

If *Modern Greece: Profile of a Nation* is to be judged as a scholarly endeavor it violates the canons of scholarship. There is no documentation except for a «Note on Biographical Resources» citing a number of books which can be picked up in library card catalogues. More serious perhaps is the author's failure to bring to bear the analytic tools of any of the social sciences, including history. It is difficult to believe that Kousoulas is a political scientist, so unaffected is he by intellectual thought or by developments in the discipline and so free is he of any of the academic concerns of political scientists or historians. One could have viewed Greek history in terms of the problems of the formation of a nation-state and/or modernization, or one could have analyzed the problems of political legitimacy, or provided an analysis of Greek political culture or of Greek political elites, or organized Greek history around other core concepts or issues. But the author has done none of these.

The absence of an analytic framework leaves unanswered a critical issue regarding his study; on what basis did he determine relevancy of the facts and events which he included. Why was the red terror during the Greek civil war discussed while the white terror at the end of World War II ignored, why was the role of Chi and Grivas towards the end of World War II in Greece ignored, as was U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy's exact role in 1952, as was the continued existence of political prisoners in Greece throughout the Papadopoulos regime. And why does the author present interpretations as if they were facts such as the statement that in 1936 the choices were between a Metaxas dictatorship or a communist-led revolution and that Papadopoulos was moving towards democracy in the 1970's.

Perhaps Kousoulas' cardinal sin is the facility with which he accepts as fact propaganda statements of politicians, particularly those of dictators, instead of making independent judgements. Particularly striking is the last chapter, where, in discussing the Papadopoulos dictatorship he has paraphrased as his own analysis Papadopoulos' statements regarding steps ostensibly taken to bring Greece to democratic rule. The blatant distortion of history in his discussion of the pre-coup and coup periods pinpoint the bias from which the author operates. He is essentially an authoritarian ideologue who was personally involved with the Papadopoulos regime. And it is this ideological commitment which permeates the entire study albeit presented as an objective study. One cannot fault a scholar for his/her ideological stance but one can fault an analyst for the pretence of objectivity and even moreso for the shabbiness of his work. *Modern Greece* is a work of little merit either for an expert in the field or for the general public. This reviewer finds no redeeming qualities about it.

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Dimitri Kitsikis, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς τῆς 4ης Αὐγούστου καὶ αἱ Μεγάλαι Δυνάμεις. Τὰ Ἀρχεῖα τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ὑπουργείου Ἐξωτερικῶν, 1936-1941*, Athens, Ikaros, 1974, pp. 155.

Among the many chapters of modern Greek history which need scholarly investigation none is more neglected than that of the five-year regime of the «4th of August». The widespread hatred which the Metaxas dictatorship succeeded in arousing in most segments of the population — but especially the intellectuals, who were the principal targets of much of its oppression — has resulted in a near-univer-

sal condemnation of its architects and their policies throughout Greek literature. With the glaring exceptions of the «Albanian Epic» and the efforts to strengthen the nation's defenses prior to that war, the years 1936-1941 are usually depicted as the contemporary «Dark Age» of Greece, fitting prelude to the country's devastation in the hands of the fascist invaders. And while foreign scholars have generally treated Metaxas much less harshly, the powerfully negative impression in the Greek mind has hindered a systematic and in-depth study of the subject. In addition, there has been a serious shortage of documentary evidence caused by archaic filing systems, the wholesale expropriation of archival materials by interested government officials, by the apparently deliberate destruction of records and by the chaos which accompanied the war and enemy occupation.

Therefore, the appearance of a study of Metaxas' foreign policy, based upon «The Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1936 - 1941», has to be viewed by interested scholars as a truly significant event. Its author, professor of history at the University of Ottawa, is well known from previous publications and academic presentations which include *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix, 1919-1920* (1963), *Le rôle des experts à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919. Gestation d'une technocratie en politique internationale* (1972), and *La Grèce et la Turquie au XX^e siècle* (1974). On the other hand, the contents of this slender volume are not exactly new. The first part, entitled «Peace: the Regime of the 4th of August Between England and Germany», was serialized in *To Vima* (May 29 - June 11, 1966) and appeared in the *Revue Historique* (July - September 1967). The acrimonious public debate it sparked in Athens is briefly described in the Introduction. It appears that conservative-royalist circles, led by the late Pan. Pipinelis and the *Estia*, took grave exception to the publication of classified documents and to certain unflattering characterizations of King George II and General Metaxas. As this reviewer has had occasion to discover, this controversy over the propriety of Professor Kitsikis' «revelations» is still very much on the minds of Foreign Ministry officials who must decide whether the Ministry's records can be made available for research. The book's second part, entitled «War: the German Invasion of the Balkans», was initially presented to an international conference sponsored by the French government in April 1969 and was subsequently published in Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (1971).

Reviewing the pre-war years Kitsikis discusses clearly and effectively the grave dilemmas of all small European states trying to adjust to the rising German menace while fearful of antagonizing Britain. Making frequent references to Metaxas' published diaries he portrays the Greek dictator as a declared enemy of the parliamentary form of government and of the western democracies and as an admirer of German might (but not himself a genuine national socialist) whose eventual triumph he regarded as both inevitable and desirable. This is by now a standard interpretation, although one wishes that Metaxas' philosophy and tactics had received here fuller treatment and clearer focus in view of their obvious bearing on Greek foreign policy under his rule. Kitsikis' principal theme, however, which was bound to infuriate friends of the Greek court, is that Metaxas remained throughout the obedient and devoted servant of King George II who could have dismissed him (in favor of former Prime Minister Andreas Mihalakopoulos, for example) at will and at any time, but retained him because the dictator was serving well the interests of the monarchy. Moreover, Britain supported Metaxas despite his philosophical ori-

entations because of his unfailing loyalty to the Greek King, whom Kitsikis characterizes as an «Englishman at heart» and as the instrument of British policy. Thus, the monarchy emerges as the true fountainhead of the dictatorship, with Britain serving her own narrow interests by backing both. Interestingly, Kitsikis admits (on p. 91) that in previous publications he had not treated Metaxas with the objectivity and respect he deserves.

