

poems are arranged chronologically, by the years in which each poet had reached his prime. Very useful is the insertion of a brief biographical sketch for each of the poets included in the anthology.

The translations of the poetry were made with considerable success, and it would appear that the author has a very sensitive understanding of the Rumanian tongue. But much of the success of the translation is due, as the author himself points out, to the valuable assistance given him by the philhellene poet Aurel Rău, by Messrs. Karambis, Anagnostopoulos-Zoukas, D. Dongas, and A. Karavias, the lecturer A. Radu of the university of Jassy, and J. Haliyannis.

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Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 280 + iv Appendices and Index.

Professor Harry N. Howard's most recent book extends the periods covered in his earlier books, *The Partition of Turkey* and *The King-Crane Commission* to include the first appearance of U.S. political and trade interests following the first Treaty of 1830 to the present. All three of these books reflect the thorough, accurate and scholarly approach typical of an author whose mature life has been dedicated to the affairs of the Middle East.

What strikes the reader is how little the «great minds» of the post-World War I period understood or anticipated the dramatic forces that were released by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. From Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 to the establishment of Ataturk's Republic, European Imperialism reigned unchallenged. The U.S. had its Imperial goals and methods in the Caribbean and in the Phillipines. All the great Powers had developed «the arrogance of Power» along with a contempt for «the lesser breeds without the law», producing deep disagreements among themselves, secret deals, rival ambitions, conflicts and contradictions which led to confrontations after the common victory of 1918.

The force which they completely ignored was the wave of nationalistic movements which erupted and soon swept away the illusions on which political divisions were based. The first of these was Kemal Ataturk's Republican Turkey, which forced rapid revision of attitudes and agreements. A concomitant set of nationalistic groups were the Zionist — Jewish nationalists — and the Arab States. The seeds sown in 1914-18 still bedevil the politics of the area in 1975.

Encouragement of a *Megali Hellas* aroused the fears of the Turks, producing the Cyprus war of July 1974. There were a few who did anticipate future problems. General Harbord predicted the impossibility of establishing an Independent Armenia and the King-Crane report predicted it would need 50,000 troops to force Zionism upon the Arabs (pp. 78-79). Though not included in this study, the U.S. soon realized that France and U.K. hoped to exclude the USA from oil concessions — which led to some friction, but final inclusion of U.S. companies in Iraq. These conflicts have escalated till in 1975, the Cyprus issue threatens the south-east flank of NATO, while the Arab-Israeli conflict has produced four wars and an Arab oil embargo and could produce still worse in the near future.

Harry Howard's books outline the steps by which these seemingly insoluble problems have arisen and escalated — partially due to the shadow of Imperial Rus-

sia and the Soviet Union which hovers over the whole area. The Captains and the Kings of 1830-1922 have departed but the millenia-old suspicions, fears, irrational cultures and peoples remain.

Harry Howard's study, while including an excellent bibliography and four Appendices, is far more than a mere narrative. He served in the Department of State and in the field after World War II. He has the advantage of first-hand observations and he participated in forming policies during these years. As history continues to unfold in this critical and dramatic area, this book outlines the path along which events moved—and will continue to move for years to come. While this book covers a smaller area than his other books, focusing on the Straits, it affords an in-depth view of a piece of real estate which has attracted the attention of peoples and nations to this strategic spot ever since the days of the Argonauts of mythological fame. Only a highly competent scholar could have produced such an accurate, useful and definitive text.

EDWIN M. WRIGHT

Redmond McLaughlin, *The Escape of the Goeben: Prelude to Gallipoli*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974, pp. 180.

For those who have forgotten something of the story, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* were two German cruisers off the Albanian coast at the beginning of World War I, when «the guns of August» thundered the opening act of that great conflict. The *Goeben* was a powerful battle cruiser of some 23,300 tons and armed with 11-inch guns. The *Breslau* was its consort. Under the able command of Rear-Admiral Wilhelm von Souchon, during August 3-10, they ran through the British and French Mediterranean fleets, got into the Dardanelles by August 10, and were in port at Constantinople by August 11 to seal the Ottoman signature to the Turco-German alliance of August 2, 1914, attack Russian Black Sea installations on October 28-29, 1914 and bring the Ottoman Empire willy-nilly into the war, thereby sealing its fate. While the *Breslau* struck a mine in January 1918 and sank, the *Goeben* remained a part of the Turkish navy as the *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, fully modernized, after World War I. Neither vessel took a direct part in the Gallipoli campaign.

How did the *Goeben* escape? The Russians have charged that the British and French plotted and planned the escape to keep Russia from gaining control of the position at Constantinople and the Straits—an altogether unlikely story! The British have claimed that the British ships which could outshoot the *Goeben* could not catch it, and those which could catch it could not outshoot. Moreover, there was an order of July 30, 1914, signed by Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, against being brought to action against superior force, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle. As Churchill was later to write, «no part of the Great War» compared «with its opening . . . the first collision was a drama never surpassed». Few parts of the war were fraught with such destiny. Barbara Tuchman well observed: «No other single exploit of the war cast so long a shadow upon the world».

This all seems very true, especially when one considers the possible consequences of the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on the side of the Central Powers and under the direction of the Young Turk Triumvirate of Enver, Talaat