions leaving the reader with little feeling for or understanding of Greek or Portuguese society or politics. However, this situation is changing. In recent years intellectual stirrings, stemming from extensive historical research of hitherto neglected data and the application of contemporary social science conceptualizations and methodologies are focusing on previously ignored problem areas and are gradually providing greater insights into these societies. Studies on Greece, for example, in such diverse issue areas as social change in villages, the impact of traditional cultural patterns on political behavior, the role of the Philiki Hetairia, the modernizers vs the traditionalists in the early post-independence period and United States foreign policy, among others, are producing marked changes in Greek scholarship.

It was to be hoped that the recently published book by D. George Kousoulas; *Modern Greece: Profile of a Nation* would fall into this category; unfortunately it does not. The study purports to be a history of modern Greece from the war of independence in 1821 to 1973. Inevitably, any attempt to cover a sweep of history of more than 150 years within one short volume places severe constraints on the possibility of engaging in in-depth analysis. Yet even granting this limitation, the work lacks an overall conceptual framework within which the author's material could be organized. An inevitable consequence is the presentation of a series of facts and events in chronological order with neither an overall theme tying them together nor with a sense of historical evolution or change. Rather, the reader is presented with a series of unrelated happenings detached from the substance of Greek politics and society.

It is difficult to surmise whether this was intended as a journalistic or scholarly effort. If it is to be judged as journalism designed for a wide reading audience, the style is obtuse and there is no story-flow to engage the interest of the reader. Greece comes across as consisting of a series of mysterious actors on a stage articulating senseless lines in a plotless performance. The reader acquires no sense of why things have happened and cannot even be certain of what has happened.