This is, of course, an important departure from traditional interpretations and its acceptance would call for major revisions in very recent Greek history. Kitsikis offers an interesting and even tempting case, but the documentary evidence and argumentation presented in these short pages are hardly sufficient to render it persuasive. There is here no thorough analysis of the dilemmas confronting the newly reinstated King following the elections of January 1936 and before he turned to Metaxas. Nor is there enough information offered on the relationship between the two men after the dictatorship had been proclaimed, or on their respective roles and initiatives. Both personalities remain obscure and one-dimensional. While it may well be true that, initially, Metaxas could not have functioned without the King's sanction, the question still remains whether, in the King's view, the country could have been governed effectively without Metaxas' firm hand. Parenthetically, if Metaxas was in fact obedient and fearful of the palace, it is difficult to see how the Boy Scouts could be dissolved and Paul and Frederica compelled to join the Youth Movement (E. O. N.), acts which Kitsikis views as insults to the royal family (and, incidentally, to Britain) and as triumphs for Metaxas. In dealing with such issues, on which the Foreign Ministry records cannot be expected to be particularly revealing, the Metaxas diaries are obviously highly partisan, while the royal archives, if they exist, remain unavailable. Similarly, British support for Metaxas and London's Greek policy generally require much fuller documentation and analysis than are offered here, as does the important link between economic factors and foreign policy, discussed briefly in Chapter 2. The recently released British Government records (as well as several important books on the war in the Aegean) were, of course, not available to Kitsikis when he was researching the present study.

The book's treatment of the Italian and German decisions to invade Greece — which Metaxas saw as the betrayal of ideology — and of the flurry of diplomatic activity which surrounded them is not likely to prove controversial. The Athens government is shown to have feared that the despatch of British troops would provoke a German attack which might otherwise be avoided. Yugoslav ambivalence, Turkish preoccupation with a Soviet threat, and London's naive optimism that a symbolic British military presence would precipitate a Balkan front further undermined Greece's desperate position. Lack of coordination and the shortage of manpower and weapons (especially aircraft) had the same effect. Nevertheless, Kitsikis argues that the earlier despatch of more British troops and better Anglo-Greek agreement on what line of defense to hold would not have altered the outcome of the struggle: as Metaxas knew only too well, Greece was doomed once Hitler had decided to invade.

The nature of the subject, the shortage of primary sources and the author's excellent credentials render Professor Kitsikis' book a useful addition to the field. His unorthodox interpretation of the Metaxas - King George relationship deserves close attention and elaboration. It is to be hoped that he will continue to publish his findings based upon the Foreign Ministry materials he has assembled. Indeed,

it would be most disheartening to have to conclude that everything of substance in the Ministry's archives for 1936 - 1941 has been presented here.

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Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet - American Confrontation. Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, pp. 275.

The current controversy over «detente» has in no way diminished scholarly interest in the causes of the conflict which since 1945 has divided most of the world into blocs dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, it can be argued that a genuine relaxation of Soviet - American tensions depends in some measure on a thorough understanding of the issues which gave rise to the postwar power struggle. In turn, such an understanding can only result from extensive and detailed research into a great variety of circumstances, perceptions and policies which motivated the major states in the 1940's and 1950's. *Soviet - American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* represents a significant contribution to this endeavor.

While focusing on economic aspects of early postwar rifts in Soviet - American relations, Paterson, a remarkably productive young scholar who teaches history at the University of Connecticut, does not attempt to offer an economic-deterministic interpretation of the Cold War. Indeed in this as in his other publications he is fully aware of the great variety of non-economic factors which need to be evaluated. He states the central theme of this book in carefully chosen words: «The failure to create a world of peace and prosperity derived from the Soviet - American confrontation, which . . . sprang in considerable measure from the determination of the United States to use its massive power to reconstruct the world its way. By the spring of 1948 the antagonists were in control of their restrictive spheres of influence, and, indeed, the world seemed to be following the scenario Americans had wanted so much to avoid» (p. 29). Moreover, in assessing to the United States major responsibility for the Cold War Paterson readily and repeatedly acknowledges that all research into these issues suffers from a fundamental imbalance: while the American side of the confrontation can be studied on the basis of nearly endless documentary and other primary source materials, one can only speculate about Soviet perceptions, motivations and objectives. Ultimately this imbalance in historical evidence and the resulting wide margin of unverifiable interpretations means that the controversy surrounding the origins of the Cold War is destined to continue unresolved as long as scholars care to debate the issues. Nevertheless, Paterson's fair-minded and painstaking examination of the available diplomatic records has produced conclusions which are effectively argued and convincing.

In the Introduction Paterson provides a brief but useful survey of the gradually unfolding Soviet - American power struggle. He argues that at the war's end the United States was not only physically unscathed but possessed tremendous economic strength which it was prepared to employ as its principal instrument in molding a new international order based upon American ideals and interests. While Soviet actions contributing to the deteriorating relationship are not ignored, they are portrayed essentially as reactions to American initiatives rather than as manifestations of Soviet aggression. The next five chapters are devoted to the issues which